Category Archives: Command and Control

Golts on Command Changes, ‘Effective Management’ Producing Cynicism

Posted on January 16, 2010 | Leave a comment
Writing in Yezhednevnyy zhurnal, Aleksandr Golts says the age limit story for Boldyrev, et al, doesn’t hold water.  These guys were honored for their performance in the five-day war, and then tossed out.  Surovikin obviously got demoted.  It was a general pogrom.
 
The brief Georgian war was not great victory, but the leadership couldn’t punish the general incompetence then.  First, it had to give out medals, and wait a year before firing them.
 
Another possibility is the retired generals were being repaid for their unsuccessful implementation of Serdyukov’s reforms.  They bore the hard burden of cutting tens of thousands of officers.  Then they lost their jobs because the process didn’t go as well as Genshtab chief Makarov has claimed.  Why were they fired if they’ve just been honored as great military leaders?
 
This takes Golts back to the issue of honor.  The Defense Ministry leadership is worried about the morale of officer corps.  It wants this new honor code to become corporate rules of conduct officers operating as members of the same caste from lieutenant to general.  But Golts concludes the new code won’t change the reality that junior officers are crap, they’re serfs.  Does a new code mean anything when generals get awards they don’t deserve, then they’re forced out?  Does it mean anything if officers are dismissed after 10-15 years of service and don’t get their benefits.  Getting officers to request dismissal or putting them outside the TO&E seems so brilliant as a  bureaucratic move, but it’s disastrous for morale.  ‘Effective management’ like this only infects the new generation of officers with cynicism, and no honor code will remedy that.

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Posted in Command and Control, Military Leadership, Officer Corps, Serdyukov's Reforms

Poor Return on Defense Ministry Auctions

Posted on January 15, 2010 | Leave a comment

 On 10 January, Interfaks-AVN reported that the Defense Ministry has sent the federal budget a fraction of an expected 10 billion rubles in proceeds from sales of its property in 2009, according to a Federation Council committee source.  The Audit Chamber expected 10.6 billion rubles, but only 1.5 billon has been forwarded to the budget.  The income was supposed to come from the sale of vacant land, unused property, and excess equipment.  So, either the sales did not produce the anticipated profits or corruption in the Defense Ministry drained them away.  The source said there was accurate accounting of what was to be sold, and what should be gained from the sales, and so there’s an obvious temptation to steal.

 In a November Duma roundtable, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee, Mikhail Babich said:

“Corrupt practices in the army and navy increase every year, not least because of the Defense Ministry’s noncore functions.  At present the Defence Ministry itself takes stock of its noncore assets, values them itself, and sells military property, land, real estate, and entire military cantonments itself. Is this really the Defense Ministry’s function?  Why doesn’t the Defense Ministry hand its noncore assets over to the Federal Agency for the Management of State Property and the government, for a subsequent sale in accordance with the law?”

It doesn’t because pretty early on Defense Minister Serdyukov won a battle to keep this right inside his department.

Nezavisimaya gazeta’s Vladimir Mukhin picked up on this story yesterday.  He concludes right off that Serdyukov’s ambitious plans to profit from unused Defense Ministry property turned into a fiasco.  He notes the Defense Ministry hasn’t made a secret of this, saying on its auction site that more than half of planned auctions didn’t occur because of the lack of applications to participate.

Mukhin quotes Aleksandr Kanshin, chairman of the Public Chamber’s veterans, servicemen, and families committee, saying the unmet plan for selling excess military property (VVI) is more or less connected with last year’s economic crisis, but from the other side, it’s not really the Defense Ministry’s business to be salesman for state property, and military men have no experience, personnel, or resources for this.  Another interlocutor says there have been significant instances of corruption arising in the sale of VVI.

Simultaneously, the Defense Ministry’s Personnel Inspectorate and the Main Military Prosecutor (GVP) have launched a widespread anticorruption inspection under orders from Serdyukov.  The inspection covers Defense Ministry directorates, the armed services, branches, military districts, and fleets.  A law enforcement source told Interfaks the inspection aims to prevent crimes by officers and generals and will continue until 1 March.

