Category Archives: RVSN

Ex-RVSN Deputy Commander Guilty of Corruption

Posted on March 17, 2021 | 2 comments

The GVSU site offered up a little sensation among its routine military crime reports recently. A general was convicted, and not just any general, but (now former) RVSN Deputy Commander General-Lieutenant Sergey Siver.

We’re not talking rear services or ground troops here, but a general officer with full knowledge of and responsibility for Russia’s land-based strategic nuclear forces.

For years people have argued that the kind of dysfunction described below may happen in the Russian armed forces, but not in its elite forces or important combat units. Well, it does.

Your author missed this one. The case came to light in September.

Also, Siver looked to be “green” or a good candidate for advancement, but it didn’t turn out that way. The 58-year-old general finished a three-year tour heading the RVSN’s most prestigious training establishment in 2019 and became a deputy commander in its headquarters. His prospects looked pretty good.

To reach that point, Siver stepped on every rung of the RVSN career ladder. He served in posts through command of a missile regiment, attended the General Staff Academy, and got command of the Irkutsk-based 29th Missile Division. Then he was commander of the 27th Missile Army — one of only three missile armies — in Vladimir before taking over the RVSN’s military academy.

Siver was one of a handful of generals with the experience to replace RVSN Commander General-Colonel Sergey Karakayev at some point. However, they are more contemporaries, and the RF MOD will probably go younger for the RVSN’s next commander.

According to Compromat.org, Siver may have faced a very serious charge at first, one possibly carrying a ten-year prison term. The site claimed that for many years he exacted tribute from subordinates in the form of money and gifts, some discovered at his home in Vladimir.

Those who ponied up reportedly got promotions, good assignments, and medals. Those who didn’t were subjected to severe pressure, transferred to remote units, or even dismissed from military service.

But Siver got off very easy against a much less severe charge.

Here’s a translation of the GVSU’s March 11 press-release on the case.

In Moscow oblast a serviceman has been convicted of misusing his official authority

The court found evidence, gathered by the Russian Federation Investigative Committee’s military investigative directorate for the Strategic Missile Troops (henceforth — RVSN), sufficient to deliver a guilty verdict on former deputy commander of the RVSN reserve general-lieutenant Sergey Siver. He was found guilty of committing a crime specified by ch. 1 art. 285 of the RF UK (misuse of official authority).

It was established that in August 2016 Siver, serving as chief of the federal state-owned military institution of higher education “Military Academy of Strategic Missile Troops named for Peter the Great” of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, illegally relieved the lead engineer of the scientific-research department Vasiliy Bugay of his service duties in order to carry out his own [trans. — Siver’s] personal errands. Despite non-fulfillment of his official duties, pay and bonuses were regularly disbursed to him [trans. — Bugay] until July 2019.

In November 2020 general-lieutenant Sergey Siver was retired from military service for health reasons by order of higher command.

Taking into account in the course of the preliminary investigation Siver acknowledged his guilt for what was done and voluntarily returned to the state budget more than 1.68 million rubles, previously paid to Bugay as wages and bonuses, the Reutov garrison military court punished him [trans. — Siver] in the form of a fine amounting to 60 thousand rubles.

As concerns Bugay on the basis of para. 2 ch. 1 art. 24 of the RF UPK (absence of corpus delicti) it was decided not to open a criminal case. The supervising organ agreed with this procedural decision.

Some restitution and a slap-on-the-wrist fine. No forfeiture of retirement or benefits. No more than mild embarrassment. The investigators and courts apparently didn’t buy Compromat’s story about Siver’s extensive history of corruption. One wonders how deep the inquiry went. Perhaps the Bugay incident was a one-time thing from Siver, but that seems hard to believe. Possibly much was swept under the rug.

Can it be that a “lead engineer” from the RVSN’s premier schoolhouse had so little of importance to do that the academy’s chief would have him do his personal chores instead?

From the MOD’s standpoint, the case — at least in mild form — was put on public display, but the decline of Russia’s free media ensured it couldn’t reach a wide audience.

Military corruption has been off the radar for a few years. The MOD claims it’s continually declining. But the GVSU may be reviving interest in the issue. Or perhaps corruption has continued all along and the Kremlin decided the Siver case should be publicized (a little) for its deterrent effect on the high command and senior officers.

