Tag Archives: GPV 2020

Defense News

Some Russian defense news from August 6, 7, and 8, 2012 . . .

Sukhorukov’s Press Conference (photo: Mil.ru)

Mil.ru provided a wrap on the First Deputy Defense Minister’s press-conference on GPV-2020.

Sukhorukov “particularly turned attention” to media reports that the program’s funding will be cut.  He told journalists such a step isn’t foreseen, and the government is talking only about “optimizing” the budget load between years by using good old state-guaranteed credits for the OPK.

Sukhorukov claims 95 percent of GOZ-2012 has been contracted, and 82 percent of funds disbursed.

Arms-expo.ru also covered this story.  It emphasized Sukhorukov’s statement that the rate of defective arms delivered by producers isn’t declining.

According to RIAN, Sukhorukov said Russia won’t buy more Israeli UAVs beyond its current contract.  He reiterated the Defense Ministry believes the BMD-4M doesn’t meet its requirements, and won’t buy it.

Sukhoy reports it’s now testing the new Tikhomirov phased array radar on PAK FA, T-50-3 to be exact.  See RIAN’s story.

Sukhoy also announced that its Su-35S is in “combat employment” testing within the process of state acceptance testing at GLITs.  The company says it meets all established requirements, and has flown more than 650 times.

New Navy CINC, Vice-Admiral Chirkov made an interesting visit to the State Missile Center named for Academic V. P. Makeyev on Monday.  The Makeyev design bureau is home, of course, to liquid-fueled SLBM development.  Could not find the last time this happened.  Might be prior to 2007.

Main Military Prosecutor Sergey Fridinskiy told the GenProk collegium yesterday that abuse or dedovshchina in the ranks is down a third this year.  But, according to ITAR-TASS, Fridinskiy noted that general crimes exceed purely military offenses by a factor of two.  Specifically, he said murders are up by half, bribery has almost doubled, and drug offenses have increased 27 percent.

Fridinskiy also said nearly 3,000 GOZ corruption cases and losses worth 400 million rubles were investigated in the first half of this year.  He said, for example, Dagdizel received 3 billion rubles in defense orders, but hasn’t sent a single product to the military, and bought farm equipment and building materials with the money.  He cited losses in purchasing apartments for military men at inflated prices as well as the problem of unfinished housing projects.

Izvestiya claims a large number of young pilots are leaving the Air Forces because the lion’s share of increased flight hours and promised higher pay are going to their commanders and older officers.  Could this be a continuation of Igor Sulim’s travails at Lipetsk?  The paper also reports a number of cleaning companies say the Defense Ministry owes them 5 billion rubles for housekeeping work outsourced over the last year.

Putin on Nuclear Forces and Aerospace Defense

Today’s meeting on implementing GPV-2020 (the third thus far) was devoted to nuclear forces and aerospace defense.  However, President Vladimir Putin had little specific to say, at least in his published remarks.

He obligatorily noted how VVKO and especially SYaS bear “special responsibility” for Russia’s security, territorial integrity, and global and regional parity and stability.

VKO, the president said, must not only be in permanent combat readiness to defend military and state command and control facilities against a potential enemy’s attack, but also “provide clear and effective coordination with other services and troop branches.”

In other words, lots of air and aerospace defense assets don’t belong to VVKO, and their job is to integrate them into a network.

On the nuclear side, Putin said Russia isn’t looking for an arms race but rather to ensure “the reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear potential.”

To reequip SYaS and VKO, the Supreme Glavk indicated Russia intends to allocate a “significant part” of the total resources for GPV-2020, but, again, nothing more specific.  By 2020, SYaS is supposed to have 75-80 percent modern weapons systems, and VVKO not less than 70 percent.

And that’s all we learn about the meeting.  Or almost all.

Kremlin.ru provided a participant list that’s a bit interesting.  Many officials and industry leaders you’d expect attended.  But some were noticeably absent — missile designers from MIT, missile builders from Votkinsk, and the RVSN Commander.  Surprisingly, the general director of the Makeyev design bureau was present.

The Winner Is . . .

Putin, politics, and industrial policy.

One loser, for sure, defense policy.

