Category Archives: Serdyukov’s Reforms

Corruption in 12th GUMO?

Is corruption the cause for the recent spate of decrees on military personnel?

In today’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Vladimir Mukhin reports a Defense Ministry source says the recent dismissals of high-ranking military men are connected to corruption by them or their subordinates.  He puts the sudden retirement of 12th GUMO Chief Vladimir Verkhovtsev in this category.  He reminds that the 12th GUMO is responsible for the safety, security, storage, testing, and reliability of Russian nuclear weapons, and is also primary recipient of years of U.S. taxpayer funding through the Nunn-Lugar Act.

Though he’s headed the 12th GUMO for the last five years, General-Colonel Verkhovtsev’s a relatively young 55, and could still serve 5 years under the law.

Mukhin says Defense Ministry sources say Verkhovtsev’s going down for corruption and theft by General-Major Viktor Gaydukov, commander of a nuclear weapons storage site, who together with his wife managed to steal 20 million rubles worth of U.S. aid intended for engineering work for “improving the secure storage and accountability of nuclear weapons.”

Gaydukov was the first to fall for failing to report his income and assets accurately under the provisions of the latest government anti-corruption campaign.  However, the authorities’ discovery of his theft of money intended for nuclear security was purely incidental.

Mukhin cites Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s persistent proponent, Igor Korotchenko:

“To the Defense Minister’s credit, he didn’t hide these facts and continues to sign dismissal paperwork for all officers and generals discovered mixed up in corruption.  That’s why there are so many retirements of military chiefs figuring in the president’s decrees.”

An anonymous 12th GUMO officer says:

“In Russia and the U.S., there are few ordinary people who know that, almost 20 years after the USSR’s collapse, Washington gives unreimbursed aid to the RF for the defense and support of its nuclear-technical facilities.  Why aren’t such activities promoted – it wouldn’t do to talk about them.  In Russia, they’re afraid that so-called patriots [Tea Party types?], the opposition, U.S. taxpayers wouldn’t like it.”

Mukhin says Moscow has spent much less on these facilities than the U.S. ($11 billion over two decades), but no one knows how much for sure because that budget article is still secret.  He says the Russian government may soon have to say whether the money’s been used as planned and effectively.

Viktor Litovkin called Verkhovtsev and asked him to react to claims his dismissal is linked to misuse of Nunn-Lugar funding.  He responded:

“My retirement has no relationship to this issue.  And to link it to the Nunn-Lugar program would be incompetent.  This is some kind of gibberish.  I personally made the decision to retire.  I wrote a request addressed to the Defense Minister at the beginning of November.  And I also recommended a man for my post.  He is a very good specialist whom I know well through joint work and service.  I’m sure that he’ll manage very well.”

Sounds like he’s pretty sure he won’t be facing any prosecutor. 

One should also observe that it might also be very convenient for a Defense Minister to label as corrupt anyone who opposes his policies and actions.  To complete the picture of possibilities, it’s also possible some are both corrupt and oppose Serdyukov on principle.

A short post-script . . . it’s a pity Mukhin didn’t also explore General-Major Fedorov’s move from one nuclear facility to another . . . Korotchenko credits Serdyukov for not hiding information about corrupt generals, but if he isn’t hiding it, where are the details of their crimes?

Serdyukov’s Duma Session

ITAR-TASS reported a few tidbits from Defense Minister Serdyukov’s closed session before the Duma yesterday.  Not surprisingly, Serdyukov told Duma deputies:

“We fulfilled those tasks which the President gave to conduct the Armed Forces to a new profile in 2010.  The Armed Forces’ combat readiness increased 1.5 times.  We believe that the combat readiness of the army and navy will grow 3-3.5 times toward 2020.”

RIA Novosti reported that Serdyukov said combat capability, not combat readiness.  Combat capability seems to make more sense.

ITAR-TASS says Serdyukov familiarized deputies with the basic tasks of transitioning to the new profile, and the completion of reforms planned for 2010.  Attention was given mainly to implementing the State Program of Armaments and social issues for servicemen.  He said:

“I familiarized deputies with the transformation of the military districts, changes in army corps and brigades, and military command and control at all levels.”

Corps?  Did he really say that?