2 Comments

Posted in Command and Control, Crime and Corruption, RVSN

Tagged , , ,

Blessing the Bomb?

Posted on February 26, 2020 | 2 comments

Blessing a Su-34 and its weapons in Volgodonsk

Blessing a Su-34 and its weapons in Volgodonsk

The debate over the propriety of Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) priests blessing Russian bombs and weapons of mass destruction (OMP) is heating up.

According to Interfaks, first deputy chief of the synod’s public relations and media department Aleksandr Shchipkov has expressed disagreement with a possible ban on the consecration of certain types of armaments.

Early this month Meduza reported the ROC’s Inter-Council Presence (an advisory body that helps draft church policy) suggested ending the practice of consecrating some conventional weapons and OMP. Its proposal will considered until at least June 1. The Presence argued that consecrating armaments doesn’t reflect the church’s traditions and should be “abolished from pastoral practice.”

The debate on blessing bombs apparently began last summer.

Interfaks reported that the proposed ban would stop the consecration of weapons which can kill “untold numbers of people” as well as “indiscriminate weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”

Priest consecrates mobile ICBM launchers

Priest consecrates mobile ICBM launchers

Shchipkov, however, said:

The essential motive of the document’s text really separates the soldier from his weapon, asserting, figuratively speaking, that it’s possible to bless the armor, but not the sword. But the Church can’t bless the man and his mission halfway . . . . Including the topic of banning the blessing of this or that type of weapon on the political agenda is an indirect blow to the people’s trust in the army and to the country’s sovereignty.

Responding to the biblical call to “turn the other cheek” against violence, Shchipkov said, “We have a right to turn our own cheek, but we are obligated to protect the cheek of those close to us.”

He claimed a ban on consecrating arms will be viewed as a sign of weakness by Russia’s enemies. (Seriously? Does he think blessing them makes the country stronger?)

Addressing nuclear weapons specifically, Shchipkov concluded:

It’s not necessary for us to repent an inclination toward the unjustified use of nuclear forces. It remains for us to say only that our policy of reasonable defense sufficiency lies in the mainstream of Christian principles.

We recall that military duty is highly valued in Orthodoxy. A weapon is sanctified by serving just and noble aims just as is any involuntary use of force. The subject of discussion should be the purposes of bearing and employing arms not blessing them. It’s important precisely who and how a weapon is used and with what intentions, but not specifically what he uses. Arms themselves don’t kill, but the people using them do, therefore it’s absurd to evaluate a weapon by the degree of its “morality.”

Wouldn’t want to spin into debating just war theory, etc. Suffice it to say it’s interesting that the Russians are discussing it. The argument’s been going on in the West since the dawn of the nuclear age.

Nevertheless, the image of Russian Orthodox priests sprinkling holy water on ICBM launchers isn’t a particularly good look for them, the Russian military, or the Kremlin. At least to Western eyes. But the average Ivan probably doesn’t worry about it too much.

Because of the ROC’s traditional subservience to the state, look for the church to go as Vladimir Putin indicates. That means more tanks will get sprinkled. 

2 Comments

Posted in Civil-Military Relations, RVSN, Strategic Deterrence

Tagged , , , , , ,

He Simply Couldn’t Take It

Posted on October 27, 2019 | 3 comments

Shamsutdinov detained in his barracks

Shamsutdinov detained in his barracks

Russian Army conscript Ramil Shamsutdinov may have killed his fellow servicemen because of the constant abuse he endured, according to a report in Gazeta.ru.

On October 25, Ramil Shamsutdinov killed eight personnel (including two officers) and seriously wounded two more during guard duty shift change at military unit 54160 in the Gornyy ZATO not far from Chita in Zabaykalye.

According to a former worker at the unit, one of the victims was “famous” for abusing his subordinates. Sources also said Shamsutdinov may have been ridiculed or singled out as a non-Russian. But the investigation on that score continues.

The 20-year-old was called up in early July, assessed to be psychologically stable, and allowed to carry a weapon. The draft board had placed him in the second group for “nervous-psychological stability” meaning he would experience a nervous breakdown only after being in a difficult or dangerous situation for a prolonged period. The MOD routinely trusts conscripts in this group to carry out missions with weapons and ordnance.

The MOD officially stated that Shamsutdinov’s actions may have been the result of a breakdown brought on by personal difficulties unrelated to his military service.

