Tag Archives: Contract Service

Serdyukov’s Post-Collegium TV Interview

After last Friday’s Defense Ministry collegium, Serdyukov was interviewed on Rossiya 24.

He probably fielded more pointed questions than normal, but he easily navigated them.  At times, he answered partially and the interviewer didn’t follow up with the next logical question.

Asked about officers dismissed in 2009, he said the armed forces shed 65,000 of them, who retired on age or health grounds, requested dismissal, or violated their contracts.  There was no mention of those put in limbo outside the TO&E, without duty posts and only their rank pay to live on.  These are the officers who can’t formally be dismissed because they don’t have housing, and are living at their ‘commander’s disposal.’  There was also no mention of how many warrant officers were put out in 2009.

Serdyukov said some officers accepted civilianized posts, and 4,000 received job retraining–a pretty small number against the large need for it.

The Defense Minister said dedovshchina was officially down 15 percent, and he doesn’t want only platoon and company commanders punished when it happens in their units.  He wants to see all levels of command take more responsibility for the problem.  Not sure what he’s insinuating, but it could be a warning to higher ups that they could suffer too when big time violence cases hit the news and make the Arbat military district look bad.

Serdyukov talked about higher officer training and appraisals, mentioning the assembly for 550 officers from the military districts and army commands.  He said we tried to make them understand what it is we’re trying to do.  But many lacked the knowledge and necessary skills–presumably to continue in the service.  See today’s Nezavisimaya gazeta.  Viktor Litovkin writes about generals and senior officers dismissed under Serdyukov.  Military district and fleet staffs which used to number 500-700 officers have been cut to 300.  Trimming the ‘bloated egg’ is generally a good idea, but as Litovkin says, it really depends on the quality of those left behind.

Back to Serdyukov’s interview . . . in cutting the military educational establishment from 65 to 10 mega-institutions, he said fewer officers will be needed but the quality of their training must be improved.  The 10 left standing have or will have their faculty members assessed for fitness to serve and they’ll get facility improvements.

On contract service which General Staff Chief Makarov has pronounced dead, Serdyukov said:

“The results of the program were not satisfactory.  In reality, we underestimated the situation somewhat, as regards who should switch to contract service and on what terms, or with what pay.”

“. . . the next program should be revised in an attempt after all to think it out regarding what specific positions should be filled by contract service personnel.  Of course, this applies to complex skills, where expensive equipment is operated.”

Nevertheless, he noted that he expects the contract sergeant program [albeit small-scale and apparently no longer funded] to succeed.

He said the army borrowed from foreign military experience in deciding on the shift from divisions to brigades.  He said the latter’s potential is virtually the same or even greater in some cases than that of the former.

Serdyukov said the Defense Ministry has reported to the Supreme CINC on its view of how it would like to reequip over the next 5-10 years.  He repeated that cuts to R&D and maintenance had allowed for bigger buys of new arms in 2008 and 2009.

He admitted Bulava hasn’t been successful, but he expects this system to be put right and completed.

He addressed possible foreign arms purchases:

“. . . in some areas we are lagging behind quite badly.  This relates not just to the Navy but also other services.  We are buying things in single numbers right now.  They are things like UAVs, all kinds of sights, night vision equipment–it is a very broad spectrum where we are specifically lagging.”

Despite reports that Moscow would be negotiating only with Paris on Mistral, Serdyukov claimed Russia is talking to the Netherlands and Spain.  He denied it was no more than a glorified cruise ship, saying it could perform many roles and had many different capabilities.

Plug Pulled on Contract Service

On Friday, Interfaks said a source in the Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee indicated the latest contract service program (the Federal Targeted Program (FTsP) for Manning Sergeant (Petty Officer) and Soldier (Sailor) Ranks with Contract Servicemen) has been scrapped.  The program was supposed to produce 64,000 contract NCOs by 2015. 

The financial resources for this 2009-2015 program have been slashed by 86 percent according to an Audit Chamber report given to the upper house of the Russian legislature.  A Defense and Security Committee representative says 22.4 billion rubles of the 26.6 billion ruble program were slashed.

This certainly sounds like losses have been cut to what’s already been spent on selecting and beginning to train a little more than 200 future sergeants at Ryazan.  The program was slow in starting, and of 2,700 candidates who came to Ryazan, only 239 were ultimately accepted.

General Staff Chief Makarov and Ground Troops CINC Postnikov recently admitted contract service had failed, but said the contract sergeant program would continue.  They didn’t say it would basically be limited to its current very small scale.

Infox.ru on Friday quoted Prime Minister Putin who, in 2008, called the contract sergeant program “the logical development of plans for the organizational development of a modern and highly professional Russian Army.”

