Tag Archives: Oboronservis

Can He Possibly Avoid Prosecution?

Posted on November 24, 2012 | 4 comments

Anatoliy Serdyukov (photo: ITAR-TASS / Aleksandr Mudrats)

Probably not.

It seems likely President Vladimir Putin, at some point, will turn Anatoliy Serdyukov over to the law, such as it is in Russia.  Despite assertions to the contrary, Putin will bow to evidence his former defense minister knew about,  condoned, or even participated in corruption schemes.

What’s Putin’s calculus?

Putin stands to look like a corruption fighter, perhaps for the first time.  Most of that corruption occurred on his protege-predecessor’s watch.  Serdyukov’s lost his tie to Putin’s closest associates through his estranged father-in-law Viktor Zubkov, so it’s free fire.  Putin can even save money by not pouring all 19 trillion rubles into new arms procurement by 2020 while investigators and prosecutors take at least 2-3 years unraveling the mess.

Few will recall Putin appointed Serdyukov to straighten out the Defense Ministry’s financial flows.  That didn’t work out too well.  Not many will remember Serdyukov was brought in because of the meager results of Putin’s stewardship of defense between 2000 and 2007.  Essentially, 12 years of Putin’s control and direction of the armed forces (de jure, de facto, or both) have come to little.  None of this will loom large politically for Putin.

On balance, it’s an easy decision to turn Anatoliy Eduardovich over to his fate.

Compared with nine months ago, clouds completely surround Serdyukov now.

Izvestiya wrote about his sister’s wealth right after the scandal broke.  A FGUP her husband ran won a lucrative one-bidder Defense Ministry vehicle leasing contract in 2010.  It’s not clear he was in charge of the firm when it got the deal.  But there can’t be any doubt the family connection was the reason for getting it.  The story appeared here, but the role of Serdyukov’s brother-in-law was unknown at the time.

This week the media reported Oboronservis affiliates responsible for paying energy suppliers for heating military installations are suddenly 4 billion rubles in the red.

The Investigative Committee (SK) searched Serdyukov’s cottage, along with those of other defense officials.

One-time Serdyukov deputy, apparent girlfriend, and central scandal figure, Yevgeniya Vasilyeva was denied bail and is under home detention.

Law enforcement sources are talking anonymously about much higher-profile and wider investigations.  There’s nibbling at other edges.  The SK is looking into alleged GOZ misappropriations.  The Main Military Prosecutor is reviewing old accusations about the poor design and quality of the army’s new uniforms.

Can Serdyukov avoid prosecutorial sharks with this much blood in the water?  Probably not.  Is he responsible for all Defense Ministry corruption?  Yes, by virtue of his former position. 

Could he become a sympathetic figure if he goes to prison?  Maybe.  Serdyukov might be seen as someone unwilling or unable to fix a broken system.  Perhaps guilty, but no more than Putin . . . a scapegoat or symbol of Russian problems larger than one man or one department of government.

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Posted in Crime and Corruption, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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A Conscript’s Year

Posted on November 17, 2012 | 7 comments

A Picture for Ufimtsev’s Demob Album

Young Komsomolskaya pravda (Chelyabinsk) journalist Sergey Ufimtsev returned from conscript service in May.  He recently published a cheerful, humorous account of time as a soldier.  He doesn’t regret his wasted year in the army.  But he describes an army that Serdyukov’s (and Putin’s) reforms have not changed substantially.  At least not his remote unit, and probably many others as well.

Ufimtsev drew his ill-fitting uniform items and was sent to Ussuriysk in the Far East.  He describes skimpy rations which left him hungry again an hour later.

Officers left Ufimtsev and other new soldiers largely in the hands of senior conscripts, the dedy.  They still exist despite the fact that one-year conscription was supposed to eliminate them.  Ufimtsev says dedy took their new uniforms and cigarettes, and threatened them at times.  But they weren’t really so bad.  He actually learned from the soldiers who’d been around for six months.

The non-Russians, Tuvans and Dagestanis, in the unit and their petty exactions were worse.  Even officers feared them, according to Ufimtsev.