Putin got his 63 percent.  He didn’t need fraud to get 50+ percent and avoid a second round, but he (or someone) wasn’t willing to take that chance.  The cheating should have drawn a flag for piling on or unnecessary roughness.  That it happened says something about Putin’s fear of being out of power.  But we digress.

Politics won over policymaking, not least of all in defense policy.

Yes, Russia is not the only place this happens.  It happens in most of the world’s democratic states.  This doesn’t prove Russia’s a democracy; it just proves Russia has politics.  But so did the USSR.  It had fights between industry and the military.

But back to our story.

Promises and populism secured votes for Putin in Russia’s industrial centers where they’ve waited years for serious defense orders.  He’d have won here without writing checks his treasury might not be able to cash.  But the once-and-future Supreme CINC made pledges he may hope factory workers forget before 2018.

If they don’t, working class disgruntlement may mingle with urban, middle class discontent in an increasingly flammable political mixture.

The case in point here is tanks and Uralvagonzavod in Nizhniy Tagil.  Did Putin court anyone, or any defense enterprise, more than the General Director of UVZ Oleg Siyenko?  Did anyone get comparable preelection attention?

The closest we get is Putin’s intervention between the Defense Ministry, OSK, and Sevmash to solve their submarine pricing dispute last fall.  But industry didn’t exactly get everything it wanted in that case.

Siyenko Casts His Ballot

In an election day press-release, this industrial chieftain all but admitted his employees were ordered to vote for Putin.  Most probably never entertained the thought of doing otherwise.  UVZ likely didn’t have to organize “carousels,” but  “corporate voting” might have occurred.

On February 20, Putin declared 2,300 “new generation” tanks will be produced (by UVZ) under GPV 2020.

It was just February 15 that Putin had a meeting with Defense Minister Serdyukov and Siyenko.  It was actually more of a beating, for Serdyukov.

Putin With Serdyukov and Siyenko

The Defense Minister had to back down publicly from everything he’s said about tank acquisition over the last couple years.  He acknowledged, as Putin said, there will be a new tank from UVZ in 2013 that will enter series production in 2015.  And, for good measure, Serdyukov said the manufacturer will receive 100 percent advance payment on the GOZ.

As recently as January, the Defense Minister was lamenting huge stocks of old tanks and repeating his willingness to wait for fundamentally new armor rather than “new” T-72 or T-90 models.  In mid-2011, he criticized tank makers (UVZ) for dressing up old ideas, and said the army would just settle for updating its existing armor inventory.

Yes, everything changed sometime between then and now.

It was just prior to this Putin-Serdyukov-Siyenko session that General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov again criticized the tanks offered to the army and argued for the military’s predominance in weapons procurement decisions.  Deputy PM Dmitriy Rogozin objected fiercely to Makarov’s public airing of dirty linen, and declared himself chief of acquisition.

All official doubts and complaints about Russian tanks heard in 2009, 2010, and 2011 were swept away in a stroke by Putin’s announcement.

It seems the Ground Troops — its supporting industry actually — were feeling left out of the GPV and GOZ.  Tanks were never one of Russia’s  priorities as enumerated by former armaments chief Vladimir Popovkin.

What do 2,300 tanks mean for the world’s largest country?  One that once measured sufficiency in tanks by the tens of thousands?  Is staving off a NATO ground attack really a top concern?  Would Moscow entertain putting most of its new tanks opposite China?  There’s been plenty written (including by Russians) about the end of the tank era.

What do these tanks mean for the GPV?  If they cost 200 million rubles per, the cost of the production run (if it actually happens) will cost close to 500 billion of the GPV’s 19 trillion rubles for procurement.  It’s a lot for one system.  The Putin-brokered sub deal in November was worth only 280 billion rubles.

So to return to the original point of this meandering post, these tanks are about industrial policy, updating the human and technical capital to make them, keeping a significant industrial center quiescent, and retaining the capability to sell tanks abroad.  There are, after all, other armies possibly facing big tank battles in the future.

When politics and defense intersect, the latter yields.  Nothing shocking in that, one admits.

One last thing.