On cutting conscription to 12 months, Putin said, “For this decision we went logically over the course of the last six years, developing a system to attract citizens to military service in a voluntary manner, on contract.”

He continued, “. . . the main load of servicing new weapons systems will be on contract-sergeants in coming years” and “forming the professional sergeant corps is an important step toward a more modern organization of combat training.”

Apparently, none of this will happen now, and the army will rely more on its conscripts and traditional conscript-sergeants with six, or more likely three, months of training.

Russians Don’t Want to Serve in the Army

Three polls are better than one.  Three different opinion polls find Russians prefer their sons and brothers not serve in the army by a margin ranging from fully one-half to nearly two-thirds of those queried.  Press reporting on these polls didn’t do them justice, so here’s another take on them.

Look first at Levada-Tsentr, the most independent and well-respected Russian polling firm.  Levada’s published numbers on yes-or-no to army service date back to 1998, when 84 percent said they’d prefer their relatives not serve in the armed forces.  This no-to-service number declined to 77 percent in 2004, and to 53 percent in 2008, before increasing again to 57 percent of respondents indicating a preference against service this year.  The corresponding yes-to-service numbers start from a low of 13 percent in 1998, rising to 35 in 2007, 36 in 2008, and 34 percent this year.

So, in late January-early February 2010, 57 percent said don’t serve, 34 percent said serve.  Presumably, 9 percent just didn’t answer either way even though that wasn’t a choice in Levada’s survey.

Levada also asked, ‘if not, why not?’  Respondents could choose from multiple ‘why not’ reasons.  ‘Dedovshchina, nonregulation relations, violence in the army’ was the top ‘why not’ answer with 40 percent in 1998 and still 37 percent in 2010.  It’s interesting that the 2006 number spiked to 49 percent, probably because the poll came right after the notorious Sychev abuse case broke.

Levada’s next top 5 ‘why not’ answers:

  • ‘Death/injury in Chechen type conflicts’
  • ‘Denial of rights and humiliation of servicemen by officers, commanders’
  • ‘Difficult living conditions, poor food, health dangers’
  • ‘Moral decay, drunkenness, drug abuse’
  • ‘Collapse of the army, irresponsible policy of the authorities in relation to the army’

The number of those picking these declined by nearly, or more than, half over the 12-year period, 1998-2010.  But dedovshchina, hazing, abuse, violence, whatever you call it, persisted.

Since 1998, Levada has also asked whether Russians prefer conscript or contract service, and they’ve consistently answered contract, but the gap has narrowed since the mid-2000s to 54 percent for contract and 39 for conscript in 2010.

Similarly, for three years, Levada asked Russians whether a family member should serve, or seek a way to avoid serving, if drafted.  This one’s pretty much a toss-up this year, with 46 percent saying serve, and 42 percent saying find a way to avoid serving.

Levada also published two years of responses on whether Russia should preserve a million-man army or cut it and use the savings to equip the army with the newest weapons.  The gap on this question went wider this year with 36 percent favoring the million-man army and 50 percent the smaller, better equipped one.

Levada always asks about threats to Russia and the army’s ability to defend the country.

On threats to Russia from other countries, the poll tends to go up or down by 10 percent from year to year, but has still been pretty consistent over the last decade.  In 2010, 47 percent said there are definitely or likely threats to Russia (48 percent said this in 2000).  This year 42 percent said there are most likely or definitely not threats to Russia (vs. 45 percent in 2000).

On the army’s ability to defend Russia, the number also goes up or down by 10 percent from year to year.  In 2010, 63 percent said definitely or most likely yes it can defend Russia.  This figure was 60 percent in 2000, and 73 percent in 2008 and 2009 (perhaps still high from victory in the war with Georgia).  So it seems the number returned more to the norm this year.  Those who said it definitely or most likely can’t defend Russia was just 22 percent this year.  It had been 38 percent in 2005, and 31 percent in 2000.

But back to the mainline question on serving or not serving in the army . . . .

The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM or ВЦИОМ) asks the same basic question as Levada—effectively, would you want your son or brother to serve in the army?  It’s the same question because Levada and his close associates went on their own when the Russian government moved to assert control over this inconvenient organization in 2003.

In VTsIOM’s mid-February poll, 50 percent said no-to-service and 36 percent yes-to-service.  Unlike the yes-no on Levada’s survey, VTsIOM allows for ‘I find it difficult to answer’ and 14 percent indicated that (but in Levada’s poll 9 percent didn’t answer, so there’s not a great difference here).  VTsIOM also breaks its responses out by sex.  Women were not surprisingly less likely to say yes-to-service than men and somewhat more likely to say no-to-service. 

VTsIOM also cross-referenced responses to its yes-or-no-to-service question by the respondent’s evaluation of the Russian Army’s condition.  So, of those who said the Russian Army’s condition is ‘very poor,’ 67 percent also said no-to-service.  But 54 percent of those who said its condition is ‘very good’ still favored no-to-service.

