Tag Archives: Vladimir Popovkin

Defense Industry’s Last Warning

Popovkin in a Suit

Last Friday’s NVO printed an interesting editorial that discussed arms exporter irritation with Deputy Defense Minister, Armaments Chief [former Commander of Space Troops and ex-General-Colonel] Vladimir Popovkin for publicly admitting the Defense Ministry’s dissatisfaction with many of the OPK’s products.  The exporters are obviously upset that Popovkin’s comments have, and will, cost them sales abroad.  But NVO concludes a greater danger would be trying to silence anyone–high-ranking defense official or independent defense analyst–who dares point out the OPK’s problems in the hope of remedying them.

NVO’s sub-title for the article is “The OPK’s systemic crisis threatens a breakdown in the supply of combat equipment to the Russian Army and a lack of export contracts.”

The Greeks have apparently called off a purchase of 420 BMP-3s for $1.5 billion (let’s call it $3.6 million per vehicle).  The deal had been 2 years in the making, and it wasn’t the state of the Greek economy that caused the halt.  According to NVO, the money was already in the defense budget.  Rather it was Popovkin’s specific criticism of the BMP-3 that folded the deal.

Popovkin is quoted:

“We very much need to protect our soldiers.  Today everyone rides on top of the BMP because no one wants to ride in this ‘coffin.’  We need to make a different vehicle.”

Greek journalists published his remarks, and opposition politicians turned them into a scandal:  how can you buy unsuitable equipment that even the country that makes it won’t buy?

Popovkin also complained about the T-90 that the Indians are buying, the tank support combat vehicle (BMPT) that Rosoboroneksport recently demonstrated at an arms show in Kuala Lumpur, and other equipment which the army won’t buy for one reason or another, but which is put forth for export and actively advertised there.

According to NVO, the arms exporters are terribly offended because the [ex-] general cost them several lucrative contracts.  But, in NVO’s estimation, his speech is very necessary.  It says:

“. . . the truth about the condition of the Russian defense-industrial complex, about those processes occurring there, about the systemic crisis in it and the inability of its various directors, including even the government’s Military-Industrial Commission [VPK], to correct the existing situation, is not a secret at all.  It’s been talked about more than once.  On the most varied levels.  Including even presidential.”

NVO says this truth is very important; it could help the powers-that-be uncover the problem areas, fix them, and produce the modern equipment needed for the defense of the country’s interests.  Without an honest discussion, the deficiencies can’t be fixed.  But the Kremlin, government, the legislature, executive organs, or the regions won’t undertake any serious measures against negligent managers.  Despite constant talk of state arms programs, federal programs of technical reequipping of defense enterprises, in reality, with the exception of aviation and air defense firms, nothing is really happening.  It’s moving at a snail’s pace.  Or is it?

Foreign buyers send in 33 warranty claims for every 100 Russian weapons systems exported.  And the scandal with the Algerian MiGs didn’t teach the OPK anything.

It would be possible to silence critics and protect military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and keep the profits coming to the budget and the manufacturers.  But won’t the low quality of these systems, their inability to meet the demands of modern war, really be a negative advertisement?  Does someone really think if they quiet the generals, together with the Moscow media, military analysts and experts then they can sell some kind of half-finished military goods to a serious buyer?  Naive views worked out for illiterate dilettantes.

NVO figures there are two ways out:  either give up, lose export orders, and accept the situation or sharply improve the quality and effectiveness of Russian weapons, reduce prices and defects, and strive to be on the leading edge of technology.  In other words, saving defense industry is in the hands of defense industry itself.  And no one else.  

When it comes to combat vehicles, sniper rifles, UAVs, assault ships, night sights, and armor, the international division of labor in defense industry isn’t such a bad thing after all.  It brings Russia closer to the ‘probable enemies’ of the recent past.  But when it comes to nuclear-powered submarines and strategic missiles we still don’t know how to do them ourselves and no one’s going to sell us those.  And [unless Russia remembers how and gets its OPK in order] it will remember national security the same way it remembers the long forgotten past. 

This is NVO’s way of telling the Putin-Medvedev regime it would be foolish to shut down this feedback channel that tells it what needs fixing in the OPK.

Can Imports and Money Solve OPK Problems?

Ilya Kramnik (photo: RIA Novosti)

On 22 April, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik provided an essay on the army, the VPK [OPK], and post-Soviet realities.   He gives a convincing negative answer to the question posed above.  Like more money and budget, foreign imports won’t be enough by themselves to fix the Russian OPK’s structural problems which have to be addressed more directly at their roots.   

