“In essence, after many years of interruption, we are beginning a large shipbuilding program: by 2020, 4.7 trillion rubles will be directed at reequipping Russia’s Navy. The aim is clear — it is creating a modern fleet, capable of carrying out all missions — from nuclear deterrence to presence on the world’s oceans, to the security of our economic interests and Russia’s bioresources.”
That’s how Prime Minister Putin put it at Monday’s party conference in Cherepovets. But Nezavisimaya gazeta and Vedomosti had sharp and pithy criticism for him and for the naval construction program.
NG concluded military voters might be cheered up, but the paper wants to know what the naval construction program is exactly. Is it the one that’s buying Mistrals that may not be needed from France? With what and how will the Navy be equipped?
Apparently not aircraft carriers. And not other large warships either. They’re built in Russia, but for sale to India and China. NG continues:
“Our own fleet is being populated piecemeal. And, as a rule, we’re talking about a mosquito fleet. Which, of course, is not capable of completing missions ‘from nuclear deterrence to presence on the world’s oceans.'”
The editorial cites former Black Sea Fleet Commander Vladimir Komoyedov who complains about the retirement of the Kara-class CG Ochakov, and claims nothing new is being developed. It quotes Aleksandr Pokrovskiy who says the Baltic Fleet’s new Steregushchiy and Soobrazitelnyy corvettes are not participating in exercises because they’re only 50 percent combat ready.
So, asks NG, what kind of modern fleet are we talking about? About past shipbuilding programs, it says:
“They were concrete and understandable — how many and what types of ships must be built. Today politicians prefer to talk not about this, but about large-scale financial investment in the future fleet. And in the very distant future at that. From the point of view of the 2011 and 2012 election campaigns, it could be, that this is correct. But from the point of view of the country’s security — hardly.”
Vedomosti takes its turn:
“. . . the idea of turning Russia into a great naval power has agitated the minds of the leaders of the Russian state for more than 300 years already. The question is how acute this mission is in the 21st century and how Putin’s new slogans correspond to programs already adopted.”“But the thing is not just the quality of the state program [of armaments], but also its strategic aims, which the government’s leader lays out. We’d like the prime minister to formulate precisely what level of Navy presence in the world’s oceans and what he has in mind for its participation in the defense of bioresources. Security of mineral and biological resources is an affair for civilian services and maritime border guards . . . .”
“Many experts consider extravagant the purchase of the Mistrals (four ships cost 2.35 billion euros), intended to support amphibious operations at a great distance from native shores. Some admirals and VPK directors called for development of aircraft carrier groups. Similar projects, the cost of which stretches to tens of billions of euros, will cause curtailment of construction of ships needed for the fleet, overloading and technological breakdowns in Russian shipyards. In any case, Russia’s main problems have to be resolved on land.”
Russian Defense Policy 