Answering a question about housing for servicemen, Serdyukov said the Defense Ministry has fulfilled the government’s order about this:

“In 2009, we obtained 45,500, and in 2010 55,000 apartments from all sources.  This attests to the fact that the government’s order has been fulfilled and is being fulfilled.”

As usual, the official news sources turned to Duma Defense Committee Chairman Viktor Zavarzin for comment, and he said:

“I give high marks to today’s meeting of the chief of the defense department and deputies.  We have established tight coordination with the Defense Ministry on legislative support of military reform, and bringing the Armed Forces to a new profile. “

“We are certain we will decide all issues concerning the rearmament of the army and navy, and social support of servicemen with the Defense Ministry leadership.  I say that we need to preserve this pace which exists in the Defense Ministry and with us next year to take the work to the intended results.”

Regarding rearmament, Zavarzin said:

“Besides, in ten years, the share of modern weapons in the army should be not less than 70 percent, for which unprecedented sums have been allocated.  For this, not only a principled position of the Defense Ministry, but also readiness by OPK enterprises for serial deliveries of modern types of armaments is required.”   

Zavarzin said Serdyukov didn’t have much to say on the Mistral purchase, but Zavarzin said:

“In our view, we don’t need to acquire a hunk of metal, but we need the documentation and understanding of those ideas and developments abroad which will enable us to realize the possibilities of our industry.”

Is Russian shipbuilding really going to learn that much from Mistral?

Zavarzin expressed the opinion of the deputies who think:

“We need to give the Defense Minister great credit because he is deeply involved in these issues and, as the one ordering, aiming to supply the army and navy modern armaments and military equipment. Our convictions are that we should create a competitive environment and competitive structures which would push Russia’s defense-industrial complex to the development and creation of the newest weapons systems, including for the Navy.”

At the same time, Zavarzin credited the Defense Ministry for understanding that military social issues deserve special attention too:

“We are talking about creating attractive conditions for those who are serving, but also providing all stipulated benefits to those who are dismissed from military service.  And this is the guarantee of permanent and service housing for servicemen and their family members, but also increasing pay to servicemen and military pensioners.  By 2012, the new pay system for servicemen should be functioning.”

“It’s understood that the level of pay and military pensions today is far from what’s really needed.  Here it’s necessary to change the situation in a cardinal way.”

ITAR-TASS also talked to members of the three other factions in the Duma. 

The KPRF’s Gennadiy Zyuganov negatively evaluated the army’s combat capability saying:

“The state of preconscription training is zero, and mobilization reserves have disappeared.  The general condition is such that today the army is not in a state to defend the country reliably in the event of a small conflict.”

Zyuganov claimed that defense is spending every third RF ruble, and “spending it absolutely ineffectively.”

He complained that outsourcing support functions to civilian companies has doubled the cost of maintaining each soldier.  Zyuganov also said that, “Switching to expensive cars is a luxury in hard times.”

The Just Russia spokesman supported Serdyukov’s formation of a single queue for military apartments, saying:

“We all know that earlier this was a very corrupt sphere where there was a great deal of injustice and complaints.”

Just Russia supported publishing the apartment queue on the Internet, as well as Serdyukov’s ‘humanization’ of conscript service (an extra day off, ability to communicate with family, service near home, and weekend passes), though nothing was said about the extent to which any of these have been implemented in units.

But the Just Russia faction leader also said:

“Today we raised the issue of material support for civilian workers serving the RF Armed Forces.  Today their wages are so low that a whole row of military commanders complains that they can’t fill vacant positions:  simply no one comes for such pay.”

According to RIA Novosti, Just Russia also supports giving military retirees the option of civilianizing their pensions, a move also advocated by the Defense Ministry, but opposed by the Finance Ministry.  The move would spare the Defense Ministry from choosing between paying more in pensions as active pay rises, or breaking the sacred link between active pay and pensions.  For its part, the Finance Ministry doesn’t want pay out for more expensive civilian pensions.

The LDPR was skeptical of Serdyukov.  Its spokesman said:

“We didn’t hear any news that would surprise us.  And the points of this endless reforming, they are all mainly well-known.  It feels like the man [Serdyukov] is in the flow of what’s happening, but our faction doesn’t always share those methods with which this is happening, particularly cuts, civilianization.”

