Category Archives: Serdyukov’s Reforms

Serdyukov Offers Access to Military Units

Posted on September 29, 2010 | Leave a comment

Varying media accounts of Defense Minister Serdyukov’s meeting Thursday with defenders of conscript rights lead one to think they attended different meetings.

But the Defense Minister deserves praise for facing some of the army’s sharpest critics.  And for apparently saying he wants to meet them routinely, according to Krasnaya zvezda.  His predecessors rarely did.

The headline story from the meeting was Serdyukov’s offer for civilian activists to accompany conscripts through the induction process until they reach their place of service, and settle into their units.  He also offered fuller access to the military’s bases.

RIA Novosti  quoted him:

“We want to propose an option for accompanying conscripts:  take part in the callup commission, and then go with them to units and see how they are billeted.” 

He added that he is prepared to let civilian representatives into all military units, with the exception of an unknown number of secret ones.

According to ITAR-TASS, he said:

“The Defense Ministry on the whole is interested in public organizations having access to military units.”

So Serdyukov bowed to greater civilian involvement, if not control or oversight, and also stumped for his efforts to ‘humanize’ conscript service in the armed forces.

His offer was interesting for the catch it included . . . these civil society representatives have to participate in the callup commission before they can go with new soldiers to their units. 

Maybe Serdyukov thinks they won’t take up the offer.  Maybe he thinks, if they do, they’ll dirty their hands in the difficult work of deciding who has to serve, or doesn’t, and where.  Maybe sorting through far-from-ideal candidates and still trying to meet manpower quotas will temper their criticism.

But it may give conscript rights activists even better insight into induction process problems and abuses than they already have.   We’ll see.

Serdyukov touted efforts to enable conscripts, especially those with dependent parents and children, to serve as close to home as possible, rather than sending them as far away as possible like in the past.

But Valentina Melnikova of the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers (SKSM or СКСМ) believes no one is fulfilling Serdyukov’s order to assign draftees closer to home:

“In military commissariats no one pays attention to this.”

According to Lenta.ru, Serdyukov cited his other innovations – introducing a rest hour after lunch, lifting virtually all restrictions on the use of cell phones by conscripts, giving them a chance to earn a weekend pass, and freeing them from all housekeeping and maintenance chores in their barracks, units, and garrisons.  But neither Serdyukov nor the media could say how widely these initiatives have been implemented. 

According to Krasnaya zvezda, Serdyukov wants to revive moribund parents’ committees introduced several years ago, but found impractical when young men served in remote areas far from home.  If they’re closer to home, their parents might be able to visit their units.  Serdyukov also mentioned the 4-year-old Defense Ministry Public Council.  Krasnaya zvezda reported that Melnikova is heading its working group to coordinate its activities with other public and human rights organizations.  Serdyukov expressed the hope that such a unification of efforts will be beneficial.

IA Regnum reports that Petersburg’s Ella Polyakova gave Serdyukov a detailed report on violations of conscript rights complete with statistics, concrete examples, and proposals to better protect them.

Polyakova would like to remove examining physicians from the callup commission, and from the control of the voyenkomat.  She said their qualifications need improvement also.  She objected to Serdyukov’s cuts in military medicine and called for better psychiatric assistance for conscripts in their units.

Polyakova says Serdyukov’s officer cuts have worsened the situation in the barracks.  Sergeants who were supposed to replace officers are ill-prepared for greater responsibility, and barracks violence has spiked as a result.  The Main Military Prosecutor’s figures support her.  Sergey Fridinskiy recently reported that hazing and other barracks violence increased 50 percent in the first five months of 2010.

Newsru.com reported Tatyana Kuznetsova’s concern about the army stretching its definition of fitness and taking men who should be deferred or exempt for health reasons:

“But, as we know, right away, having just reached the troops, many guys turned up in hospitals which were overflowing.  Like in a war, they laid in three rows, on the floor, in corridors.  These boys were called up sick, with chronic illnesses that weren’t discovered during the callup.  They weren’t discovered on purpose.”

