The promotion list contains names of 552 generals and admirals against 730 the MOD says it has.
This link goes to a larger file with more data.
The newest promotees were announced on June 11, 2019.
The promotion list contains names of 552 generals and admirals against 730 the MOD says it has.
This link goes to a larger file with more data.
The newest promotees were announced on June 11, 2019.
RF President Vladimir Putin signed out his Russia Day promotion list on June 11. The MOD got 11 two-star and 14 one-star promotions. Putin’s alternative army — the National Guard — did almost as well receiving one three-star, five two-star, and 11 one-star promotions. Find the list here.
Putin’s list this time was interesting because four generals were picked up for two-star after waiting seven or eight years for it. They include:
Other two-stars include the Chief of MOD’s GU MVS, a deputy chief of NTsUO (who picks up his second star in four years), the Chief of the Military Strategy Faculty at GSA, the chief of comms and deputy chief of staff for comms in the Eastern MD (strange choice for general-lieutenant), and the Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet (VADM Rekish).
New one-stars commanding significant formations include:
Staff officers getting their first stars include the chief of missile troops and artillery and chief of armor service (Central MD); a professor, Military Strategy Faculty (GSA); chief of personnel directorate (VKS); chief of NTsUO’s flight coordination center and chief of NTsUO’s territorial affiliate in the Black Sea Fleet.
Six promotees couldn’t be identified in a post. Two are new two-stars. We have to assume they only reach general-lieutenant without public mention if they serve in the GRU, SSO, et al.
Short and long promotion list files will be available in the next day or two.
At the outset of the May 8 MOD collegium, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu announced a shake up in the Russian Navy’s leadership.
Admiral Vladimir Korolev — Navy CINC for just three years — was retired by a May 3 presidential ukaz. He will be 65 next February 1. Shoygu was gracious saying in 46 years of service Korolev strengthened Russian defense capabilities, returned the fleet to the world’s oceans, and rationalized fulfillment of the shipbuilding program to 2050.
Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral Nikolay Yevmenov, who recently turned 57, replaced Korolev. Yevmenov’s a submariner and Pacific Fleet sailor generally.
Born April 2, 1962, Yevmenov graduated the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation (Leningrad) in 1987. He was assigned to the navigation department of a Soviet Pacific Fleet submarine. He completed his senior service school, the Naval Academy named for Kuznetsov in 1999.
Yevmenov then served as an executive officer before commanding Delta III-class ballistic missile submarines K-490 and K-506 Zelenograd. Following a stint as chief of staff for the Pacific Fleet’s 25th Submarine (SSBN) Division, he graduated the General Staff Academy in 2003.
He returned to the 25th as deputy commander and then commander before becoming chief of staff and commander of the 16th Submarine Squadron (all Pacific Fleet nuclear-powered ballistic missile, cruise missile, and attack subs). In 2012, the 16th was renamed simply Pacific Fleet Submarine Forces.
In September 2012, Yevmenov switched fleets with an appointment as chief of staff, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet. He became Northern Fleet Commander in April 2016 as a vice-admiral (two-star). He was promoted to admiral in December 2017.
After a very brief stint as Black Sea Fleet commander, Vice-Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev replaces Yevmenov in the Northern Fleet. Moiseyev’s also an SSBN driver, and his career is very similar to Yevmenov’s but far more illustrious.
He wears two Orders of Courage and a Hero of the Russian Federation. One Order for helping to plant the Russian Federation flag in the North Pole seabed in 2007 and the second for the underice inter-fleet transfer of Delta III SSBN K-44 Ryazan to the Pacific Fleet in 2008.
Moiseyev’s Hero came in early 2011 after he’d commanded the Northern Fleet’s 31st Submarine (SSBN) Division. He was awarded for successfully testing new weapons and conducting a series of missile launches (probably tests of R-29RMU Sineva — SS-N-23A Skiff SLBMs).
He’s just two weeks younger than Yevmenov.
It’s difficult to see how Yevmenov got ahead of Moiseyev, but he did. There must be a logic obvious to the Kremlin in the choice of Yevmenov, it’s just not apparent to outsiders right now.
RF President Putin signed out his promotion list for Defenders’ Day on February 22. He was generous to the MOD.
Twenty-seven officers were promoted to or within the general and flag ranks: one four-star, two three-star, six two-star, and 18 one-star promotions were handed out.
Putin’s National Guard got few promotions this time.
The big news, already discussed, was Ground Troops CINC Salyukov’s new army general (O-10) rank.