He has praise for Defense Minister Serdyukov for being willing to admit that the ‘emperor had no clothes’ to some degree.  Serdyukov’s management has recognized that the world has changed and changed the army’s missions accordingly. 

A recognition of one’s problems, however, is not the same thing as fixing them.  Serdyukov, the army, and the OPK face the same kind of modernization dilemmas that face Russian politicians, business, and society.  But thanks to Serdyukov, the armed forces are operating under a more realistic vision of what they are, or should be, building toward.

Kramnik believes imports are fine, but the OPK needs the capability to build the entire line of military equipment needed, if it has to.  To do that, it will have to remedy its capital problems, including human capital.  He concludes there’s still a way to go to get to a mobile, well-armed, and trained army, appropriate for the real threats facing the country.

Kramnik writes:

“In the past few days Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and his deputy Vladimir Popovkin again raised questions about the quality of the work of the country’s VPK [military-industrial complex].  These questions are not being mouthed for the first time, and are taking on a particular acuteness against the backdrop of announcements of planned purchases of military products abroad–both separate components and complete systems.”

“It’s difficult to say when the theme of the Russian VPK and armed forces’ dependence on foreign supplies first began to resound.  In a large sense, it was always acute–even the USSR didn’t have full independence from foreign supplies, in its heyday, trainer aircraft from Czechoslovakia, light helicopters (Soviet-designed) from Poland, large assault ships from the very same Poland, various types of boats and ships from the GDR, etc., were bought.”

“After the USSR’s collapse this dependence deepened because of the foreign status of many producers which had been an integral part of the Soviet VPK–from Dnepropetrovsk’s Yuzhmash to the Tashkent Aviation Production Conglomerate.  But the problem of the VPK’s growing dependence on producers in the ‘far abroad’ is the most acute and painful today.” 

“The list of purchases of military equipment abroad being realized by the Russian military and producers is already now quite broad:  different types of infantry weapons, communications systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, thermal sights, digital electronic equipment…” 

“Now being added to this list are multipurpose assault ships, and armor for vehicles and light armored equipment.” 

“Meanwhile from the Defense Ministry resound still louder complaints about the domestic VPK over the quality of the equipment it is producing.  Of the number of the largest scandals of this type the recently resonating complaints about domestically developed unmanned aerial vehicles, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles must be noted.  Problems are also arising where there are no alternatives to domestic manufacturers, and can’t be in principle–in the development and production of ballistic missiles (“Bulava”).”

“What is happening with the country’s VPK, and what kind of ways out of the situation which has taken shape are there?” 

“The main cause of today’s situation is obvious:  from the beginning of the 1990s through the mid-2000s a large part of VPK enterprises together with the entire country was occupied with everything except strengthening defense capability and modernizing production.  The collapse of the USSR, with the consequent destruction of Soviet industrial infrastructure, disruption of production ties and scientific schools didn’t leave any chance for a better result.” 

“It follows to note that the disruption was systemic, and besides experts in the State Property Committee and other government organs of the 1990s, the authors of this process could, with complete justification, be considered the ‘captains of industry,’ many of whom in this period openly used enterprises entrusted to them for the purpose of ‘making money here and now,’ even through the ruin of production sold off for scrap.”    

“Against this background in the armed forces and those close to the military, but also in industrial circles, groups of ‘patriotic’ experts and analysts, rose like mushrooms after the rain, thoroughly glorifying the country’s army and VPK with chants of one and the same incantation:  ‘it has no analog in the world.’  The incantations rang out with respect to various military and technical wonders, and meanwhile not the slightest attempt was made to comprehend the changing world map, missions of industry and the armed forces.”       

“From the other side the ‘alarmists’ were entrenched and grievously moaned about the death and destruction of the army and military industry, keeping such an inadequate perception of the world as a whole.  Both sides supposed that Russia and its army would in the future conduct a precisely ‘Soviet’ type war against the entire capitalist world, or, at a minimum, against a Chinese invasion.”       

“Very few production associations, which were flagships of the domestic VPK, were able to preserve themselves as single entities in the Bacchanalia of destruction.  There is, first of all, the ‘Sukhoy’ firm, which knew how to turn the crown of Soviet scientific-design thinking–the family of aircraft on the T-10 (Su-27) platform–into the most commercially successful product on the combat aircraft market of the last 20 years.  There is ‘Almaz-Antey,’ whose air defense systems received not less recognition.  There is Nizhnyy Tagil’s UVZ which was saved thanks to the T-90.  There are some shipbuilders and several other companies that managed to ‘get’ the situation and survive.  But such successful ones turned out to be far from all.”        

“The renewal of defense development and the increase in the State Defense Order in the middle of the 2000s could not be and didn’t become a panacea.”       

