Bulava Launch (photo: ITAR-TASS)
ITAR-TASS reports today’s Bulava SLBM launch from Dmitriy Donskoy was successful. It was the 13th test overall. The missile’s warheads impacted on the Kura range on Kamchatka, according to the Defense Ministry press service.
Dmitriy Donskoy fired the Bulava while submerged in the White Sea. The missile’s flight trajectory was normal. ITAR-TASS notes Russia’s military command and defense industry prepared for this launch more thoroughly than ever.
Posted in Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged Bulava, Dmitriy Donskoy, SLBM
Viktor Litovkin (photo: RIA Novosti)
Returning to procurement and the GPV . . . in this week’s Delovoy vtornik, NVO’s Viktor Litovkin also asks what will 19 trillion rubles be spent on.
He says the answer isn’t simple. During the last 20 years of ‘starvation rations,’ the armed forces got handfuls of essential combat equipment, and, meanwhile, a dangerous imbalance between strike and combat support systems was created. And this was obvious against Georgia in 2008.
Litovkin says this imbalance has to be corrected, meanwhile priorities like strategic nuclear forces can’t be forgotten – not just the offensive triad, but also the missile attack early warning system (SPRN), missile defense (PRO), and aerospace defense (VKO).
Like Viktor Yesin of late, Litovkin asks how Russia will replace its aging strategic offensive arms to stay up to the limits of the Prague / New START agreement. Half the Russian force is SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 ICBMs which will be retired in 7-10 years. Moscow needs to build 400 strategic systems to replace them. He doesn’t even mention Delta III and IV SSBNs and their aging SLBMS. And Russia has only the SS-27, RS-24 Yars, Sineva, and Bulava to replace them.
Litovkin expects a very large amount of money to be spent not just on replacing strategic systems, but also reequipping the enterprises that produce them.
He turns to his second priority – also demonstrated by the Georgian war – precision-guided weapons, which in turn depend on reconnaissance-information support and equipment in space, on long-range surveillance aircraft [AWACS], and UAVs.
Priority three – automated command and control systems (ASU). He cites Popovkin on linking all service C2 systems into one system over 2-3 years.
Litovkin says you can’t forget about the Navy, but he mentions just the Borey-class SSBNs, and the need for a wide range of surface ships. And he makes the point [made by many] that Mistral is all well and good, but it’ll have to have multipurpose combatants operating in its battle group. They need to be built, and they won’t cost a small amount of money.
One can’t forget aviation either. Litovkin cites a $100 million per copy cost for 60 fifth generation fighters [that’s a significant 180-billion-ruble bite out of the GPV]. He notes Vega is working on an updated Russian AWACS (A-100). And, like Korotchenko, he mentions transport aircraft, but also combat and support helicopters.
And so, says Litovkin, the question arises – isn’t the country putting out a lot of money to rearm its army?
Viktor Litovkin (photo: Ekho Moskvy)
Being bold, he says, not really. He actually uses that accursed 22 trillion figure, which is procurement for all power ministries. If he used 19 trillion, it would be 1.9 trillion or $63 billion per year for Russia against $636 billion for the U.S., $78 billion for China, $58 billion for the U.K., and $51 billion for Japan. But he doesn’t say this is annual procurement, the GPV, against the total annual defense budget for these other countries. A bit of comparing one piece of pie to a whole pie. Nevertheless, he concludes this makes Russia far from champion when it comes to military expenditures.
Litovkin’s last word is Russia will remain one of the G8 with a powerful, combat capable, and effective army, but without it, only a raw materials appendage of either the West or East.
But one wonders, hasn’t Russia long been in the G8 without that kind of armed forces? Doesn’t breaking away from the raw materials supplier role have more to do with developing an open, attractive, innovative, value-added, and competitive economy (and a political system and society to match) than with military power?
Posted in Air Forces, Command and Control, Force Modernization, Naval Modernization, RVSN, Space Troops, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged ASU, AWACS, Borey, Bulava, Delta III, Delta IV, ГПВ, GPV, ICBM, PRO, Procurement, RS-24 Yars, Sineva, SLBM, SPRN, SS-18, SS-19, SS-25, SS-27, SSBN, UAVs, Viktor Litovkin, Viktor Yesin, VKO
Today Navy CINC, Admiral Vysotskiy told an ITAR-TASS correspondent a Bulava SLBM test is planned this week. Asked whether the missile would fly, Vysotskiy said he hopes it will:
“If I wasn’t confident, I wouldn’t have made these plans. Nothing can be ruled out, we aren’t giving guarantees. But we hope it will fly.”