Siyenko’s an interesting character.  The 46-year-old former bike racer and past President of the Russian Cycling Federation spent most of the 2000s as General Director of Gazprom subsidiary Gazeksport (Gazprom Eksport), selling natural gas to the Europeans.  From 2003, he was a deputy chairman of the shady gas intermediary Itera.  Itera Chairman Vladimir Makeyev too is a one-time world-class rider who succeeded Siyenko as the cycling federation’s head.

But suddenly in 2009, Siyenko changed tracks, and went to Sverdlovsk Oblast and UVZ in Nizhniy Tagil.  There must be a story explaining why he’d abandon gas for tanks and railcars.

Guns and Money (Part II)

Returning to KP, Baranets, and Pukhov on Russia’s defense budget . . . Pukhov continues trying to put Moscow’s spending in perspective.

The journalist says readers want to know how it is that the U.S. spends $600-700 billion a year on its army and Russia spends only $40-50 billion.

Pukhov says look at spending per soldier.  The figures work out neatly and they are dramatic.  Per soldier, the U.S. defense budget is $400,000.  Per soldier, Russia’s is $40,000 [probably much, much less in reality].  Pukhov concludes:

 “And it’s completely clear that it’s necessary to reduce this gap to a less dramatic magnitude.  Otherwise our Armed Forces will remain the poor army of a poor country.”

Pukhov tells Baranets and his audience that Russia occupies fifth place in world military expenditures after the U.S., China, U.K., and Japan.  But, Pukhov says Russia isn’t the U.K. or Japan:

“The problem is the defense missions facing Russia are much larger scale . . . .”

He points to Russia’s size and a nuclear arsenal comparable only to the United States.  So, according to him, it’s obvious Moscow’s military spending is insufficient and its army underfinanced.  

Baranets asks, are the condition of Russia’s economy and its defense expenditures properly correlated?  Or has it gone overboard with money for the army?  Pukhov responds:

“Russia’s current military expenditures and plans for increasing them in the next 10 years, including the State Program of Armaments to 2020 (GPV-2020) aren’t excessive, on the other hand, they represent the most essential minimum.  I recall that, according to the Defense Ministry’s own calculations, a minimum of 36 trillion rubles were needed for an optimal technical reequipping of the troops by 2020.  But the adopted GPV-2020 promises a sum smaller by almost half.  This really allows us to patch only the most obvious holes in the army’s technical equipping.”

Baranets finishes up asking if European MD is affecting the military budget.  Pukhov replies that development of Russian strat forces is already in the budget and GPV-2020, and MD doesn’t present a threat to them until after 2020.

Less argument with the end of Pukhov’s interview.  Just a couple points.  Look back here to see what General-Lieutenant Frolov said 36 trillion would do.  “Optimal” must mean complete rearmament.  But others claim they can’t do it for even that amount.  Still, Putin, Medvedev, Serdyukov, and Makarov are consistently saying they are buying 70 percent rearmament by 2020 for 19 trillion.

A Third S-400 Regiment

According to Interfaks, Air Forces Deputy CINC, General-Major Viktor Bondarev told journalists yesterday that another air defense regiment will be reequipped with the S-400 this fall. 

He didn’t mention a deployment location, or exactly when the regiment would go on combat duty.  This would be Russia’s third operational S-400 regiment.

The second regiment reportedly started combat duty on 15 May at Dmitrov, north of Moscow.

The first two regiments have four battalions between them, each battalion with 8 or more launchers.

In 2010, the Defense Ministry said it was buying 5 battalions of S-400s.  This seems to make sense with two battalions entering service in the first half of 2011, and two more possibly in the second half.  The first two S-400 battalions – at Elektrostal – were likely bought in 2006-2007. 

The plan is to buy 56 battalions worth of S-400s under GPV-2020.

It’s interesting to note that the previous, abandoned GPV-2015 (designed by Defense Minister, then Deputy Prime Minister, Sergey Ivanov) called for  acquiring 23 S-400 battalions by 2015.  The press often reports these 23 battalions as a pared-down 18, but the original goal was in fact 23.

So who’s really responsible for breaking the GPV (and GOZ)?

Makarov Interview

Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer published an interview with the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov last Tuesday.  It’s not exactly a hard-ball interview.  But it’s fairly consistent with his other statements.  Among the priorities, preserving mobilization appears again.  Inter-service C2 in the new OSKs is a big theme.  He can’t explain why the Air Forces aren’t getting more new aircraft, and PVO sounds like it’s destined for joining VKO under the Space Troops. 