The source said corruption and other offenses by several generals and senior officers had already been uncovered, and the central attestation commission might relieve them of their duties.  Offenses were noted in the VVS, VDV, Railroad Troops, and Ground Troops.

More than 40 percent of offenses by officers involved the theft of property or funds, and crime by senior officers is rising.  The GVP reported damages to the state from military corruption exceeded 2.5 billion rubles.

Krasnaya zvezda’s interview with the MVO military prosecutor is quite astounding.  He says he’s been implementing the national anticorruption plan since 2008, using an interdepartmental group, including “state security organ employees in the troops” [FSB officers] and command representatives.  So, in 2009, prosecutors and FSB officers investigated 190 cases.  Based on these, they gave commands 200 reports leading to disciplinary action against more than 300 “responsible parties.”  More than 130 investigations were directed to the “military-investigative organs” [the military section of the Investigative Committee or SK].  More than 100 criminal corruption cases were developed.  He credits the system of coordination among the “organs” involved.  But corruption sometimes has a very organized character.  He cites the loss of 128 million rubles to a corruption ring of officers from the Defense Ministry’s “central apparatus,” the apartment management directorate and staff of the MVO who stole and sold 140 vehicles and pieces of equipment in 2005-2008.

Mukhin gives some attention to the GVP’s figures too.  He adds that the GVP uncovered 1,500 corruption crimes in the ‘power’ ministries as a whole in 2009.  Every other case was either aggravated, or especially aggravated.  In 70 percent of cases, officers were the culprits.  In the GVP, they say that dishonest military commanders are making a fortune on auctions and contract bidding.

Mukhin then reminds everyone that it was Prime Minister Putin who, in late 2008, gave the Defense Ministry the right to handle its own VVI, rather than the Federal Agency for the Management of State Property.

Commenting for Grani.ru, Vladimir Temnyy also blames Putin for letting the Defense Ministry run these auctions.  The first thing Serdyukov intended was to inventory and get rid of noncore property and functions which lead generals to embezzle state funds, but this has apparently happened anyway since 9 billion rubles are missing.  So why wasn’t somebody like Serdyukov, as everyone expected, able to pull off a successful process of shedding VVI and benefiting the state.  Two reasons–the crisis and theft by his subordinates surpassing all conceivable limits.  Could the reformer become a victim of his own trust in his people?  The state won’t get the money back anyway because it’s already gone into fabulous suburban homes occupied by modest colonels and generals, according to Temnyy.  So the sale of VVI has raised military living standards after all, at least for some.

Recall also that Nikolay Poroskov said one source told him the recent command changes weren’t just about age and rotations, a third reason was the results of the personnel [and GVP?] inspection above.

Also, there’s the talk about devising a new “officer’s honor code.”  Certainly, it will prohibit corruption.  Can’t be a coincidence.

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Posted in Command and Control, Crime and Corruption, Law, Order, and Discipline, Military Law

Babich on the Command Changes

Posted on January 15, 2010 | Leave a comment

Duma Deputy Mikhail Babich

United Russia Duma deputy, and deputy chair of the Duma’s Defense Committee, Mikhail Babich believes that those who don’t agree with reforms in the armed forces are being pushed out.  NEWSru.com reports on what Babich told Interfaks. 

Babich says: 

“Changing military commanders–this is not a planned rotation.  This is an attempt to stop the possibility of a leak of any objective information from the troops.  Former Ground Troops CINC [Army] General Boldyrev, being a sufficiently professional military commander and understanding the hopelessness of what’s occurring, calculated it was better for him to go out on his pension than to continue putting today’s reforms into practice.  This also goes for the dismissal of very promising, well trained, and organized General [-Colonel] Sergey Makarov, but it’s only tied to the fact that the SKVO commander correctly, but very professionally established his position in relation to the negative consequences of transferring the district’s troops to the so-called new profile.  Rotating military commanders, undoubtedly, will continue to the point when those who don’t agree (with the conduct of reforms) or who have their own point of view no longer remain at all in the armed forces.” 

