Another posting hiatus officially ends.
A recent Defense Ministry press-release on the conclusion of this spring’s draft campaign contained the following:
“According to the situation as of 2 July 2013, more than 582,800 men were summoned to proceedings connected with the call-up, to which more than 574,900 citizens came.”
President Putin’s March decree stipulated 153,200 men would be inducted into the armed forces in the first half of 2013.
We’ve not often seen figures on the number of young Russian men receiving a summons to appear at local draft commissions during conscription campaigns.
A check turned up only two more recent instances where the summons number was specified:
- In fall 2012, 556,000 were summoned and 545,000 came against an induction target of 140,140.
- In fall 2008, more than 800,000 were summoned against a target of 219,000.
The drop from 800,000+ to 500,000+ illustrates the abrupt break in the number of men liable to conscription which occurred between 2008 and 2013, i.e. the “demographic hole” caused by lower birthrates in the 1990s.
Still, it shows consistency — it appears the Defense Ministry (if it meets its induction target) conscripts 25 percent of the men it summons to draft commissions.
And the difference between summonses and appearances shows what looks like the number of draft evaders for that half year (i.e. 8,000 or 11,000).
It’s interesting to compare the summons number to the number of available 18-year-old males.
The data below came from the U.S. Census Bureau, but the birth year in the left column was changed to indicate the year group will turn (or turned) 18. The age column is the year group’s age in 2013. According to this, you can see the nadir of the “hole” doesn’t come until 2018 and the climb out is long and slow. The number of males born doesn’t even return to the level of 1990 (shown here as 2008) until some time after 2031.
So, this spring the Defense Ministry summoned 582,800 men against 718,070 available 18-year-olds. Obviously, a significant number of those summoned are probably 19, 20, etc., and were summoned before, in 2012 or earlier. And presumably, some who will be, but aren’t yet, 18 this year can’t be summoned until the fall 2013 draft.
The point being that the draft net has to be expanded considerably to bring in two groups of nearly 600,000 (even with many repeaters) to be considered for military service. And it’s clear many brought in for the second or third time have solid legal deferments. Some of them are, of course, drafted later. Witness the Defense Ministry’s fondness for citing the percentage of draftees with complete higher education.
But it’s certainly harder for the military to draft an older man than it is one just turning 18 this year. Economically speaking, the marginal cost of inducting a 22- or 24-year-old is much higher. It requires greater effort on the commissariat’s part and the average return on the time invested is much lower.
It’s hard to guess the mechanics of the draft, but here’s a whack.
As stated above, the Defense Ministry puts 582,800 men in front of draft boards to find 153,200 it will accept. Of those 718,070 18-year-olds in 2013, presumably only half have birthdays allowing them to be drafted in the spring. So, in a perfect world, that’s 359,035 of the men needed at the draft commission. And 223,765 are still needed.
The Defense Ministry looks first to this year’s 19-year-olds. There are 730,049 of them. But many served, or will have served, in 2012-2013. The draft campaigns last year inducted 155,570 and 140,140 for a total of 295,710 men.
Here’s where real guesswork begins. If 200,000 18-year-olds were drafted last year, there are only potentially 530,049 19-year-olds to send some of those other 223,765 summonses to this year. And if deferred, their deferments probably still hold this year. And the undrafted 19-year-olds will probably need to be summoned again in fall 2013 even though another 359,035 men will turn 18 in the second half of the year. Those 19-year-olds might be considered for induction in place of some large number of 18-year-olds already picked for the military in the spring.
But you get the picture of how rapidly the military’s human resources diminish.
It’s far from a complete picture, but an interesting and essential part of the Russian military manpower dilemma.
Of course, the Defense Ministry has the long-term answer for its declining conscription resources: professional contract service. The trick there is to make it work.
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