Category Archives: Manpower

Golts on Makarov, Postnikov, and Contract Service

In Yezhednevnyy zhural on 1 March, Aleksandr Golts says Makarov’s and Postnikov’s pronouncements on the failure of contract service were, of course, an open secret.  Analysts and journalists had been writing about its failure for two years [much longer actually].  He recalled being at a December roundtable including GOMU generals, who had implemented contract service, who railed against slanderers who dared describe things as they are, including the failure of the contract program.  And now Defense Ministry chiefs have also acknowledged the obvious.

Golts concludes that Makarov and company also finally recognized something known to ‘liberal experts’ seven years ago–it was senseless to try to go to volunteer service without first creating a professional NCO corps.

Then Golts describes a Defense Ministry propensity for lying–GOMU Chief Smirnov gives one figure on the number of draft evaders, his deputy gives a different figure; Deputy Defense Minister Pankov says the 85 permanent readiness brigades are ready for battle in one hour, Ground Troops CINC Postnikov says actually they are ready only to depart their garrisons in one hour; Armaments Chief Popovkin says 5-6,000 tanks are needed, Postnikov says 10,000, or maybe only 2,000 are needed.

This irresponsible and unpunished lying pervades the army, it’s an everyday automatic reflex, and it’s not harmless.  The country’s leadership takes decisions on it.  God forbid they should trust GOMU when it says it’s possible to provide for conscription just by stopping draft evasion.  This would indicate that the complete collapse of the military manning system is near.  And the generals would use this as an argument to overturn the current reforms.

GOMU Chief Smirnov Denies Plans to Increase Draft Term

Reacting to spreading rumors that the Defense Ministry intends to increase the current one-year draft term to 18 months, 2 years, or more, GOMU Chief Vasiliy Smirnov said Monday, “There’s no plan to increase the term of conscripted military service in the Russian Army.”

His denial came hard on the heels of General Staff Chief Makarov’s sudden public declaration that professional contract service has failed, at least for enlisted soldiers if not future sergeants, and the army will redouble its emphasis on drafted manpower.

Commenting in today’s Novaya gazeta, the chairwoman of Mother’s Right Veronika Marchenko says:

“If the Genshtab Chief is acknowledging the fact that the Genshtab is not capable of transferring the army to contract service, even though a corresponding [Federal] goal program was adopted, this is not cause to return to the draft system and increase the number of conscripts.  This is a reason to dismiss all the inept generals.”

That is a quaint sentiment, but it doesn’t work that way.  The generals always muttered that contractees wouldn’t work, and men inclined to evade simply had to be herded in.  They’ll say they were right all along.  The chiefs won’t suffer, only the indians.

More interesting, however, Marchenko thinks the rumors could be a trial balloon to gauge society’s reaction–if there’s no reaction, they might try to increase the service term again.

Another human rights organizer claims every 10th conscript is abused in some dehumanizing fashion.  She compares army service to life in a leper colony:

“It’s possible to live [there] ten years and not contract leprosy, or it’s possible for the irreparable to happen in one day.  The army today is potentially dangerous for the human system.”

Komsomolskaya pravda’s Viktor Baranets writes today that he’s amazed that it’s taken 20 years for generals like Makarov, Postnikov, and Chirkin to acknowledge that contract service is doomed.  He goes on:

“And how here can’t you believe that in the same manner in a year or two the Defense Ministry and Genshtab again will publicly ‘scratch their noodles’ and with a funereal sigh announce to us that the transfer of troops to the brigade system, and the transfer of the Navy Main Staff to Piter, and getting rid of warrant officers, and the reduction of almost 200 thousand officers were also mistakes?  But the strategists who reformed the army for no reason will by that time will be wearing pensioners’ slippers and courageously scribbling out their memoirs.”

This Russian (maybe even universal, bureaucratic) penchant for back-to-forth reform, reforms where process is everything and results are nothing is truly amazing and very evident in the armed forces.  But it’s everywhere even on the very same day.  Witness please Putin’s solemn announcement that he’s slashing the rolls of strategically important enterprises after many years of just as solemnly building up their ranks . . . what was the point?  What did they gain, what was accomplished?  Nothing.  It was a political drill to fend off clients desperate for money and bureaucratic attention, and their strategic status was, by and large, a sop.  End of digression.