Babich sees General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov appointing his SibVO loyalists to MD posts in these personnel changes. 

“The Genshtab chief is promoting people personally attached to him who owe him their military careers.  In this way, he’s trying to buy some time to cover up the negative consequences of the ongoing military reform, which are increasingly obvious today.” 

Babich said a just completed check of unit and formation combat readiness in the DVO “ended in complete failure.”   

“According to the results of the check, practically all units of the air-assault and motorized rifle brigades put on alert turned out to be not combat ready.  A complete zero–beginning from manning, ending with equipment readiness, its capability to exit the parking area, availability of mechanic-drivers and drivers, who are qualified to operate this equipment.  Despite the fact that they’ve already reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [Medvedev] ten times about the fact that since 1 December 2009 all units and formations of the Russian Army have been transferred to the permanent combat readiness category and are fully combat ready, really not one of them is such.  The real situation is completely otherwise, but the Genshtab chief continues to mislead the Defense Minister and the country’s highest military-political leadership about the real state of affairs.” 

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Posted in Command and Control, Ground Troops, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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More on the Command Changes

Posted on January 14, 2010 | Leave a comment

Interfaks-AVN reported today that Boldyrev’s resignation was his third attempt.  He allegedly tried to resign following the Defense Minister’s criticism of commanders in the five-day war with Georgia and while the ‘new profile’ reforms were being drawn up.

Aleksey Nikolskiy in today’s Vedomosti makes the good point that, at 57 and his rank, SKVO commander Sergey Makarov could have served another three years under the law.  So, following this logic, he was moved out for a reason.  Nikolskiy claims new GOU Chief Andrey Tretyak is close to General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov.  He notes that Postnikov and Galkin served under Nikolay Makarov when he commanded the SibVO.  The command changes may have been Makarov’s idea, and just approved by the Defense Minister.  And all those promoted are proponents of the Serdyukov-Makarov reforms.

Nikolay Poroskov, writing in Vremya novostey, notes that, in his nearly three-year tenure, Serdyukov has now changed out just about every significant military leader.  Poroskov notes that Defense Ministry spokesman Aleksey Kuznetsov had cited age and rotation as reasons for the changes, but he adds a third one–sources tell him it is the results of a personnel inspection conducted in the Defense Ministry.  The Main Military Prosecutor and others a conducting a major anti-corruption inspection that will last until 1 March.

Dmitriy Litovkin in Izvestiya says the departed generals like Boldyrev and Sergey Makarov weren’t officers who didn’t fit the ‘new profile.’  They know how to fight and how to control large force groupings.  But it may be that Serdyukov is really insistent on keeping to 55 as a general age limit for service.  Not really convincing…

A source has told Ivan Konovalov, writing for Kommersant, that the changes were about Nikolay Makarov putting his own guys in place in the MDs.  Konovalov notes the strange, meteoric rise of Surovikin, and his equally quick return to the ‘sticks.’  Konovalov has a source who says Surovikin didn’t cope well with GOU work at a time when it was being drastically cut.  The colonels and generals in GOU didn’t jump like conscripts, apparently.  At any rate, Serdyukov has said three-year rotations are going to be the norm.

In a more fanciful vein, Argumenty nedeli writes that N. Makarov could replace Serdyukov–who’s done his duty and his time.  Serdyukov could replace Sergey Ivanov as a deputy prime minister in charge of the defense sector.  Poor Ivanov would take responsibility for the North Caucasus.  Seems unlikely.

Yuriy Gavrilov in the government daily Rossiyskaya gazeta tries to damp things down a bit by saying the changes aren’t so revolutionary.  It’s not surprising that two ‘Siberians’ should move up because the SibVO is one of the best MDs [but there are only 6].  And Gavrilov draws the Siberian connection between N. Makarov, Postnikov, and Galkin.  A source has assured that Surovikin committed no missteps at GOU resulting in his return ‘to the troops.’  We get the same story about learning at the center, then taking the experience back out to the field.