But, according to Gazeta.ru, media sources with sources in Shamsutdinov’s unit claim he was a target of constant abuse from other servicemen.

Tyumen news outlet 72.ru published a report from a unit source saying that one of Shamsutdinov’s victims, Senior Lieutenant Danil Pyankov, was well-known for abusing conscripts and driving them to a “serious psychological state.” Shamsutdinov is from a village in Tyumen.

The source said Pyankov once kept him awake studying military regulations for four days straight and forced his troops to put on and take off protective gear for five consecutive hours. He concluded Shamsutdinov simply couldn’t take it.

Shamsutdinov’s father — a policeman — said his son never complained about abuse from officers or more senior soldiers, i.e. dedovshchina. Friends say he once asked relatives to put money on someone else’s bank card because his was supposedly frozen. But he also said he planned to stay in the army as a contractee.

Unit 54160 is inside a closed administrative-territorial entity. It was formerly known as Chita-46 and is operated by the MOD’s 12th GUMO — Russia’s nuclear weapons custodial force.

It served the RVSN’s 4th Missile Division equipped with UR-100 (SS-11 / Sego) ICBMs at Drovyanaya in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1970s and 1980s, it transitioned to RSD-10 (SS-20 / Saber) IRBMs, then to mobile RT-2PM (SS-25 / Sickle) ICBMs before disbanding in 2002.

The unit is still under GUMO command and RVSN prosecutors went to investigate. It likely serves the 200th Artillery Brigade and newly-established 3rd Missile Brigade (Iskander missiles) in Gornyy and Drovyanaya.

The Russian military has avoided similar incidents for some time. The MOD claims the climate inside units and barracks has improved drastically over the past decade, but this assessment is apparently exaggerated.

With the fall draft underway, the MOD has to question the quality, or lack of quality, in the screening of potential soldiers. 

3 Comments

Posted in Hazing, Law, Order, and Discipline, Manpower, RVSN

Tagged , , , ,

Grom-2019

Posted on October 15, 2019 | 2 comments

A Russian MOD press-release outlined Grom-2019 — Russia’s annual strategic nuclear forces exercise which begins today and runs through Thursday.

Grom-2019

The MOD officially describes the activity as a “strategic command-staff exercise in the command and control of the Armed Forces.”

RVSN, LRA, VTA, and Northern and Pacific Fleet forces will be involved. Ballistic and cruise missile launches will terminate on the Pemboy, Kura, and Chizha ranges.

Pemboy near Vorkuta is typically for ALCMs; Kura and Chizha are for ballistic missiles. VTA tankers will refuel Russian bombers. 

The head of GU MVS General-Major Yevgeniy Ilin indicated activity will include 16 ballistic — Yars ICBMs and Bulava,  Sineva (SS-N-23), and Stingray (SS-N-18) SLBMs — and cruise missile firings.

The press-release said 12,000 personnel will participate in the exercise along with 213 ICBM launchers, 105 aircraft including five bombers, and as many as 15 surface ships and five submarines.

2 Comments

Posted in Command and Control, RVSN, Strategic Deterrence, Training and Exercises

Tagged

“Dead Hand” Alive and Modernized?

Posted on November 12, 2018 | 3 comments

From Friday’s news . . . .

“Russia could shift to preemptive nuclear strike doctrine — ex-chief of RVSN”

“Retaliatory nuclear strike command and control system ‘Perimeter’ has been modernized”

“Moscow. 9 November. INTERFAKS-AVN – Russia could renounce its retaliatory strike doctrine in favor of a preemptive nuclear attack on a potential aggressor, if the U.S. deploys missiles on the territory of European states, said General-Colonel Viktor Yesin, who led the Main Staff of the Missile Troops of Strategic Designation in 1994-1996.”

“‘If the Americans start deploying their missiles in Europe, we have no choice but to abandon a retaliatory strike doctrine and move to a preemptive strike doctrine,’ V. Yesin said in an interview published in the weekly ‘Zvezda.'”

“He also said the Soviet-created ‘command’ missile system ‘Perimeter’ capable of transmitting launch commands to intercontinental missiles after an enemy nuclear strike on Russia has been modernized.”

“‘The ‘Perimeter’ system is functioning, and it is even improved,’ said V. Yesin.”