All in all, it’s clear that, no matter how often they get together, Defense Minister Serdyukov and human rights activists will continue to disagree about the state of the army and how to change it.

According to IA Regnum, when Serdyukov said there’s no money for contract service, the activists asked him to explain:

“. . . how much money is being expended from budgets at all levels to fulfill the conscription plan in the ranks of the armed forces, as a result of which young men who are sick, invalids, and psychologically unstable end up in the army.  And next compare this with the amounts of expenditures to dismiss conscripts from the army after several months for health reasons, and to pay compensation to the families of those who have died or become invalids in peacetime.”

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Posted in Conscription, Hazing, Law, Order, and Discipline, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Mayor Serdyukov?

Posted on September 29, 2010 | Leave a comment

Rumors of possible replacements for Yuriy Luzhkov as mayor of Moscow have just started swirling, and lots of names are floating, but it’s worth mentioning that people are talking about Serdyukov as one possibility.

Today’s Vedomosti claims Defense Minister Serdyukov is on a reported short-list of candidates for Moscow mayor, along with the President’s deputy chief of staff Aleksandr Beglov, popular Emergency Situations Minister Sergey Shoygu, and Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Sobyanin.

It would be difficult to replace Serdyukov with army reforms in full swing right now, according to a source close to the Presidential Administration.  But Serdyukov is the only one of these men with business experience that President Medvedev is said to value.

One of Vedomosti’s interlocutors ‘knows’ that Serdyukov discussed the possible move with his patron, Prime Minister Putin, on Thursday, delaying the start of the Defense Ministry collegium in St. Petersburg by two hours.

A Defense Ministry official claims there’s talk inside the military department to the effect that Serdyukov was offered the mayor’s job, but declined in order to finish military reform.  Is it really possible to say no to that kind of offer?  Probably not.

Vedomosti also says there’s talk Medvedev will select a native Muscovite, which Serdyukov is not.

How much stock should we put in any of these rumors?  Probably not too much.  They’re interesting nonetheless, and show that Serdyukov and his managerial skills are pretty well regarded.

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Posted in Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Collegium on MDs and Antiterrorism

Posted on September 27, 2010 | Leave a comment

Last Thursday, Defense Minister Serdyukov conducted an extramural ‘board of directors’ meeting in St. Petersburg.  The agenda had two publicized items — forming the new Western Military District (MD) and antiterrorism.

Deputy Defense Minister, General-Colonel Dmitriy Bulgakov (effectively chief of material-technical support) and acting commander of the new Western MD (ZVO or ЗВО), General-Colonel Arkadiy Bakhin reported on the new district.  Genshtab GOU Chief, General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak reported “On the Condition of Antiterrorist Work in the RF Armed Forces and Measures to Neutralize Terrorist Threats.”

In its coverage, ITAR-TASS noted that recommendations from forming the ZVO will be applied to the new Southern, Central, and Eastern MDs. 

After the collegium, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov told journalists that work on the ZVO was being closely analyzed, and all issues had been resolved in the main.  But its command doesn’t fully recognize the importance of its tasks, and its combat training demands higher quality work.  Makarov called this a consequence of the fact that, for 15 to 20 years, almost 85 percent of officers in command and control organs didn’t command troops. 

Of course, Makarov considers himself a ‘troop general’ and that 85 percent figure makes it easy for him to oversee cutting the officer corps by 50 percent.

Makarov said the terrorist attack near Buynaksk was being closely analyzed, and noted that commanders didn’t take measures necessary to protect their people.  But the tasks essential to countering terrorist threats have been identified.

Krasnaya zvezda reported that Serdyukov met human rights organization representatives during a break in the collegium.  More on this later.