VPK asked about the possibility of changes in Russia’s military doctrine following the NATO-Russia summit and more talk of a strategic partnership.  Makarov said the approach of NATO infrastructure to Russia’s borders and the alliance’s continued “open door” policy vis-a-vis Ukraine and Georgia are still factors in Russia’s military doctrine.  Therefore, there’s no need to adjust it.

Makarov expounded on the concept of force and force structure development [строительство] to 2020 adopted by President Medvedev last April 19.  Its main measures include:

  • Establishment of the air-space (aerospace) defense (VKO) system;
  • Formation of the optimal composition of inter-service troop (force) groupings on strategic axes;
  • Supporting mobilization of military formations and troop groupings;
  • Establishing modern command and control systems;
  • Deploying military towns of a new troop basing system;
  • Reequipping formations and units with new and future types of armaments and military equipment;
  • Resolving social protection issues of servicemen.

Asked about military science and operational training, Makarov said the main task of the military-scientific complex is to “support the training and employment of the Armed Forces in their new profile, especially inter-service training of the military command and control organs” of the new MDs / OSKs. 

Makarov admitted that Russia lags behind developed countries in reconnaissance and command and control, and is still using communications systems developed in the 1990s.  He continued:

“Another problem is the fact that every service and troop branch of the Armed Forces developed its own means of automation and communications without looking at the others.  The command and control systems of the Ground Troops, Navy, and Air Forces didn’t interface with each other, that lowered the possibilities for controlling troop groupings on the operational-strategic and operational level.”

He says the General Staff has given the OPK requirements for high-tech digital reconnaissance and communications systems.  Industry is already developing a fundamentally new, sixth generation radio system with digital signal processing to implement a net organization in radio communications.  He says it’s being built as a unitary, integrated net at all levels, from the General Staff to the individual soldier on the battlefield.  Command and control systems will get 300 billion rubles under GPV-2020, according to Makarov.

Sounding very much the net-centric warfare disciple, Makarov says the main task is to form a unitary information space uniting reconnaissance, navigation, command and control, and new generation weapons.

Makarov doesn’t have a good answer when asked why the Air Forces don’t have a single fully reequipped unit despite increased defense expenditures.  He maintains they are getting new aircraft and their units are now all permanently combat ready and fully equipped and manned.

On aerospace defense, Makarov says PVO, PRO, SPRN, and KKP (space monitoring) will be concentrated in the hands of one commander, but:

“I’d like to note this won’t be a simple, mechanistic merger of different military entities under the leadership of a new strategic command.  Their deep integration and echelonment by mission, information exchange, and interception fire is envisaged.  We’ve already started fulfilling the initial measures on this issue.”

Obviously speaking much prior to last week’s news about reversing cuts in the officer ranks, Makarov addressed the moratorium on inducting new cadets.  He said 78.5 percent of 2010 VVUZ graduates became officers.  Others, he says, who wanted to stay in the service were temporarily placed in lower-ranking [i.e. sergeant] posts, but will participate in command training and form a cadre reserve for filling officer positions.

Lastly, Makarov talked about the new military pay system coming next year.  Military retirees have been especially concerned about its effect on pensions.  Makarov didn’t say much to assuage them.  He said there will be no difference in pensions depending on when servicemen retired, and a commission under Finance Ministry leadership is working on the issue.  That will probably reassure army pensioners.

New Year’s Peep Show (Part I)

Yes, the season of little or no news continues . . . but there’s always something to write. 

On 29 December, Krasnaya zvezda provided a little holiday treat — a year-ending issue filled with official views on a variety of topics:

  • Priorities of Armed Forces Organizational Development.
  • Armed Forces Manning.
  • State Program of Armaments.
  • Global Political-Military Situation.
  • Improving the Military VUZ System.
  • State of Military Discipline.
  • Transition to a Unitary System of Armed Forces Material-Technical Support.
  • Provision of Housing to Servicemen.

A cornucopia of data for discerning and careful readers.

Caught up in the joy of the holidays, many probably overlooked these articles.

Let’s have a look at the first one — Priorities of Armed Forces Organizational Development.