Vysotskiy noted that preparations for the next launches have been conducted very seriously, and state acceptance made much tighter.
He said Bulava won’t be fired from Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy until there are successful tests from Dmitriy Donskoy, adding that Dolgorukiy will be ready to launch Bulava in about a month or six weeks.
Posted in Naval Modernization, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged Borey, Bulava, Dmitriy Donskoy, SLBM, Vladimir Vysotskiy, Yuriy Dolgorukiy
Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy
Not a huge news story, but worth keeping continuity on . . . and there are interesting questions — has the fourth Borey really been laid down, and how many launch tubes will be on unit 2, 3, etc.?
Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy completed its factory underway testing by 24 September, according to the official Russian news services. A spokeswoman for Sevmash said the current testing plan was fulfilled, and all established tasks were completed. Captain First Rank Vladimir Shirin called the last at-sea period ‘excellent.’ All systems reportedly worked well, and minor issues noted during previous cruises were resolved. The Sevmash delivery team and Dolgorukiy crew are preparing to present the submarine to the state acceptance commission. But according to Grani.ru, a United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) source told Interfaks the obvious – acceptance of Dolgorukiy into the Navy inventory is not being considered since its main weapon – the Bulava SLBM – is not ready. The Defense Ministry is still hoping that the new SSBN will be the launch platform for one of the next three Bulava tests.
The news services noted there are two additional Boreys, not three, on Sevmash’s buildingways. So one supposes number four, Saint Nikolay, hasn’t been laid down yet.
The news services maintain the line that the Borey-class boats will have 12 launch tubes each, but Grani.ru, like other media outlets, claims Aleksandr Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh are proyekt 955A units and will have 16 tubes, while Saint Nikolay will be a proyekt 955U boat, possibly with 20 tubes.
Attending today’s OPK modernization meeting in Ramenskoye, General Staff Chief, Army General Nikolay Makarov talked to the press, and said:
“A decision not to supply Iran with the S-300 was made, it, of course, falls under the sanctions. The leadership made a decision to stop the supply process, we are fulfilling it.”
He wouldn’t say the contract to supply them has been broken. Apparently asked if the missiles could be provided in the future, Makarov said:
“We’ll see, this will depend on Iran’s conduct.”
Unnamed official sources put the price of the Iranian S-300 contract at hundreds of millions of dollars.
ITAR-TASS reiterated Defense Minister Serdyukov’s 20 August comment on providing Iran the S-300:
“We aren’t supplying anything. There’s no decision on supplying them.”
Makarov’s comments coincided with President Medvedev’s ukaz implementing UNSCR 1929 from 9 June. The ukaz expressly listed the S-300 as an item not to be transferred from Russia to Iran.
Asked about Russia’s military laser program, Army General Makarov said development is on-going:
“Work on a combat laser goes on throughout the world, including here.”
He added that it was premature to talk about the characteristics of Russia’s laser system.
Answering another question, Makarov said student draft deferments won’t be abolished:
“The possibility of ending deferments for students is not being considered. This issue is too socially significant.”
“There are many other measures which will allow us to resolve the situation [with the draft].”
He added that he expects Serdyukov to talk about the draft at Friday’s Defense Ministry collegium.
Asked if compulsory military service will be increased from 12 months, he said, “I don’t know if there’s sense in this.”
But Makarov went on to vent his frustration about conscription:
“Today not more than 13 percent of young people are called up, the rest aren’t called up for health reasons. We need to understand what is happening . It can’t be that only 13 percent of our young people are healthy. Among people getting a deferment or exemption from the army on health grounds, 40 percent of them had documents either purchased or manufactured in some way. In other words, there’s an issue, and we need to toughen monitoring in this area.”
Thirteen percent is really low. And the corruption rate when it comes to health exams in commissariats is at least 40 percent. We need to explore his numbers and math. These are startling figures.
Makarov paid a little respect to Serdyukov’s fledgling effort to ‘humanize’ conscript service:
“A number of measures to reduce the load on prospective conscripts are being reviewed.”
Finally, press questions turned to the pending Bulava SLBM tests. Makarov said:
“The missiles which we’re preparing to launch were produced from beginning to end under strict monitoring by military acceptance, the Defense Ministry, and the Military-Industrial Commission. A great deal will depend on these launches. If the launches are unsuccessful, then we have to shake up fundamentally the entire cycle of missile production.”
On the timing of the next Bulava test, Makarov contradicted Serdyukov’s last statement by saying:
“It’s doubtful this will happen in September.”