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Posted in Command and Control, Force Structure, Serdyukov's Reforms, Training and Exercises

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The Military Elite

Posted on September 26, 2010 | 1 comment

Vitaliy Shlykov (photo: Sergey Melikhov)

This is something sure to be overlooked, but it’s fun, interesting, and worth considering.

Every year Russkiy reporter selects its 100-person elite of Russia in various categories — artists, educators, journalists, doctors, businessmen, social activists, scholars, lawyers, bureaucrats, and military men.

The magazine touts its selections as people the country needs to know and listen to.  It calls them authoritative and influential people; they aren’t necessarily the most powerful or widely known.

It’s worth knowing who the magazine believes is influencing military thinking and men in uniform.  You read what many of them write on these very pages.  Picking only ten had to be hard.  One can think of dozens of others.

The article also has a short interview with one of the ten, Vitaliy Shlykov.  Russkiy reporter asked him what it means to be authoritative in the military, what society thinks of the military, and whether the military influences the authorities.  It’s worth reading.

Without further ado, the military elite are:

  • Makhmut Gareyev
  • Vladimir Dvorkin
  • Vladimir Shamanov
  • Vladimir Popovkin
  • Vitaliy Shlykov
  • Vladimir Bakin
  • Vladimir Boldyrev
  • Mikhail Pogosyan
  • Leonid Ivashov
  • Nikolay Makarov

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Posted in Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Contract Service Not Quite Abandoned

Posted on September 26, 2010 | Leave a comment

In St. Petersburg Thursday, Anatoliy Serdyukov explained that the Defense Ministry is cutting the number of contractees due to a lack of funding:

“We don’t have the resources to maintain contractees in the amount we want, therefore a reduction in contractees and an increase in conscripts are occurring.”

He made the remarks in response to complaints about higher draft numbers in a meeting with human rights activists.  

Serdyukov said the transition to permanent combat readiness units requires the Defense Ministry to take a full draft contingent, meaning that an increased number of those with an unfulfilled military obligation are being conscripted. 

But he repeated past statements that the armed forces will drop by 134,000 at some point to a level of one million personnel.

According to Svpressa.ru, at the March Defense Ministry collegium Serdyukov admitted:

“We are not satisfied with the results of this [contract service] program.  We somewhat underestimated the situation in units – who should transfer to contract, on what conditions, with what kind of pay.”

RIA Novosti cited GOMU Chief Vasiliy Smirnov from the end of July when he said that contractees will man more than 100,000 soldier and sergeant billets in the Russian military.  This press item added Smirnov’s comments that contractees will be 20 percent of the armed forces, and currently number 210,000.  And money freed up by the reduction in contractees will go to increased pay for other unidentified servicemen.

Some of this reporting – especially Smirnov’s 100,000 and 20 percent figures – seems garbled, but it’s just that some key background’s been left out.  Let’s rebuild some context around last week’s statements, so they make more sense.

Looking back on what was said officially last winter, General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov had a much harder edge on his pronouncements about the failure of contract service.  Serdyukov was much less categorical; he emphasized that contract service was being cut, not abandoned.

Makarov and Serdyukov offered different figures on contractees; the former said 190,000 and the latter 150,000.  And Smirnov said 210,000.  Recall all three figures probably included 79,000 or less recruited in the 2004-2007 program.

Serdyukov said first the contract service program will be cut – perhaps down to Smirnov’s 100,000 – then eventually expanded to 200,000 or 250,000.  In his March interview, even Makarov said ideally a motorized rifle brigade should have about 20 percent professional enlisted personnel. 

At Alabino in May, Serdyukov said contract service is being reworked.  The key thing is he’s yet to explain exactly how he’ll do it.  For the time being, he’s saying there’s no money for it, but it remains on the agenda.

For now, contractees will or may be cut to Smirnov’s 100,000 level, but if they expand back to 200,000 somehow in the future, they would be 20 percent of Serdyukov’s million-man army.  For now, they’re going to be 18 or 13 percent of the army, and drop maybe as low as 10 percent before increasing (maybe).

