Tag Archives: BSF

Serdyukov on Contract Service

Wednesday Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov appeared before a closed session of the Federation Council’s ‘government hour,’ and answered 30 prepared questions. 

ITAR-TASS reported the upper legislative chamber’s Speaker Sergey Mironov summarized Serdyukov’s presentation as follows:

“Objectively speaking, we received exhaustive explanations on several positions, some answers explained the situation which had called forth serious questions from the senators.”

Mironov added that Serdyukov’s answers:

“. . . did not completely satisfy FC members.  Personally I and many of my colleagues remained with our own opinions about what is happening in the armed forces.”

Defense and Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ozerov delivered the gist of Serdyukov’s answers to the Russian media, although Serdyukov answered some direct press questions after his session with the legislators.

According to RIA Novosti, Serdyukov said:

“We talked about the transition to the new profile, the numerical composition of the armed forces, the new structure, military units which are being created, draft legislation on pay and proposals concerning the provision of housing to servicemen.”

The major news out of Serdyukov’s parliamentary appearance was the report that he denied Russia is abandoning professional contract service or returning to Soviet-style, all-conscript armed forces.  This contrasted with the recent Newsru.com report saying contractees will soon be drastically cut everywhere except in permanent readiness units, as well as with General Staff Chief Makarov’s February admission that contract service has failed. 

Several media sources reported that Serdyukov indicated contractees would increase 50 percent from a current level of 150,000 to between 200,000 and 250,000.  ITAR-TASS reported his words as:

“In the future it [the number of contractees] will grow, there is potential for this.  In the future the number of contractees will grow to 200-250 thousand, such conditions will be created for them so that they can fulfill their duties as real professionals.”

However, BFM.ru and Regions.ru heard it quite differently.  They reported:

“The Russian Army has not abandoned contract service.  Now in the Armed Forces of Russia there are 150 thousand contractees.  At minimum, this number will be preserved.  If the financial potential of the government allows, we will broaden this component.  Ideally, according to our calculations, the quantity of contractees should be about 200-250 thousand.  They should occupy duties demanding good training and knowledge, service experience.”

According to Ozerov and press sources, Serdyukov addressed other miscellany.

The Defense Minister said the LDPR’s recent draft law proposing to allow young men to buy their way out of the draft for 1 million rubles “raises a whole series of issues.”  He claimed this would interfere with the country’s mobilization potential.  He apparently didn’t say how many guys he thought could afford that much, but he must think a lot can, if it could affect Russia’s human mobilization resources.

Despite recent press indicating a strong presumption that Serdyukov is ready to euthanize premilitary Suvorov and Nakhimov schools (much as VVUZy have been paired back), he told the Federation Council that Suvorov schools will be preserved and strengthened.

Serdyukov demurred from the possibility of more Russian bases abroad, calling them an “expensive pleasure.”

He said the military’s 8,000 plus military towns will be reduced and consolidated into only 184, and those cut would be turned over to the oblasts and republics in which they are located.  The Defense Ministry will discuss with RF subjects and local governments the transfer of housing and other social infrastructure in military towns to their jurisdiction. 

This harks back to the late April announcement about constructing new, large ‘core military towns.’  The smaller number of garrisons sounds more appropriate for a million-man army than 8,000, but taking care of those left stranded without utilities and other services in former garrisons is much more troublesome than simply transferring them to the control of oblasts or local governments.

Serdyukov said the Defense Ministry will acquire 51,000, rather than 45,000 permament apartments for servicemen this year.  He doesn’t see any problem with providing service apartments to every military man by the end of 2012.

He regrets that the Defense Ministry’s request for indexing military pay and pensions has not been approved, but he said this issue is not decided yet.

On the Black Sea Fleet, Ozerov said Serdyukov said the fleet’s personnel will be less than the 24,000 stationed there earlier.  He said Serdyukov said he expects the new Ukrainian government to be much more amenable to discussing deliveries of new weapons and equipment of the Russian fleet.

Medvedev Can Wait for His BSF Basing Report

Medvedev and Serdyukov Meeting on 1 May

Whatever the complaints of some Ukrainians, the 21 April deal extending Russia’s basing privileges in Sevastopol is a good deal for Kyiv.  It’s now using the relatively meaningless Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) presence to secure a valuable 30 percent discount on Russian natural gas supplies.  

Moreover, in one suited for the ‘be careful what you wish for’ file, Moscow is also left holding the bag when it comes to the economy and infrastructure of Sevastopol, and much of Crimea as well, instead of Kyiv having to worry about assuming responsibility in a few short years. 

On 1 May, President Medvedev ordered Defense Minister Serdyukov to prepare a plan for developing the BSF’s naval base in Sevastopol, and to conclude an agreement with Ukraine on its social infrastructure.  According to Kremlin.ru, Medvedev said: 

“. . . today I want to touch on an issue with you which has taken on particular acuteness for our country in recent times.” 