Funny no one’s yet mentioned the old Siberian army ‘mafia’ led by former Ground Troops CINC Army General Kormiltsev when Sergey Ivanov was defense minister.  He had his ‘Siberians’ in key spots.  Actually, it might have been a former Transbaykal MD (ZabVO) ‘mafia.’  A lot of the members came to SibVO when ZabVO was shut down in 1998.

In Nezavisimaya gazeta, Vladimir Mukhin repeats the rumor that Serdyukov might go, and a military man could replace him.  But the issue is whether President Medvedev can, or feels like he can, replace one of Putin’s men.  Perhaps it would all depend of the circumstances of a possible Serdyukov departure, promotion, etc.  It’s very difficult to see why they would go back to a uniformed officer after having Sergey Ivanov, basically a civilian as minister, and Serdyukov, who is a complete civilian.

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Posted in Command and Control, Ground Troops, Military Leadership

Why the Command Changes?

Posted on January 13, 2010 | Leave a comment

Writing in Grani.ru, Vladimir Temnyy reminds that Komsomolskaya pravda also indicated 58th CAA commander Anatoliy Khrulev would be retired.  This follows a theory that the Defense Ministry is cashiering all commanders from the five-day Georgian war.

But Temnyy says there are more serious reasons for the changes.  He says Serdyukov’s struggle to introduce the ‘new profile’ still has an ‘information-propaganda quality’ and real changes are coming with extreme difficulty, especially in the largest service, the Ground Troops.

According to Temnyy, here is where the greatest structural changes came–more than 20 combined arms divisions liquidated to make 80 brigades.  And although the Genshtab reported last month that all reform plans were fulfilled, today realistically not more than 10 percent of the troops entrusted to former CINC Boldyrev are ready to fulfill combat missions.  The rest are in a drawn out transitional state. 

Temnyy expects more retirements in other services.  He concludes that Serdyukov didn’t get to pick any [well, not many, certainly not most] of these military leaders.  Recent years of war, chaotic reforms, scandal, and intrigue have formed such a pack of military leaders that, if you grab any one of them, you get a real zero.

Some other thoughts…Utro.ru turned to one Yuriy Kotenok, who said the changes are a continuation of the army reforms.  He believes the departure of Boldyrev and Makarov is hard to explain since he calls them the ‘designers’ of victory in the five-day war.  They preserved the training and the units that fought, so in his opinion, their retirement won’t do anything to raise combat readiness or lead to anything good.  About the formula “retired on reaching the age limit” for service, one thing can be said, when the leadership needs it, it falls back on this method.  And considering that several [sic?] hundred thousand officers and warrants have fallen under it, the practice is sufficiently widespread.

Not terribly convincing…

One more try…Gzt.ru quotes a Defense Ministry spokesman, Aleksey Kuznetsov, who said that Postnikov is 53 and this is a good age for a Ground Troops CINC.  Kuznetsov said, in this reshuffling, the Defense Ministry’s desire for younger personnel and rotations is being pursued.  Commanders should get leadership experience in the central apparatus and then take it out ‘to the troops.’

Privately, a number of Defense Ministry sources told Gzt.ru that before the end of May chiefs of staff and deputy commanders would be changed in all MDs.  In the Genshtab, they’re expecting more high-level retirements.  By spring, Serdyukov may shed those generals who don’t agree with something in the reforms he’s introduced.  Vitaliy Shlykov hints that having new command teams in the MDs may not make the reform process easier in the short run, since they’ll need time to get oriented.

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Posted in Command and Control, Ground Troops, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Postnikov New Ground Troops CINC

Posted on January 13, 2010 | Leave a comment

General-Colonel Aleksandr Postnikov

This morning ITAR-TASS reported a number of changes in the Ground Troops and military distict leadership.  SibVO commander Postnikov becomes Ground Troops CINC, replacing Vladimir Boldyrev, retired on age grounds–he just turned 61. 