Sounds like he’s tired of sound bytes too.

Igor Barinov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee from United Russia, expressed concern that Serdyukov’s VVUZ reductions have cut military education to the bone:

“Of course, optimization on this level was essential.  But I think it was clearly a mistaken decision to stop induction [of new cadets] into military VUZy altogether this year and next.”

Mikhail Grishankov, also from United Russia, said there have been failures in the program of providing housing to servicemen.

The Defense Ministry’s Vehicle Fleet

Yesterday Newsru.com relayed an Interfaks story indicating that the Defense Ministry’s tender for a three-year lease on 553 automobiles for 10.3 billion rubles attracted just one bidder.

The Defense Ministry’s requirement included armored and luxury models, including a Porsche, BMWs, Mercedes, and a Toyota Land Cruiser, as well as more run-of-the-mill Fiats, Fords, and Volkswagens.  They’ll be used in Moscow, and all four MDs.  The luxury models are for chauffeuring foreign visitors.

The sole bidder – FGUP “St. Petersburg Engineering-Technical Center of the RF Defense Ministry” – took the contract at the unchanged initial price of 10,265,000,000 rubles.

The Defense Ministry had said earlier it was looking to save money by not buying, servicing, insuring, or operating this vehicle fleet.  It said the cost of the luxury vehicles was only a small part of the contract, and claimed they would be leased by the hour, for example 250 rubles per hour for the Toyota Land Cruiser and 400 rubles for an armored car.

Vedomosti published the first story on this tender on 10 December.  It said the Defense Ministry was looking to save 3 billion rubles.  It also predicted that the ministry’s own motor pool would win the tender because private firms are just appearing in this area, and don’t have an established network covering the entire country. 

Serdyukov’s effort to bring more efficient business practices to the Defense Ministry is again short-circuited by a lack of bidders.  This has happened before, most prominently in the case of Defense Ministry property sales.  Firms either don’t compete for contracts because they aren’t capable of performing them, or perhaps they only bid on ones they know in advance they’ll win.  Either way, it complicates successful outsourcing.

Southern MD and Black Sea Fleet

BSF Commander Vladimir Korolev told IA Rosbalt today he thinks resubordinating the BSF to the Southern MD will allow for resolving a large number of missions:

“The South-Western Axis which existed in Soviet times allowed us to coordinate the efforts of various services and troop branches.  This experience is extremely opportune today.”

Korolev acknowledged that military reform may progress painfully:

“Fundamental changes in any structure aren’t coped with easily, naturally, they can’t proceed painlessly in an organism as complex as the fleet.  The strategic command isn’t swallowing the fleet, the BSF will become an integral part of it with its specific sphere of missions.  Adjusting the synchronization of the work of structures, processes, mutual adaptation, delineation of authorities — all this is not simple at all, but it’s very important because such large-scale changes are happening for the first time in the history of our Armed Forces.  But we have to go for this in order for the fleet to develop, to get stronger in accordance with modern requirements.”

He called ‘synergistic cooperation’ the main benefit of establishing the common command uniting the fleet and army:

“The fleet, aviation, and ground units won’t compete among themselves, but organically supplement and support each other.  The events of August 2008 showed how important it is to have a powerful grouping of varied forces which have to act according to a single plan, dispose of an entire arsenal of forces and means, including modern communications systems, on the Southern, as well as on any other axis.”

Rosbalt said the BSF and Caspian Flotilla will transform into the Operational Command of Naval Forces (OKMS or ОКМС) within the Southern MD.

Now it seems Korolev’s putting a happy face on this; it won’t be easy.  Establishing real unified commands is just as hard as it is necessary.  Like it or not, the BSF is getting swallowed and subordinated.  It will operate according to plans made largely by green uniforms in Rostov-na-Donu.

If true, what Rosbalt says about the naval ‘Operational Command’ is very significant.  Remember the much-ballyhooed shift to a three-tier command structure?  The tiers are military district, operational command, and brigade.  The name sounds like the fleet’s being reduced from equal of the MD to equivalent of an army, another operational-level command.  Quite a come down.

