Promotion List

Here’s the latest promotion list. Roughly 620 general and flag officers from the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Always trying (and failing) to make it up-to-date.

Still color-coding (green, yellow, red, orange) individual officers for likely, uncertain, or unlikely future career progression.

What, you ask, are indicators of probable advancement? One is, ironically and simply, a recent promotion. An officer promoted to one-star rank is in the running for a second star, etc. But also whether an officer is in a line or staff position, his age (where we have it), and his past career progression.

Sometimes generals or admirals are marked yellow or red for lack of another rung to step up. General-Colonel Kim and Admiral Moiseyev are recent examples.

Orange is for those without an identified position or post (probably some are GRU and their names are kept out of the media). Some may be commanding militia forces in Russian-controlled eastern Ukraine.

The folder of photos of promoted officers has been updated — 110 pics.

Latest Promotions

Here are the latest RF MOD promotees after confirming their current postings.

General-Colonel (3 stars)

Aleksey Kim…Deputy CINC of Ground Troops for Peacekeeping.

Admiral (3 stars)

Aleksandr Moiseyev…Commander, Northern Fleet.

General-Lieutenant (2 stars)

Roman Berdnikov…Commander, 29th CAA, Eastern MD.

Andrey Burbin…Commander, 27th Missile Army, RVSN.

Dmitriy Krayev…Commander, 14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet.

Sergey Ryzhkov…Commander, 41st CAA, Central MD.

Sergey Chuvakin…Deputy Chief, GOMU, General Staff.

Vice-Admiral (2 stars)

Arkadiy Romanov…Commander, Submarine Forces, Northern Fleet.

Aleksandr Yuldashev…Commander, Troops and Forces in the North-East, Pacific Fleet.

General-Major (1 star)

Aleksey Avdeyev…Commander, 3rd MRD, Western MD.

Aleksandr Anistratenko…Deputy Chief, Main Armaments Directorate, MOD.

Andrey Baranov…12th GUMO officer.

Oleg Botsman…Chief, Military Institute of Physical Eduation.

Vladimir Kutsenko…Commander, 1st Composite Aviation Division, Southern MD.

Sergey Marchuk…Chief, Space Test Center named for Titov.

Vadim Morozov…Commander, 132nd Composite Aviation Division, Baltic Fleet.

Aleksandr Osadchuk…Commander, v/ch 74455, GRU.

Dmitriy Pyatunin…Chief, Material Support Directorate, Central MD.

Oleg Stepanov…Chief, Directorate of Military Representatives, MOD.

Andrey Sukhovetskiy…Commander, 7th Air-Assault Division, Southern MD.

Dmitriy Sukhoruchkin…Commander, 18th Military-Transport Aviation Division.

Yuriy Khort…Chief, Railroad Troops Directorate, Southern MD.

Sergey Chubarykin…Commander, 76th Air-Assault Division, Western MD.

Valeriy Shkilnyuk…Chief, 392nd District Training Center, Eastern MD.

General-Major of Medical Service (1 star)

Aleksandr Sergoventsev…Deputy Chief for Medicine, Central Military Clinical Hospital named for Mandryk.

Four new generals and admirals could not be identified in a position.

* * * * * *

Some notes on the above-mentioned promotees:

New General-Colonel Kim served in Russia’s “reconciliation center” in Syria. He’s a military academic previously posted to MAGS and the Combined Arms Academy. A specialist without command experience, he’s probably achieved terminal rank.

Admiral Moiseyev is likewise unlikely to be promoted again. He’s an experienced operator but he and Navy CINC Admiral Yevmenov are the same age. Moiseyev will probably have to be content in Northern Fleet. But strange things happen….

Kim and Moiseyev defy the wisdom that getting a promotion makes one more likely to be promoted. For that to work, there has to be a logical higher position.

Krayev was commissioned an airborne officer. He’s served his career in naval infantry, demonstrating again that Russia’s VDV aren’t simply airborne — they’re a jumping off point for combat commanders throughout the armed forces.

Chuvakin has no clear biographic details, but his father may have been the two-star General Staff officer who served as secretary of the Defense Council in the last years of the USSR.

Romanov is a former SSBN commander with an impressive service record. He commanded Typhoon-class SSBN Dmitriy Donskoy during testing of Bulava SLBMs.

Baranov has apparently commanded several nuclear weapons storage facilities, including one where conscript Shamsutdinov went on a killing spree in October 2019. Not a good look for Baranov but he got promoted.

Osadchuk commanded the GRU hacking outfit that broke into Democratic National Committee servers and gave the contents to Wikileaks in 2016. He’s wanted by the FBI.

Image

Stepanov’s Military Representatives are the voyenpredy supervising work on MOD state orders in Russia’s defense enterprises.