“We need to think about the social arrangements for this base, that is very important to us, so that our sailors live in modern, full-fledged human conditions, have the chance for recreation and other opportunities a base is supposed to provide.” 

“So we’re agreed that our base will conclude a corresponding agreement with the Ukrainian side, with Sevastopol.  In accordance with this agreement, special support, social-economic support will be rendered to a series of Sevastopol city programs.” 

“This city is really not foreign to us and we need to think in what way to participate in these programs both along Defense Ministry lines and along the lines of other executive organs and business structures.  That’s the task.” 

Medvedev said Serdyukov should present his plan for approval in a month, and the latter responded that he would. 

Curiously, on 7 May, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov told RIA Novosti

“A working group’s been created which will evaluate the real condition of the basing point in Sevastopol and make its proposals.  I think this will take not less than two months.” 

“Practically nothing’s been invested there in recent years.” 

One wonders, would Makarov have unilaterally announced that Putin, when he was president, would have to wait an extra month or longer for the plan he ordered? 

Makarov said the Genshtab has no plans to freeze development of other basing points:   

“The fleet has to be.  The more basing points, the better.  And Novorossiysk is one of the key basing points.  And we intend to develop it.” 

Without elaboration, he said the Defense Ministry has modernization plans for the fleet’s ships, submarines, and aircraft to 2020.  Makarov was with Prime Minister Putin visiting the construction work at Novorossiysk.  

Putin Briefed on Novorossiysk

On 24 April, Anatoliy Tsyganok told RIA Novosti conditions at Novorossiysk are not particularly well suited for major base.  He noted it’s only 25 percent complete, and its price tag is continuously rising. 

Nevertheless, Putin reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to Novorossiysk.  He acknowledged only 13 billions rubles have been spent, and he’s looking at an ultimate cost of 92 billion.  The base is slated for completion by 2020. 

But Moscow, Medvedev, and Putin may need to worry more about new ships and submarines than about infrastructure when it comes to the BSF. 

On 2 May, Anatoliy Baranov in Forum.msk pointed out that there’s practically no fleet there; a minimum of 2 more first rank ships and a submarine are needed for an adequate order-of-battle.  He says the social infrastructure’s not so bad, but 40- and 50-year-old civilian engineers and technicians have to go out with fleet units to conduct training.  What will the Navy do when they retire?  

Rosbalt.ru described a wave of new officer and civilian dismissals in the BSF, which occurred simultaneously with the new agreement with Kyiv.  The fleet, it says, is nothing more than a mixed force division’s worth of units and personnel.   Viktor Yadukha concludes: 

“NATO’s gracious reaction to the BSF lease extension didn’t surprise politicians more.  But if Western special services knew about real plans for its reinforcement, the reaction would have been very severe.” 

Lastly, in today’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Aleksandr Khramchikhin says: 

“. . . renting empty piers for a great amount of money is not a mistake, but thoughtless, considering how many ships and how well-outfitted a base in Novorossiysk this money could build.” 

He calls today’s BSF a unique collection of floating antiques.  Even if the oldest units were dropped, most BSF ships would still be 20- to 25-years-old.  It will be impossible to avoid sending ships from the 1960s and 1970s off for scrap soon, as has been officially acknowledged.  Khramchikhin recommends placing what’s left at Novorossiysk as a ‘water area security’ (OVR or ОВР) brigade.

BSF Expects Frigates and Subs

To counter recent predictions of the fleet’s demise, a BSF staff source today told RIA Novosti 3-4 frigates and a similar number of diesel-electric submarines would meet the fleet’s needs in the coming five years.  He pointed to the Admiral Gorshkov class frigate at Northern Wharf and proyekt 677 submarine Sevastopol at Admiralty.

The source said:

“In the course of the next five years, new class frigates and diesel-electric submarines will be included in the order-of-battle of the Black Sea Fleet.  The need to replenish the BSF order-of-battle is caused by the decommissioning of obsolete ships of various classes.”

He said new ships would also support the fleet’s full participation in exercises with NATO and Ukraine, and also exercises and long-distance cruises planned by the RF Navy’s command.  He noted that the renewal of the BSF’s ships in no way would contradict the provisions of Russia’s basing agreement in Ukraine.  He called Russia’s plans transparent and a subject for discussion in the sessions of the Russian-Ukrainian BSF sub-commission.

These hopes are basically the same as those expressed back in February when another source said 2 frigates and 3 submarines.

Other media today reported the possibility that Moscow could get a base agreement extension in return for higher rent payments or lower gas prices for Kyiv.

Viktor Litovkin on BSF

Writing in Friday’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Viktor Litovkin talked about the procurement of proyekt 20380 corvettes from Piter’s Northern Wharf.  The second unit Soobrazitelnyy was just launched, and three more have been laid down, but it’s not clear when they’ll enter of the order-of-battle.  A total of 20 are planned, but the specialists say everything depends on financing.