What else on the topic of the moment?

Baranets.  He speculates the ‘death notice’ for contract service could be a first step backward on Serdyukov’s reforms.  He says there are now 70,000 contractees and contract-sergeants.  He believes in a year the Genshtab will increase conscription to 700-750 thousand guys annually, and they won’t become specialists in anything with demob always just around the corner.  So, he concludes, the rumors about a return to longer conscript service ain’t a coincidence.

Versiya has interesting coverage of the issue.  So Makarov says contract has failed, all sorts of other innovations in army service similarly haven’t brought the desired results.  Dedovshchina didn’t decrease, collecting the requisite quantity of servicemen will now be more complicated, the quality of soldier training has sharply declined.  And the number of conscripts in the ranks will grow.  Versiya asks:

“Can it be we’ll return to the Soviet model of an army which has been publicly declared ineffective in modern conditions?”

One-year service was supposed to eliminate dedovshchina, but General-Lieutenant Chirkin admits it didn’t.

Versiya’s versions:

  • First Version:  Return to Soviet-style manning.  Probability:  50 percent.
  • Second Version:  No alternative but contractees, this is just a pause.  Probability:  30 percent.
  • Third Version:  Course will be unchanged despite Makarov’s announcement.  Probability:  20 percent.

It sounds like Versiya really puts the odds of largely diverting from contract service at 50:50.

One-Year Conscription Hasn’t Stopped Dedovshchina

General-Lieutenant Chirkin (photo: IA Regnum)

On Thursday, SibVO Commander, General-Lieutenant Vladimir Chirkin told reporters:

“The military expected a dramatic decrease in this type of offenses, but, regrettably, hazing remains an acute problem. The conscripts, who now have to serve 12 months, regard themselves as ‘old timers’ after serving 6 months, and the same thing continues.  Apparently, this virus is transmissible.”

“We now know that we should search for the causes of bullying not in the duration of service but, it seems, deeper.  We now have to work harder with detachment commanders.  This year issues of discipline will be even more important for us than those of combat readiness.”

Chirkin said several high-profile abuse cases are currently under investigation in the SibVO.

Introduced in 2008, the one-year draft was intended to reduce conflict between conscripts from different draft campaigns.  The ‘dedy’ or ‘grandfathers’ about to demobilize would often abuse, haze, or otherwise mistreat brand-new inductees.  But as Veronika Marchenko from Mother’s Right says, it hasn’t been enough to stop dedovshchina:

“In the army then and now they beat people on the third day of service, in two weeks, and in the first months.”

Marchenko believes ending conscription completely is the only way to curb dedovshchina, but that’s not likely now with the virtually complete failure of professionalization through contract service.

The Contractees Are Dead, Long Live the Contractees!

Asked about professional soldiers and contract service last week, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov said: 

“We are not switching to a contract basis.  Many mistakes were allowed, and that task which was given—construction of a professional army—was not completed.  Therefore a decision was made that conscript service needed to remain in the army.  Moreover, we are increasing the draft , and decreasing the contract part.  We’ve come to understand that a contractee has to be trained by altogether different methods than there were earlier.  Therefore now we’re taking on contract only sergeants who are studying for 2 and a half years.  We plan to reach a contract army through this.  Many people talked even in the Soviet Army about the need to train sergeants, but now we’ve thought everything through well and we’re promptly moving forward, so that in 2.5 years in our army there will be a sergeant, an assistant commander who’s capable of independently resolving an entire complex of tasks that are now resolved by officers.”

The effort to build a professional NCO corps will continue, but the experiment in recruiting career enlisted personnel—a main line of the army’s development since 2003—has failed.  The tenor of Makarov’s statement almost makes it sound as if he didn’t think or know a mixed manning system with conscripts predominating was the plan all along.  The Russian Army was always going to remain mixed, but now it will be much more one-sided in favor of conscripts.  A Vedomosti editorial pointed out that Russia’s generalitet (what remains of it) never supported contract service anyway.  The training of professional NCOs begun on a very small scale last fall will continue, but how long will it be before that effort too is abandoned?

Makarov’s announcement will only add to pressure on Russia’s dwindling manpower resources.  The start of one-year service basically doubled the semi-annual requirement for draftees from 133,000 to 270,000 or so.  Now it’s clear that conscripts are needed to fill spots contract enlisted were supposed to occupy.