We should also recall Valentina Melnikova’s admonition not to believe Russian generals (or defense ministers) when they say they can’t afford a professional army.  They just have other priorities right now.

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Posted in Conscription, Ground Troops, Manpower, Serdyukov's Reforms

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What Serdyukov Said About Piter

Posted on September 18, 2010 | Leave a comment

Late, but worth capturing for future reference . . . .

By way of recap, on 3 September, Vice-Admiral Burtsev told the press the Navy headquarters move to St. Petersburg was off, and this was decided over a year ago.  But later the same day, he claimed he’d been misunderstood.

Then, on 8 September, Defense Minister Serdyukov took up the issue . . . whether he was asked or just elected to address this, we don’t know.

ITAR-TASS claims he put an end to recent media speculation about the Main Staff’s eventual move to Piter.

Serdyukov said:

 “No one has cancelled the decision to transfer the Navy Main Staff.  The planned work is on-going.  We said from the beginning that we didn’t intend to do this in the course of any short period of time, for example, in a year.  This is happening not quickly, but according to readiness.  At Admiralty in St. Petersburg, the place where the Main Staff will be located, renovation is on-going.  Within the limits of the work’s completion, we will move.     

“As far as the Command and Control Post (KPU or КПУ) goes, it won’t be transferred quickly, not even in the coming one-two years.  We will outfit it with absolutely new equipment, new resources.  There will be an absolutely new KPU.  The old KPU, most likely, will be mothballed.  Transferring it wouldn’t make any sense.  So there aren’t any changes in our plans.”

Be all this as it may, it seems like a sign that the Defense Ministry, Serdyukov, or someone else, and the Navy were (or are) still at odds over moving its headquarters to the northern capital.

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Posted in Command and Control, Navy, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Serdyukov and Gates ‘Reload’

Posted on September 16, 2010 | 2 comments

Gates and Serdyukov (photo: Reuters / Larry Downing)

Defense Minister Serdyukov and Defense Secretary Gates signed two documents yesterday.  RIA Novosti covered the event.  The first document was a memorandum of understanding on bilateral military cooperation replacing an old one from 1993.  The second, more important one established a ministerial-level working group on defense relations under the aegis of the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission established in July 2009.

A joint statement from the two defense chiefs said:

“The following issues will be at the center of attention of the U.S.-Russian working group on defense relations:  armed forces reform and transformation, high-priority defense and national security policy issues, transparency and strengthening trust to improve mutual understanding, regional and global security, new challenges and threats, and cooperation in areas of mutual interest.”  

The document apparently says, as co-chairmen of the working group, the Defense Minister and Defense Secretary will meet at least once a year.  And Serdyukov has invited Gates to Moscow.

In his remarks on their talks yesterday, Serdyukov said:

“The transformations occurring in the Russian and U.S. armies are very large-scale and very painful.  But they are absolutely necessary to create a modern army, a 21st century army.”

Gates said both men face similar problems in reforming their armed forces:

“Mr. Serdyukov and I are making great efforts to implement broad reforms which are painful but necessary.”

An unnamed U.S. official explained:

“The Minister and Secretary are trying to introduce new thinking into the military system.  The visit of the Russian minister was a chance to learn more about Russian military reform, and understand issues on which we can be useful.  So the first session of the talks concerned only military reform.”

However, Kommersant picked the pithy winner of the day when it quoted former NSC staffer Steven Pifer: 

“Yesterday Robert Gates presented his plan for reducing military expenditures under which the budget of the Defense Department will be cut by $100 billion over five years.  It’s possible this experience will be interesting to Defense Minister Serdyukov, but I’m not sure it applies to reforming the Russian Armed Forces.”