Postnikov will be 53 in February.  Commissioned in 1978, he’s served in many combined arms command posts, including in the GSFG and several military districts.  He served in army-level staff and command posts in the MVO and SKVO.  He was chief of staff, first deputy commander of the SKVO from 2004 to late 2006, when he moved to SibVO, becoming its commander in mid-2007. 

Postnikov now goes by Postnikov, but his real surname is Streltsov.  After marrying the daughter of former Army General Stanislav Postnikov, he adopted the hyphenated Postnikov-Streltsov, later dropping Streltsov completely.  The recent problems at the frozen ‘Steppe’ garrison in Postnikov’s SibVO didn’t hurt his promotion chances.  He eagerly publicized every SibVO effort to implement Serdyukov’s ‘new profile,’ and it apparently paid off.  

Postnikov’s chief of staff, first deputy commander also benefited.  General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Galkin moves from SibVO to become SKVO commander, replacing 57-year-old General-Colonel Sergey Makarov, sent off to retirement. 

General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Galkin

Galkin commanded the 41st CAA before moving up in the SibVO.  He’ll be 52 in March.  He doesn’t strike as particularly fit. 

General-Lieutenant Vladimir Chirkin will replace Postnikov as SibVO commander.  Chirkin was chief of staff, first deputy commander of the PUrVO. 

General-Lieutenant Vladimir Chirkin

Chirkin once served as chief of staff of the SKVO’s 58th CAA, and later as a deputy commander of the MVO.  He served in the GSFG and several MDs.  He will be 55 this year.  Interestingly, he was born in Khasavyurt, Dagestan and has four children.  He needs more apartment space. 

In a move that may reflect continued downgrading of the central apparatus and staff in Moscow, the very junior General-Major Sergey Surovikin will leave the [once?] prestigious Genshtab Main Operations Directorate (GOU) to replace Chirkin as chief of staff, first deputy commander in PUrVO.  Officers used to leave GOU only to move up or to retire. 

General-Major Sergey Surovikin

Surovikin commanded the 20th CAA before replacing the very experienced General-Colonel Rukshin as GOU Chief before the war with Georgia in 2008.  Surovikin will turn 46 this year.  He reportedly fought in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.  He commanded the 34th and 42nd MRDs.  He is said to come from the ‘iron fist’ school of military leadership.  While commanding the 34th, one of his colonels blew his brains out in front of the entire staff after Surovikin upbraided him.  Serdyukov’s weeding out of GOU apparently occurred on Surovikin’s watch; about 500 posts, including lots of colonels and generals were reportedly eliminated from GOU in late 2008 and early 2009. 

It’s strange Surovikin would return to the ‘sticks’ so soon, and simply to what would be the next rung of the career ladder for him.  Did he cope with the GOU assignment or not?  Maybe he accomplished what was intended and wanted to return ‘to the troops.’  But his GOU tour seems like an abbreviated one. 

General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak moves from chief of staff, first deputy commander of LenVO to take over GOU from Surovikin.  Before his LenVO tour, Tretyak commanded the 20th CAA, and served in various MDs plus the GSFG. 

General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak

Tretyak is probably about 50-51, and was born into a serviceman’s family in Soviet-occupied East Germany. 

Finally, General-Major Ivan Buvaltsev will take Tretyak’s place as LenVO chief of staff, first deputy commander. 

General-Major Ivan Buvaltsev

Buvaltsev has been serving as first deputy chief of the Defense Ministry’s Main Combat Training and Troop Service Directorate.  He previously headed the MVO’s combat training directorate and commanded a tank division.

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Posted in Command and Control, Ground Troops, Military Leadership

Moscow Upgrading CSTO?

Posted on January 8, 2010 | Leave a comment

Nogovitsyn to be First Deputy Chief of CSTO's Joint Staff (photo: http://www.1tv.ru)

Several days ago, the Russian press reported General-Colonel Nogovitsyn, a deputy chief of the Genshtab and Russian military spokesman during the war with Georgia, would be moving to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  Nogovitsyn’s an air defense fighter pilot and former deputy CINC of the Air Forces who lost out to Zelin in the bidding to become CINC.  He will replace General-Lieutenant Oleg Latypov, who was not an operator, but a military diplomat who came from the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation (GU MVS) and had experience in arranging arms sales, supplies, and military activities with former Soviet states.

