Category Archives: Command and Control

Goodbye GRU Spetsnaz, Hello Army Spetsnaz

Writing in last Friday’s Stoletiye.ru, Rossiyskaya gazeta correspondent Sergey Ptichkin says that, practically on its 60th anniversary, GRU Spetsnaz have landed in a most unexpected place – the Ground Troops.  His piece is full of bitter sarcasm.

Ptichkin concludes:

“The GRU Spetsnaz brigades have transferred into the Ground Troops structure.  Several units have disbanded altogether.  Ranks for duties have been lowered.  Now a senior lieutenant will command a reconnaissance group, and that’s the ceiling.  All warrant officers have been dismissed – there’s no longer such a rank in the army.  And it’s strange that professional sergeants haven’t magically appeared in place of full-grown warrants.  The issue of halting parachute training for reconnaissance men is on the agenda.  Really, why parachutes if they’ve become ‘pure infantrymen?’  They can deliver them to any rebellious village in the mountains or forests on trains or in KamAZes.”

According to Ptichkin, professional Spetsnaz believe:

“. . . it’s simply impossible to train an eighteen-year-old boy into a genuine reconnaissance man-saboteur in one year.  In Afghanistan, Spetsnaz soldiers were sent out only after a year of intensive combat training.  That is real service, when a professional military reconnaissance man was born even at the very lowest level, began a year after callup, but now they’re dismissed into the reserves where they forget everything they learned after a few months.”

Ptichkin recalls the GRU Spetsnaz’ anniversary ten years ago.  Even though their relations with the Spetsnaz were tense, the Defense Minister and General Staff Chief came and paid their respects.

But this year:

“Neither the Defense Minister, nor the Chief of the General Staff, not even their current chief – the Ground Troops CINC came.”

“Many veterans and even serving officers consider this day a quiet farewell to the GRU Spetsnaz, born 60 years ago.  It’s possible something more mobile, combat ready, and effective will take its place.”

So he’s thrown Putin and Medvedev’s own description of the kind of army they want back at them.  Of course, the Spetsnaz have always considered themselves the ultimate fighting force.

Ptichkin says the Defense Minister didn’t even issue a traditional order of recognition for the day of Spetsnaz troops.

“There is still the symbol of military reconnaissance – the bat [literally, ‘flying mouse’].  But very soon it’ll be possible to boldly replace this silent night hunter on the emblem with a grey field mouse.  A sweet and inoffensive ground-pounder.”

ITAR-TASS’ coverage of the Spetsnaz anniversary also clearly identified them as subordinate to the Ground Troops, CINC General-Colonel Aleksandr Postnikov, and his Chief of Reconnaissance, Deputy Chief of Staff for Reconnaissance, Colonel Vladimir Mardusin.

The press service said Mardusin indicated that:

“. . . at present, army Spetsnaz are organized in independent brigades of special designation, which exist in every military district, and battalions in several combined arms formations of the Southern Military District.  Within the formation of the new profile of the armed forces, independent brigades of special designation were transferred to the Ground Troops and are in direct subordination to military district commanders / unified strategic commands.”

Izvestiya’s Dmitriy Litovkin predicted the GRU Spetsnaz’ transfer from the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) to the Ground Troops last November on the day of military intelligence (6 November).  This was after the 67th, 12th, and 3rd Spetsnaz brigades were disbanded, and even the 16th was in danger of the same.

Igor Korotchenko told Litovkin:

“It’s possible to judge what’s happening in the GRU only through open information.  For example, one of the results of the reform is taking the force component from the GRU and resubordinating Spetsnaz to the military district commanders.  Only space, radioelectronic, and agent reconnaissance, and also the analytic service remain in today’s ‘Aquarium.’”