“Answering the question if the ‘Perimeter’ system can guarantee a retaliatory strike in the case of an enemy preemptive attack, the general said: ‘When it is working, we will already have few means remaining – we can launch only the missiles which survive after the aggressor’s first strike.'”

“The expert also stated that ‘we still don’t have an effective response to American medium-range missiles in Europe.'”

“‘Perimeter’ (in English Dead Hand) is an automated command and control system for a massive nuclear retaliatory strike developed in the USSR. According to open information, the ‘Perimeter’ system was created as a component part of the Airborne Command Post (VKP) system under the codename ‘Link’ developed in the Soviet Union.”

“The airborne command and control post on the Il-86VKP aircraft, airborne radio relay on the Il-76RT, silo-based command missile (KR) ‘Perimeter’ and mobile KR ‘Gorn’¹ were part of ‘Link.'”

“In a crisis period three Il-86VKP would have had the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff on board.”

“‘The aircraft didn’t have passenger windows so those on-board wouldn’t be blinded by the flash of nuclear blasts. Computers and communications were located in the nose. Two electrical power generators were hung under the wings. They guaranteed long operation of all aircraft systems,’ it says in a book from the series ‘World of Russian Weapons’ published in 2016.”

“At the determined moment the Il-86VKP would launch an 8 km long antenna which not even impulses from nuclear explosions could affect. Using this antenna the aircraft would transmit commands to launch all the country’s intercontinental missiles even in the event that all underground KP [trans. command posts] were destroyed by the aggressor’s nuclear strike.”

“The radio relay aircraft Il-76RT would transmit commands to launch missiles in distant regions, including those deployed on submarines in the Northern and Pacific Fleets.”

“‘Perimeter’ and ‘Gorn’ missiles could have transmitted missile launch commands when the aggressor had already delivered a surprise first strike and destroyed communications systems. The KR, having launched into space, where no satellite or enemy nuclear explosions could reach them, would transmit radio signals from there. The missiles ‘awakened’ by them would take off and strike the aggressor.”

“The ‘Perimeter’ missiles were reliably protected on the ground by concrete silos. ‘Gorns’ deployed on missile transporters permanently on the move.”

“According to expert assessments, the ‘Link’ system, including space KR, was one of the most important factors deterring the U.S. from a nuclear attack on the USSR.”

An interesting piece bringing Perimeter back into the news. Yesin calls the system Dead Hand. But he doesn’t describe how the system is engaged, any atmospheric, seismic, and radiation sensors, or ground-based command, control, and communications link monitors that some claim allowed it to function autonomously. Others assert these elements, though considered, were never incorporated into Perimeter.

Russian military commentator Viktor Murakhovskiy has pointed out that, even if the U.S. quits the INF Treaty, Washington is a long way from deploying new intermediate- or shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe. So Yesin’s recommendation for a change in Moscow’s declaratory nuclear doctrine is premature.

¹ Command missile Gorn [trans. bugle, trumpet, etc.] had GRAU index 15Zh53 and deployed with Soviet SS-20 IRBMs.

3 Comments

Posted in Command and Control, Military Doctrine, RVSN, Strategic Deterrence

Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , ,

More on the Conscription Campaign

Posted on July 3, 2017 | 2 comments

The Russian military press has published relatively little on this spring’s draft which is set to end in just a few days.  There are, however, data points worth examining against what was written here.

Northern Fleet draftees lined up with their paperwork in hand

Northern Fleet draftees lined up with paperwork in hand

On June 21, Mil.ru noted that Russia’s Western MD is getting 48,000 of this spring’s conscripts.  That’s a pretty enormous 34 percent of all draftees.

Mil.ru also reported the Black Sea Fleet has gotten 1,700 of 2,600 new men it’s expecting.

Russian Orthodox priest blesses Black Sea Fleet draftees

Russian Orthodox priest blesses Black Sea Fleet draftees

We already heard that the Baltic and Northern Fleets were getting 5,000 and 2,500 conscripts respectively, putting the Navy over 10,000 without counting the Pacific Fleet’s share.  If we guess the latter gets 3,000, this puts the Navy at 13,000 for the spring campaign.  That would be nine percent of all draftees, not the predicted six percent.  A similar number from last fall would make 26,000, and conscription would account for perhaps 19 percent of Navy manpower.  