Posted in Arms Sales, Conscription, Manpower, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged Bulava, Iran, Nikolay Makarov, S-300, SLBM, UNSCR 1929
According to RIA Novosti, Defense Secretary Serdyukov told Russian journalists in Washington Friday that, if the next Bulava launches fail for different reasons, Russia will have to change its system of production and quality control.
Serdyukov said, if the missiles fail for the same reason, the cause of the failures will be found. But if the causes turn out to be different, we “have to change the entire production and quality control system for these missiles.”
According to ITAR-TASS, Serdyukov said:
“In the assembly of these missiles we tried to make them fully identical so that they would be like twins [triplets?].”
“We can’t hurry the testing. The main thing is that in every assembly cycle there were strict guarantees that we made the missiles absolutely identically and all procedures were followed.”
“The possible defects will be the same, then we will eliminate them, but if they are different, then we have to break down the entire system and find out what is happening in production and quality control. Then it will be clear that the production monitoring is incorrect and it’s absolutely necessary to change it.”
Posted in Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged Anatoliy Serdyukov, Bulava, SLBM
Dmitriy Donskoy Underway (photo: Sevmash)
According to Rossiyskaya gazeta’s sources, Bulava SLBM test platform Dmitriy Donskoy was on-station in the White Sea for a launch last week, and all test arrangements were laid on — command and control, international notifications, ground and space tracking, telemetry, support and rescue ships, but the launch was put off at the last minute.
The paper’s space and OPK sources said the Bulava commission had concluded the missile and boat were ready for the launch, and “today there is no reason whatsoever to put it off to a later time.”
But, Rossiyskaya concludes, it turns out there was a reason serious enough to return the submarine to base.
So it comes to nothing, and Defense Minister Serdyukov’s 8 September comments added no clarity to the situation, according to the paper’s account.
So, we don’t know the reason why a launch was prepared, drew close, and didn’t happen. It suggests some continuing problem or doubt about Bulava’s performance, or continuing disagreement over the system’s readiness for its next test.
Posted in Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged Bulava, Dmitry Donskoy, SLBM
Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov talked to the press today about the next Bulava SLBM test:
“The next test launch of the Bulava could happen, most likely, in September, but not in the first half of the month. Definitely.”
“We’ve tried to control the entire process of assembling these missiles as precisely as possible to produce the same parameters. There will be three missiles at a minimum, we need to understand that if failures are repeated in the launches, we’ll learn the cause of unsuccessful launches.”
After reiterating how previous failures had different causes, Serdyukov continued:
“Now at every level and phase of assembly of the missile there was strict control and analysis. Moreover the commission established to explore the results of the last unsuccessful launch also worked here. It gave recommendations, we incorporated all of them in preparing for new tests.”
“I believe that launches will be conducted most likely in September according to their readiness.”
Bulava (photo: Newsru.com)
An OPK source has told ITAR-TASS the next Bulava SLBM test is expected in the first half of September. The source said the state commission investigating the last Bulava failure is scheduled to meet 6 September, and the launch window for the next test opens on 9 September.
A missile industry source told Interfaks the commission will meet in the 5-7 September timeframe, and it could fix a launch date sometime at the end of the first ten days of September.
Newsru.com recalled that three tests are planned for 2010: two from Dmitriy Donskoy and one from Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy. The website’s Defense Ministry source unofficially repeated claims that, if all three firings are successful, the Bulava will be accepted into the armaments inventory next year.
ITAR-TASS also reported today that Dolgorukiy successfully completed its latest phase of factory underway trials, and is preparing to go sea again next month. Sevmash reports the new SSBN completed its cruise program, showing “good performance characteristics and reliable working of all onboard systems.”
Posted in Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Strategic Forces Modernization
Tagged Borey, Bulava, Dmitriy Donskoy, OPK, Sevmash, SLBM, SSBN, Yuriy Dolgorukiy
Today’s Kommersant cites Interfaks saying a session of the state commission deciding on the next Bulava SLBM test will happen during the next week. Kommersant’s own OPK source confirmed this, calling the session a formality since the commission’s already announced that testing needs to continue in the near future. The source says, after the commission meets, another week is needed to prepare for a launch, so look for the next test in late August or early September.
Kommersant quotes an unnamed OPK official who said the planned launch in the 11-13 August timeframe was postponed because “additional stand tests of the system were conducted with the goal of more rigorous preparation for the launches.”
Kommersant reminds readers three launches are planned before year’s end — two from Dmitriy Donskoy (proyekt 941U Akula) and one from Yuriy Dolgorukiy (proyekt 955 Borey).
The paper’s OPK source claims, in view of Bulava’s failures, “this strategic missile system will only be accepted into the inventory after a minimum of five consecutive successful tests.”
Russian Defense Policy 