Refusenik Accountants

This morning Argumenty.ru reports that Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov can’t find a new deputy minister for finance-economic work to replace Vera Chistova who left to head the Moscow city finance department on 8 November.  

A Defense Ministry source tells Argumenty.ru, “about 10 offers have been made, but all candidates declined.”

A highly-placed source in the Defense Ministry’s financial directorate says the absence of a deputy minister to answer for financial issues is already creating a number of problems in the ministry’s work:

“A number of contracts for construction of housing for dismissed officers have been broken, draft orders for next year for financial incentives for serving officers have been frozen.  And there’s simply no one to sign the certification of budget execution for this year for the country’s highest leadership.  I simply can’t recall such disorder in my 30 years of service.”

The source says Defense Minister Serdyukov’s report to the President on the fulfillment of orders to provide apartments to servicemen has also been postponed for an undetermined period.

Leaving to work for the new Moscow mayor seemed like a good opportunity for Chistova.  Or did she figure this was an opportune time to escape some blame for problems in the military’s budget? 

Chistova’s predecessor Lyubov Kudelina served for a long time, but left in early 2009 because, according to Viktor Litovkin’s source, she objected to the Defense Ministry pressing some officers to resign short of receiving their severance benefits, and because Serdyukov refused to ask for extra money to pay for military reform.

It seems odd that someone as well-connected in government finance as Serdyukov can’t find a deputy for this.  It would seem he has cronies already brought into the Defense Ministry that he could just order to take the post.  Maybe the refusenik accountants know it’s a bad place to be right now.

We should also recall that Serdyukov was brought to the Defense Ministry in early 2007 reportedly for the express purpose of bringing financial order to the armed forces.

GUBP Retirees Against Reform

 A belated post-script to the Colonel Krasov, Seltsy, SDR flare-up against Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and his reforms . . . .

On the first of this month, Life.ru reported that officers of the now-disbanded Main Directorate of Combat Training and Troop Service (ГУБП or GUBP for short) established a public organization to oppose military reform.

The organizing assembly occurred right after the directorate furled its standard (marking the unit’s dissolution) on 26 November.  Life.ru says 60 men attended.  This new, as yet unnamed organization is apparently seeking official registration.  It expects support from the LDPR faction in the Duma, and from large veterans organizations that have come out against reform.

Its executive secretary, Andrey Serdyuk, said:

“Ill-conceived reform has left the Russian Army without a central combat training methodology – that is, now no one knows what and how we teach soldiers and officers on the battlefield.  Nevertheless, we intend to conduct meetings and demonstrations like our colleagues from the Union of Airborne Troops.  We plan to achieve our goals in three ways – media appearances, organizing public monitoring over the course of reform, and cooperation with public veterans’ organizations.”

Retirees will be the backbone of this organization.  It won’t accept serving military men out of concern for their welfare.

A former chief of the main directorate, General-Colonel Aleksandr Skorodumov will head the group.  He retired in late 2004 after complaining publicly about personnel decisions and reorganizations that look minor compared with Serdyukov’s tenure.  He created a mini-scandal by saying the army had collapsed at that time.

Viktor Ozerov – Chairman of Federation Council’s Defense Committee and an uncritical functionary – admitted:

“There was and undoubtedly will be resistance to reform.  Remember when the General Staff apparatus was cut, how many dissatisfied people there were:  people occupied specific duties, had pay, and then they’re deprived of all this.  But in any instance, there are people standing behind every such decision and their legal rights should be guaranteed upon dismissal.”

Ozerov also said responsibility for combat training will go to the individual services and branches, and inter-service training will be supervised by the military districts / unified strategic commands (OSKs).

Serdyukov himself told the Defense Ministry’s official Public Council on Friday that combat training will be the purview of services, armies, and brigades, and operational training will be under the Genshtab, MDs, and brigades (but apparently not armies?).

The GUBP’s fate was decided in June and sealed in September.  See Moskovskiy komsomolets, Argumenty.ru, and Gazeta.ru for more.  They claim former Moscow MD Commander, General-Colonel Valeriy Gerasimov – newly retooled as a deputy chief of the General Staff – will oversee inter-service training for the Genshtab.  And, by 1 February, a new Directorate of Troop Service and Military Service Security will stand up.  This will actually be a new / old directorate.  It existed several years ago and supervised safety issues, and grappled with crime and dedovshchina among the troops. 

