Tag Archives: Professional Enlisted

There Will Be Professionals, But Later

In Thursday’s Vedomosti, Aleksey Nikolskiy wrote about Defense Minister Serdyukov’s remarks on contract service to the Federation Council.  Serdyukov and General Staff Chief Makarov have cited different figures on the current number of contractees (150,000 vs. 190,000), but agree they’ll be cut.  Professionals will come not only later, but in a smaller numbers.  And contractees will occupy only certain duties.

Nikolskiy cites a figure of only 50,000 contractees signed on during Russia’s failed 2003-2007 attempt to set up a professional enlisted force.

A future smaller number of contract NCOs could receive pay equivalent to that of junior officers.  Except that junior officer pay is supposed to increase dramatically toward 2012 under the new pay system.

According to Nikolskiy’s interlocutors, a new table of organization will soon spell out exactly where contractees will serve, i.e. there will reportedly be few driver-mechanic contractees, while the number of senior NCO billets will increase.

While contract soldiers decrease, how will Moscow manage its commitment to keep conscripts out of ‘hot spots’ (i.e. potential combat zones)?  As recently as April, the Defense Ministry had to reassure the public it had no intention of stationing draftees in Chechnya.

Here’s Nikolskiy verbatim:

“In the long run, contractees in the army will increase from 150,000 to 250,000, but first they will cut them to pick the best and pay them more.”

“Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov told reporters in the Federation Council yesterday there are no plans to abandon contractee servicemen and their number in the future will increase to 200,000-250,000. The day before in the defense committee of the upper chamber, the Genshtab chief Nikolay Makarov said the number of contractees will be significantly reduced compared with the current 190,000.  According to him, contractees will occupy only duties in the Navy, Air Forces and Air Defense requiring good professional training, and also in permanent readiness units.  Only conscript soldiers will serve in the remaining posts.”

“An officer from the Defense Ministry central apparatus explains that Serdyukov’s and Makarov’s statements don’t contradict one another.  In the long run, depending on developing financial conditions, the number of contractees will grow, but first they will reduce them to get rid of ballast which got into these posts during the first attempt at professionalization of the army.”

“In 2003 the FTsP “Transition to Manning with Soldiers Conducting Military Service on Contract in Some Formations and Military Units” was adopted at a cost of more than 20 billion rubles.  According to it, by 2007, the number of contractees in soldier and sergeant duties in permanent readiness units should have gotten to 150,000.  However, they began to fulfill this program from the wrong end, said an officer, having simply mechanically increased the number of contractees in posts not worrying about their training or paying a normal wage.  As a result, they took less than 50,000 and the program collapsed, as the Defense Ministry’s leaders confirmed this year.  Now, after their reduction, the number of contractees will be increased carefully, take well trained people into posts and pay them wages equivalent to salaries of junior officers, said Vedomosti’s source.  At President Dmitriy Medvedev’s meeting on Monday [7 June], increasing wages was discussed and a figure was named—from 25,000 rubles [monthly].”
 
“In the words of an officer from one of the Ground Troops’ motorized rifle brigades, the latest order about contractees came to the unit at the beginning of the year and it indicated there should be no more than 5 percent of them among the number of soldiers and sergeants in driver duties, though more posts for contract sergeants as company and battery sergeant-majors were introduced.”
 
“According to him, you can’t judge where exactly contractees will serve until the introduction of new tables of organization which they’ve promised to do in coming months.”

The Contractees Are Dead, Long Live the Contractees!

Asked about professional soldiers and contract service last week, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov said: 

“We are not switching to a contract basis.  Many mistakes were allowed, and that task which was given—construction of a professional army—was not completed.  Therefore a decision was made that conscript service needed to remain in the army.  Moreover, we are increasing the draft , and decreasing the contract part.  We’ve come to understand that a contractee has to be trained by altogether different methods than there were earlier.  Therefore now we’re taking on contract only sergeants who are studying for 2 and a half years.  We plan to reach a contract army through this.  Many people talked even in the Soviet Army about the need to train sergeants, but now we’ve thought everything through well and we’re promptly moving forward, so that in 2.5 years in our army there will be a sergeant, an assistant commander who’s capable of independently resolving an entire complex of tasks that are now resolved by officers.”

The effort to build a professional NCO corps will continue, but the experiment in recruiting career enlisted personnel—a main line of the army’s development since 2003—has failed.  The tenor of Makarov’s statement almost makes it sound as if he didn’t think or know a mixed manning system with conscripts predominating was the plan all along.  The Russian Army was always going to remain mixed, but now it will be much more one-sided in favor of conscripts.  A Vedomosti editorial pointed out that Russia’s generalitet (what remains of it) never supported contract service anyway.  The training of professional NCOs begun on a very small scale last fall will continue, but how long will it be before that effort too is abandoned?

Makarov’s announcement will only add to pressure on Russia’s dwindling manpower resources.  The start of one-year service basically doubled the semi-annual requirement for draftees from 133,000 to 270,000 or so.  Now it’s clear that conscripts are needed to fill spots contract enlisted were supposed to occupy.

Rossiyskaya gazeta and Krasnaya zvezda covered similar comments last week from new Ground Troops CINC Postnikov.  Both papers concluded that, while the effort with professional NCOs will continue, the army’s priority will be on meeting its manpower requirements through conscription.

Vremya novostey quoted Postnikov:

“The federal program to transfer permanent readiness units to manning with contractees did not achieve its intended goals.”

It didn’t succeed in making contract service prestigious, they didn’t select those who could be true professionals, they fully manned units with contractees to the detriment of quality.  Now corrections have been made in the troop manning plans.  Only those positions that determine the combat capability of units and formation will be contract.  There both pay and social conditions will be fitting – just like officers.  They will train contractees for the positions of professional sergeants, just as in the U.S.

And Izvestiya:

“. . . we can’t say that we have precisely those contractees which we wanted to have ideally.  We understood that we had to change the system of training contractees.  It’s planned to do this through the institution of sergeants – an assistant commander capable of independently resolving a whole block of tasks which officers now resolve.  For this reason they have to occupy positions directly answering for the combat readiness of army units and sub-units.  We have to increase their pay, create social conditions for living at the level of officers.”

But one basic problem has always been the jealousy of officers (who rarely get all their pay and benefits) toward contractees or NCOs who might possibly get almost as much as them. 

Novyye izvestiya quoted Sergey Krivenko, a member of the RF President’s Human Rights Council:

“Contractees were not provided housing or normal pay, or even timely indexing of their wages . . . .  Instead huge sums were invested in construction of housing, reequipping ranges and other facilities where the money could easily be hidden and stolen.”

Krivenko adds that contractees didn’t experience a change in their status, were often forced to sign contracts, and were not allowed to leave the garrison or live a normal life with their families outside the garrison.  So there was nothing to distinguish them from conscripts.

To sum Krivenko up, the army failed to find the right candidates and deliver the benefits it promised them.  So one has to be skeptical that the selections and Defense Ministry follow through on the professional NCO effort will be any better.

Krivenko believes that the army has virtually no choice but to increase the conscription term from one year to cover the lack of contract soldiers.  But simply allowing undermanning of units would have the same effect, but that might impinge on Makarov’s claims that most units are now fully manned and permanently ready.