ITAR-TASS yesterday cited a Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) source who said the volume of financing for the State Armaments Program 2011-2020 (GPV-2020) will be 13 trillion rubles (roughly $430 billion). The source said this amount includes purchases of new arms and equipment, development of new types, soldier gear, and other army necessities. He said the Finance and Economic Development Ministries are familiar with the amount and have not objected.
As background, ITAR-TASS reminded that this money is supposed to get Russia to not less than 30 percent modern armaments by 2015, and not less than 70 percent by 2020, according to Prime Minister Putin’s goals.
Deputy Defense Minister, Armaments Chief Vladimir Popovkin has said the RF Security Council will review GPV-2020 in June, and it will be the basis for developing a new Federal Targeted Program for OPK development.
So, 13 trillion rubles over the 10-year period is 1.3 trillion rubles in procurement per annum (undeflated, of course). At face value, this is a significant increase over the old GPV 2007-2015, which was reportedly funded at 5 trillion rubles for 9 years, or about 550 billion rubles in military purchasing per annum.
But it’s not so easy. First, the cascading and overlapping way the GPVs are done (how did the last years of the old one mesh with the first years of the new one?) would make it well-nigh impossible to judge what was actually bought, even if it were clear how much money was disbursed when and what was bought with it. But none of those things are clear to outside observers, and probably not clear even to officers and officials inside the system.
Russian Defense Policy 