What’s interesting is we’re given a little peep show into a much more interesting, detailed, and lengthy document — “The Concept of Organizational and Force Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Period to 2020” — approved by President Dmitriy Medvedev on 19 April 2010, with absolutely no fanfare.

What we don’t know is how this little peek inside the document was edited.  We don’t know what was emphasized, or left out, and why.

A couple preliminaries.  First, the title in the vernacular is “строительства и развития Вооружённых Сил.”  We really don’t want to say “Construction and Development” or “Building and Development” or something like that.  We’re not talking a suburban Moscow water park here.  By the same token, “Organizational Development and Development” sounds dumb. 

What we’re really talking here is force structure planning and force development.  The emergence of this planning document isn’t surprising given that they got a new national security concept in 2009, and a new military doctrine in early 2010.  This article also makes the point that, besides this ten-year military organizational development plan, there are also five- and one-year plans.

We’re going to move quickly today.  So pay attention.

The priorities are:  strategic deterrence (SYaS and VKO); building inter-service groupings on strategic axes (as in OSKs); building a new command and control system; reequipping in line with GPV-2020; a new education and training system for officers and sergeants; and resolving ever-present issues of social defense [i.e. pay and benefits] of servicemen.

What does it mean for each service?

  • For the Ground Troops, get organized on the axes and prepare to be mobile. 
  • For the Air Forces, emphasize supporting the Ground Troops and Navy.  Improve VTA and airfields for strategic mobility.
  • For Navy, support personnel and combat readiness of naval SYaS.  Series construction of multipurpose nuclear submarines and surface ships.
  • For RVSN, preserve the structure of ground SYaS.  Complete rearmament with fifth generation missiles.
  • For Space Troops, deploy formations with future missile attack warning and space monitoring systems.  Complete the full orbital grouping with future satellite systems.
  • For VDV, improve training, especially inter-service training.  Reequip with armaments, military equipment, and specialized equipment.

Sounds like Ground Troops have to make do with the weapons and equipment they have.

Stay tuned for Part II.

Shamanov Sides with Serdyukov

General-Lieutenant Shamanov

VDV Commander Vladimir Shamanov knows which side his bread’s buttered on.  Talking to the press yesterday, Shamanov supported the boss in the storm over his alleged obscenity and грубость at the VDV’s Seltsy training center.

In short, Tverskaya, 13 reported the airborne chief doesn’t believe the story about Defense Minister Serdyukov.  He denies the boss ordered Colonel Krasov dismissed as head of the airborne commissioning school.

According to Shamanov, Serdyukov expressed doubts about constructing the Church of the Prophet Elijah opposite the airborne training school, since cadets aren’t there for long.  The Defense Minister suggested [politely one is sure] that they move the church to a populated area adjacent to the training center where the congregation can take care of it [but aren’t the VDV cadets and officers the congregation?].  Shamanov concludes:

“All the rest is cock and bull.”

Apparently answering the Union of Russian Airborne Troops’ appeal to the President and Patriarch, Shamanov told ITAR-TASS and RIA Novosti he’s satisfied with the course of army reforms, and doesn’t see any reason to worry about the fate of his service branch:

“The plans that will be presented to the Supreme CINC for approval indicate that the VDV’s composition will remain as before.  Also two more district-level airborne formations [соединение] should come into service raising the troops’ potential overall.”

As if to assure people the VDV won’t march on the Kremlin, Shamanov added that the situation in his branch is “normal,” and his troops are occupied with combat training as usual.

Tverskaya, 13 reported Shamanov saying for the umpteenth time that his branch will remain independent [i.e. not be subordinated to the Ground Troops] under Serdyukov’s ‘new profile’ reforms.  He added that the VDV will get the BMD-4M according to the ‘concept’ of GPV 2020.

We should recall that Serdyukov may have helped Shamanov on some occasions, and certainly did in one instance.  The Defense Minister at least acquiesced in Shamanov’s return to lead the VDV in May 2009.  And last September, he helped Shamanov out of his own scandal when he tried to order a detachment from the VDV’s 45th Independent Reconnaissance Regiment to detain an investigator looking into his son-in-law, a well-known criminal figure.  Shamanov only got a reprimand for this incident.  He could easily have been dismissed.  Serdyukov likely retained him because the airborne general is a useful ally.