VTsIOM’s ‘if not, why not’ data is a little different from Levada’s.  It only gives data for 2000, 2002, and 2010.  Like Levada, in 2010, the number one reason was ‘Dedovshchina, nonregulation relations, violence in the army,’ but with 75 percent of respondents picking it in this closed, multiple choice question.  Otherwise, its list of top ‘why not’ answers tracked closely with Levada’s.

VTsIOM also collected data on responses by geographic region and educational attainment, though it didn’t fully publish it.  For instance, Russians in Siberia and the Volga basin are more likely to say yes-to-service than the average Russian, according to VTsIOM.  Poorly educated [undefined] respondents said yes-to-service slightly more than half the time.

Educated [undefined] Russians said no-to-service at a 57 percent clip.  And southerners and northwesterners said no at 56 and 55 percent respectively.

Early last October, SuperJob.ru conducted a poll on the issue of service.  But it limited its respondents to Russians with sons, and its question to whether they would want their sons to serve in the army.  SuperJob.ru also broke out respondents whose sons have already served (6 percent) and it also allowed for a ‘I find it hard to answer’ option (11 percent).  That said, this poll’s responses were 63 percent no-to-service and 20 percent yes-to-service.

SuperJob.ru also broke out its data by sex, age groups, and educational attainment.  The age group data was interesting for the 45-55 and the above 55 groups.  Respondents in those groups reported that their  sons had already served at the rates of 22 and 23 percent respectively.  This is a good indication of the general rates at which young Russian men serve (about one-fifth) or manage to avoid serving (about four-fifths) one way or the other.

Russians with higher education were more likely to say yes-to-service (25 percent) and those with only secondary or technical degrees were more likely to say no-to-service (66 percent).

Some of what SuperJob.ru’s respondents said:

‘Yes, I would’ – 20 percent.

  • ‘All men in our family served, and he is no exception.’
  • ‘I myself am an officer.’
  • ‘Why not?’
  • ‘A good school for life.’
  • ‘Let the lad grow.’
  • ‘Yes, I would.  But in my region, so there’s a chance to see him more often.  And on the condition that there’s access to the Internet and mobile phones.  Even more desirable would be if there they taught some kind of profession:  telephone operator, driver, draftsman, etc.’
  • ‘Of course, this is the obligation of every man.’
  • ‘Avoiding army service is shame for a man.’
  • ‘My first son didn’t serve, and should have.’
  • ‘Who can’t survive the army won’t survive in life.’

‘No, I wouldn’t’ – 63 percent.

  • ‘My husband and I gave 30 years to the service, and now don’t have anything.  And we raised two sons without the state’s help.  And now when they are grown, it turns out, they have a debt to the state!  When will the state pay its debts to us?  Enough, we’ve already served ten years for each child.’
  • ‘My brother served, after which he said he would never send his son to the army.’
  • ‘I’m afraid for my child.’
  • ‘I served 25 years myself.  Today year-long service in the army is wasted time for a man with higher education, even during [financial] crisis conditions.’
  • ‘I prefer to get a higher education in a VUZ with a military faculty.’
  • ‘Service needs to be on contract.’
  • ‘What we have is not an army.’
  • ‘There’s still no order in the ranks of our army even among officer personnel, so I wouldn’t want my sons to serve.’
  • ‘I’m afraid for his life and health.’
  • ‘To lose a year of your life is too expensive a present for Russia.’
  • ‘Why put a moral invalid in my family?’

‘I find it hard to answer’ – 11 percent.

  • ‘I want my son to go through training for life, but I don’t want this experience to consist only of beatings.’
  • ‘My son is still young.  And I don’t know what will be in 12 years when he will have to go into the army.  It could be they won’t be conscripting any longer and everything will be volunteer, but it could be, to the contrary, they could ‘shave’ everybody no matter what.’
  • ‘Every young man needs to go through this school to feel like a man and, if necessary, stand up for his country.  However, when kids come back from the army with ruined health, even in peacetime, you begin to think, is this necessary?’

Golts on Makarov, Postnikov, and Contract Service

In Yezhednevnyy zhural on 1 March, Aleksandr Golts says Makarov’s and Postnikov’s pronouncements on the failure of contract service were, of course, an open secret.  Analysts and journalists had been writing about its failure for two years [much longer actually].  He recalled being at a December roundtable including GOMU generals, who had implemented contract service, who railed against slanderers who dared describe things as they are, including the failure of the contract program.  And now Defense Ministry chiefs have also acknowledged the obvious.

Golts concludes that Makarov and company also finally recognized something known to ‘liberal experts’ seven years ago–it was senseless to try to go to volunteer service without first creating a professional NCO corps.