Then Litovkin turns to last week’s reports of imminent decommissioning for Ochakov, Kerch, etc.  He says this’ll leave the BSF with about 40 ships (12 of which are either in repair or a ‘conservation’ status).  He puts the average age of the remaining fleet units at 25-30 years, and the youngest are its proyekt 1239 small air cushion missile ships.

As far as capabilities go, the BSF is still stronger than Ukraine and Georgia (at least), but there is a question as to whether it can defend the country’s interests.  But maybe it doesn’t have to be so powerful when the country still has the RVSN, and the BSF wasn’t really challenged in the August 2008 war with Georgia, and it can still show the flag in the Mediterranean, defend the country’s economic zones, and participate in antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa.  No one would take it into their head to compare it with the U.S. 6th Fleet.

But still Litovkin wants to answer why the BSF reached its current state.  Because the ‘Orange Revolution’ Ukrainians wouldn’t permit Moscow to renew the BSF’s potential in ships, aircraft, or personnel.  And Moscow was busy trying to modernize and preserve parts of the military other than surface ships.  He says:

“It built them for India, China, Vietnam.  Only now is it beginning to launch new corvettes and frigates for the Navy.  But by a drop (by one) per year.  And this is for all four fleets and a flotilla.”

“According to experts’ assertions, in the coming 10-15 years there are no possibilities for renewing the composition of the surface fleet.  Despite even the fact that today two frigates for the distant naval zone are laid down (proyekt 22350), five corvettes of proyekt 20380, three small gun ships of proyekt 21630, large landing ship of proyekt 11711… But even if the program of their construction is successful, they won’t under any circumstances compensate for the ships withdrawn due to age.”

“Even the Mistral won’t help here.”

Incredible Disappearing Fleet

Kara-class CG Kerch (713)

The Black Sea Fleet’s predicament is hardly a news story.  The press in recent months has featured stories claiming that the BSF will receive new ships to replace its aging order-of-battle.

But Gzt.ru maintains the BSF is just about rusted through, and its ships will be unable to go to sea by 2015.  A Navy Main Staff source says the average age of BSF ships exceeds 30 years—the practical limit for naval vessels.  He claims the fleet’s sailors keep their ships in good condition, but, since metal has its limits, their hulls are reaching a point where “no one will risk going to sea in such ships.”

The source says the oldest BSF ships—whose service lives have expired and don’t warrant further investment—will be written off.  They include the Kara-class CG Ochakov (707), Tango-class SS Saint Prince Georgiy (B-380), probably Kara-class CG Kerch (713), and various transport and auxiliary ships.  Ochakov is 37 years old, and spent the past 18 years in the repair yard.  The disappearance of the Ochakov and Kerch will leave the BSF with only two major surface combatants—Slava-class CG Moskva (121) and Kashin-class DDG Smetlivyy (810).  And there is apparently a rumor that the Moskva will remain in the Pacific after participating in Vostok-2010 this summer.  The BSF will also be down to a lone submarine, Kilo-class Alrosa (B-871), which reportedly awaits repair after an engineering casualty during a recent training cruise. 

The final decision to write off some ships is driven by a 30 percent cut in the fleet’s maintenance budget [recall Defense Minister Serdyukov saying the repair budget has been cut by 28-30 percent, supposedly in favor of new procurement].  Since February, personnel at the 13th and 91st ship repair plants have been reduced by 2 times, according to Newsru.com.  And the repair plants have practically no work this year.

So they’re not fixing old ships, but neither are new ones in sight . . . the press noted that the BSF didn’t get new units in the 2000s, will get no new ships this year, and the introduction of new ones isn’t planned.

A BSF staff representative told Gzt.ru that several new corvettes of the Steregushchiy type (proyekt 20380) would restore the BSF’s combat potential. The Steregushchiy is in the Baltic Fleet, and a second unit of the class was just launched on 31 March.  This seems too slow to help the BSF, even if any of these ships were destined for Sevastopol.

 A source tells Gzt.ru the basic problem is the lack of production capacity:

“All shipbuilding plants are overflowing with foreign orders for several years ahead, and even if there is money it’s very complicated to arrange additional production for the Russian Navy’s needs since there isn’t the right quantity of milling machinists, lathe operators, and welders.  There’s great productive potential in Ukraine, and we consider that the warming in Russian-Ukrainian relations could lead to realizing a number of projects on Ukrainian building ways, which never worked for the USSR’s Black Sea Fleet.”

