Returning to former General-Major Tazekhulakhov’s article in NVO . . . to make VKO an integral organism under unitary leadership and command and control, with personal responsibility for solving the tasks laid on the system, Tazekhulakhov believes it best, in the current Armed Forces structure, to concentrate troops (forces) and VKO system resources in one service or troop branch.
The ex-Deputy Chief of VPVO then reviews five possibilities:
- Give VVS PVO (including air defense aviation) to KV, and turn KV into a new branch called VVKO.
- Disband KV, give RKO to the VVS and space launch, monitoring, and other supporting structures to RVSN.
- Using KV as the base, create a new branch VVKO by including those VVS forces and resources currently in OSK VKO (the old KSpN, Moscow AVVSPVO, Moscow Air Defense District, etc.).
- Without transferring or resubordinating any of VVS or KV, establish a Strategic Command of VKO (SK VKO), and designate a commander to whom every MD / OSK, and every PVO, RKO, and REB resource would be subordinate for VKO missions in peace and wartime.
- Divide VKO along the existing MD / OSK lines with each of the four commanders responsible for the mission with common command and control exercised by the RF Armed Forces Central Command Post (ЦКП ВС РФ).
Tazekhulakhov says none of these possibilities is ideal. Currently, VKO elements belong to different services, troop branches, Armed Forces structures, and even civilian departments. PVO and RKO forces and resources aren’t evenly distributed throughout the RF. And some are operationally subordinate to regional MD / OSK commanders and others (RKO and REB) to the center. Triple subordination — administrative, operational, and support — violates one-man command for the VKO system.
Tazekhulakhov says the first three variants ask service or branches to perform missions outside their traditional competence. Variant four would require agreement on the authorities of the VVS CINC, MD / OSK commanders, and the SK VKO commander. Variant five makes it hard to find one commander responsible for VKO.
Of all variants, Tazekhulakhov finds variant two best. It keeps the current integrity of VVS, and cuts one branch and reduces command and control organs.
But he’s found another problem not yet addressed — how to treat operational-tactical PVO and PRO of the MDs and fleets. For it to operate on the same territory and with the same missions as strategic VKO, reconnaissance and warning information exchange and command and control and REB coordination has to be worked out. And MD / OSK commanders won’t want to subordinate their forces, plans, and responsibilities to a VKO commander.
Lastly, Tazekhulakhov steps back to look at a bigger picture. Why develop VKO? With whom and how is Russia preparing to fight? He concludes, from all appearances, U.S. missile defense won’t seriously impede Russian strategic nuclear forces, and, to some extent, Moscow has wasted time worrying about it:
“Russians need to stop getting harnessed, it’s time to get moving, and not simply waddle, but race full speed. The result of our procrastination is obvious: Russia is still trying through negotiations to find a compromise between its and NATO’s positions on missile defense, under cover of the protracted negotiating process, the American missile defense system in Europe is already approaching very close to Russia’s borders. Evidently, it doesn’t do to waste time, hope and focus on NATO. It’s essential to take serious military-political decisions and do what’s needed and useful for Russia, without looking at others. No one, first and foremost the U.S., will give us anything, especially in the armaments area. We have to rely only on ourselves. Russia, undoubtedly, has no other way.”
Russian Defense Policy 