He goes on to describe training in his air defense battalion.  He got bloody blisters from endless close-order drill, and finally received his unloaded AK-74, which he cleaned often but never fired.  It was kept with others under seven locks in the weapons storage room.

This is why Serdyukov didn’t want to buy new automatic weapons for the army.  It already has massive stockpiles of unused ones.

Ufimtsev says he and his cohorts were kept busy with non-military work.  Money to hire civilians into housekeeping jobs apparently hadn’t reached his unit.  His battery commander took most of their meager monthly personal allowance (about $13) to go to “the needs of the sub-unit.”  The soldiers, mostly farm boys or technical school graduates, wore lice-infested underwear and got to bathe once per month.  The situation improved some when a new major took command, according to Ufimtsev.

Ufimtsev’s article drew so many comments that it’s possible only to summarize.

A few readers were critical of today’s youth.  One called them dolts, who cry to mom and dad, and wimps, not defenders of the fatherland.  Another says real men should be silent about the privations of army life.

Many readers drew the obvious conclusion that the author’s experience shows Russia needs an all-volunteer army.

One reader said, in a couple of months at home, he could train soldiers better for less.  He asks, “What’s the sense in such an army?”  Several commentators remarked that generals’ complaints about a lack of money for recruiting career military professionals is a lie.

One reader put it in the context of Yevgeniya Vasilyeva and the Oboronservis scandal that brought down Anatoliy Serdyukov:

“No, they won’t do away with conscription.  There’s no money.  They lost their conscience in their 13-room apartments and can’t find it.  But then they never will.  They have to decide which of 120 diamond rings to wear today.  Therefore, there’s no money for a professional army, and there won’t be.  And so there will be an army of slaves — it’s so expedient and cheap.”

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Posted in Conscription, Law, Order, and Discipline, Serdyukov's Reforms, Training and Exercises

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Thickening Clouds

Posted on February 19, 2012 | 1 comment

Deputy PM Rogozin and Serdyukov (photo: Yuriy Magas)

Anatoliy Serdyukov completed his fifth year as Russia’s Defense Minister on Wednesday (February 15).

But the inimitable Argumenty nedeli concludes “clouds are thickening” around him. 

AN says Serdyukov’s in the “eye of a storm” of PA cadre changes, and he’s begun sacrificing subordinates to save himself.

The paper’s Defense Ministry source claims there will be a large number of resignations from “support structures controlled by the military department,” i.e. the quasi-commercialized, civilianized logistic agencies established to outsource “non-core” military functions.

OAO Slavyanka — responsible for housing and communal services in military towns — will lose its general director, Aleksandr Yelkin, over poor winter preparations and boiler breakdowns in Murmansk, Kaliningrad, and the Far East. 

Not surprisingly, the source says this decision followed Prime Minister Putin’s harsh criticism of Serdyukov on February 9.  See Kommersant, Komsomolskaya pravda, Nezavisimaya gazeta, or Newsru.com for more on this.

The general director of Agroprom — an affiliate of OAO Oboronservis — Natalya Dynkova, lost her position for “redistributing” the military food procurement market.  Agroprom declined an AN request for comment on Dynkova’s situation.

AN’s source also says Serdyukov’s apparat chief [chief of staff] Yelena Vasilyeva is also “hanging by a thread.”  From detention, the indicted former chief of GVMU, General-Major Aleksandr Belevitin has given evidence against her. 

Several months ago, AN claimed dustups with Vasilyeva led to former Deputy Defense Minister Mokretsov’s departure as well as complaints from high-ranking civilians and officers.

Finally, AN’s officer source says the FSB is investigating and arresting some people connected to the Defense Ministry’s commercial structures.  He concludes Serdyukov is ridding himself of people who could compromise him or interfere with him finding a place in once-and-future president Putin’s new government this spring.

BFM.ru sounded a separate but similar note reporting that the chief of a firm entrusted with selling excess Defense Ministry property is suspected of fraud. 

General director of the “Expert” Legal Support Center, Ye. F. Smetanova  allegedly sold military property for reduced prices in exchange for kickbacks ranging from 5 to 25 percent of the transaction, according to the MVD.  She reportedly received 18 million rubles for endorsing the sale of four Samara Voyentorgy for 147 million. 

