Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds
The NIC has released its latest Global Trends publication. Hat tip to Newsru.com and Igor Korotchenko for taking note of it. As usual, and rightly, the document focuses more on “megatrends,” and less on individual countries. Nevertheless, here are excepts of its forecast for Russia.
Under the “Changing Calculations of Key Players,” the NIC says:
“Russia’s strategic calculations will depend to a great extent on whether Russian leaders decide to increase Russia’s integration into the international system and mitigate the threat of future armed conflict or whether they choose to continue Russia’s relative isolation and mistrust of others, exacerbating interstate tensions. Russia has serious concerns regarding the threat posed by a rapidly expanding China, particularly Beijing’s growing appetite for natural resources which could eventually encroach upon the Russian Far East and Siberia. Russian leaders believe that they need to be wary of the potential for the US and NATO to intervene in a conflict involving Russia and one of the former Soviet republics.”
The section on military trends has the following:
“Nuclear Disfavor vs. Nuclear Renaissance. Nuclear ambitions in the US and Russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy is a US objective, while Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy.”
The following appears in a textbox entitled “Russia: Potential Global Futures.”
“Russia’s role in the world during the next two decades will be shaped by the rising challenges it faces at home as well as in the global environment. Russia’s economy is its Achilles’ heel. Its budget is heavily dependent on energy revenue; efforts to modernize the economy have made little progress; and its aging of the workforce will be a drag on economic growth.”
“Russia’s population is projected to decline from almost 143 million in 2010 to about 130 million in 2030. Although Russia’s fertility rate is similar to that of many European countries and aging populations are also a drag of European economies, life expectancy is about 15 years lower for Russians than for Europeans: since 2007 the size of the Russian workforce has been declining and it will continue to do so for the next two decades.”
“However, Russia’s greatest demographic challenge could well be integrating its rapidly growing ethnic Muslim population in the face of a shrinking ethnic Russian population. There are now about 20 million Muslims in Russia, comprising about 14 percent of the population. By 2030, that share is projected to grow to about 19 percent. Russia’s changing ethnic mix already appears to be a source of growing social tensions.”
“To enhance its economic outlook, Russia will need to improve the environment for foreign investment and create opportunities for Russian exports of manufactured goods. Russia’s entry into World Trade Organization (WTO ) should provide a boost to these efforts and help Moscow to diversify the economy: by one estimate Russia’s membership in the WTO could provide a substantial boost to the economy, adding 3 percent to GDP in the short term and 11 percent over the longer term.”
“Russia’s relations with the West and China are also likely to be a critical factor in determining whether Russia moves toward becoming a more stable, constructive global player during the next two decades. We see three possibilities:”
“1. Russia could become more of a partner with others, most probably, in a marriage of convenience, not of values. Russia’s centuries-long ambivalence about its relationship with the West and outside is still at the heart of the struggle over Russia’s strategic direction.”
“2. Russia might continue in a more or less ambivalent relationship with the other powers, but over the next 20 years this path would likely be a more troublesome one for international cooperation if Russia rebuilds its military strength and must contend with an increasingly powerful China.”
“3. Russia could become a very troublesome country, trying to use its military advantage over its neighbors to intimidate and dominate. This outcome would be most likely if a Russian leader were facing rising public discontent over sagging living standards and darkening economic prospects and is looking to rally nationalist sentiments by becoming much more assertive in the Near Abroad.”
There’s not a lot new here. But it can’t go without comment.
Are the Russians really not integrated into the “international system?” Or do they obstruct because they don’t like the outcomes of the “system’s” operation? Moscow will probably never (at least not for a long, long time) agree with Western views on mitigating a future armed conflict, especially in a former Soviet republic. Russia always evinces more worry about the U.S. and NATO despite the claim of its “serious concerns” about a threat from China.
One can’t be sure what’s meant by “pursuing new concepts and capabilities” for nuclear warfighting. The Russians are active developing their strategic nuclear forces for two reasons. First, conventional force problems. Second, U.S. ballistic missile defense. Both require ensuring their deterrent is viable, now and somewhat down the road.
Yes, it’s the economy stupid (and demographics too). It’s hard for anyone to say what will happen with Russia’s economy, but the latter’s pretty much destiny at this point. Russia will need more than a better foreign investment climate and WTO to improve its long-term economic prospects. If years of windfall hydrocarbon revenues don’t do it, perhaps open politics, impartial rule-of-law, and serious anti-corruption efforts might be the path to a modernized, diversified, and stronger economy.
Are Russia’s external relations with the West and China critical in its behavior as a “global player?” Or does that behavior stem more from the country’s internal evolution or lack thereof?
The three possibilities look pretty familiar — pretty good Russia, not as good Russia, and bad Russia. We’ve had the first and second mostly, and a taste of the third occasionally, over the last 20 years. And elements of one and two, or two and three, can occur at the same time.
Overall, the Russian discussion in Global Trends 2030 is disappointing.
Russian Defense Policy 