“Firstly, a simple increase in monetary investment will not save a disrupted industry:  dead people don’t need money, neither do the seriously ill generally.”       

“Secondly, this money by itself could not resolve the row of problems of even successful enterprises–for example, the problem of a lack of personnel, caused not only by the outflow of workers ‘in the hungry 1990s,’ but also by a sharp decline in the young population, together with the fall in the quality of engineering-technical education, and the practically complete collapse of the system of specialized secondary education.”       

“But the biggest problem became the management of the armed forces and military industry in principle.  The armed forces command right up to recent times didn’t have any kind of clearly expressed views on the future profile of the Russian Army.  All the years of reforms right up to the arrival of Anatoliy Serdyukov in the post of Russia’s Defense Minister preserved in essence the truncated and frayed Soviet Army, whose model was becoming ever less and less adequate for the missions facing the country in the prevailing economic and political conditions.”

“Military industry against this background survived reorganization after reorganization, the overwhelming majority of which led to nightmarish overgrowth in bureaucratic components and an increase in the already huge gap in pay between specialists on the line and in the laboratory and the management.  This state of production efficiency contributed to the growth of military expenditures and the amount of ‘kickbacks’–most of all.  Responsibility for results was conveniently forgotten:  ‘captains of industry’ together with the armed forces leadership now, as a rule, won’t risk even dismissal, much less their freedom.”       

“A similar uncertainty led to uncertainty with the military order.  Plans and ideas floated and sank, development began and stopped, the vision of the army and its complex of armaments as some kind of organic system aimed at resolving such-and-such concrete missions was totally absent.  The sole exception on this score was the strategic nuclear forces, where a clear understanding of missions and ways of conducting them was preserved, and work was conducted–on supporting old RVSN missiles, on testing and adopting new ones, on repair and modernization of the Navy’s strategic missile submarines and Air Forces heavy bombers.” 

“Anatoliy Serdyukov’s reform, being the first systemic reform of the armed forces in the last decade, not directed at supporting a dead Soviet structure, but at arranging a new one, under concretely certain missions of fighting local and regional conflicts while preserving nuclear deterrence potential, did not create new problems.  It simply revealed old ones, aggravating them with the absolute ‘nonconcurrence’  of the new Defense Ministry leadership in the old system of relations of the army and VPK.”       

“This ‘nonconcurrence’ became a thorn in the side of very many, those problems earlier kept quiet behind the reckoning ‘well, you understand,’ suddenly stopped being kept quiet, and floated in all their ugliness before the eyes of an astonished public.”      

“For the public the foregoing was a big shock, since it all these years kept the point of view on the army and VPK as some ‘island of stability,’ preserving, in the face of all problems, the Soviet system of connections and ties, and, in general, Soviet possibilities.  Many understood the fact that this wasn’t so, but an open recognition of the changed situation by the leadership of the armed forces and the country, nonetheless, was unexpected.”       

“However such a recognition was necessary as a recognition of the fact that the world has changed.  The Russian Army is more incapable of realizing the West’s half-century nightmare–a three-day dash to the English Channel (we set aside the question of whether the Soviet Army was capable), however does Russia need this capability for defending its people, its sovereignty, its interests?”      

“It occurs that our country needs something different.  It needs a clearly expressed understanding of threats, developed with the participation of the military, politicians, and the public, which stand before the country and the capability to counter these threats.  It needs a compact, ‘quick reaction,’ innovative, directed military industry with minimal bureaucratic overhead, and an education system regularly supplying engineering and labor personnel who will receive pay greater than the managers of shops selling mobile phones and taxi drivers.  At a minimum.”      

“This industry needs to produce the entire line of types of equipment and hardware essential to the armed forces, even if using some quantity of imported components–in the end, even the USA doesn’t disdain the use of military imports, and it imports foreign military hardware worth $15-16 billion annually.”      

“It needs an army–mobile, trained, armed, conscious of its status, prestige, and many centuries of history.  It needs strategic forces which protect the country against wars with superior enemies, the calculation of which on our planet doesn’t even require three fingers.”      

“All this could become a reality only in the event that it’s made into a goal at the very highest level.  Still the reactions of the country’s leadership, and of the armed forces, at a minimum, demonstrate understanding of the problem.”      

German Armor

Serdyukov Wants Troops to Ride Inside

Reports about Russia looking abroad for light armored vehicles and not buying BTR-80s and BMP-3s in GVP 2011-2020 came into better focus this week . . .

On Tuesday Defense Minister Serdyukov announced Russia will buy armor for vehicles and light armored equipment from Germany.  In his meeting with representatives of public organizations, he said:

“The RF Defense Ministry will proceed from the need to guarantee the protection of personnel.”