MK presented two opposing opinions on GUBP’s fate. 

Leonid Ivashov said:

“The most experienced officers and generals serve in the GUBP, they develop and monitor combat training.  The Genshtab has several other functions – strategic ones.  No one there will take evaluation trips to far-off garrisons.  Especially since the Genstab’s combat training directorate will be a very truncated version.  Its elimination means our troops won’t be prepared for combat actions.

A Genshtab source gave this view:

“This is simply the latest course of reform which we have going on.  The information about the GUBP’s elimination appeared long ago.  The directorate has a highly inflated number of personnel, and its work has been evaluated as, to put it mildly, ineffective.  No new methods, no training ground equipment, no simulators in recent decades.

Makarov’s Year-Ender

On Tuesday, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov provided his year-end wrap-up on the ‘new profile’ of the Armed Forces in the form of a press-conference featuring a videolink with the four new MD / OSK commanders.

It was pretty much a self-congratulatory celebration of how Makarov and company have turned everything in the Russian military around for the better.  As Moskovskiy komsomolets put it, “Nikolay Makarov told the media how bad it was in the army in the past, and how good it will be in the future.”

Rossiyskaya gazeta paraphrased Makarov’s remarks, giving only a couple direct quotes.  First up was President Medvedev’s call for unified aerospace defense (VKO) before the end of 2011.

RG says Makarov said VKO will be fully operational in 2020 when new reconnaissance and weapons systems have been deployed.  He said its purpose is to defend the state [interestingly the state, not the country] from ballistic and cruise missiles.  It needs to be an umbrella against any kind of threat, including low-altitude ones.

Makarov said different military structures have been occupied with the security of the skies.  Space Troops do orbital reconnaissance and ground-based missile early warning.  The air forces and air defense armies (АВВСиПВО or АВВСПВО) and radar troops monitor air space for approaching hostile aircraft.  The Special Designation Command (КСпН) covers the Moscow air defense zone [didn’t this long ago change its name to the OSK VKO?].  Air defense troops (ЗРВ) and fighter aviation cover other important facilities.  The system was set-up on a service (видовой) basis and that’s why it was uncoordinated.  It needs to be made integrated and put under the command of the General Staff [of course – this sounds like Olga Bozhyeva in MK].  In the Defense Ministry, they understand unification won’t be quick and will require a lot of resources, but there’s simply no other way.

Izvestiya proffered a quotation on this one:

“If we look at how this system was built earlier, then it’s possible to see that it acted separately by services and branches of troops, and also by regions.  So, Space Troops answered for space reconnaissance, the work of missile attack warning stations.  The Ground Troops for the activity of radar units.  Now we are uniting all these separate organizations in a unitary whole.  We need to establish the foundation of this system in 2011.  To finish its formation completely by 2020.”

According to RG, Makarov said a modern army would be useless without a new command and control system for the Armed Forces.  Russia’s move to a unified information environment will cost 300 billion rubles, and will be phased, with the initial phase being the replacement of all analog equipment with digital systems by 2012.  Command and control systems will be developed and produced in Russia, but other weapons will be bought abroad.  This is when he broke the news about Mistral winning the amphibious command ship tender.

RG concludes Makarov called for a fully professional Armed Forces, but the words it quoted aren’t particularly convincing:

“Now we can’t do them like this.  But year by year we’ll increase the selection of contract servicemen with commensurate pay.”

However, Moskovskiy komsomolets quoted the General Staff Chief this way:

“We are aiming for a contract army.  Now we can’t make it so instantly, but year by year the number of contract servicemen, with commensurate pay, will increase.”

Olga Bozhyeva viewed this as a total reversal of Makarov’s earlier rejection of contractees and insistence on conscripts as the backbone of the army.

Makarov also talked about efforts to create ‘human’ service and living conditions.  He referred, as always, to outsourcing and civilianizing mess hall and other housekeeping duties.  He repeated that, starting in 2012, officer pay will increase by several times.  According to Krasnaya zvezda, Makarov said 50 percent of officers now receive higher pay through premiums and incentives.  Officers and their families will be moved from remote garrison towns to oblast centers where their children can get a better education and wives can find work.  About the large cut in military towns, he said:

“We had about 22 thousand of them, approximately 5,500 remain, but in all, we’re taking the number of military towns to 180.”