Promotion Quicklook

Mr. Putin signed out the latest promotion list (for Constitution Day) yesterday.

For the MOD, it’s pretty thick — two three-stars, seven two-stars, and 20 one-stars.

Putin’s National Guard added one three-star, one two-star, and two one-stars.

But back to the MOD . . .

New General-Colonel Aleksey Kim is Deputy CINC of Ground Troops for Peacekeeping.

Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev commands the Northern Fleet.

New general-lieutenants include commanders of the 29th and 41st CAAs, and the commander of the 18th MGAD.

The chief of the RVSN’s central command post got a second star, as did Deputy GUMO Chief Sergey Chuvakin.

General-Lieutenant Chuvakin

The commander of Russian Troops and Forces in the North-East (Kamchatka) and commander of Belomorsk Naval Base became Vice-Admirals.

Full rundown on the latest promotions after some research.

Peacekeepers Deployed

On November 20, Interfaks-AVN reported 250 VTA flights have deployed 1,960 troops of the Samara-based 15th Independent Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Peacekeeping) to Nagorno-Karabakh. Citing Defense Minister Shoygu, the news agency said 552 equipment items were also delivered.

Russian peacekeepers checking for roadside mines

Shoygu indicated Russian peacekeepers occupy 23 observation posts to oversee the ceasefire. Russian troops are divided into two zones — north and south.

Interesting what it takes to airlift a brigade, even a light one.

An-124 Program

KZ coverage of yesterday’s MOD leadership videoconference provided a little window into what has apparently become the modest modernization program for Russia’s An-124 Ruslan heavy transport aircraft.

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu proposed discussion about the modernization and repair of the An-124, saying:

In conditions where the demand for transport of super-heavy and large diameter loads in the Armed Forces is growing, resolution of this problem has taken on special importance. In the conference, we will hear proposals of the directors of Aviation Complex named for S. V. Ilyushin and the Ural Civil Aviation Plant [UZGA] regarding completion of the contract for modernization, restoration, and life extension of two An-124 aircraft, but also for the capital repair and modernization of 12 D-18T aircraft engines.

So that’s modernization of two aircraft and 12 engines (three aircraft?). Shoygu confirmed what was reported for VPK in 2018 by one-time officer and KZ journalist Oleg Falichev.

Falichev called (perhaps shilled?) for work on 12 D-18T engines. He claimed Russia’s An-124s received only two percent of funding required for their maintenance, and indicated UZGA had not “mastered” repair of the D-18T, a Soviet-era product made on the territory of Ukraine.

Recall we see various numbers for An-124s in VTA’s inventory, perhaps four or nine operational aircraft with maybe more than 20 airframes in various states of repair (or disrepair).

It’s been clear for a while that Moscow won’t try to recreate production of An-124s; modernization is supposed to allow them to serve until the 2040s when PAK TA might enter the force.

Shoygu could be right. The demand for super-heavy airlift might be growing, especially given the current state of world disorder and Moscow’s increased activism abroad. This could put a premium on the ability to deliver large amounts of cargo rapidly to great distances.

Then again, if this is the extent of the An-124 modernization program, it doesn’t sound like a high priority. It sounds like a band aid. Always resourceful, the Kremlin will find simpler ways to get the job done.

The Latest Arsenal Fire

Russia’s latest military arsenal tragedy is a new chapter in an unfinished book. What follows isn’t so much news as context you haven’t seen.

According to Interfaks-AVN, a woman died on October 10 from severe injuries received from the fire and explosions which began October 7 in Ryazan oblast. Another 15 victims are reportedly stable with serious burns, injuries, or chronic conditions aggravated by smoke inhalation.

A grass fire was inexplicably allowed to reach the ammo dumps at military unit 55443 near Zheltukhino in Skopinskiy region, and it ignited munitions in open storage. It’s unclear whether the Russian MOD’s Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) or the Western MD is responsible for the unit at present. Neither wants to be for certain.

Interfaks-AVN indicated the arsenal (once maybe the GRAU’s 97th Arsenal) consists (or consisted) of 113 warehouses and bunkers with 75,000 tons of missiles, rockets, and artillery shells (a “large portion” of which were 152-mm high-explosive fragmentation).

Munitions from other Russian Army ammo dumps were being collected at Zheltukhino, according to Komsomolskaya pravda.

More than 2,300 people living near the depot were evacuated.

Four VTA Il-76 aircraft, and one Mi-26 and one Mi-8 helicopter were used against the fire as water tankers, TVZvezda reported. Izvestiya said five helos. In 36 fixed and 763 rotary-wing flights, they dropped 4,700 tons of water on the flames.

Izvestiya added that 650 servicemen and nearly 200 pieces of equipment — including 120 EOD personnel and 32 special vehicles (likely Uran-6 and Uran-14 robotic mine clearance vehicles) — were used to battle the fire.

