Tag Archives: Oleg Shvedkov

Winners and Losers in Organizing New MDs and Armies

Today a Ground Troops spokesman told ITAR-TASS three current Leningrad Military District (MD) brigades will form a 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in the new Western MD.  The 200th, 138th, and 25th Motorized Rifle Brigades will comprise the new army, and its headquarters will probably be Agalatovo, just north of St. Petersburg.  The spokesman also said a surface-to-air missile brigade and independent engineering brigade will be added to the Western MD.

These comments came in conjunction with a visit by Ground Troops CINC, General-Colonel Aleksandr Postnikov to the region to check on the formation of the new MD.  The spokesman said Postnikov may be working on peacetime coordination between the district’s Ground Troops, the Northern and Baltic Fleets, and Air Forces units.  He said, in wartime, “everything’s clear – [the district’s] commander directly commands everything deployed within the district’s boundaries.  But there’s still no experience of coordination in peacetime and we need to get it.”

Nezavisimaya gazeta’s Vladimir Mukhin also wrote today that the third new CAA will be based in Maykop, Southern MD.  Mukhin says that staffs, commands, formations, and military units in the Far East, Siberian, and Moscow MDs are being liquidated in the shift to four new MDs / OSKs, and, as a result, several thousand officers will be placed outside the TO&E beginning 1 September.  He thinks many of them won’t find vacant posts, and will be discharged from the army.

Serdyukov’s Defense Ministry will also be putting some soon-to-be-vacant properties up for sale, e.g. Moscow MD headquarters (Polina Osipenko Street, Moscow), Far East MD headquarters (Seryshev Street, Khabarovsk).  The initial asking prices for these buildings and land will be several billion U.S. dollars.  As long planned, proceeds from these sales, along with the sale of the Navy Main Staff, military educational institutions, and other military establishments in Moscow, are supposed to fund construction of housing for servicemen as well as military garrison infrastructure in new army deployment locations.

Mukhin talked to General-Lieutenant Yuriy Netkachev about Maykop.  Netkachev says Moscow is resurrecting the army headquarters located there until 1993.  He believes Maykop was chosen to reinforce against threats from Georgia as well as threats to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.

In the Central MD, Mukhin says the 67th Spetsnaz Brigade will move yet again, from IVVAIU in Irkutsk to Chita or Transbaykal Kray.  The IVVAIU building will be sold.

Mukhin sees Moscow’s demilitarization and moving forces closer to their likely operational theaters as the right policy, but asks if it’s underpinned with resources.  It has serious impact on servicemen and their families, and they’ve been forgotten in this process.

Mukhin quotes servicemen’s union chief Oleg Shvedkov:

“Continuing steps to transition the troops into a new profile supposes not only a significant cut in professional servicemen, but also their relocation to a new place of service.  And this means new everyday life problems are possible:  transfers, absence of housing, work for spouses, education for children, and the like.  The Defense Ministry is trying to resolve these issues on its own, but it would be more correct for the government to work on them through a special federal program.”

‘Virtual’ Apartments and the Army’s Protest Mood

Ex-Military Men Protesting 'Virtual' Apartments (photo: RIA Novosti)

In Monday’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Vladimir Mukhin described a 15 May demonstration outside the Defense Ministry by former officers who were allocated ‘virtual’ apartments in Balashikha six months ago, but have been unable to occupy them due to slow paperwork.  Their demands are simple:  these retirees want bureaucratic obstacles removed.  

The protest was not covered by the media, or received only scant coverage.  However, the Defense Ministry’s promise to fix the problems for former servicemen from Balashikha was reported widely in the press. 

Mukhin’s subtitle for the article reads, “Unfulfilled Presidential housing program for the military leading to protest actions.”  He concludes that military demonstrations have been so rare in post-Soviet history that, if they occur, they have to be symptomatic of something.  He says similar protests have happened in other regions with large military garrisons. 

Everyone remembers Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reports about fulfilling the military housing program in 2009.  However, it’s becoming clear that this didn’t happen.  New military housing and construction chief Grigoriy Naginskiy not long ago announced that of 45,000 permanent apartments handed out in 2009, less than half have been occupied.  So the plan wasn’t achieved.  This has provoked a protest mood in the army, and the authorities, it seems, prefer not to notice it.  