Just a reminder, this would mean they were taken even before the six old MDs were reformed into 4 MDs / OSKs.  The poor performance of the GRU generally and the Spetsnaz specifically in the 2008 Georgian conflict may have provided impetus for the change.  Litovkin and others have reported that the GRU and Spetsnaz received an ‘unsatisfactory’ for their efforts in that brief war.   Meanwhile, subordinating Spetsnaz to warfighting MD CINCs on different strategic directions would seem to make sense, the angst of the GRU, its officers, and veterans notwithstanding.

We should, however, get back to the original Ptichkin article.  It has a lot of interesting stuff you might want to peruse.  Some is hyperbolic though, so take it with a grain of salt . . .

He describes all details of their formation from 24 October 1950.  The Spetsnaz were subordinate to the General Staff (GRU) because they were first and foremost strategic, and strategic nuclear, warfighting assets designed to disrupt U.S. and NATO capabilities – nuclear weapons, logistics, transport, communications, etc. – in deep rear areas, including even North America.

And, according to Ptichkin, they were supermen capable of singly accomplishing missions not even combined arms sub-units could handle.  And the Spetsnaz were more secret than Soviet nuclear weapons; not even all generals or marshals knew about more than their general outlines.

Everything changed with Afghanistan and glasnost.  Every power structure wanted its own special forces.  And the GRU Spetsnaz were thrust into the forefront of a war they weren’t created for.  But through the skill of their commanders they adapted and were successful.  Ptichkin claims a single Spetsnaz detachment could pacify an entire province.  And, according to him, if the Spetsnaz had been unleashed fully, the Afghan war would have been won and the country under Soviet control by the mid-1980s.

He says Tajikistan in 1992 proves this isn’t a fantasy.  The 15th Spetsnaz brigade under Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, one of the accused in the Chubays’ assassination attempt, was given a free hand there and pacified the country. 

Ptichkin says Spetsnaz weren’t so involved in the First Chechen War, and the results were bad of course.  But they were used more extensively in the Second Chechen.  And he claims the Chechen Spetsnaz battalion under Sulim Yamadayev prevented Georgian saboteurs from blowing the Roki tunnel in August 2008.

And so, says Ptichkin, for 30 years, Spetsnaz have fought in places they weren’t intended to be, but have fought beautifully anyway.  Instead of landing in he main enemy’s rear areas, they are sitting on their own territory prepared, in extreme circumstances, to be sent to the next hot spot in the CIS, and not further afield.

As proof of how they’ve been used, it’s interesting to note the holiday press which says 8 Spetsnaz became Heroes of the Soviet Union in 40 years, but 44 have become Heroes of the Russian Federation in less than 20 years.

LRA Command-Staff Exercise

Today Russian Long-Range Aviation (LRA or ДА) began a large three-day command-staff exercise (CSX or КШУ) under Air Forces CINC General-Colonel Aleksandr Zelin’s direction.  The CSX involves units from Siberia, the Far East, but also Lipetsk, and 40 aircraft including the Tu-160, Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, Il-78, A-50, MiG-29, MiG-31, and Su-27SM.  They will operate both from their home and temporary bases, and fly over central Russia, the Far East, and extreme northern parts of the Russian Federation.  A-50 crews will control the airspace for the exercise.  Il-78 tankers will conduct mid-air refueling, and ranges at Pemboy near Vorkuta and at Nogotay in Irkutsk Oblast will be used for missile launches and other weapons training.

Larger Significance of the Serdyukov Flap

Pavel Felgengauer

You’ll find bits of the following by Pavel Felgengauer in various English language articles, but not his full argument as laid out here.

Writing in Novaya gazeta this week, military commentator Pavel Felgengauer concludes that Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov remains in place, but the army’s problems are growing.  He says:

“Today a dangerous situation of general decay in discipline and order is taking shape which could lead to a loss of control over the armed forces.”

The slow disintegration of the Soviet Armed Forces required Serdyukov to take immediate, radical, and often not well thought out reforms, according to Felgengauer.  Mass officer and warrant officer dismissals have put 70 thousand outside the TO&E “at the command’s disposition,” essentially just waiting for dismissal.  Only 10,000 are junior officers whom the Defense Ministry owes little by way of benefits.