Right on, brother.  Mr. Gates surely knows the $20 billion of chump change he wants to trim each year is not a lot less than what annual Russian defense budgets have been, give or take some, in recent years.  That $20 billion isn’t far off what the Russian government initially proposed to spend for arms procurement each year until 2020.   

Saying the U.S. and Russian militaries are in the same boat when it comes to their reform efforts certainly makes for good feelings and good press in the midst of an important high-level visit.  But it’s a great exaggeration that doesn’t really help anyone in the longer run.

The U.S. already has full-fledged, albeit overstretched, 21st century military forces; ones that are constantly and painfully reinvented to meet the threats and demands of the future.  It’s painful all right.

Russia, on the other hand, is 18 years into attempts to reshape its Soviet-era Armed Forces into a modern military.  It still has a fundamentally 20th century force, and not a late 20th one at that.  It’s true to say that Serdyukov has ushered in Russia’s first comprehensive reform effort, and it’s very painful.  But he’s hurt more by the fact that his predecessors didn’t do enough, fast enough. However, he may be doing too much, too fast.  And the ultimate results may not be what Putin, Medvedev, and Serdyukov intended.

But the main point remains it’s naïve to suggest the two military establishments are in anything like the same place.

Similarly, it wouldn’t pay to get excited about the new framework for defense consultations and cooperation.  We’ve been here several times.  Like U.S.-Russian relations as a whole, over time these frameworks are driven off-track by Russian actions and U.S. overreactions.  But they never die.  They just get reloaded.

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Serdyukov Meets Gates at Pentagon

Posted on September 15, 2010 | Leave a comment

Mr. Serdyukov Goes to Washington (photo: ITAR-TASS)

ITAR-TASS reports Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and his U.S. counterpart Robert Gates will meet for a total of 5 hours today.  And the Russian press service concludes: 

“This is highly unusual and attests to the great significance the U.S. Defense Department attaches to the visit.” 

Aside from all the customary ceremonies, there will be three sets of talks today.  The morning session is dedicated to discussing military reform plans and defense spending on both sides.  ITAR-TASS says the Americans consider this the most important topic from their viewpoint. 

The press service quotes The New York Times saying the two men “simultaneously declared war on longstanding and ineffective bureaucratic organizations,” adding that they’ll find a common language as they compare their efforts. 

A working lunch will be devoted to nuclear arms control and missile defense.  RIA Novosti quoted a Defense Department spokesman who said you can’t meet Russians without discussing missile defense, but it won’t be the main topic of the visit.  Today’s afternoon session will cover a variety of regional and global security problems.  Serdyukov will visit an unspecified U.S. Army base as well as the Naval Academy. 

In an interview published in today’s Kommersant, Gates said: 

“I’ve attentively followed Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reform efforts.  I have the impression that the scale and depth of the reforms he’s conducting correspond to what I’m trying to do in the U.S.  The thing is in the coming years we don’t expect significant budget increases.  Therefore, we have to decide how best to use the resources we have.” 

“I know the Russian Defense Minister has an interest in how to select highly professional soldiers and how to keep them in the armed forces, how to exert command and control of the armed forces in order to strengthen national security.  This is especially complicated in the face of economic problems standing before each of our countries.” 

Apparently, Gates doesn’t understand precisely.  The Defense Ministry already has an answer — to jettison its failed professional contract service program, return to reliance on conscripted soldiers, and see if they can train and retain some professional NCOs. 

Asked if Russia’s a threat to the U.S. and about its new ballistic missiles, Gates replied:  

“No.  I don’t view Russia as a threat.  We are partners in some areas and competitors in others.  But we cooperate on important issues.” 

Good answer. 

“From the viewpoint of our program modernization the new SOA agreement is a great achievement.  Just as the agreements which preceded it.  They establish rules of the game which provide transparency and predictability.  Modernization programs within the bounds of the new SOA agreement are absolutely normal.  We’ll conduct our own modernization. 