Of course, he didn’t mention who will take care of large numbers of retirees left behind in that archipelago of abandoned military towns.

KZ gave its own recap of Makarov’s press-conference, and it’s interesting to hear his rehash of why the army needed a ‘new profile.’  His remarks blow up any lingering myth about the 2000s, at least the Putin years, as the time of the Russian military’s rejuvenation.  He said:

“Before 2009, 87 percent of the Armed Forces consisted of formations and military units with abbreviated personnel and cadres, practically not having personnel.  They almost didn’t conduct operational and combat training.  The army didn’t just degrade.  During this time, we grew an entire generation of officers and generals who ceased to understand the very essence of military service, they didn’t have experience in training and educating personnel.”

KZ paraphrases more of Makarov.  The personnel training system caused complaints.  VVUZy were teaching the Great Patriotic War.  Low pay and poor prospects for housing made the officer’s profession a low-prestige one.  In units, personnel weren’t occupied with combat training, but serving themselves, and military discipline fell as a result.  On the whole, the Armed Forces stopped fulfilling the missions for which they are intended, and could scarcely react to threats and challenges beyond the state’s borders and inside the country.

Makarov addressed how the MDs were changed to meet future threats and challenges:

“Planning and troop employment happened with significant difficulties, since each of six military districts had a series of missions where one often contradicted another.  Moreover, four air forces and air defense armies were established, as a result, the zones of responsibility of the military districts and these armies didn’t coincide at all.  This led to confusion in employing air defense forces.  At the same time, experience showed that military actions in recent decades are conducted, as a rule, by unified force groupings and forces under a unitary command.  Each of our districts and each of our four fleets existed independently. Each had its own zone of responsibility, not matching the others.  In order to organize any kind of joint actions, it was necessary to establish temporary commands, temporary structures, which, as a rule, were poorly prepared, didn’t have corresponding experience.  All this led to unsatisfactory results.”

Izvestiya quoted him:

“In the bounds of the ongoing transformations, full-blooded troop groupings have been established on all strategic axes.  Four full-blooded commands have appeared for us which, having in their composition and immediately subordinate to them all forces and means, can react adequately to all challenges and threats to the borders of our districts.  Changes in the Armed Forces command and control structure are a necessary occurrence since the old administrative-territorial division had stopped answering the challenges and threats of the time.”

New MDs (photo: ITAR-TASS)

Then Makarov brought in MD commanders over the video so they could attest to how it’s going.  They remarked on how cutting intermediate, redundant command levels has made their jobs easier.  Western MD Commander, General-Colonel Arkadiy Bakhin said 40 percent of his formations and units have outsourced some support functions. 

KZ says earlier MD commanders answered only for Ground Troops, and when they needed forces from another service or branch, they had to get permission from above.  Southern MD Commander, General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Galkin claims making these requests cost the commander time, but now all forces and means are in one command, the fundamentally new unified strategic command (OSK).  Galkin also says freeing soldiers from support tasks means there are now 20-22 training days per month instead of 15-16.

Sick in Siberia

Is Yudashkin Warm Enough? (photo: Viktor Vasenin)

Or maybe “Central MD Public Relations Nightmare.”

Mass illnesses among conscripts are a familiar, though less common, occurrence nowadays.  This time it’s the Central MD’s 74th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade (v/ch 21005) in Yurga, Kemerovo Oblast.

What we have are assorted versions of what’s happened in Yurga.  There’s backpedaling and softpedaling.  The prosecutor’s only too happy to probe the army’s mistakes.  There have been cuts in military medicine and reorganizations under Serdyukov that are to blame.  His fondness for the expensive new uniforms by fashion designer Yudashkin are an easy target too.  Yes, Russian draftees are unhealthy when they arrive, but why are they drafted then?  And there’s always gross neglect by commanders who see conscripts as sub-human.  And General Staff Chief Makarov just chalks it all up to the ‘slovenliness’ of the command.

With all that said . . .