Rossiyskaya gazeta and Krasnaya zvezda covered similar comments last week from new Ground Troops CINC Postnikov.  Both papers concluded that, while the effort with professional NCOs will continue, the army’s priority will be on meeting its manpower requirements through conscription.

Vremya novostey quoted Postnikov:

“The federal program to transfer permanent readiness units to manning with contractees did not achieve its intended goals.”

It didn’t succeed in making contract service prestigious, they didn’t select those who could be true professionals, they fully manned units with contractees to the detriment of quality.  Now corrections have been made in the troop manning plans.  Only those positions that determine the combat capability of units and formation will be contract.  There both pay and social conditions will be fitting – just like officers.  They will train contractees for the positions of professional sergeants, just as in the U.S.

And Izvestiya:

“. . . we can’t say that we have precisely those contractees which we wanted to have ideally.  We understood that we had to change the system of training contractees.  It’s planned to do this through the institution of sergeants – an assistant commander capable of independently resolving a whole block of tasks which officers now resolve.  For this reason they have to occupy positions directly answering for the combat readiness of army units and sub-units.  We have to increase their pay, create social conditions for living at the level of officers.”

But one basic problem has always been the jealousy of officers (who rarely get all their pay and benefits) toward contractees or NCOs who might possibly get almost as much as them. 

Novyye izvestiya quoted Sergey Krivenko, a member of the RF President’s Human Rights Council:

“Contractees were not provided housing or normal pay, or even timely indexing of their wages . . . .  Instead huge sums were invested in construction of housing, reequipping ranges and other facilities where the money could easily be hidden and stolen.”

Krivenko adds that contractees didn’t experience a change in their status, were often forced to sign contracts, and were not allowed to leave the garrison or live a normal life with their families outside the garrison.  So there was nothing to distinguish them from conscripts.

To sum Krivenko up, the army failed to find the right candidates and deliver the benefits it promised them.  So one has to be skeptical that the selections and Defense Ministry follow through on the professional NCO effort will be any better.

Krivenko believes that the army has virtually no choice but to increase the conscription term from one year to cover the lack of contract soldiers.  But simply allowing undermanning of units would have the same effect, but that might impinge on Makarov’s claims that most units are now fully manned and permanently ready.

Happy Defender’s Day

Medvedev Lights Flame at Tomb of the Unknown Along Kremlin Wall

In his Defender’s Day eve address on Monday, President Dmitriy Medvedev said:

“The defense of native land, service in the army and fleet has always been considered our holy duty.  And those who chose the military profession as the business of their entire lives command great respect among our people.”

Apparently, not too holy since Medvedev didn’t serve, even though he would have been due for conscription at the zenith of the mass mobilization Soviet Army and one of the coldest points of the Cold War [1983].  Of course, there are lots of presidents who didn’t serve in their countries’ armed forces.

Medvedev went on to thank Russia’s veterans with the 65th anniversary of the Great Victory fast approaching [9 May].

Then he noted:

“. . . strengthening the defense capability of our country–this, absolutely, is the fundamental basis for our development.  Our strategic goal is the formation of an effective army and navy, adequate for the level of modern threats, capable of withstanding any level of aggression and being a real factor in guaranteeing international stability.”

“Before us stands the main mission–to reequip the army and fleet with the newest armaments.  It is essential to concentrate resources, all our best forces, and our country has done this more than once, in order to create new quality types of military equipment and finally escape from a system of “patching holes” in old armaments.  Some has already been accomplished here, but this is a basic task for the near future.”

“Strengthening Armed Forces personnel will also remain a priority.  People who have received a modern quality education answering the demands of the time need to be occupied with military affairs.  People who are prepared to complete contemporary combat missions, to complete them in the most effective way and, absolutely, physically and morally prepared.”

“The most important condition for the successful modernization of the Armed Forces–this is increasing the quality of life for servicemen.  The current military labor stimulus system (I have in mind the so-called order 400) is already giving positive results today.  From 2012 new salaries will be paid to all our country’s officers.”

“Everything necessary is being done so that this year all military men needing permanent housing will receive it.  I am keeping this issue under my personal control.”