Then Golts describes a Defense Ministry propensity for lying–GOMU Chief Smirnov gives one figure on the number of draft evaders, his deputy gives a different figure; Deputy Defense Minister Pankov says the 85 permanent readiness brigades are ready for battle in one hour, Ground Troops CINC Postnikov says actually they are ready only to depart their garrisons in one hour; Armaments Chief Popovkin says 5-6,000 tanks are needed, Postnikov says 10,000, or maybe only 2,000 are needed.

This irresponsible and unpunished lying pervades the army, it’s an everyday automatic reflex, and it’s not harmless.  The country’s leadership takes decisions on it.  God forbid they should trust GOMU when it says it’s possible to provide for conscription just by stopping draft evasion.  This would indicate that the complete collapse of the military manning system is near.  And the generals would use this as an argument to overturn the current reforms.

The Contractees Are Dead, Long Live the Contractees!

Asked about professional soldiers and contract service last week, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov said: 

“We are not switching to a contract basis.  Many mistakes were allowed, and that task which was given—construction of a professional army—was not completed.  Therefore a decision was made that conscript service needed to remain in the army.  Moreover, we are increasing the draft , and decreasing the contract part.  We’ve come to understand that a contractee has to be trained by altogether different methods than there were earlier.  Therefore now we’re taking on contract only sergeants who are studying for 2 and a half years.  We plan to reach a contract army through this.  Many people talked even in the Soviet Army about the need to train sergeants, but now we’ve thought everything through well and we’re promptly moving forward, so that in 2.5 years in our army there will be a sergeant, an assistant commander who’s capable of independently resolving an entire complex of tasks that are now resolved by officers.”

The effort to build a professional NCO corps will continue, but the experiment in recruiting career enlisted personnel—a main line of the army’s development since 2003—has failed.  The tenor of Makarov’s statement almost makes it sound as if he didn’t think or know a mixed manning system with conscripts predominating was the plan all along.  The Russian Army was always going to remain mixed, but now it will be much more one-sided in favor of conscripts.  A Vedomosti editorial pointed out that Russia’s generalitet (what remains of it) never supported contract service anyway.  The training of professional NCOs begun on a very small scale last fall will continue, but how long will it be before that effort too is abandoned?

Makarov’s announcement will only add to pressure on Russia’s dwindling manpower resources.  The start of one-year service basically doubled the semi-annual requirement for draftees from 133,000 to 270,000 or so.  Now it’s clear that conscripts are needed to fill spots contract enlisted were supposed to occupy.

Rossiyskaya gazeta and Krasnaya zvezda covered similar comments last week from new Ground Troops CINC Postnikov.  Both papers concluded that, while the effort with professional NCOs will continue, the army’s priority will be on meeting its manpower requirements through conscription.

Vremya novostey quoted Postnikov:

“The federal program to transfer permanent readiness units to manning with contractees did not achieve its intended goals.”

It didn’t succeed in making contract service prestigious, they didn’t select those who could be true professionals, they fully manned units with contractees to the detriment of quality.  Now corrections have been made in the troop manning plans.  Only those positions that determine the combat capability of units and formation will be contract.  There both pay and social conditions will be fitting – just like officers.  They will train contractees for the positions of professional sergeants, just as in the U.S.

And Izvestiya:

“. . . we can’t say that we have precisely those contractees which we wanted to have ideally.  We understood that we had to change the system of training contractees.  It’s planned to do this through the institution of sergeants – an assistant commander capable of independently resolving a whole block of tasks which officers now resolve.  For this reason they have to occupy positions directly answering for the combat readiness of army units and sub-units.  We have to increase their pay, create social conditions for living at the level of officers.”

But one basic problem has always been the jealousy of officers (who rarely get all their pay and benefits) toward contractees or NCOs who might possibly get almost as much as them. 

Novyye izvestiya quoted Sergey Krivenko, a member of the RF President’s Human Rights Council:

“Contractees were not provided housing or normal pay, or even timely indexing of their wages . . . .  Instead huge sums were invested in construction of housing, reequipping ranges and other facilities where the money could easily be hidden and stolen.”

Krivenko adds that contractees didn’t experience a change in their status, were often forced to sign contracts, and were not allowed to leave the garrison or live a normal life with their families outside the garrison.  So there was nothing to distinguish them from conscripts.

To sum Krivenko up, the army failed to find the right candidates and deliver the benefits it promised them.  So one has to be skeptical that the selections and Defense Ministry follow through on the professional NCO effort will be any better.

Krivenko believes that the army has virtually no choice but to increase the conscription term from one year to cover the lack of contract soldiers.  But simply allowing undermanning of units would have the same effect, but that might impinge on Makarov’s claims that most units are now fully manned and permanently ready.