Investigators are trying to identify other Defense Ministry properties sold with kickbacks as well as possible co-conspirators in the schemes.

In 2011, the Defense Ministry conducted 43 auctions and sold real estate for 4.7 billion rubles.  Movable military property was sold to the tune of 560 million.

It’s worth recalling the Main Military Prosecutor’s words about the scale of Defense Ministry corruption in 2011.  He singled out commercial firms outsourcing for the military and violations of auction rules as particular problems, along with routine kickbacks and bribery.

Where does this leave us?

Things aren’t so rosy for Serdyukov right now. 

For one thing, Rogozin’s replacement of the virtually invisible Sergey Ivanov has probably been a near-daily irritation for the Defense Minister.

Even after five years, it’s still hard to get a handle on all the military’s “financial flows.” 

And resignations and reports of corruption don’t reflect well on Serdyukov.

Still, Serdyukov remains a member of Team Putin, and he’s probably secure.  The election season makes everyone nervous, and it’s hard to say who’s driving corruption charges.  Shaking out some incompetent or corrupt defense officials might serve to create the impression that Prime Minister Putin’s on top of things.

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Posted in Civil-Military Relations, Crime and Corruption, Military Housing, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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GRU Rumors

Posted on October 30, 2011 | Leave a comment

Moskovskiy komsomolets reported some rumors about the GRU yesterday.  But one may or may not want to put stock in them. 

MK reports that the country’s leadership is still working over a candidate for chief of the GRU.  General-Colonel Shlyakhturov’s request for retirement was given a month ago, and the president has signed it.  But MK claims the issue of GRU reform is also being decided.

The media’s widely reported that the retiring Shlyakhturov will become Chairman of the Board of the Defense Ministry’s Oboronservis corporation, which is consolidating, civilianizing, and outsourcing most of the military’s logistics and support services.  More recently, it’s been said he’ll occupy the same position with Russia’s lead ballistic missile design bureau, MIT.

MK claims Shlyakhturov isn’t retiring for failing to fulfill his mission, or for disputes with the leadership, or for age reasons (since he was already too old), or for poor health.  According to the paper’s Genshtab source, it’s because a reform awaits the GRU.

MK’s source reports there’s a plan to unify the GRU and SVR into one powerful intelligence center.  The GRU would be cut down to just an intelligence directorate with Russia’s military attaches and intelligence posts around the country, etc.

MK also reports a key appointment.  One general Vladimir Stepanovich Alekseyev has reportedly become First Deputy Chief of the GRU.  He was chief of intelligence for the former Moscow MD, then for the Far East MD.  He returned to Moscow to be chief of the GRU’s 14th Directorate (Spetsnaz), according to MK’s GRU source.  The paper says he could be chief of the GRU in the future.  Alekseyev is from GRU operational agent intelligence inside Russia and the “near abroad.”  Shlyakhturov was from strategic agent intelligence, that is, spies and operations in the “far abroad.”

OK, some of the odd stuff here . . . for one, there’s already been reform in the GRU, so wouldn’t this be more reform, or more radical reform?  MK makes the good point that it’s not clear why Shlyakhturov’s retiring — he’s been too old for a long time, so why now?  Maybe it is a much bigger restructuring that eliminates the “G” in GRU.  There’s long been talk of merging GRU and SVR, but the paper strangely refers to SVR being formally within the FSB’s structure (?!).  Now about Alekseyev . . . perhaps he’s the guy who would head an RU focused on Russia’s strategic approaches and the CIS (i.e. military opintel), while the GRU’s remaining “far abroad” assets chop to the SVR.  This makes some sense since RU-type work and opintel seems to be where the GRU failed in Georgia.  And then SVR gets swallowed by an even bigger fish, the FSB, in a grand reanimation of the KGB for Putin’s third presidential term.  But, as said at the top, one may not want to see too much in all this.

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Two More Perspectives on Serdyukov Flap

Posted on October 25, 2010 | Leave a comment

Defense Minister Serdyukov (photo: RIA Novosti)

A couple more interesting ones today . . . .