A bit of explanation that Felgengauer doesn’t give you.  We haven’t had any independent observer put this number so high.  These 70,000 are waiting for housing because, by law, surplus officers can’t be discharged until they get permanent apartments.  But they aren’t living on much while they wait.  Because they don’t have duty posts, they get only rank pay, not various monthly supplements that officers in active positions get.  Rank pay might be only 30 percent of what they received when they were in the TO&E.

But back to Felgengauer.  He turns next to NCOs.  He says experts say, with a million-man army and 150,000 officers, the Russian Armed Forces need 200,000 or 300,000 sergeants.  But in Serdyukov’s ‘new profile’ TO&E, there are billets for only 90,000 contractee-specialists and NCOs together.

And these are the guys who’re supposed to help the shrunken officer corps keep order in the ranks.

Felgengauer then recites the Main Military Prosecutor’s announcement that barracks violence is up 50 percent in 2010.  He says incidents of open ‘hooliganism,’ criminal violence, and inter-ethnic conflict are all rising.  And only a declining number of officers is there to hold all this together – with the help of an inadequate NCO corps.  This is why, says Felgengauer, the Soviet officer corps relied on dedovshchina as a lever to keep order among the troops.  He may be suggesting Russian officers are doing the same thing now.

He concludes many are dissatisfied with this state of affairs, and they all focus blame on Serdyukov, somewhat unfairly, according to Felgengauer.  Criticism is focused on the man who actually tried to fix Russia’s decaying defense department, and not his predecessors who drove it to ruin.

Of course, one could ask Felgengauer isn’t this the fate of all reformers?  Maybe those being reformed were happy with the decaying and ineffective bureaucracy and forces that were comfortable, and perhaps profitable, for them.

Felgengauer returns to the issue of attempts to train NCOs.  Instead of officers, military schools are supposed to prepare sergeants instead.  But only the erstwhile Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School is actually doing it, and, ironically, this is where the storm over Serdyukov arose.

Felgengauer concludes that Putin and Medvedev agreed with Serdyukov’s reforms, and so they aren’t ready to dismiss him now.  But the problems and tensions surrounding the Defense Ministry are growing.

In a kind of postscript, Felgengauer sees the decision for military police as something of a ridiculous answer to disorder in the army.  First, they will be selected from the ranks of the most disgruntled – the dismissed officers.  The concept behind using some ‘dissatisfied-dismissed’ to keep order among other dissatisfied is just a little inscrutable.  And, in the best case, it’ll take over a year to change all the laws and regulations to allow military police to operate.  Will Serdyukov and his reforms remain intact by then?

Military Not Ready for Winter

Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin apparently doesn’t want to share any of the blame this winter.

At a government meeting today, Basargin said he’s worried about whether military towns are capable of preparing for winter in the necessary fashion.  ITAR-TASS quoted him:

“This year problems with preparation for winter have already arisen in 95 percent of military towns.”

He said there are places like St. Petersburg providing positive examples, but “in a number of regions the military is hiding the true state of affairs from the administration.”

He indicated this could lead to recurrences of last winter’s situation with the frozen ‘Steppe’ garrison in Transbaykal.

Basargin added:

“Minregion and the MVD have taken this situation under firm control, I have reported to the chairman of the government [Putin] about it.  The decision was singular:  all military towns have to perform all procedures mandatory for civilian populated areas.  I ask administrators in all areas to give this special attention.”

So Basargin’s decided in advance he won’t take the heat (or lack of it) and the blame this year.  It’s all shifted squarely, and early, onto the Defense Ministry.  One finds it a little odd that Basargin and Minregion would call Serdyukov out so publicly over this.  Maybe they really see disaster looming.