Nogovitsyn’s move could be a pre-retirement posting or it could mean a little more emphasis on the Russian-led grouping.  Today, Interfaks-AVN reports that an operations center will be established for the Collective Rapid Reaction Force within the CSTO’s Joint Staff.  The chief of the center will be a general-lieutenant and deputy chief of the Joint Staff.  These changes follow decisions on a new structure and functions the CSTO made at its meeting last June.

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Posted in Collective Security Treaty Organization, Command and Control

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Defense Ministry Considering New Ranks?

Posted on January 7, 2010 | Leave a comment

An old story worthy of a slow Orthodox Christmas Day…. 

In mid-October, an unnamed source told Interfaks that the Russian military might introduce a new rank–either ‘brigade general’ or ‘senior colonel’–in between its colonel (O-6) and general officer ranks.  The story called forth a variety of official and semi-official reactions. 

According to one account, the Defense Ministry termed discussion of a new rank “premature.”  Other accounts said no decision on the introduction of a new rank had been made.  Others dismissed the story as pure rumor, saying the issue was not being worked in the Genshtab or Main Personnel Directorate.  One Genshtab source attributed the story to the imagination of journalists. 

The Interfaks source said the Defense Ministry might confer a new rank on the commanders of its 85 new permanently ready Ground Troops brigades and 33 air bases.  The new rank would supposedly “enhance their status,” and distinguish them from “ordinary” colonels. 

However, in late November, State-Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the issue of new ranks was speculation, and had not even been raised.  He said the current rank structure would remain, and denied that either ‘brigade general’ or ‘senior colonel’ would be introduced. 

Deputy Defense Minister Pankov Said No New Ranks

Who knows whether a new higher rank would be significant to Russian officers?  One new brigade commander said that, when you’re living month to month, higher pay is the best incentive and recognition.  The best commanders are already being ‘incentivized’ with Serdyukov’s premium pay.  But, in a couple years, all officers are supposed to share in a new and significantly higher base pay scheme.  

Several well-known defense commentators like the idea of a new rank to distinguish the new brigade commanders.  Anatoliy Tsyganok says he is more concerned about whether they will receive the education and training needed to become operational and operational-strategic commanders at a time of wholesale changes in the Russian military educational system. 

‘Brigade general’ or brigadier would fit well into the current Russian system, since a Russian one-star is a General-Major.  Moscow reportedly would not go with ‘senior colonel’ because it might look like Russia was following the lead of China, North Korea, and Vietnam. 

If this issue comes back around, it’s worth remembering how Pankov flatly denied it.

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Posted in Command and Control, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Combat Capability, Battle Readiness, and Combat Readiness

Posted on January 6, 2010 | 2 comments

Interconnection and Correlation of Indicators of Combat Potential

Now that the Russian Armed Forces have moved away from low-strength, cadre divisions and units to a permanently combat ready force structure, it’s time to think a little harder about where they might be . . . yes, Shlykov makes one think.

A two-part article in Voyennaya mysl from early 2009 sheds some light on Russian military thinking in this regard.  It was prepared by retired colonel, a military academic teaching at the soon-to-be-former Combined Arms Academy.  He was a tactical commander of motorized rifle units, and later a professional staff officer with experience in the GOU.  It’s likely violence will be done to his work in an effort to understand and dumb it down.  His construct is full of equations and diagrams like the one above.  But the article helps in understanding what 100 percent combat readiness really means.

The articles examine the concept of combat potential and use it to determine the ‘real combat possibilities’ of a force.  It aims to evaluate and calculate indicators of combat potential, accounting for their combat capability and readiness to fulfill combat missions (battle readiness).