Asked about cooperation on missile defense and the Gabala radar specifically, Gates said the U.S. is interested in Gabala and in the possibility of establishing a missile launch data exchange center [JDEC] in Moscow.

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Posted in Manpower, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms, Strategic Forces Modernization

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Creating ‘New Profile’ Army Not Easy in Far East

Posted on September 13, 2010 | Leave a comment

A variety of press reports indicate establishing a ‘new profile’ army in the Far East is a difficult and increasingly protracted process.

On 7 September, ITAR-TASS said General Staff Chief, Army General Nikolay Makarov was in Chita to resolve a number of army problems.  The press service noted Makarov was accompanied by new Eastern Military District (MD) Commander, Vice-Admiral Konstantin Sidenko.

Specifically, Makarov was in eastern Siberia (now part of the Eastern MD) working on ‘military organizational development [строительство]’ – a Russian euphemism for TO&E changes and force restructuring – and development of base military towns and their social infrastructure.  In plain English, the General Staff Chief was in the Transbaykal sticks sorting out which units go into this or that brigade, or get disbanded, and how to provide housing and a modicum of other basic services for their soldiers, officers, and families.

But Makarov and Sidenko may have worse problems further east.

On 8 September, ITAR-TASS published a small, but significant report claiming that Khabarovsk Kray’s military garrisons and towns are not ready for winter.

Preparation for heating season in the majority of military buildings in Khabarovsk Kray is breaking down, according to the Kray’s emergency situations commission.  The poor state of preparation of communal infrastructure (i.e. boilers, coal supplies, steam pipes, etc.) and apartment blocks in Lazo, Bikin, and Vanino Rayons is alarming.

A Kray official said, “. . . supplies of winter fuel haven’t been established, boiler equipment hasn’t been repaired, facilities don’t have personnel.”  In Vanino, workers repairing a major boiler received layoff notices.  Days before the start of heating season, several boilers have been completely dismantled and there are no supplies of coal, according to the news agency.

 The emergency situations commission noted that:

“The Defense Ministry has begun transferring housing-communal servicing functions for its garrisons to private organizations, but this process has bogged down.”

The military’s Housing Management Directorate (KEU) representatives in the Far East didn’t deny the problems, but blamed them on a catastrophic lack of financing.  The military’s indebtedness to Far East communal services providers over the first 7 months of the year is 181.6 million rubles, and Khabarovsk Kray accounts for more than 88 million of this amount.

The first deputy chairman of the Khabarovsk Kray government has asked military prosecutors to intervene and force the army to prepare the region’s military towns and villages adequately and forestall emergency situations this winter.

All this comes on top of reports of similar problems last fall.  

Half of Russia’s 85 new army brigades had to move units and construct new barracks, housing, and other essential infrastructure for them, and this was proving especially difficult in the Far East. 

Almost a year ago, Vladivostok’s largest newspaper Zolotoy rog reported that officers in two newly organized brigades in the Far East were in danger of being stranded in ‘open fields,’ or field conditions, because they lacked materials and funding to prepare their garrisons.  However, the deputy commander of 5th Combined Arms Army assured the media that barracks and other buildings were being repaired for brigades at Barabash and Sibirtsevo.

Zolotoy rog reported that one battalion commander took out a private loan to repair barracks for his men.  Some officers who arrived at Barabash left after seeing the condition of their new garrison, and the brigade also had trouble keeping battalion commanders for the same reason.  The brigades reportedly turned to Primorskiy Kray’s governor for help.

So what are we to make of all this?

First, having Makarov travel out east to straighten up a mess is something of a no-confidence vote in new Eastern MD Commander Sidenko.  It’s a particularly inauspicious start since many eyes are on Sidenko to see how he performs as the first naval officer to lead this major ground-oriented command.

Second, Khabarovsk Kray had some pretty stark criticism for Defense Minister Serdyukov’s policy of privatizing logistics support functions for the army.  What might work in the new Western or Southern MDs may not work well in the remote reaches of the Eastern MD.