“By the end of 2012 the issue of providing servicemen with service housing will be fully resolved.  I am sure that such guarantees will increase the wellbeing of your families and the prestige of military service as a whole.”

“Next it is important also that all measures to transfer the army and fleet to a new quality should be fulfilled efficiently and on schedule.  I am expecting precisely this from the Defense Ministry.”

On Tuesday, Medvedev participated in reigniting the eternal flame on the grave of the unknown soldier below the Kremlin wall.  The flame had been moved temporarily to Victory Park on Poklonnaya gora during the renovation of the tomb of the unknown.

Medvedev also visited a military unit in the Moscow suburbs and had tea with a senior lieutenant and his family in their new apartment.

The KPRF and its leader, Gennadiy Zyuganov, played the lead in presenting an opposite point of view on Defender’s Day.  The KPRF faithful marched from Triumfalnaya ploshchad to Teatralnaya ploshchad for a rally.  The party predicted 10,000 attendees, the police said there were 1,500, and Ekho Moskvy reported 4,000.

One KPRF leader said his party was coming out in defense of the army and fleet, their history, their power and against this senseless reform which Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov is conducting.  He said the KPRF would hold rallies in 8 regions where elections are being held on 14 March.  Those demonstrations, however, were focused on more ‘bread and butter’ issues like communal service rate increases.

Zyuganov himself was in vintage form, saying:

“The army is currently in an exceptionally poor state.  A totally useless man is today in charge of the army.  He has no right to hold this office.  Not a single military man would want to pronounce the family name of Serdyukov properly, without adding some insult.  This means that Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev have put in charge of the army a man who is incapable of teaching servicemen, rallying them together or setting key objectives concerning military security and army training and equipment of our armed forces.”

He continued, saying Russia has “no possibility not only to produce, but even to reform its existing military complex.”  He claimed Russia is 10 years behind NATO in military potential, and he said Russia’s strategic forces are “on their last legs.”  Addressing Prime Minister Putin, he asked why a minister like Serdyukov was being retained.

IA Regnum reported on a rally in support of army reform and modernization led by United Russia youth wing Molodaya gvardiya and the local branch of veteran’s organization Combat Brotherhood in Ulyanovsk.  Press reports said attendees were looking forward to restarting An-124 transport aircraft production at Aviastar, and having OPK enterprises serve as a locomotive for the rebirth of local industry.

Makarov Meets the Press

Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov

General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov spoke at length to the press yesterday. In no particular order, here are some of the impressions and reports that followed in his wake.

RBCdaily quoted Makarov on the possible Mistral purchase:  “Ships of the Mistral type have very great multifunctionality, and they surpass our ships in all parameters by three times.”  He went on to say that Russian shipbuilders would only be able to produce helicopter carriers of this quality in 5-10 years.  Aleksandr Khramchikhin commented that, in the first place, Russia doesn’t currently have comparable ships and, in the second, it will take 50 years.

Makarov said the final decision on buying the Mistral had not been made.

According to Rossiyskaya gazeta, Makarov said the Russian Army went to brigades vice divisions to avoid the previous need to flesh out units with reservists and take days to bring them to combat readiness.  ‘Modular’ battalions by contrast are permanently ready for battle in an hour.

Makarov didn’t rule out establishment of some type of ‘rapid reaction forces,’ though these are closest in nature to today’s VDV.  And this wouldn’t mean VDV would simply change its name. And other services need rapid reaction capabilities too for action in the air, on the sea, etc.  Aren’t permanently ready brigades rapid reaction forces already?

On the Navy headquarters move to St. Petersburg, Makarov claimed Moscow is overflowing with army and navy leadership [but haven’t they just cut 200,000 officers and lots of excess command structures to create a personnel pyramid?].  And with today’s networks the fleet can be commanded from thousands of kilometers away from the Genshtab and other main commands.

Makarov doesn’t foresee any change to the one-year conscription policy, but there may be changes in NCO acquisition.  Instead of six months training in MD training centers, they may only get 3, so they can serve 9 months in troop units.  Makarov thinks they’ll cut back on conscript sergeants once their professional ones start to appear.

Moskovskiy komsomolets quoted Makarov on the new strategic arms agreement with the U.S. to the effect that it’s 97 percent complete, and it only remains to agree on the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons, and there will not be anything in the treaty to Russia’s detriment in this regard.