Main Combat Training Directorate Chief Ivan Buvaltsev and Central MD Commander Aleksandr Lapin became general-colonels.
Four new general-lieutenants included new 8th CAA Commander Andrey Sychevoy, 11th Army Corps Commander Yuriy Yarovitskiy, 68th Army Corps Commander Dmitriy Glushenkov, and 45th Air and Air Defense Army Commander Aleksandr Otroshchenko.
Just shy of 50, Sychevoy seems to be a mover. But he also appears to be camera shy, so no photo.
Yarovitskiy in the Baltic Fleet’s 11th Army Corps served in the First Chechen War and was chief of staff, first deputy commander of the 1st Tank Army, according to one bio.
New vice-admirals are Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Sergey Lipilin and a deputy chief of the NTsUO.
New one-stars included the:
Headed by newly minted General-Major Sergey Parshin, the MOD’s 9th Directorate is one of the Russian military’s more secretive elements. It designs and builds silos, launch positions, command, control, and communications networks, and underground command posts and bunkers for the RVSN and Russia’s missile defense system.
There were seven promotees for which a position couldn’t be identified at this time.
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin signed out his Defenders’ Day promotion list yesterday with something unexpected.
Putin handed out the four-star rank of army general for the first time in a while. To Ground Troops CINC Oleg Salyukov.
Russian media outlets say Putin gave army general to Rosgvardiya chief Viktor Zolotov and Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Popov in 2015. But we’re not talking about cronies and creatures of Putin or Defense Minister Shoygu.
We’re not talking about Shoygu himself, who got his four-star rank as a politician and bureaucrat.
And we’re not talking about Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov, FSB man and associate of former defense minister Sergey Ivanov. (Pankov’s a fascinating and separate story. He’s the longtime éminence grise of the MOD. One might bet he’s always been Putin’s reliable spy in the high command. He’s also been officially retired from military service for some time.)
So here’s the short list of current Russian Armed Forces four-stars:
It’s safe to conclude then that Putin’s been quite parsimonious with the “big star.”
Recall Russia’s gone back and forth on four stars. For some time, army generals actually wore four stars. Now they wear a single “big star” like marshals, but on different epaulets.
The Russian army general rank, however, is equivalent to a full U.S. General (O-10) wearing four stars.
The last Ground Troops, Air Forces, and Navy CINCs to wear four stars were Vladimir Boldyrev in 2010, Vladimir Mikhaylov in 2007, and Vladimir Masorin in 2007.
So why promote Salyukov to four-star? It doesn’t buy him more service time; by law, he still has to retire in 2020. He’ll be 65 on May 21, 2020.
We should note also that Gerasimov will be 65 on September 8, 2020 and old man Bulgakov on October 20, 2019.
But like all Russian laws, the law on military service tenure can be ignored or changed easily if Putin wants.
A little more about Salyukov. He’s a tanker. He served in the old Kiev MD as a junior officer, and then the Moscow MD. He was deputy commander of the 4th Kantemir Tank Division. After the General Staff Academy, he went to the old Far East MD in 1996, serving from division commander to commander of the district in 2010.
When the MD system was reduced to just four MDs, Salyukov returned to Moscow for a four-year stint as deputy chief of the General Staff. In May 2014, he became Ground Troops CINC. His official bio says he’s a combat veteran, but it’s unclear where he was actually under fire.
P.S. Here’s the latest official photo of Salyukov.
Seven new Russian combined arms (or tank) army commanders have been appointed since early 2017. Five old ones remain in place.
Eighteen months ago, only three were at post they held 18 months prior to that (i.e. in early 2016).
But two — General-Lieutenants Kuzmenko and Sevryukov — have now served in the same spot for three years or more.
The current rundown of armies, headquarters, MD/OSK, and commanders looks like this:
Kisel replaced General-Lieutenant Avdeyev who went to head the Combined Arms Academy. Ivanayev took the place of General-Major Peryazev who moved to the MOD’s Main Combat Training Directorate.
There’s been considerable churn in the 2nd CAA. In early 2017, General-Major Zhidko was its commander. In less than two years, he served as chief of staff, first deputy commander for the Russian group of forces in Syria, deputy chief of the General Staff, and Commander of the Eastern MD.
General-Major Rustam Muradov replaced the meteoric Zhidko before being replaced himself by General-Major Kolotovkin. Muradov is now a deputy commander of the Southern MD.
General-Lieutenant Zavizon was relieved by Rezantsev. Zavizon is probably in Syria, or, less likely but possibly, even eastern Ukraine.