Third, this early warning of problems may be an attempt to prevent another ‘Steppe’ garrison crisis in Transbaykal this winter.  And the problems are not confined to active military garrisons.  Lots of remote former garrisons – with real living retirees – are caught in limbo between military and civilian municipal services.  Pereyaslavka’s problems last winter are just one case of this.  Pereyaslavka happens to be the administrative center of Lazo Rayon, cited this year as the scene of potential problems this winter.

So while the Defense Ministry and media focus almost exclusively on the attractive leading edge of the army’s ‘new profile,’ it pays to remember that Russian military reform has a large, messy trailing edge that’s found in places like Lazo, Bikin, Vanino, Barabash, Sibirtsevo, and Pereyaslavka.

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Posted in Force Structure, Ground Troops, Military Housing, Rear Services, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Mr. Serdyukov’s Restrained Smile

Posted on September 9, 2010 | Leave a comment

Defense Minister Serdyukov (photo: Reuters)

 On 31 August, Sobesednik offered a not-altogether-serious, but nonetheless-interesting psychological portrait of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov . . . the magazine interviewed an expert in nonverbal  communication and microfacial expressions, a specialist in physiognomy, a professional image consultant, a handwriting analyst, and, yes, a numerologist. 

Of course, these observers had the advantage (or perhaps disadvantage) of knowing at least a little something about their subject, his reputation, and style beforehand. 

The nonverbal and microfacial expert said Serdyukov’s restrained smile and concentration are most characteristic of his expression.  He looks as if he’s suffering over the resolution of some problem with knitted brows, and he’s a man of few words.  His external appearance and pudginess suggest he senses and feels more than he hears or sees, and he likes both physical and psychological comfort. 

According to this observer, there’s nothing that bespeaks talent or charisma in Serdyukov, but he does exude efficiency and discipline. 

Finally, he concludes: 

“Anatoliy Serdyukov is a man capable of resolving problems on the orders of those who appointed him to this position.  His entire external appearance, his restrained gestures, constant concentration on business, and small number of public speeches speak exactly to this.”  

The physiognomy expert says Serdyukov’s round and soft appearance are characteristic of a peacetime military man.  A man occupied with logistical issues, who knows how to set goals and achieve them.  A businessman or administrator, not a wartime leader. 

His crooked brows and wrinkled forehead attest to difficulties in government service; it would have been easier for him in business.  A sharp visage compensates for his external softness.  His mouth is narrow; he is no orator.  However, his correctly formed ears connote someone who listens to information and the opinions of others. 

The image consultant notes Serdyukov practically never wears military attire.  He prefers his civilian clothing, and avoids ingratiating himself with the uniformed military.  His suits are conservative and classic.  He’s a restrained and severe man.  He can be somewhat aggressive (shown by the broad contrasting stripes on his ties).  Such people are usually burning to reform things and implement their ideas and goals, no matter what. 

The handwriting analyst says Serdyukov’s handwriting indicates his concrete way of thinking, and tactical planning.  He has a great sense of his own importance.  The pinching, arc, and intricacy of his letters show palpable internal emotion and willfulness, but other features indicate he’s inclined to self-control.  The constant requirement to control himself and hold his emotions is externally expressed as tension and restraint. 

Using Serdyukov’s birth date, the numerologist produced a number to reveal his character — 811962279112.  Four 1’s means he’s likely to be military, severe, and direct.  But the absence of 5’s means he has weak intuition and his actions are sometimes illogical. 

In all seriousness, it’s pretty easy to laugh all this off since Serdyukov’s a well-known public figure, but recall The Atlantic article describing Brenda Connors’ analysis of then-President Vladimir Putin’s gait, and how it explains his character and behavior. 

So Serdyukov’s a bit repressed.  In fairness, one probably shouldn’t expect any Defense Minister (or any minister for that matter) to be a happy man or woman.

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