The MD command, district medical service representatives, and military prosecutors blame ‘oversights’ in the work of the brigade’s command for an outbreak of acute upper respiratory infections (colds) that have afflicted 126 conscripts since mid-October, according to ITAR-TASS.

They blame the command  for poorly “organizing the daily activity of sub-units in conditions of severe frost going as low as minus 40 degrees (-40 F).”  They also cite the lack of timely preventative measures. 

This is, of course, Russian official euphemistic language that’s used rather than describing more graphically exactly what’s happening.

One hundred men are currently in isolation, but none are in serious or critical condition according to the army.  The MD reinforced the formation’s medical staff, and provided special immunity-boosting medications.  It also emphasized that all conscripts are fully supplied with essential winter clothing and footwear.

A second ITAR-TASS account emphasizing the prosecutor’s investigation of the situation reported:

“The causes of the growth in illness among the brigade’s servicemen are weak support of the medical company and branch hospital with medicines and other prophylactic means [not more than 15 percent of requirements], but also the overloading of the medical ward.”

The prosecutor’s inquiries include the chief of the Central MD’s medical service, the commander of the 41st Army, and the chief of the military hospital.  The prosecutor’s already informed the Main Military-Medical Directorate about the unsatisfactory supply of medicines in the Yurga branch of the 321st Military Hospital.  At the prosecutor’s prompting, an extra isolation ward of 130 beds has been deployed, antiviral drugs supplied, soldiers put in valenki and sheepskin coats, and outside activity cut to a minimum.

According to Gazeta.ru, the South-Siberian Legal Defense Center says there are 160 to 250 men who have been ill, including several in critical condition.  It says conscripts have been wearing new and inadequate Yudashkin uniforms  while standing outside the brigade’s tiny mess hall three times a day in -20 (-4 F).  One old lady reported her grandson was sleeping in an unheated area.

Moskovskiy komsomolets reports the military denies the outbreak of illness is related to the new uniform, and says the men still have their winter boots and valenki.  One specialist who helped develop the new uniforms told the paper few soldiers have the new Yudashkin uniform, and the Defense Ministry is trying to come up with a cheaper version of it.

Svpressa.ru talked at length to the legal defense center’s Yelena Lapina.  She says mothers started complaining after a long oath-taking ceremony conducted outside at the end of November.  It was between -15 and -20 (5 and -4 F).  Parents said their sons were wearing new uniforms not suited to Siberian conditions.

Svpressa.ru also interviewed the mother of Stanislav Karpenko who remains in very serious condition in Kemerovo’s main civilian hospital with kidney failure.  She said no one from command even contacted her after her son was transported from his unit:

“No one called or came.  And generally, you know, this reeks of a concentration camp, not the army.”

Rossiyskaya gazeta reports the men weren’t given proper winter gear, and didn’t have warm places to sleep.  Many ended up sick, the formation’s branch hospital overflowed, and didn’t even have enough medicine.  Karpenko, who had double pneumonia and kidney failure, was treated only with aspirin and paracetamol.

And an army spokesman named Yuriy Sivokhin (described variously as representing the Central MD or the 41st Army) had this to say about the problems:

“The weak health of today’s youth that has come is not suited.  From homemade pirozhki and into the barracks is acclimatization, a clear matter.  Conscripts are sick every winter.  And the statistics on ORZ [URI] are practically on the same level.  But here, of course, father-commanders have to look out not to leave the boys out in the cold for a long time.  Of course, in the new uniform, they’re in leather boots and not what they came to the unit wearing, and no one’s taken their foot wrappings, just issued them later.  Yes and they’ve fallen under a reorganization again:  the Siberian MD is eliminated, hospitals consolidated, medics finalizing new contracts . . . It’s possible at such a time there wasn’t enough of something.  But now the unit’s supplied with medicines, everything is under control.  And, by my data, there are now 60 men in the hospital, not 250.”

Does this guy need lessons or what?  So the boys are weaklings, should they really have been drafted?  If the sickness stats are the same as last year, why is this in the news?  Does he expect anyone to believe him?  He does mention some chaotic reorganization as a possible factor.  No one claimed 250 were in the hospital right now.

Newsru.com got Sivokhin again:

“The lad, whose old lady who raised a stink, had a cold.  But he’s not in the hospital, but in the [formation’s] medical unit.  And not with pneumonia, but a URI.  And why Yudashkin here, when now we have such puny soldiers arriving?”

