Tag Archives: Price Formation

What’s It Cost?

S-400

S-400

A reader recently asked:

What’s the cost of one division of the S-400 for Russia and for foreign customers?

Let’s call it a battalion (дивизион).  We’ll start with exports (for which there is actually data).  And we proceed from what was paid for the S-300.

Russia’s planned sale of the S-300PMU1 to Iran reportedly involved the transfer of five “battalion sets” for $800 million.  Some sources said as much as $1-1.2 billion.   

Let’s guess the “battalion set” has three firing batteries, with two launchers per, for a total of 30 TELs, 120+ missiles, and all associated radars, fire control systems, and vehicles.

If $800 million is accurate, the price for one battalion was $160 million.  The price for one S-400 system, four missiles on a TEL, was roughly $27 million.

This isn’t unlike what the Chinese paid for the S-300 in the 1990s and 2000s.  According to Sinodefence.com, they bought battalions for between $25 and $60 million at different times under different contracts.

That done, we make the leap from the S-300 price to the S-400 price.

A couple years ago, Vedomosti drew the scarcely precise conclusion that the price of the S-400 will double the S-300’s price (and the S-500 double the S-400’s). 

So perhaps a “battalion set” or a battalion of the S-400 will go for $320 million.  That would be one full-up launch vehicle for $40-50 million.

The only other shred of information is the widely-reported Financial Times story saying, if the Russians added the S-400 to a $2 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, the price of the sale would climb to $7 billion.  But lots of Russian reports say Moscow won’t be selling the S-400 abroad soon.  The military obviously hopes that’s true, so it can get first.

But not every customer is Iranian, not every one will have to pay a premium price, and not every customer is foreign.

Which brings the trickier question of what Russia’s Defense Ministry has to pay.  It’s simply impossible to guess.

Certainly a lot less than buyers abroad.  The military’s bought some S-400 systems so there is a going price.  OAO Concern PVO Almaz-Antey’s costs are a big question as is the level of profit the government is willing to tolerate.  

The government owns Almaz-Antey, so one part of government is selling to another.  It’s a prime example of angst over GOZ “price formation” in recent years.  There was a similar big-ticket dustup over submarine prices with Sevmash.  It’s something of a Mexican standoff.  The buyer doesn’t have other supplier alternatives.  And the seller may not be allowed to sell elsewhere. 

The Defense Ministry, the government don’t want to pay a lot and have the power to refuse and yet still receive goods.  The question is how many.  That’s ECON 101, friends.

If those buyers set their price below equilibrium, Almaz-Antey will provide a lower than desired quantity more slowly than the buyers want.   And Almaz might have other buyers as an option, an advantage Sevmash lacks.  So “price formation” for the S-400 is all about agreement on Almaz’s costs and an acceptable level of profit.  That agreement is apparently not smoothly worked out yet.

Serdyukov Year-Ender (Part I)

Serdyukov Watches Troops with President Medvedev

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov gave a two-part interview to Rossiyskaya gazeta this week.  It covers some contentious issues, but the questions aren’t exactly hard-hitters, and there’s no follow-up on his answers.  Nevertheless, Serdyukov as always puts out a steady and consistent message on what he, the government, and military are trying to accomplish.  Much of the first part of his interview concerned this year’s GOZ problems and the Defense Ministry’s difficulties coming to terms with defense sector enterprises.

Serdyukov says he’s been occupied for two years with reaching agreement on prices, deadlines, and quality for arms and other military equipment.  But, he says, now producers have no reason to complain because they’re receiving 80-100 percent advance payments for their work.  Some contracts for ships, aircraft, and strategic missiles are long-term ones extending to 2017-2020.  He adds:

“The fact is we are completely forecasting the entire future activity of a company for many years to come.  This allows for planning for expenses and receipts, training personnel, introducing new technologies, reequipping the production base.”

Regarding the tussle over OPK prices, Serdyukov says he’s told enterprises to give the Defense Ministry their production cost [себестоимость], and the military department will make production profitable for them.  Producers can have a profit margin of 20-25 or even 30-35 percent, but, he says, component suppliers will be limited to a one-percent mark-up.

Many producers (Sevmash for one) blame their suppliers for their own high costs, but it seems likely that limiting sub-contractors to a 1 percent profit is a formula for failure.

But Serdyukov has one condition for profits of 30-35 percent over the cost of production:

“The difference [10 percent?] has to go toward the technical reequipping of the enterprise, the purchase of new technologies and licenses.  And this will lead to lower costs or improved technical characteristics and combat potential of this or that weapon in the future.”

Later Serdyukov noted the Defense Ministry will compensate producers for annual inflation but production cost and timeframe will remain fixed. 

Then questions turned to the issue of foreign weapons.  Serdyukov said the Defense Ministry can’t buy Russian arms that aren’t up to world standards in price and quality.  Russia, he said, is interested in foreign systems so it can understand where it lags or has already fallen behind.  He described cooperative ties with foreign producers, buying licenses, and organizing joint production of entire systems or components in Russia as a way to get domestic industry up to date.  Serdyukov said foreign characteristics and prices are always part of the discussion of price formation with OPK enterprises.

Serdyukov told RG he doesn’t believe the Russian defense sector’s potential has dissipated despite the economic and financial difficulties of the last 15 years.  But now, with a 10-year GPV in hand, Russia has to restore the volume of defense production to the level of the 1980s.

He said foreign purchases were mainly small numbers of samples for the Defense Ministry to investigate.  It bought Iveco armored vehicles for explosive testing, after which Russia proposed to produce them jointly with Italy in Voronezh.