Russian media reported the fire was localized on the evening of October 8 and controlled on October 10.

Kommersant reported the fire and explosions damaged 430 structures, public facilities, apartment buildings, and private homes. If not completely burned down, they have broken windows, partially collapsed roofs, and damaged walls. More than 500 families received 10,000 rubles in immediate emergency funds from the RF government.

Izvestiya relayed some (but not all) of the history of Russia’s recent arsenal fires.

A major fire and explosions rocked the 31st Arsenal and the city of Ulyanovsk in 2009.

A fire and explosions at Pugachevo, Udmurtia in 2011 caused the evacuation of 30,000 people and damaged 3,000 buildings. But Pugachevo (GRAU’s 102nd Arsenal) proved a persistent problem; new fires and explosions occurred there in 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2018.

There were other disasters in 2011 — at the 99th Arsenal in Bashkiria and in Ashuluk where six troops died and 12 were hurt. In 2012, there were two fires with explosions in Orenburg and one in Primorye.

Then soon-to-be ex-minister of defense Serdyukov exerted some serious control over Russian munitions storage and dismantlement. But this came too late and, along with his other problems, made him expendable to the Kremlin.

In early 2012, Deputy Defense Minister Dmitriy Bulgakov said the military planned to complete 35 modern arsenals, outfitted with hundreds of bunkers, before 2015 for 90 billion rubles. It also began explosive destruction of a large quantity of outdated munitions. Work on new ammo storage continued through 2018.

But the MOD hasn’t been able to catch up with the problem. It hasn’t offered a comprehensive assessment of the construction effort. So it’s safe to conclude it’s taking longer and accomplishing less than what’s needed.

A couple cases in point. On August 5, 2019, the ammo depot in Achinsk, Krasnoyarsk territory burned. About 16,000 people living within a 20-km radius had to be evacuated. One person died and 40 were injured.

On May 9, 2020, a grass fire ignited small caliber ammo at Pugachevo. The fire covered 15 hectares, but was put out without a disaster like previous incidents there.

Akula Update Progressing, Slowly

Russia’s effort to extend the service lives of its Akula submarines and increase their capability to the level of new Yasen-M boats is progressing, but not as quickly as Moscow planned.

The Russian Navy counts on refueled reactors and new major systems to enable project 971 Akula-class SSNs to operate at least 15 more years. This would provide needed time for construction of new Yasen-M submarines. The modernization of the Akulas, to include possible deployment of Kalibr missiles on them, will bring them closer in capability to new fourth generation Yasen-M SSNs.

Akula-class SSN Vepr returned to service in the Northern Fleet around August 5, according to an OPK source. The submarine arrived at Nerpa, in Snezhnogorsk near Murmansk, in 2012 for repairs and modernization. Vepr was originally scheduled to rejoin the fleet in 2014, but this was delayed several times.

Nice photo of renovated pr. 971 Akula SSN Vepr (K-157) from Murmanskiy vestnik

Vepr is the second renovated Akula. Kuzbass was modernized at Zvezda in Bolshoy Kamen between 2009 and 2016 when it returned to the Pacific Fleet. Kuzbass reportedly received Kalibr cruise missiles during its modernization. But that capability has not been demonstrated.

Vepr gives the Russian Navy maybe three operational Akula SSNs. Six Akulas, all 25 or more years old, are currently located at Zvezdochka, Nerpa, or Zvezda.

The Northern Fleet’s Leopard arrived at Zvezdochka for repair and modernization in 2011 , with a planned return to service in 2015. That deadline passed, as did ones in 2016 and 2018. Completion of work on Leopard is now expected in 2020 or 2021.

Volk arrived at Zvezdochka possibly as early as 2011 and repairs began in 2014. The Pacific Fleet’s Bratsk and Samara arrived in late 2014 on a heavy lift vessel via the Northern Sea Route. Serious work on Bratsk and Samara likely awaits the completion of Leopard and Volk. Volk may be ready in 2023.

Northern Fleet boat Tigr was towed to Nerpa in 2017. According to Izvestiya’s source in the Russian MOD, Tigr will be renovated, armed with Kalibr missiles, and returned to the fleet in 2023.

In mid-2019, a Vladivostok news agency reported the repair and modernization of Magadan had commenced at Zvezda in Bolshoy Kamen, although some initial work may have started in 2018. The submarine arrived at the shipyard in 2015 or even earlier. It will not to return to operational status before 2023.

On September 25, an MOD source claimed it will return in 2021 or early 2022. It will receive a new name given that Magadan has been assigned to a project 636.3 diesel-electric submarine under construction for the Pacific Fleet.

The Akula repair program first and foremost entails refueling the nuclear reactors and restoring the hulls of the SSNs. Reactor and propulsion system components – steam generators, turbines, turbogenerators, motors, gears, shafts, rudders, and propellers – likely require major work.