On May 21, the Russian military indicated that 8,000 draftees were going to the RVSN.  That’s six percent of the spring cohort rather than the estimated eight.  About 26 percent of RVSN personnel might be conscripts.

The MOD website reported on May 7 that the VDV will take more than 6,000 draftees.  That gives the Russian airborne four percent of the current allocation of conscripts, about as predicted.  A roughly similar number in the fall would mean the VDV are 30 percent conscript-manned.

Mil.ru added:

“Few conscripts are fortunate enough to get to serve in VDV sub-units.  The competition for those wishing to serve in the VDV in some military commissariats reaches 30 men per spot.”

The VDV get to pick the best available young men:

“The main selection criteria for the VDV are excellent health and physical preparedness, a high level of neuropsychological stability, [and] positive social and moral characteristics.”

2 Comments

Posted in Conscription, Manpower, Navy, RVSN, VDV

Tagged ,

Longer Combat Duty

Posted on January 26, 2012 | Leave a comment

Yars in the Field

Seems like standard stuff but there might be something here.  It could be the U.S.-Russian deadlock over missile defense.  It might (somewhat ironically) be the increasing age of Russia’s mobile ICBMs.  There are probably additional or alternative explanations.

Krasnaya zvezda and Mil.ru have dedicated print recently to Russian mobile ICBMs spending more time on their combat patrol routes.

On January 18, KZ wrote that Topol, Topol-M, and Yars units from central Russia and Siberia are in the midst of exercises to implement the highest states of combat readiness and to carry out combat duty on combat patrol routes (in field positions).  Troops are conducting a number of training tasks — system calibration, engineering preparation of field positions, CCD (maskirovka), and combat security.  They also have to react to training “injects” from higher commands.

The Defense Ministry’s daily said units would be deployed to field positions for a longer period, from January 16 to February 3.  It indicated all divisions and units will also institute a new type of training this winter — a “complex practical exercise” in implementing combat readiness.

RIA Novosti’s account indicated this annual training is routine, just with more time spent in the field.

In a December 28 review of the year in RVSN, KZ reported turgidly:

“90 percent of field training measures were conducted with missile launcher regiments and battalions departing for combat patrol routes.  In the summer training period, a test of the order of conducting combat duty in the highest combat readiness states with an increased duration of mobile ground missile regiments on combat patrol routes was conducted.  This allowed for ensuring the readiness of missile launcher regiments for maneuvering actions.  All missile regiments were evaluated positively in the results of the tactical exercises.”

In mid-November, Mil.ru summarized RVSN Commander General-Lieutenant Karakayev’s comments:

“Division, unit, and sub-unit combat training was maintained at a level ensuring their capability to conduct military actions under various conditions of the situation.  A test of the order of conducting combat duty in the highest states of combat readiness with an increased duration of mobile missile regiments on combat patrol routes was conducted.”

“The training of multi-axle chassis mechanic-drivers ensured accident-free operation of nuclear weapons.  Despite the fact that currently more than 70% of missile systems are beyond the limit of their warranty periods, the technical condition, the reliability characteristics of the armaments and military equipment guaranteed maintenance of the required level of combat readiness of missile systems.”

You can find additional relevant info on RVSN combat duty and patrols here.

Leave a comment

Posted in RVSN, Training and Exercises

Tagged , , , , , , , ,

Extending the SS-25

Posted on October 29, 2011 | Leave a comment

SS-25 / Topol (photo: RIA Novosti / Sergey Guneyev)

Strat forces aren’t this author’s favorite or best subject.  Unlike some other Russian military issues, there are many places to turn for info on ICBMs, SLBMs, ALCMs, and their launchers.  Yet one still can’t resist a whack at yesterday’s story.

RVSN Commander General-Lieutenant Sergey Karakayev told the RVSN Veterans’ Union that Russia intends to, once again, extend the service life of its single-warhead mobile SS-25 / Topol ICBM force:

“Ongoing work to extend the service life of the Topol missile system to 25 years allows for keeping missile regiments with mobile launchers of this type on combat duty until 2019, until the start of their rearming with the new Yars mobile missile system.”

So, SS-25 regiments will gradually be rearmed with the MIRVed RS-24 / Yars.  Media outlets noted Russia is currently rearming its second RS-24 regiment, and its sixth silo-based SS-27 / Topol-M regiment.