Mukhin cites similar situations and actions in Bashkiriya, and elsewhere in  Moscow’s far suburbs.  The All-Russian Professional Union of Servicemen (OPSV or ОПСВ) tells Mukhin it’s pretty simple.  A garrison is drawn down, and officers who don’t want to relocate are put out of their apartments (sometimes into the street).  The garrison is then sold by Defense Ministry officials with a direct interest in this.  Mukhin concludes, that’s the ‘new profile’ army for you. 

OPSV Chairman Oleg Shvedkov told Mukhin several thousand retired officers and servicemen participated in May 1 protests around the country.  They protested not just housing, but also pension and pay problems.  But, of course, active-duty servicemen are prohibited from participating in political actions under the law. 

Viktor Baranets also addressed the plight of former officers in Balashikha in a 12 May article. 

According to ITAR-TASS and RIA Novosti, a Defense Ministry housing official promised on 15 May that the problem of 80 retired servicemen and the apartments allocated to them in Balashikha would be resolved before the end of June.  He said the process of preparing all the necessary documents would be complete by that time. 

A Defense Ministry spokesman said a meeting with an ‘initiative group’ [i.e. the protesters] was held in the ministry.  He also indicated the Defense Ministry is trying to speed up and smooth out the process of preparing and registering survey and property ownership documents.

18-Month Conscription or More Money for Contract Service

Vladimir Mukhin’s report on General Staff Chief Makarov denouncing  contract service has not received much attention.  See Monday’s Nezavisimaya gazeta

Mukhin concludes the military leadership has decided the longstanding effort to transfer some troops to a professional basis and reduce the length of conscript service has been a total fiasco.  And contractees will be reduced, and conscripts increased. 

Mukhin says, with this, Makarov touched the very painful issue of increasing conscript service back to 1.5 years.  He says such a plan is allegedly with the country’s leadership right now [this will really add to Medvedev’s popularity, won’t it?]. 

Duma Deputy Vladimir Komoyedov

Mukhin cites former Black Sea Fleet Commander, Admiral Komoyedov, now a KPRF Duma deputy and member of the Duma’s Defense Committee, who says the issue of raising the draft term is under discussion among generals as well as among legislators. 

Mukhin says all this is perfectly logical to military leaders.  A longer draft term will allow conscripts to be better trained and more knowledgeable and to compensate for the absence of professionals.  But this approach in no way  connects with the political statements of the country’s leadership which assures society there won’t be any increase in conscript service time. 

Komoyedov says: 

“The situation here is complicated.  The idea of increasing the military service term to 1.5 years is written into our, the KPRF, program.  We understand well that in current conditions it’s almost impossible to train a skilled and knowledgeable specialist in the troops in a year.  They’ve begun, apparently, to understand this in the Genshtab also.  It seems to me that military leaders know how to convince the president and prime minister to take unpopular steps on questions of changing to the side of increasing the military service term.  Otherwise the army expects significant undermanning–because of the demographic hole, losses on health grounds, and the like.”  

Mukhin turns next to the Chairman of the All-Russian Professional Servicemen’s Union (OPSV or ОПСВ) Oleg Shvedkov who says:   

“It seems to me that the idea of increasing the conscript military service term to a year and a half, even if it today it’s actively lobbied for by someone in military circles, neither the Kremlin nor Okhotnyy Ryad (the Duma) will support it.  Our leaders have already made so many mistakes including in questions of military reform.  Changes in the conscription and troop manning system will cause significant agitation in society.  The authorities of course won’t allow this.  More likely a decision on increasing military budget parameters for use in selecting and training contractees will be taken.” 

Valentina Melnikova, Secretary of the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers (СКСМ) of Russia, told Mukhin she still thinks a complete transition to contract service could be made. 

She and Shvedkov are right of course.  Theoretically, Russia could shift to all professional enlisted, but it would take political will lacking heretofore.  After what Makarov and Postnikov said (and knowing the generalitet’s predilections anyway), an effort to reinforce a badly, badly sagging contract service effort seems very unlikely.  And it would seem Makarov and his protege would have to resign too.