Calls for Serdyukov to resign seen as an effort to stop the ‘revolution from above’ . . . journalist Mikhail Leontyev told United Russia’s website:

“Serdyukov is a very severe man.  He’s conducting a very severe reform.  The very logic and mission of reform is merciless in relation to many people.  Serdyukov himself and others understand this, but this is not a reason not to renovate the army.  Reform is being conducted from аbove and by a man who’s a stranger to the army.  Moreover such a task was set from the beginning so it would be exactly like this.  Because they won’t ever do anything to ‘their own.’  In essence, the system is resisting.  Many would want to stop military reform at the current stage but this is stupidity.  Therefore a rumor beneficial to a large number of people is launched that they’re removing Serdyukov.”

Serdyukov almost a victim of his own success when it comes to making military officers focus exclusively on military affairs . . . Aleksandr Golts writes in today’s Yezhednevnyy zhurnal:

“The entire business, in my view, consists in the fact that a new revolution is ripening in the armed forces today.  They are removing officers, almost to the very top, from the heavy responsibility of distributing finances.  Unit commanders and district commanders alike henceforth don’t need to answer for the work of a boiler or cafeteria, or for guaranteeing electricity to the district’s troops.  Civilian departments — Oboronservis, Rosoboronpostavka and the like — will be occupied with supporting the troops with all essentials — from ammunition to the most complex armaments.  Military reformers set as their goal to put an end forever to commanders as ‘big business managers.’  In the course of decades, the commander was hardly evaluated by senior chiefs according to how he trained his unit for action on the battlefield.  They evaluated him according to whether he succeeded in building the cafeteria or bathhouse ‘efficiently,’ that is without allocating the necessary resources.  All this submerged commanders in tangles of corrupt relationships.  Besides lumber and bricks, the officer could pay his debts with the help of a natural resource which was at his disposal — a free work force.  If in Soviet times this system was somewhat limited by party control, then in the 1990s, when the state didn’t have any money at all to support its gigantic military machine, military units were practically condemned to self-support.  As a result, now officers have come to be brigade commanders and deputy army commanders who know perfectly how to ‘operate,’ but not to command.  This is not their fault, but their misfortune.  And the Defense Ministry is creating a special system for retraining senior and higher officer personnel [to learn or relearn their strictly military business].”

“But far from all military leaders are inspired by the prospect of perfecting troop command and control, and combat training methods day and night, meanwhile having at their disposal only that money that came to their personal bank card from their salary.  Many long ago became accustomed to side profits which now seem like their base pay.  In the minister’s innovations, they see the main threat to their interests.  And, as we’re seeing, they aren’t standing on ceremony.”

No, they aren’t standing on ceremony.  They’re using the opportunity to come after the guy who dared threaten their profitable arrangements.  Who knows how widespread this kind of corruption is, but it certainly exists and those benefiting don’t want it to end.  Similarly, one can only guess to what extent Serdyukov’s been successful instituting his civilian control over Defense Ministry financial flows.  And no one should assume the civilian hands on these flows will be any cleaner.

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Posted in Crime and Corruption, Military Leadership, Rear Services, Serdyukov's Reforms, VDV

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New Chief of Defense Minister’s Apparat

Posted on April 8, 2010 | Leave a comment

Mikhail Mokretsov (photo: RIA Novosti)

Yesterday’s press announced that Mikhail Mokretsov, ex-Director of the Federal Tax Service (FNS) and long-time colleague of Anatoliy Serdyukov, will be the Defense Minister’s Apparat Chief.  

Kommersant says Serdyukov had largely kept his old team in place, and still influenced personnel decisions in the Finance Ministry’s FNS.  And the FNS has been a stable supplier of high-level cadres for Serdyukov’s Defense Ministry.  Along with ex-deputy directors of the FNS Dmitriy Chushkin and Yevgeniy Vechko, not less than 10 other highly placed former tax service officials have come over to Serdyukov’s Defense Ministry. 

Kommersant indicates this may represent the end of Serdyukov’s ‘agreement’ with Finance Minister Kudrin to leave his old cronies in place in the FNS for three years.