The modernized Akulas probably are receiving new major ship and combat systems including command, control, and communications, navigation, fire control, sonars and non-acoustic sensors, and weapons possibly including the Kalibr anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile system. Its land-attack 3M-14 missile has a range possibly up to 2,500 km.

Despite frequent announcements that Kalibr is being incorporated, no firing of the missile from a modernized Akula has been reported. A test launch of the new system would be a normal part of combat certification for returning to operational status. Moreover, when it occurs, the MOD can be expected to publicize it widely.

Delays in the Akula repair and modernization program are endemic. In 2016, Zvezdochka’s press-service reported that the shipyard routinely had to begin repair work – dismantling the hull and equipment – while awaiting design documents. Zvezdochka also indicated it faced difficulty in obtaining new or repaired components because some original manufacturers are defunct. The shipyard has retooled and re-equipped to support the program, but making changes inside its shops has pushed the completion of the Akulas to the right.

Russian shipyards are likely at capacity with submarine repairs. Zvezdochka has been maintaining and upgrading Russia’s Project 667BRDM Delta IV-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and it modernized Oscar II-class cruise missile submarine Orel. This work has slowed progress on the Akulas. Similarly, at Zvezda on the Pacific, modernization of Oscar IIs, specifically Irkutsk — now supposed to be finished in late 2022 or 2023 — competes with work on Akulas.

Despite these challenges, Moscow is committed to returning modernized Akulas to operation to retain its capability for long-range anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare while it awaits new SSNs. The first Project 885M Yasen-M SSN, Kazan, has been undergoing trials since 2017 and is expected to be delivered in 2020. The Russian Navy plans to add seven Yasen-M by 2027, but at the current pace of construction, it is unlikely to have its full complement of new production SSNs before the early 2030s.

New Dry Dock

SSK Zvezda has completed a massive dry dock at Bolshoy Kamen, reportedly four years ahead of schedule.

The Rosneft-owned facility will build ships to support Russian oil and gas extraction and transport.

The dock is 485 meters long, 114 in width, and 14 deep. It is outfitted with internal gates to create separate compartments that can be flooded independently. Besides the massive 1,200-ton gantry crane, the dock has four 60-ton tower cranes.

This image from May shows the new dock in the lower left, and the existing buildingway (also pretty new) just right of center adjacent to DVZ Zvezda. Recall DVZ Zvezda is Russia’s sole sub repair yard on the Pacific Ocean.

Shaposhnikov Trials

Marshal Shaposhnikov enroute to factory trials

Marshal Shaposhnikov enroute to factory trials

Mil.ru reports Russian Pacific Fleet Udaloy-class destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov departed Dalzavod shipyard in Vladivostok yesterday after an overhaul and modernization which took five years to complete. The original plan was three.

The 35-year-old ship will conduct factory trials in the Sea of Japan.

Below is Izvestiya’s video.

 

The destroyer’s hull and fittings were repaired and new equipment was installed, according to Mil.ru. More than 20 percent of the superstructure was dismantled and refurbished. Trunk cables were partially replaced.

Most significantly, the modernized destroyer became a land-attack and anti-surface warfare platform whereas it was primarily ASW before. It received long-range Kalibr-NK (SS-N-27 Sizzler) missiles and Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASCMs.

TV Zvezda also had a long video in which Shaposhnikov’s new armament is easy to see.

The destroyer is supposed to rejoin the Pacific Fleet’s order-of-battle before the end of 2020.

Russian media have claimed four of the Navy’s other seven Udaloy (pr. 1155) destroyers will be modernized. But the Russian MOD and Navy may not have committed to this yet, waiting perhaps to absorb how the process turned out and exactly what it cost. The upgraded Shaposhnikov could be a stopgap for a fleet awaiting more new corvettes and possibly frigates.

Updated Promotion List

Here’s an updated promotion list. Over 600 general and flag officers from the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Never as up-to-date as one would like, but at least it’s bargain-priced.

And make no mistake, this is a time-consuming and never-ending process. Just learned that General-Lieutenant Sergey Yudin died suddenly at 59 on June 10, 2019. So, off the list.

A couple wrinkles this time.

First, generals and admirals are in the process of being color-coded — green, yellow, red, and orange.

The “stop light” colors are a WAG at likely, uncertain, or unlikely career progression in the future.

What, you ask, are indicators of probable advancement? One is, ironically and simply, a recent promotion. An officer promoted to one-star rank is in the running for a second star, etc. But also whether an officer is in a line or staff position, his age (where we have it), and his past career progression.

Orange is for those without an identified position or post (probably some are GRU and their names are kept out of the media).

Second, a folder of photos of promoted officers (at least some so far) has been added.