In today’s Tverskaya, 13, Deputy Defense Minister Naginskiy offered an impassioned defense of Serdyukov.  Naginskiy was on the Seltsy inspection with the Defense Minister.

Naginskiy said they saw facilities unfinished since 2008.  But he doesn’t exactly deny the press reports:

“Nothing terrible happened there.  I think if people standing 120 meters behind us heard something, filled it in, and put it on the Internet, they are dishonest.  I can say there was no boorishness or cursing, but there were raised voices, when on the territory of a unit entrusted to you someone is selling things and someone is building for 180 million rubles, undoubtedly, this calls forth natural indignation and, as it should, a conversation in raised voices.”

Naginskiy goes on, questioning why they need a church at Seltsy when troops go there to train and then return to Ryazan, but:

“I’m in absolute solidarity with the Defense Minister — what I saw there brought indignation.  There were no orders to move the church.”

This morning Nezavisimaya gazeta’s Viktor Litovkin reported some comments from Colonel Krasov himself: 

“In particular, Serdyukov expressed dissatisfaction over the incomplete repair of the cafeteria and engineering networks.  The conversation was very emotional both from Krasov’s side [speaking of himself in the third person] and from Serdyukov’s side.  However, this was a businesslike dialog.  The Ryazan school has already eliminated deficiencies revealed during the military minister’s visit.”

That certainly sounds like some type of unpleasantness transpired.  Litovkin says it’s strange neither Shamanov nor Krasov remembered [or mentioned] any obscenities.  But nevertheless he concludes:

“If this is ‘cock and bull’ as General Shamanov says, or simply ‘businesslike dialog,’ as Colonel Krasov asserts, then it’s no longer worth worrying about the battle against dedovshchina and nonregulation relations in the armed forces.”

It isn’t worth it because the abuse of subordinates apparently begins from the Defense Ministry’s very top, and won’t ever be rooted out.

Litovkin finishes saying the VDV have nothing to gain from fighting with Serdyukov, and are just trying to silence the whole incident.  There will be other defense ministers, but the VDV will always exist.

Izvestiya’s Dmitriy Litovkin says his Defense Ministry sources say there were no demands to raze the church.  He claims Serdyukov may have wanted to move it outside the base’s gates to ease access for its parishioners.  He finds the whole situation odd since there are 200 churches on Russian military property, and next year the army will begin training military chaplains.

More Money in GPV-2020

ITAR-TASS yesterday cited a Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) source who said the volume of financing for the State Armaments Program 2011-2020 (GPV-2020) will be 13 trillion rubles (roughly $430 billion).  The source said this amount includes purchases of new arms and equipment, development of new types, soldier gear, and other army necessities.  He said the Finance and Economic Development Ministries are familiar with the amount and have not objected.

As background, ITAR-TASS reminded that this money is supposed to get Russia to not less than 30 percent modern armaments by 2015, and not less than 70 percent by 2020, according to Prime Minister Putin’s goals.

Deputy Defense Minister, Armaments Chief Vladimir Popovkin has said the RF Security Council will review GPV-2020 in June, and it will be the basis for developing a new Federal Targeted Program for OPK development.

So, 13 trillion rubles over the 10-year period is 1.3 trillion rubles in procurement per annum (undeflated, of course).  At face value, this is a significant increase over the old GPV 2007-2015, which was reportedly funded at 5 trillion rubles for 9 years, or about 550 billion rubles in military purchasing per annum.

But it’s not so easy.  First, the cascading and overlapping way the GPVs are done (how did the last years of the old one mesh with the first years of the new one?) would make it well-nigh impossible to judge what was actually bought, even if it were clear how much money was disbursed when and what was bought with it.  But none of those things are clear to outside observers, and probably not clear even to officers and officials inside the system.

Medvedev Speaks at Defense Ministry Collegium

President Medvedev (photo: kremlin.ru)

In his remarks [text and video], President Dmitriy Medvedev reviewed the results of 2009 and talked about future plans for the armed forces.

He focused first on the international situation, noting that, “. . . today we have no requirement to increase further our strategic deterrence potential,” although it remains a determining factor in Russia’s conduct of independent policies and the preservation of its sovereignty.