It’s clear military base infrastructure, especially that which Serdyukov wants to do away with, isn’t getting much attention and there are lots of other demands on the military’s money.  To be fair, a lot of garrisons were in a really bad state and grossly neglected long before Serdyukov arrived.  There are, however, several things he’s done which make the situation worse.  The shift to brigades and renovation of the MD structure have caused shuffling that could leave some officers, families, military pensioners, or troops out in the cold.  Especially in the most severe climate regions.  And cuts in support troops and services, and their privatization, probably isn’t going smoothly in remote (and cold) areas.  This could cause disruptions in winter logistics.

We’ll see how the winter goes.

More Testing for YeSU TZ

RIA Novosti reports that, starting tomorrow, the Defense Ministry will test its developmental Unified Tactical Level Command and Control System (YeSU TZ or ЕСУ ТЗ) on its range at Alabino in Moscow Oblast until 23 October. 

This is not the first time the system’s been tested, but a Ground Troops spokesman says:

“In the course of the exercises for the first time the capability of the given system to support the work of sub-unit [battalion and below] command and control organs equipped with its command and control stations [YeSU TZ] will be tested in the course of combined arms combat.”

As is often the case, the 5th Independent Taman Motorized Rifle Brigade will be used in the testing.  Command and control for the brigade will also employ “new technical means.”

Proposals and recommendations on the use of the automated system will be made for combat regulations based on the results of the exercise.  Mi-24 helicopters, Su-25 aircraft, and Russian-produced UAVs will also participate.

Litovkin on What the GPV Will Buy

Viktor Litovkin (photo: RIA Novosti)

Returning to procurement and the GPV . . . in this week’s Delovoy vtornik, NVO’s Viktor Litovkin also asks what will 19 trillion rubles be spent on. 

He says the answer isn’t simple.  During the last 20 years of ‘starvation rations,’ the armed forces got handfuls of essential combat equipment, and, meanwhile, a dangerous imbalance between strike and combat support systems was created.  And this was obvious against Georgia in 2008. 

Litovkin says this imbalance has to be corrected, meanwhile priorities like strategic nuclear forces can’t be forgotten – not just the offensive triad, but also the missile attack early warning system (SPRN), missile defense (PRO), and aerospace defense (VKO). 

Like Viktor Yesin of late, Litovkin asks how Russia will replace its aging strategic offensive arms to stay up to the limits of the Prague / New START agreement.  Half the Russian force is SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 ICBMs which will be retired in 7-10 years.  Moscow needs to build 400 strategic systems to replace them.  He doesn’t even mention Delta III and IV SSBNs and their aging SLBMS.  And Russia has only the SS-27, RS-24 Yars, Sineva, and Bulava to replace them. 

Litovkin expects a very large amount of money to be spent not just on replacing strategic systems, but also reequipping the enterprises that produce them. 

He turns to his second priority – also demonstrated by the Georgian war – precision-guided weapons, which in turn depend on reconnaissance-information support and equipment in space, on long-range surveillance aircraft [AWACS], and UAVs. 

Priority three – automated command and control systems (ASU).  He cites Popovkin on linking all service C2 systems into one system over 2-3 years. 

Litovkin says you can’t forget about the Navy, but he mentions just the Borey-class SSBNs, and the need for a wide range of surface ships.  And he makes the point [made by many] that Mistral is all well and good, but it’ll have to have multipurpose combatants operating in its battle group.  They need to be built, and they won’t cost a small amount of money. 

One can’t forget aviation either.  Litovkin cites a $100 million per copy cost for 60 fifth generation fighters [that’s a significant 180-billion-ruble bite out of the GPV].  He notes Vega is working on an updated Russian AWACS (A-100).  And, like Korotchenko, he mentions transport aircraft, but also combat and support helicopters. 

And so, says Litovkin, the question arises – isn’t the country putting out a lot of money to rearm its army? 

