Candidate Vladimir Putin’s election manifesto on the military and national security appeared in today’s Rossiyskaya gazeta. The rambling 6,500-word essay reads like most campaign literature — a series of feel-good sound bites with inconvenient facts, details, and background left out.
But let’s get at it.
Putin says the changing world presents risks of an unpredictable nature. He insinuates that Russia should expect challenges to its sovereignty over its natural resources. It can’t tempt others by weakness. Strategic nuclear deterrence preserved Russia’s sovereignty in the difficult 1990s as it does today.
Putin continues his habit of excoriating the long-ago 1990s but largely ignoring what he did or didn’t do during the 2000s.
He points right off to the GPV’s 19 trillion rubles to modernize the Armed Forces, and the coming FTsP’s 3 trillion for the OPK. And, he says, he’s convinced the country can afford these expenditures.
Putin then turns to the nature of future war. He wants the military to “look over the horizon” at the nature of threats in 30-50 years to determine what the army will need.
Deterrence has worked, and Russia keeps its nuclear “powder” dry. But Putin points to the mass introduction of long-range, precise conventional arms becoming decisive even in a global conflict.
Someone tell Putin this is not news. But there’s more.
Putin reveals that space and information (or cyber) warfare may be decisive in the future. Beyond this, he continues, new beam, geophysical, wave, genetic, and even psychophysical weapons may be developed. Their effects may be comparable to nuclear weapons but more acceptable politically. So, expect the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression to decline.
He then segues wildly to responding quickly and effectively to other new challenges, and how Russia’s ODKB partners will help stabilize the “Eurasian space.”
Putin proceeds to a long-winded explanation of how the army saved Russia in the terrible 1990s. As mentioned earlier, he doesn’t have a lot to say about the eight years he was Supreme CINC.
Putin claims he rejected a proposal (he attributes to then General Staff Chief Kvashnin) to move SSBNs from the Pacific and consolidate them in the Northern Fleet. He says permanent readiness units with contractees were formed on all strategic axes, and, he claims, they allowed Russia to “force Georgia to peace” in August 2008.
No mention that the large-scale introduction of contract service failed miserably during this time. Also no mention of “winning” the Second Chechen War by ceding federal control of that republic to a brutal young warlord.
Putin rightly notes the Soviet Army’s mobilization model made no sense for Russia, and there was no alternative to building a New Army [starting in late 2008 when he was not president, and after things went so well for the army in Georgia]. He admits there were difficulties and mistakes in this process, but goes on to describe his view of what’s been done in the army.
Full-up permanent readiness brigades have replaced old cadre units. “Non-core, auxiliary functions” have been moved out of the army to maximize time for training. And effective Defense Ministry sub-units responsible for the military order have to guarantee the effective formation of technical requirements for the development and production of arms and equipment.
Yes, but that’s not happening yet.
Putin lists other changes in the Russian military. C2 organs cut by 50 percent. Four districts with air, air defense, and naval forces subordinate to them. Seven large air bases established. Twenty-eight airfields renovated, and 12 more set for this year. The share of modern ICBMs increased from 13 to 25 percent. Ten more regiments to be reequipped with Yars or Topol-M. Putin says Russia has accepted its new strategic ALCM. Dolgorukiy and Nevskiy will soon enter the fleet. The Navy’s renewed its presence on the world’s oceans.
Then the Prime Minister turns to tasks for the next ten years — rearmament: nuclear forces, VKO, comms, recce, C2, EW, UAVs and unmanned strike systems, transport aviation, individual soldier systems and protection, precision weapons and defense against them. And he reemphasizes, new generation precision weapons need development and a larger place in Russia’s future doctrine.
Putin seems to say Russia’s happier with the capability of defeating any missile defense than trying to develop its own. He again promises effective, asymmetrical steps to counter any U.S. MD.
Then, a ten-year acquisition laundry list from candidate Putin:
- 400 ICBMs and SLBMs.
- 8 Borey SSBNs.
- About 20 multipurpose submarines.
- More than 50 surface ships.
- Nearly 100 military satellites.
- More than 600 aircraft.
- More than 1,000 helicopters.
- 28 regimental sets of S-400.
- 38 battalions of Vityaz SAMs.
- 10 brigades of Iskander-M.
- More than 2,300 tanks.
- About 2,000 SP artillery systems.
- 17,000 military vehicles.
The tanks are really surprising. And the list doesn’t really even match the ten-year tasks Putin set out.
Look for the second half later. It covers army social issues and the OPK.