This isn’t the first, and probably won’t be the last, service life extension for the SS-25, which had an original warranty of ten years.  Its life was extended to 20 years with a test in 2005, to 21 years in 2007, and 23 years, or until 2015 according to an RVSN spokesman, with a firing last October 28.

What caught one’s eye was Russianforces.org’s attention to the fact that the Russians say they’ll extend the service life by two more years (25), but the missiles will stay in the force four more years (2019).  Russianforces concludes Moscow must’ve been making SS-25s as late as 1994 rather than 1992.

In any event, it’s a cheap way to keep deployed ICBM numbers up, as long as the SS-25 performs.  A 25-year SS-25 lets them stretch RS-24 and SS-27 deployment timelines, find SS-18 and SS-19 replacements, and produce Bulava SLBMs at a time when there are many other demands on the defense budget.

Maybe it gets the RVSN to 2014 or 2015 before they have to deploy the RS-24 more quickly to replace retired SS-25s.  If they further extend the SS-25’s life, maybe they get close to 2018 or 2019 before the RS-24 deployments really pick up.

At any rate, it was notable that Karakayev put his stamp on the SS-25’s life extension.

Leave a comment

Posted in RVSN, Strategic Forces Modernization

Tagged , , , , , , ,

Today’s Appointments, Dismissals

Posted on June 1, 2011 | Leave a comment

President Medvedev’s Armed Forces personnel decree from today.

Appoint:

  • Colonel Vadim Anatolyevich Shamarin, Chief of Communications, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, Eastern MD.

Relieve of duty:

  • Colonel Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Galaktionov, Commander, 7th Missile Division.
  • Colonel Yuriy Gennadyevich Kashlev, Commander, 62nd Missile Division.
  • Rear-Admiral Yuriy Nikolayevich Lichkatyy, Chief of Staff, Rear Services, First Deputy Chief of Rear Services, Northern Fleet.

Relieve and dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major Sergey Viktorovich Goman, Chief of Rear Services, Deputy Commander of the Operational-Strategic Command Aerospace Defense for Rear Services.

Dismiss from military service:

  • Rear-Admiral Yuriy Stanislavovich Rebenok.

Trying to keep score on the RVSN command changes, it looks like we’re now seeing changes of command in half of Russia’s missile divisions — 14th, 8th, 60th, 7th, and 62nd.  You can add that to new commanders, and new deputy commanders, in the 31st and 33rd Missile Armies.

Leave a comment

Posted in Military Leadership, RVSN

Tagged , ,

More Appointments, Etc.

Posted on May 12, 2011 | Leave a comment

The wave of appointments, dismissals, and reshuffling in the upper echelons of the military leadership continues . . . this one features the dismissal of Vice-Admiral Borisov, the shipbuilding chief, who reportedly went down over his role in the December round of Mistral talks with the French.  This one also has a lot of changes and shuffling of officers in RVSN armies.

Here’s what President Medvedev’s 19 April decree on Defense Ministry personnel does.

Relieve:

  • Colonel Aleksandr Vasilyevich Deryavko from the post of Commander, 60th Missile Division.

Relieve and dismiss from military service:

  • Vice-Admiral Nikolay Konstantinovich Borisov from the post of Chief, Shipbuilding, Armaments, and Arms Servicing, Deputy CINC for Armaments, Navy.

Appoint:

  • Colonel Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kasyanenko, Deputy Commander, 31st Missile Army, relieved of duty as Chief, Military Academy of the RVSN Branch (Rostov-na-Donu).
  • General-Major Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Sivachev, Deputy Chief, Military Academy of the RVSN, relieved of duty as Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, 33rd Missile Army.
  • General-Major Valeriy Yevgenyevich Tarazevich, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, 33rd Missile Army, relieved of duty as Deputy Commander, 33rd Missile Army.
  • General-Major Ivan Nikolayevich Kuzichkin, Deputy Commander, 33rd Missile Army.
  • General-Major Viktor Vladimirovich Lizvinskiy, Chief, Organizational-Technical Directorate, Deputy Chief, Main Armor Directorate, Defense Ministry.
  • Colonel Andrey Gennadyevich Loginov, Commander, 60th Missile Division.
  • Colonel Andrey Nikolayevich Mordvichev, Commander, 4th Independent Tank Brigade.
  • Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Novkin, Commander, 138th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Leave a comment

Posted in Military Leadership, RVSN

Tagged , , ,