Followed by Nosulev, General-Major Kovalenko went to the unusual post of deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet for ground and coastal troops.
General-Major Poplavskiy became a deputy commander of the Central MD when Berdnikov replaced him.
Tsekov took over the 5th CAA after General-Lieutenant Asapov died in a mortar attack in Syria in 2017.
An observer has noted a flag from the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic on Asapov’s grave. According to some, he commanded the DNR’s “1st Army Corps” at one point. He reportedly also saw combat in Chechnya and Abkhazia as well.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin got serious about modernizing his military in 2013, he lacked something: somewhere to flex those new muscles.
It’s a “chicken or the egg” paradox. Does a country really have military power if it doesn’t use it? Or does the process of employing the country’s military create that power?
The leaders of the world’s most bellicose nations don’t feel secure until they’ve seen their troops in combat, no matter how well manned, equipped, and trained they are. Supreme CINCs like to see the effect using their military power has on others.
The Kremlin watched while U.S. and NATO forces were used in many places around the globe in the 1990s and 2000s. There were some senior Russian officers who’d done a tour in Afghanistan during the 1980s. But Moscow’s soldiers — and precious few at that — had only Chechnya and Georgia, and the results weren’t encouraging.
So Putin’s modernized forces got their first real practice annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine in 2014. And though Moscow can’t advertise, its generals and units have been fighting alongside the Russian militias in Donetsk and Lugansk ever since.
Syria served as a bigger firing range.
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 provided not just a live proving ground for the new weapons and equipment Moscow procured. It created another opportunity for Russian officers and soldiers to acquire combat experience.
There have been various Russian media summaries capturing this, but Interfaks-AVN published one recently that seems pretty comprehensive.
According to Interfaks-AVN, the Russian MOD announced that 68,000 troops, including 460 generals, have received combat experience in Syria.
It indicated that the commanders of all four Russian military districts, all combined arms army and air and air defense army commanders, all division commanders, and also 96 percent of combined arms brigade and regiment commanders have served in Syria.
The MOD said 87 percent of frontal aviation crews, 91 percent of army aviation crews, 97 percent of transport aviation crews, and 60 percent of strategic Long-Range Aviation crews have gotten combat experience over Syria.
The Russian Defense Ministry added that it’s reducing its contingent in Syria now.
These are, of course, pretty remarkable claims, but one wonders: does Russia have 460 general officers in combat command positions from which they could be sent for a tour in a war zone?
RF President Vladimir Putin signed out his latest promotion list on December 12, 2018. For the MOD, it included two new three-stars, 10 two-stars, and 11 one-stars.
Against 23 MOD promotees, the National Guard had 13 (1 three-star, 3 two-stars, and 9 one-stars).
Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Central MD Yevgeniy Ustinov became a general-colonel.
Ustinov served as a conscript in 1979-1980 before becoming a career Airborne Troops officer. He earned combat experience in his two years in Afghanistan serving as a deputy battalion commander.
After mid-career assignments and graduating MAGS, he served briefly as commander of the 106th Airborne Division in 2007. In 2009, he became deputy commander of the former Leningrad MD, and then commanded its 6th CAA.
He became deputy commander of the Central MD in 2013. He was TDY in Syria during 2016-2017 when he participated in the second operation to reclaim Palmyra. He was one of the leading contenders to replace Vladimir Shamanov as VDV commander in 2016.
He was passed over when younger General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Lapin was brought in from the Eastern MD to command the Central MD in 2017.
Ustinov has been acting MD commander since October so Lapin is likely commanding Russian forces in Syria now. But what about when Lapin returns? A two-star with a three-star first deputy? Lapin is likely to get his third star in February before he returns to the Central MD.
VDV generals who’ve traded blue for green uniforms may experience jealousy and resentment from career Ground Troops colleagues. Ustinov could be the victim of some of this.
Also getting his third star is Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral Aleksandr Nosatov who got his current post when his predecessor was dismissed for deficiencies in combat training and for distorted reports about the state of his command.
The two-star promotions include:
The one-stars include:
Four new general-majors could not be identified in a post at present.
Has a future Chief of the General Staff (NGSh or НГШ) appeared on the Russian military leadership horizon? Is it Aleksandr Zhuravlev?
RF President Vladimir Putin appointed General-Colonel Zhuravlev (zhu-rav-LYOV) Commander of the Western MD sometime prior to November 10. For more than a year, he’s been a rapidly rising star of the Russian Army.