On Mistral, Makarov said, after study, we’ve concluded we need this type of ship, which can be an amphibious assault ship, hospital, command ship, and helicopter carrier.

On the Navy and Piter, MK notes Makarov wanted to avoid Baluyevskiy’s fate and didn’t contradict his superiors.  He expounded on his vision (perhaps dream) of Russian netcentric warfare:

“Earlier it was like this:  the closer to subordinates, the more reliable the command and control.  Now all leading countries, including us also, are going to netcentric command and control systems.  This allows completely remote means of reconnaissance, command and control, electronic warfare, fire, command posts–all spread over an enormous distance, but located in a single information-communications space and capable of solving tasks in real time.”

On a related note, Makarov said the new Sozvezdiye tactical level command and control system will be part of the netcentric structure toward the end of the year.

Gazeta’s coverage focused on Makarov’s comments about establishing the personnel pyramid, i.e. going from armed forces with about 500,000 officers and warrants to one of 150,000 officers and 720,000 soldiers in the space of a year.  It also noted Makarov’s remark that brigade commanders in their training assembly at the General Staff Academy are learning new warfare and command and control principles.

Izvestiya quoted Makarov at length on the Navy Main Staff’s move to Piter.

“Presently all command and control organs are concentrated in Moscow, but we want these command and control organs to be as close as possible to the troops they control [didn’t he also call this the old way of doing business?].  The dispersal of command and control and fire means at great distances doesn’t have any great significance, what’s important is maintaining uninterrupted and clear command and control of troops and weapons.  Therefore, the transfer of the Navy Main Staff to St. Petersburg won’t place any kind of extra burden on the command and control system, with the exception perhaps, only in the initial period of its functioning in a new place.”

Viktor Baranets in Komsomolskaya pravda focused on Makarov’s words on the U.S. and Iran, noting his statements that the U.S. has a plan to strike Iran, and, if it occurs, it’ll be terrible for Iran, the region, and the U.S.

Krasnaya zvezda covered the Iran issue.  It noted that Russia’s need for ready units forced the shift to brigades.  It also covered Makarov’s comment that the Voronezh conference agreed on changes needed in the Sozvezdiye C2 system, and that it would be received this July and fielded in November.  KZ also quoted Makarov at length on the capabilities of the 5th generation fighter aircraft.

KZ also indicated that Makarov noted the U.S. as an example where units and commands are often separated by great distances when he talked about the Navy Main Staff and Piter.

Generally, it seems those invited to this press availability only asked Makarov ‘soft ball’ questions.

Chechens as a Conscription Resource

On 13 January, ITAR-TASS announced that, for the first time since the Soviet collapse, the armed forces will conduct preliminary military registration in Chechnya of males born in 1993 and earlier.  The SKVO is organizing town and rayon draft boards.  The preliminary registration will continue until the end of March.  Administration heads are asked to get organizations and institutions to help spread the word about registration.

There is no move to draft young Chechens yet, and this represents an effort to inventory and organize potential manpower from the republic.

In recent years, small numbers of Chechens were called to serve in special operations units like the Vostok and Zapad battalions, but only in Chechnya.  In 2008, the republic’s military commissar said nearly 700 Chechens were conscripted during his tenure.  He said he had recommended that Chechens not be sent to serve outside their home republic for several years, and even then in limited numbers at first.

The military commissar said Chechnya had 50,000 men of draft age, and only 8-10 percent would be exempt for health reasons.

By spring 2009, however, the commissar reversed himself, saying he was confident Chechens would be drafted in fall 2009 or spring 2010.  The available Chechen manpower was also put at 80,000.  And its percentage of medically unfit men is one of the lowest in the Russian Federation.

Chechen human rights activists have opposed sending young Chechens outside their republic to serve.  Valentina Melnikova of the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia has said that after two military campaigns in Chechnya, not many parents are ready to send their children to serve in the Russian Army, where the majority of the officers took part in the counterterrorism operation and have a negative attitude toward Chechens.  She said, “There is no reason to involve Chechens in military service.  Almost every family has either lost a member or has had a member mutilated in the war.  Something like that is not easy to forget and this means that if Chechens end up in military communities, we are to expect new conflict situations and even crimes.”