“We have forced KamAZ and other Russian companies to enter into contacts with foreign firms.  They’ve already begun to make contact in order to buy light armor and use it in reconnaissance vehicles, BTRs, BMPs and other transport means.”

Kommersant talked to KamAZ officials who didn’t know anything about buying armor for vehicles abroad.

Serdyukov said, in particular, they were talking about purchasing light armor from one German company (reportedly Rheinmetall).

ITAR-TASS said Serdyukov was referring to poor protection of personnel inside Russian armored vehicles when he warned:

“We, of course, won’t buy Russian vehicles and armored equipment in the condition they are in.”

“We want Russian industry to produce what we need and what the times demand, so that they (OPK enterprises) will modernize their production and create quality equipment.”

In Stoletiye.ru, Sergey Ptichkin writes that Rostekhnologiya’s Sergey Chemezov and FSVTS’ Mikhail Dmitriyev have concluded that the purchase of foreign arms for the Russian Army is a ‘done deal’ at this point.  Dmitriyev said in particular that the political decision to buy Mistral has been made, and the contract will be signed this fall.

Ptichkin concludes:

“In connection with this, by all appearances, a large number of domestic military programs are being rolled up.  Billions are needed to support the import of ships and weapons.”

Chemezov also said, reluctantly, that Russian armor really doesn’t meet the Defense Ministry’s sharply increased requirements, therefore purchases from Germany are justified.  Ptichkin wonders what Rostekhnologiya’s [Chemezov’s] specialty steel holding will do if Germany supplies Russia’s defense industries.

Media sources alluded to past statements by Deputy Defense Minister, Chief of Armaments, Vladimir Popovkin to the effect that foreign purchases would only be to ‘patch holes’ in the Russian Army and OPK.  They imply that either arms imports have expanded beyond ‘hole patching,’ or the ‘holes’ are bigger than originally thought.

Nezavisimaya gazeta writes that buying armor abroad will be catastrophic for Russian metallurgy.  Without part of the GOZ, they reportedly won’t be able to modernize.  Uralsib metals analyst Nikolay Sosnovskiy said, without state orders, enterprises which still produce something won’t be able to survive.  He said buying foreign armor for BTRs and BMPs will lead to buying it for tanks, which is much more costly.  Sosnovskiy says armor orders were ‘second tier’ for the past 20 years, so no one was working on new types.  On the other hand, Aleksandr Khramchikhin thinks the competition posed by foreign armor will force the Russian industry to improve.

Despite this little uproar, it seems unlikely that the Defense Ministry or Russian government are suddenly ardent fans of free trade in all things.  Moscow’s economic management remains more paternalistic and state-directed than that.  Rather purchases abroad are probably viewed as the only way to:  (a) rearm Russian forces quickly with badly needed high-quality arms and equipment; and (b) shake the OPK enough to get it started on the road to competitiveness.

Rearmament Tempo Less Than 2 Percent Per Year

Vasiliy Burenok

Vasiliy Burenok told a round table at the ‘Army and Society’ exhibition in Moscow Friday that the current pace of Russian force modernization, not more than 2 percent, won’t support the transition to a ‘new profile’ military.

Burenok is Director of the Defense Ministry’s 46th Scientific-Research Institute (46 NII).  The 46 NII is a lead organization involved in formulating the State Armaments Program (GPV) and State Defense Order (GOZ).  It works on military-technical policy documents and program planning methodologies.  Burenok is a member of the Scientific-Technical Council of the RF Government’s Military-Industrial Commission (VPK).

Reviewing history a bit, Burenok told his audience, at the beginning of the 1990s, the rearmament rate was 5-7 percent annually.  But, between 1991 and 2000, financing for new arms and equipment declined more than 50 times, leaving only enough money to maintain existing weapons.

Burenok concludes to get the army to the ‘new profile’ it’s essential to introduce 9 percent new equipment every year, and for some services and combat arms, up to 11 percent.

This 9 to 11 percent is, of course, the difficult target President Medvedev set at the Defense Ministry Collegium.  Burenok indicated just how difficult–going from less than 2 to an 11 percent annual renewal rate.

Armaments Chief and Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin also addressed the ‘Army and Society’ round table.  He said GPV 2011-2020 will go to the president for approval in June.  The new GPV will be accompanied by yet another new Federal Targeted Program for OPK Development.

Popovkin said a number of systems won’t be produced under the new GPV.  They include short-range tube artillery, and BTR-80, BMP-2, and BMP-3 combat vehicles that soldiers are afraid to ride in.