Zhuravlev replaced General-Colonel Andrey Kartapolov who became Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the RF Armed Forces back in mid-summer.
Putin made General-Colonel Zhuravlev a Hero of the Russian Federation for commanding Russian forces in Syria in 2017 (he was also previously chief of staff in Syria). He served a stint as a deputy chief of the General Staff. He also briefly commanded the Eastern MD and led its troops during Vostok-2018. Those “strategic maneuvers” likely delayed his appointment to the Western MD.
Born in Tyumen oblast on December 2, 1965, Zhuravlev’s not quite 53. He graduated from the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School in 1986. He served in the USSR’s Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia) for about eight years before returning to mid-career training at the Military Academy of Armored Troops.
In 1996, he was posted to the Far Eastern MD where he was a tank regiment and motorized rifle division commander.
He completed his senior training at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 2008. Upon graduation, he became Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander of the 58th CAA in the North Caucasus (now Southern) MD.
In 2010, Putin appointed him to command the 2nd CAA in the Volga-Ural (now Central) MD. He became Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander of the Central MD in early 2015. That posting led to Zhuravlev’s duty in Syria. The Central MD has been responsible for Russian operations in Syria.
Zhuravlev was chief of staff for Russia’s forces from the start. He commanded them during the second half of 2016 and for most of 2018. He basically never got settled in the Eastern MD before being moved to the Western.
General-Colonel Zhuravlev looks like he’s checked all boxes to become Chief of the General Staff at some point. A Hero of the Russian Federation . . . command of forces in combat . . . command of MDs . . . chief of staff assignments in Syria, Central MD, 58th CAA. Perhaps all he needs to spend a couple years actually commanding the Western MD.
But what of the current NGSh Army General Valeriy Gerasimov? He just turned 63. By statute, he can serve until he’s 65, but there are cases where general officers serve beyond established limits. A lot could depend on how long Putin intends for Sergey Shoygu to be Minister of Defense. Shoygu picked Gerasimov right away to replace his predecessor’s NGSh — Nikolay Makarov — in 2012. It’s hard to say when Gerasimov might go.
The current list of Russian three-star officers has less than 20 men. General-Colonel Sergey Surovikin is Zhuravlev’s most obvious competition. But is he a stronger candidate now that he’s getting the unusual chance to command Russia’s air forces, or was he shunted aside?
Among the others, at least five are specialists lacking experience commanding large-scale ground forces. Two are career staff officers without recent command experience. About six are so close in age to Gerasimov that they don’t really make sense.
Soon to be 57, Airborne Troops Commander Andrey Serdyukov is a possibility but he never commanded an MD. He was, however, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander of the Southern MD, and slated to command in Syria in late 2017 when a serious car accident derailed that plan. Andrey Kartapolov seems sidelined with Russia’s resurrected political officers, but he’s only 55, so it might be early to count him out. Similarly, Aleksandr Dvornikov is 57, was the first commander of Russia’s troops in Syria, is a Hero of the Russian Federation, and currently commands the Southern MD.
There are younger rising stars but, as general-lieutenants, most haven’t yet held a large command. But two are new MD commanders — Aleksandr Lapin in the Central and now Gennadiy Zhidko in the Eastern. At 53, Zhidko was a chief of staff in Syria, served a year as a deputy chief of the General Staff, and is a Hero of the RF. Lapin and Zhidko will probably get their third stars in December.
From what we can tell externally, it doesn’t appear NGSh Valeriy Gerasimov is going anywhere soon. But a change in the MOD’s top uniformed officer will probably happen overnight and take us by surprise. When it does, General-Colonel Zhuravlev might be best positioned to succeed him.
President Vladimir Putin issued his latest general and flag officer promotion list on June 11 for Russian Federation Day.
The MOD promotees included six two-stars (5 general-lieutenants and a vice-admiral) and 17 one-stars (14 general-majors and three rear-admirals).
Putin’s rebranded National Guard (ex-MVD Internal Troops) got three two-stars and 8 one-stars.
The MOD promotions included:
Also among the promotees are the chief of the General Staff’s topographic directorate, deputy chief of staff of the Eastern MD, and commanders of the 41st and 44th Air Defense Divisions, and Novorossiysk Naval Base. Others include the deputy commander for logistics of the Group of Forces and Troops in the North-East (Kamchatka), and personnel chiefs for the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.
As usual, several military educators were promoted; notably the chief of the MOD’s Military University received his second star.
Five promotees could not be identified in a specific billet at present.