Mokretsov’s work in the tax service has drawn some praise.  Deputy Chairman of the Duma’s Budget Committee Andrey Makarov says the Defense Ministry can use another strong manager like Mokretsov, and he adds:

“The main thing in reforming the army is to stop the stealing.  Control and auditing are essential there.”

Perhaps playing the provocateur, Gzt.ru suggests that some in the Genshtab see Mokretsov’s arrival as a precursor to Serdyukov’s departure from the Defense Ministry.  Under this scenario, Serdyukov would be preparing Mokretsov to take his place as Defense Minister when he moves to a higher post.  But a PA source denied any prospect for a change of Defense Minister and specifically ruled out Mokretsov’s chances.

Mokretsov will occupy a long-vacant post.  Its last occupant, Andrey Chobotov left with former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov when he became Deputy Prime Minister.  Chobotov apparently works in Ivanov’s office and in the government’s Military-Industrial Commission (VPK).  Since Chobotov had the job, the apparat has been considered a Defense Ministry ‘service’ [not to be confused with an armed service] and this brings its chief the title of Deputy Defense Minister.

According to Gzt.ru, retired General-Lieutenant Andrey Kazakov has been the acting apparat chief since Chobotov’s departure.  Kazakov has served in the Defense Minister’s apparat, primarily as Chief of the Defense Ministry’s Affairs Directorate, since at least 2001.

The apparat chief wields serious power–at least within the administrative system.  According to Gzt.ru, he is not simply the Defense Minister’s right hand.  He’s a chief of staff and critical gatekeeper whose agreement is necessary to get documents signed and decisions made.  This power is largely unofficial, deriving from personal proximity to the Defense Minister.

The apparat chief’s official, statutory powers are more modest.  Mil.ru lists six official elements under him.  The Expert Center of the RF Defense Minister’s Apparat is something of a ‘think tank’ preparing analytical information and reports on military-technical policy, force structure, and force development, under the Defense Minister’s direction.  The Main Legal Directorate of the RF Defense Ministry has been reinvigorated of late, and its role is self-evident.  The above-mentioned Affairs Directorate serves as property manager and business agent for the Defense Ministry in Moscow.   The Directorate of State Assessment of the RF Defense Ministry is responsible for ensuring that military infrastructure complies with an array of government regulations.  The apparat also includes, without explanation, Inspection of State Architectural-Construction Oversight and the Management Directorate of the RF Defense Ministry.

Gzt.ru got our old friend Leonid Ivashov to comment on yesterday’s news.  Ivashov hates to contemplate the idea of career growth for Serdyukov, and he thinks the idea of Serdyukov putting Mokretsov in place behind him is ‘patently untenable.’  He holds even less back than usual when he says:

“If the task is to destroy the country the way Serdyukov has destroyed the army, then such an appointment is possible.  Serdyukov is a destroyer.  And the fact that they are dragging their nonprofessionals into the [Defense] Ministry supports this.  It’s very sad that the Defense Minister of our country is first when it comes to being an example of corruption and disrespect for the army.  Mokretsov can’t help Serdyukov straighten out financial flows which go through the military department.  But he will absolutely help him steal from them.”

Ivashov goes on to complain about Serdyukov’s commercialization of Defense Ministry functions, e.g. turning rear services into Oboronservis.

Vitaliy Shlykov, who views Serdyukov favorably, sees the Mokretsov move as promoting creation of a civilian Defense Ministry that still doesn’t exist.  And Shlykov doesn’t see Serdyukov leaving the Defense Ministry since it is, in many ways, a higher post than a deputy prime minister with a portfolio, who doesn’t really run anything.

Today’s Vedomosti intimates that Mokretsov will focus on auditing the State Defense Order on the heels of Prime Minister Putin’s remarks this week about corruption, waste, and poor results in the OPK .

More about Mokretsov specifically . . .

He joined the tax service in 2000, moving quickly from department chief to deputy director of the Tax Ministry’s Directorate for St. Petersburg, deputy director of the Directorate for Moscow, and Chief of the Directorate for International Tax Relations.  In 2004, he became deputy director of the renamed Federal Tax Service under Serdyukov, and Director of the FNS in February 2007 when Serdyukov left for the Defense Ministry.  