Viktor Litovkin (photo: Ekho Moskvy)

Being bold, he says, not really.  He actually uses that accursed 22 trillion figure, which is procurement for all power ministries.  If he used 19 trillion, it would be 1.9 trillion or $63 billion per year for Russia against $636 billion for the U.S., $78 billion for China, $58 billion for the U.K., and $51 billion for Japan.  But he doesn’t say this is annual procurement, the GPV, against the total annual defense budget for these other countries.  A bit of comparing one piece of pie to a whole pie.  Nevertheless, he concludes this makes Russia far from champion when it comes to military expenditures. 

Litovkin’s last word is Russia will remain one of the G8 with a powerful, combat capable, and effective army, but without it, only a raw materials appendage of either the West or East. 

But one wonders, hasn’t Russia long been in the G8 without that kind of armed forces?  Doesn’t breaking away from the raw materials supplier role have more to do with developing an open, attractive, innovative, value-added, and competitive economy (and a political system and society to match) than with military power? 

Collegium in Southern Military District

Anatoliy Serdyukov conducted another extramural Defense Ministry collegium today, this time in Rostov-na-Donu, and the new Southern Military District (MD).

RIA Novosti quoted a spokeswoman who said:

“Participants in the session are reviewing issues concerning formation of the YuVO.  In particular, they will review questions about optimizing the deployment of formations and military units on the district’s territory, work with personnel, medical and housing support for servicemen, and also preparations for the heating season.”

So, they’re talking about possibly moving some brigades or regiments to better locations, and probably about who will command some of them.

The YuVO began operations in its new composition on 1 October.

According to ITAR-TASS, Serdyukov spoke of the ‘doubling’ of the ‘potential’ of the armed forces in the south with the establishment of the new district, but added this isn’t connected with the army’s counterterrorism missions in the region.

One would like to know how that ‘doubling’ was calculated since the MD’s ground units haven’t changed.

The Southern MD, or Unified Strategic Command (OSK) ‘South’ encompasses not only the former SKVO, but also the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla.

Collegium on MDs and Antiterrorism

Last Thursday, Defense Minister Serdyukov conducted an extramural ‘board of directors’ meeting in St. Petersburg.  The agenda had two publicized items — forming the new Western Military District (MD) and antiterrorism.

Deputy Defense Minister, General-Colonel Dmitriy Bulgakov (effectively chief of material-technical support) and acting commander of the new Western MD (ZVO or ЗВО), General-Colonel Arkadiy Bakhin reported on the new district.  Genshtab GOU Chief, General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak reported “On the Condition of Antiterrorist Work in the RF Armed Forces and Measures to Neutralize Terrorist Threats.”

In its coverage, ITAR-TASS noted that recommendations from forming the ZVO will be applied to the new Southern, Central, and Eastern MDs. 

After the collegium, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov told journalists that work on the ZVO was being closely analyzed, and all issues had been resolved in the main.  But its command doesn’t fully recognize the importance of its tasks, and its combat training demands higher quality work.  Makarov called this a consequence of the fact that, for 15 to 20 years, almost 85 percent of officers in command and control organs didn’t command troops. 

Of course, Makarov considers himself a ‘troop general’ and that 85 percent figure makes it easy for him to oversee cutting the officer corps by 50 percent.

Makarov said the terrorist attack near Buynaksk was being closely analyzed, and noted that commanders didn’t take measures necessary to protect their people.  But the tasks essential to countering terrorist threats have been identified.

Krasnaya zvezda reported that Serdyukov met human rights organization representatives during a break in the collegium.  More on this later.

What Serdyukov Said About Piter

Late, but worth capturing for future reference . . . .

By way of recap, on 3 September, Vice-Admiral Burtsev told the press the Navy headquarters move to St. Petersburg was off, and this was decided over a year ago.  But later the same day, he claimed he’d been misunderstood.

Then, on 8 September, Defense Minister Serdyukov took up the issue . . . whether he was asked or just elected to address this, we don’t know.

ITAR-TASS claims he put an end to recent media speculation about the Main Staff’s eventual move to Piter.