Combat potential expresses the summation of the material and morale possibilities of the armed forces, which determine their capability to fulfill their missions, to conduct combat actions.  Its components are technical equipping, soldierly skill, and morale.

Combat potential has three basic indicators that define the limits of combat possibilities:  ideal, or armaments potential; real, or combat capability potential, and actual, or readiness potential.  Armaments potential is a theoretical and unattainable indicator; based on quantity alone, it seems to be defined as 1 or 100 percent, if the requisite number of armaments are on-hand.  It’s a starting point for the other indicators.

Combat capability is defined as the condition of troops (forces) which allow them to conduct combat actions successfully in accordance with their designation and to realize their combat possibilities.  It is real combat possibilities to conduct combat actions with the forces and means on hand.

At this point, the author defines combat readiness in peacetime as defined by the readiness to transfer from peacetime to wartime, but in wartime it is determined by battle readiness.  Battle readiness expresses preparation or training for fulfilling missions as a portion of potential combat capability.  It is conducting measures to train for battle.  Battle readiness is the actual share of potential combat capability.  Increasing the potential (degree) of battle readiness is the process of turning real combat possibilities into actual ones.

Ideal combat possibilities are simply a question of the quantity of armaments.  Forty arms equals 40 arbitrary units of combat potential or 1 in the diagram above.  If the real combat possibilities are .6, combat capability is 24 (40 x .6), and if the actual possibilities are .4, battle readiness is 16 (40 x .4).  And the ratio of battle readiness to combat capability (16/24) yields a degree of battle readiness of .6, and this seems to be the key output of the first part of the article.

Part two turns to indicators of the combat capability of subunits (battalion and lower) and units (regiments, which don’t exist any longer except for RVSN and VDV).

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Posted in Command and Control, Serdyukov's Reforms

Defense Ministry’s Closed Session Unimpressive

Posted on December 21, 2009 | Leave a comment

General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov

General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov gave the main report at the 17 December session with Duma Defense Committee members.  Makarov talked about the military’s ‘new profile’ reorganization to include a reduction to three levels of command.  He talked about major exercises in 2009 and plans for the Vostok-2010 exercise to begin in late June.  Committee Chairman Viktor Zavarzin billed the topic as “The Course and Interim Results of the Realization of RF President Dmitriy Medvedev’s Decision on the Formation of a New Profile of the RF Armed Forces.”  Deputy defense ministers Nikolay Pankov and Vladimir Popovkin also reported. 

According to Gazeta, the session went 3 hours.  Committee members were unhappy because they either didn’t get an answer to their questions, or didn’t even get to pose a question.  There were not more than 15 questions.   The lengthy reports and long, drawn out answers used most of the time.  Pankov talked about officer and warrant officer cuts, but said nothing new.  Popovkin gave a secret report on arms acquisition for 2010.  He apparently indicated there aren’t, and won’t be, any alternatives to the troubled Bulava SLBM.  Deputy Committee Chairman Mikhail Babich managed to propose sharing Defense Minister Serdyukov’s Order No. 400 premium pay equally among officers of good units, rather than giving it to a few.  Someone also proposed postponing the elimination of warrant officers until the first professional sergeants appear in the ranks.

Sovetskaya Rossiya reported that Serdyukov didn’t have much to say and showed some irritation.  Makarov maintains everything’s great, but mid-ranking servicemen say otherwise; life is not like the Defense Ministry paints it.  The official answers to questions were unconvincing, and former Black Sea Fleet Commander Komoyedov says the speakers didn’t assess Russia’s combat capabilities.  For his part, he sees major problems in training personnel and rearmament.  Komoyedov concludes military men are becoming cringing and servile because they fear being put out of the Armed Forces.  N. V. Kolomeytsev wanted to know how exactly how many officers remain and how many have been put out.  Apparently, Pankov must have said only 59,000 were put out this year.  Kolomeytsev says the session was closed to keep information from getting out, but also to conceal that the Defense Ministry reforms are being introduced by incompetents.

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Posted in Command and Control, Force Modernization, Serdyukov's Reforms