The 49-year-old Mokretsov was born in Udmurtiya, and graduated in 1984 from the Leningrad Financial-Economic Institute.  He was called up after graduation and served two years as a finance officer in the Soviet Army.  Between 1986 and 2000, he worked in unnamed government and commercial enterprises in St. Petersburg.

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Posted in Command and Control, Crime and Corruption, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Second Half of General Staff Chief’s Interview

Posted on March 27, 2010 | Leave a comment

General Staff Chief Makarov (photo: Viktor Vasenin)

Rossiyskaya gazeta published the second, less substantial, half of Nikolay Makarov’s interview yesterday.

On speculation that the one-year conscription term will be raised, Makarov said:

“No one intends to increase the conscript service term.  But in the Defense Ministry they are thinking of measures to tighten accountability for evading military service.  Today no serious sanctions are applied against evaders.”

Regarding the supply of young men for the army:

“. . . after the transition to 12-month conscript service the callup increased about two times.  But from 2012 the complex demographic situation in the country will add to the problem of manning the armed forces.”

So this is why the military is thinking about clamping down on evasion, which Makarov puts at about 200,000 for all draft-age men.

Asked about measures to make the life of military school and institute cadets more like that of other students, Makarov said changes in the order of the day will have cadets go to classes and exercises in the mornings, and they will be free in the afternoons.  He continues:

“Why do we have to lock cadets in the barracks?  We understand if a person consciously picked the military profession, this means he will study.  If he’s not sure of his choice, he’ll simply get filtered out.”

Makarov indicated the Defense Ministry is looking at having its new state-owned rear services corporation Oboronservis supply militarized security guards for garrisons.  Privatized security companies would relieve servicemen of all guard duty functions and allow them to stop taking personnel away from combat training.  He cites U.S. and Israeli experience in using hired security for these purposes.

Makarov reaffirmed that only professional contract soldiers will serve in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  He added:

“Even brigades in immediate proximity to the borders will be manned by professional soldiers to the greatest degree.”

That’s a lot of confidence to express in a professional contract service program that he’s deemed a failure.

Makarov indicated the ranks of generals have been trimmed from 1,200 to about 700, but he insisted all combined arms brigades with 3,000 personnel would be led by general-majors, not colonels.  He said generals had been cut in the Defense Ministry’s central apparatus, its main and central directorates, including the Genshtab, and the main commands of the services.  He concluded, “Now to become general, you need to serve with the troops.”

Makarov discussed the evolving training and promotion system for officers:

“Now a system has been built out where an officer after [commissioning] school can occupy at most a company commander position without supplementary training.  They can only be appointed higher through specialized courses.  Candidates for promotion need to complete them, take corresponding examinations.  And then they will pick the best on a competitive basis.  They will appoint them to higher positions.”

Under the old Soviet and Russian system, mid-career education and training didn’t usually come into play until an officer had commanded a battalion and was preparing to move into regimental command or staff positions.

Makarov said the new specialized courses might run 3 weeks for battalion chief of staff positions, or maybe several months for other positions.  He said the army would not be looking at keeping officers in certain posts for obligatory periods.  Some might master their duties in one year, others might not in five, he said.

Asked about whether Russia would accept French helicopter carrier Mistral as a ‘shell’ without weapons and electronics, Makarov said:

“The country’s leadership and the Defense Ministry have an absolutely clear position on this subject.  If a final decision on Mistral is made, then we’ll accept this ship only in a fully equipped form–with all command and control systems, navigation, and armaments.  The only exception is helicopters.  They will be ours.  Everything else must be done to their standards in full form.”

Asked whether the army would conduct reservist assemblies and even callup reservists for short periods, Makarov said no, conscripts are covering Russia’s manpower requirements, and reservist training assemblies would be kept at the level of about 10-15,000 men for the whole country.

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Posted in Conscription, Manpower, Officer Corps, Serdyukov's Reforms, Training and Exercises

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