He needs to be driving a tank, not talking to the media.

The army said 54 guys with a pneumonia diagnosis didn’t amount to an outbreak in the formation.  It did admit one needed intensive care for kidney failure in Kemerovo.  The Central MD said all the men of the formation were fully outfitted in suitable new winter gear, and the new winter uniform uses better fabrics with a higher level of thermal protection than the old one.

These varying accounts clearly don’t add up, but it’s hard to tell who’s lying and about what.

Serdyukov’s Two Presidents

One can’t avoid Wikileaks forever . . . you’ve already read about “alpha dog” Putin, and Medvedev who plays Robin to Putin’s Batman.  But not many media outlets picked up on Defense Minister Serdyukov’s story, but Argumenty nedeli did.

In early 2009, the Azeri Defense Minister reportedly shared details of his meeting with Serdyukov with the U.S. Ambassador in Baku.  Sufficiently lubricated after sharing two bottles of vodka, Serdyukov allegedly asked his Azeri counterpart:

“Do you follow the orders of your President?”

Then Serdyukov volunteered:

“Well, I follow the orders of two Presidents.”

This is really no more than anecdotal confirmation of what’s been known all along — Serdyukov was put in place by Putin, and he’s part of Team Putin.  While appropriately deferential and respectful of President Medvedev, Serdyukov is very unlikely to get in a situation where he might have to cross his mentors from Team Putin.  Medvedev himself is part of the Team writ large, but he’s from a different, and less influential branch.  So, the ruling tandem has a senior and junior member and everyone knows it.

Not exactly a revelation, but Serdyukov’s admission makes for a funny story, and no small embarrassment for him now in dealing with Dmitriy Anatolyevich.

Scapegoat Biront Wins in Court, for Now

Lieutenant Colonel Biront (photo: http://www.odnoklassniki.ru)

Last Tuesday, the Lyubertsy Garrison Military Court held President Medvedev’s dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Biront to be illegal.  Recall Biront was the President’s and the Defense Ministry’s scapegoat when the 2512th Central Aviation-Technical Base of Naval Aviation burned in this summer’s infernos near Moscow.

A criminal case for negligence was also raised against Biront, but, according to Moskovskiy komsomolets, they punished him by dismissing him “in connection with nonfulfillment of contract.”  Biront fought back, and an inquiry revealed that, as of 1 February, the base’s firefighting unit had been disbanded, a 50-meter fire break hadn’t been established, and firefighting supplies were absent.  Biront had informed his leadership, but was ignored.  Biront’s lawyer also argued that his client had an impeccable 26-year service record, and had only been in charge of the Kolomna base for 3 months and 25 days.

The lawyer said Biront was left with 70 sailors to dig a fire safety zone around an 8-kilometer perimeter.  And Biront’s predecessor was fined for trying to dig this zone on his own.  The lawyer says the Defense Ministry plans to appeal the overturning of Biront’s dismissal.

In its coverage, Kommersant said Biront’s lawyer pointed out that every due process was violated in his client’s case: 

“First an investigation is performed regarding the disciplinary violation which served as the basis for dismissal, then the serviceman should be familiarized with its results and guaranteed the right to present his objections.  None of this was done.”

The lawyer continues, “The president gave the order to sort it all out and dismiss the guilty, but they didn’t sort it out and found a scapegoat among the unit’s officers.”

In Kommersant’s version, Biront and 30 sailors fought the fires armed with nothing but axes. 

One officer told the paper a chain reaction following Biront’s victory was likely, as others dismissed make similar appeals based on the lack of due process.

So, one can conclude that Medvedev’s ‘tough guy’ on-the-spot firing in the 4 August special Sovbez session was really nothing more than feelgood PR at best, or stupid at worst.  But, if they want to get Biront, they will, especially for being impudent enough to fight the system, and not being a quiet, cooperative victim. 

Biront is one of those allegedly superfluous officers denigrated by the victors in Serdyukov’s ‘new profile’ reforms for being a ‘housekeeper,’ uninterested or unprepared to conduct combat training.

The news about the Biront case has received very little media attention.