Serdyukov said:

 “No one has cancelled the decision to transfer the Navy Main Staff.  The planned work is on-going.  We said from the beginning that we didn’t intend to do this in the course of any short period of time, for example, in a year.  This is happening not quickly, but according to readiness.  At Admiralty in St. Petersburg, the place where the Main Staff will be located, renovation is on-going.  Within the limits of the work’s completion, we will move.     

“As far as the Command and Control Post (KPU or КПУ) goes, it won’t be transferred quickly, not even in the coming one-two years.  We will outfit it with absolutely new equipment, new resources.  There will be an absolutely new KPU.  The old KPU, most likely, will be mothballed.  Transferring it wouldn’t make any sense.  So there aren’t any changes in our plans.”

Be all this as it may, it seems like a sign that the Defense Ministry, Serdyukov, or someone else, and the Navy were (or are) still at odds over moving its headquarters to the northern capital.

Mr. Serdyukov’s Restrained Smile

Defense Minister Serdyukov (photo: Reuters)

 On 31 August, Sobesednik offered a not-altogether-serious, but nonetheless-interesting psychological portrait of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov . . . the magazine interviewed an expert in nonverbal  communication and microfacial expressions, a specialist in physiognomy, a professional image consultant, a handwriting analyst, and, yes, a numerologist. 

Of course, these observers had the advantage (or perhaps disadvantage) of knowing at least a little something about their subject, his reputation, and style beforehand. 

The nonverbal and microfacial expert said Serdyukov’s restrained smile and concentration are most characteristic of his expression.  He looks as if he’s suffering over the resolution of some problem with knitted brows, and he’s a man of few words.  His external appearance and pudginess suggest he senses and feels more than he hears or sees, and he likes both physical and psychological comfort. 

According to this observer, there’s nothing that bespeaks talent or charisma in Serdyukov, but he does exude efficiency and discipline. 

Finally, he concludes: 

“Anatoliy Serdyukov is a man capable of resolving problems on the orders of those who appointed him to this position.  His entire external appearance, his restrained gestures, constant concentration on business, and small number of public speeches speak exactly to this.”  

The physiognomy expert says Serdyukov’s round and soft appearance are characteristic of a peacetime military man.  A man occupied with logistical issues, who knows how to set goals and achieve them.  A businessman or administrator, not a wartime leader. 

His crooked brows and wrinkled forehead attest to difficulties in government service; it would have been easier for him in business.  A sharp visage compensates for his external softness.  His mouth is narrow; he is no orator.  However, his correctly formed ears connote someone who listens to information and the opinions of others. 

The image consultant notes Serdyukov practically never wears military attire.  He prefers his civilian clothing, and avoids ingratiating himself with the uniformed military.  His suits are conservative and classic.  He’s a restrained and severe man.  He can be somewhat aggressive (shown by the broad contrasting stripes on his ties).  Such people are usually burning to reform things and implement their ideas and goals, no matter what. 

The handwriting analyst says Serdyukov’s handwriting indicates his concrete way of thinking, and tactical planning.  He has a great sense of his own importance.  The pinching, arc, and intricacy of his letters show palpable internal emotion and willfulness, but other features indicate he’s inclined to self-control.  The constant requirement to control himself and hold his emotions is externally expressed as tension and restraint. 

Using Serdyukov’s birth date, the numerologist produced a number to reveal his character — 811962279112.  Four 1’s means he’s likely to be military, severe, and direct.  But the absence of 5’s means he has weak intuition and his actions are sometimes illogical. 

In all seriousness, it’s pretty easy to laugh all this off since Serdyukov’s a well-known public figure, but recall The Atlantic article describing Brenda Connors’ analysis of then-President Vladimir Putin’s gait, and how it explains his character and behavior. 

So Serdyukov’s a bit repressed.  In fairness, one probably shouldn’t expect any Defense Minister (or any minister for that matter) to be a happy man or woman.