Gazeta.ru provided the opinion of Vladimir Yevseyev, who believes, until the BSF gets a new main base, it won’t get any new ships.  He says all the fleet’s problems are connected with its basing.  Most Ukrainian politicians oppose extending Russia’s presence in Sevastopol beyond 2017.  And Moscow has allocated a billion rubles to build a new base at Novorossiysk, but billions of dollars are required to create modern infrastructure there.  Yevseyev doesn’t like Novorossiysk, or Ochamchira:

“But we need to choose, otherwise the fleet could simply be liquidated.  Russia is just simply marking time.”

Svpressa.ru seconds this line of thought, concluding that malicious people say the fleet’s fate has been decided, and Russia’s Crimean base is folding up, and, in order to avoid a furor, its order-of-battle will be liquidated by taking units out of service.

Unrest in the Black Sea Fleet?

In Part 2 of his article, Shurygin ended by describing the Black Sea Fleet as being on the verge of an explosion.  We’ll see if he elaborates on this in the final part when it’s published.

Meanwhile, on 12 November, Moskovskiy komsomolets wrote about thousands of officers and families in Sevastopol “thrown to their fate,” without the possibility of getting a job in Ukraine, and left practically without money and housing.  The author, Yekaterina Petukhova, like Shurygin, said the situation in Crimea is on the “verge of revolt.”

Young BSF Officer and Guided Missile Cruiser Moskva

According to Petukhova, 2,000 BSF personnel were cut in 2009, and another 9,000 have been warned that they will be dismissed.  She talked to an officer named Oleg, who said he was one of the “fortunate” ones who were put outside the fleet’s TO&E.

The situation’s not worse anywhere.  They’ve already cut thousands, now they’re mowing down the command and control organs.  When they put you outside the TO&E, for a half year they still pay your salary, but minus premiums and minus the supplement for handling secret information.  But this is nevertheless some money.  But then it’s all gone.  View it however you want.  But we’re all here with Russian citizenship.  Where are they going to let us work?  And we can’t go back anywhere in Russia.  They don’t want to give us the service apartments in Sevastopol which we lived in all this time.  They are proposing several cities in Russia, but there really aren’t apartments there—it’s excavation that could go on forever.  And so officers sit, they don’t get pay, nor can they finalize a pension without a permanent residence permit.

Oleg went on to say that single officers especially don’t know what to do.  They aren’t giving out single apartments and, if they get together with a friend and apply for an apartment for two, they are derided as homosexuals.

He gives his view of how it might end. 

Can you generally imagine such a crowd of healthy men, who know military matters firsthand, wandering around Crimea and the quays?  Some kind of Lenin will be found and he’ll raise a crowd, then people will wish he hadn’t turned up.  The fleet commander is silent, everyone spits on us, a kind of chaos is being created.

Petukhova ends by noting that when Kyiv makes a move against the BSF, Moscow politicians race to the defense of Russian sailors, but they’re all silent when the Russian authorities have driven thousands of BSF men and their families to the edge.  She concludes that the ‘new profile’ of the armed forces has an unpleasant odor.

Stirrings in the Black Sea Fleet

IA Rosbalt has conjectured that Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander, Vice-Admiral Kletskov, might be replaced.  The outspoken Kletskov would take the hit for BSF officers’ anger over Serdyukov’s reforms.  The article says the BSF’s fundamental problem — illustrated by the 21 November submarine breakdown — is its aging order-of-battle and lack of combat capability.  Between Moscow and Kyiv, it doesn’t look like the BSF will get modernized either.  Serdyukov’s personnel cuts are hitting the BSF hard.  IA Rosbalt cites the 10,000 figure for personnel being cut loose there, and, although he’s not to blame, Kletskov could be the scapegoat for reductions. 

Dissatisfaction with Serdyukov’s reforms flows from the particular circumstances of the BSF.  Specifically, dismissed officers will not be able to privatize their service apartments, i.e. base housing.  Many of these apartments were built through the largesse of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and his patronage of the fleet, and Moscow won’t allow them to be privatized.  But one also has to suspect the issue goes to whether ex-officers of the Russian BSF will be allowed to become permanent residents of Sevastopol.

IA Rosbalt thinks Vice-Admiral Menyaylo, who directed the amphibious assault of Abkhazia in August 2008, might succeed Kletskov, but no one in the BSF is commenting.  The rumors could just remain rumors.

The article finishes with a note about the BSF’s weakness vis-a-vis the Turkish Navy.  Can and whether Moscow wants to revive the BSF is the question.

On 10 December, ITAR-TASS said the Russian Navy Main Staff has asked the Moscow government to privatize nearly 300 service apartments for dismissed officers in the BSF.  Vice-Admiral Smuglin says 940 BSF officers are being dismissed without housing, 287 of whom want to remain in Crimea.  Smuglin notes that the BSF has 1,900 service apartments, 817 of which were built by the Moscow government.  When dismissed, officers have to leave these apartments and the situation is causing ‘social tension.’  The Moscow and Sevastopol governments are looking at whether these apartments can be transferred from the former to the latter.