He noted Moscow’s new law authorizing the use of force to protect Russian citizens abroad, and he pointed to unresolved conflicts on Russia’s borders [where presumably the new law could be used].

Medvedev acknowledged some positive tendencies such as work on a new strategic arms control agreement and renewed Russia-NATO contacts.  But he called the West’s reaction to Russia’s draft treaty on European security a barometer of relations with the U.S. and NATO.  He said it could prevent conflicts like Georgia-South Ossetia.  Medvedev asserted that, unfortunately, far from all countries and politicians drew the correct lessons from the August 2008 events.  And, unfortunately, he said the reestablishment of Georgia’s military potential continues with external assistance.

Then Medvedev turned more to the exact points of his speech.

He said the main goal is the qualitative improvement of the armed forces, the creation of a modern army and fleet equipped with the newest weapons.  He said last year the organizational base for this was established, as planned, without expending additonal resources.

In 2009, Moscow got its authorized personnel down to 1 million, and, according to the President, the Defense Ministry largely achieved its task of getting to the military’s future combat composition.  Medvedev said the results of Osen-2009 confrmed this, and more exercises like it are needed and need to have a ‘systematic character.’  Because, “Without this there simply are no armed forces.”

Medvedev called the training of officers the ‘most important task. Motivated, high-class specialists are needed, but the recently degraded military educational system and its material base need improvement. Medvedev said particular attention also needs to go to sergeants.  They need to be capable of replacing front-line officers when needed, according to the Supreme CINC.

On to rearmament . . .

Medvedev called the task of reequipping the troops with new armaments ‘extremely complex and very important.’  He said last year Russia stabilized the condition of its arms and equipment, despite the financial crisis, and fulfilled the GOZ, although not without problems.

He called the contracting mechanism for arms purchases ‘not effective enough,’ and said we are  working on this, but it’s slow.  This year the State Armaments Program, 2011-2020 will be written.  Medvedev gave the government the task of renewing arms and equipment at an average rate of 9-11 percent annually to allow Moscow to reach 70 percent modern armaments by 2020.  Reequipping has to be supported by full and timely financing.  He referred to his Poslaniye list of  priority systems and arms to be acquired.  He said this task will not be adjusted, and old weapons need to be decommissioned [He seems to have gotten it into his head that new means good and old bad which is not necessarily the case with Russian weapons.  What happens if you scrap lots of stuff, but you don’t succeed in producing new stuff?]. 

Medvedev said, as he’s already said more than once, steps are needed to bring order to the use, storage, and upkeep of missiles, ammunition, and explosives.  The events of the last year have shown there are problems here [alluding to Ulyanovsk, Karabash, etc.].

Medvedev noted another issue, providing the armed forces with automated command and control, and information systems, and transferring the military to digital comms by 2012, as put forth in the Poslaniye.  He said Zapad-2009 worked on mobile automated C2, but this was only a beginning to the work, which needs to be intensified, because “the communications situation is problematic.”

The President said forces will increase their combat readiness in their new TO&E structures [aren’t they 95 or 98 percent combat ready already?].  The main effort will be forming and training inter-service troop and force groupings, and supporting nuclear deterrence forces.  Medvedev said he’ll attend the main, key phases the coming Vostok-2010 operational-strategic exercise.

Medvedev obligatorily cited increasing the prestige of military service and improving the social defense of servicemen as a priority task.  

“I’d like to note that all obligations of the state to current and released servicemen will be fulfilled unconditionally, I will not accept any amendments for budget changes, or for other reasons.”

Medvedev said the government has the clear task to guarantee that all servicemen needing permanent housing have it by the end of this year, and service housing by the end of 2012.

“The realization of this task is not going badly, I will also take this under my personal control.”

Finally, Medvedev spoke for a moment to pay issues.  Increasing pay, and instituting a new pay system for active duty troops from the beginning of 2012, and increasing pensions to retired military men [but nothing specific promised].

He said he thinks premium pay or the well-known Order 400 brought respectable results, and it will be important to preserve ways of rewarding servicemen with extra money under the new pay system, and he expects proposals on doing this.

Defense Minister Serdyukov had some comments after Medvedev’s speech, but they’ll have to wait until tomorrow.