Tag Archives: Nikolay Bogdanovskiy

Shuffling Generals

The deck of generals has been shuffled somewhat.  But fairly little notice was given to the mid-June reassignments of General-Colonel Vladimir Zarudnitskiy, General-Colonel Nikolay Bogdanovskiy, and General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov.

General-Colonel Zarudnitskiy departs the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU) to take over the Central MD, replacing General-Colonel Bogdanovskiy.

Zarudnitskiy (left) Receives Central MD Standard from Deputy Defense Minister Pankov (photo: Mil.ru)

Zarudnitskiy (left) Receives Central MD Standard from Deputy Defense Minister Pankov (photo: Mil.ru)

Zarudnitskiy’s background is pretty well summarized here.  He is 56.

Bogdanovskiy leaves the Central MD to become First Deputy Chief of the General Staff — a post recreated after former Defense Minister Serdyukov cut it.

General-Colonel Nikolay Bogdanovskiy (Wearing Two Stars)

General-Colonel Nikolay Bogdanovskiy (Wearing Two Stars)

Bogdanovskiy’s had an interesting career path.  He commanded an army in the Far East before becoming a deputy commander of the old Far East MD.  He served as First Deputy CINC, Chief of the Main Staff of Ground Troops.  He commanded the old Leningrad MD.  He was again a deputy CINC of Ground Troops and Chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate from early 2011 until his late 2012 assignment to the Central MD.  Bogdanovskiy was early rumored to be a candidate to replace General-Colonel Chirkin as Ground Troops CINC.  He is 57.

Find coverage on Zarudnitskiy and Bogdanovskiy at Mil.ru.

General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov is a fresher face.  He’s 50.

General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov (photo: B-port.com)

General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov (photo: B-port.com)

The most cursory review of Kartapolov’s career shows he was an O-6 commanding a machine gun-artillery division in the Far East in the early 2000s.  In 2007, he served as a deputy commander of the Novosibirsk-based 41st CAA.  He then became First Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff for the 22nd CAA in Nizhegorod.  In 2010, he commanded the 58th CAA, and in early 2013 became a deputy commander of the Southern MD.  After a very brief stint as First Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff of the Western MD, he will head the GOU.

Kartapolov’s wiki bio says he served as chief of an unidentified GOU directorate in 2009-2010.

But GOU chiefs of late still seem more “from the troops” than “born and bred” General Staff officers.


Mil.ru made it official today.  General-Lieutenant Nikolay Bogdanovskiy, late of the Leningrad MD, is now the military’s trainer-in-chief.  According to the Defense Ministry website:

“On 1 December 2010, the Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Troops was transformed into the Main Combat Training Directorate (GUBP or ГУБП) of the Ground Troops, and given the function of coordinating the training of the RF Armed Forces services and troop branches.”

And Bogdanovskiy is now a Deputy Ground Troops CINC heading the new GUBP, according to the latest personnel decree.

General-Lieutenant Bogdanovskiy

We’re left wondering how far his new writ extends . . . just combined arms training, or to the VDV, RVSN, and Space Troops?  Recall also there was speculation that new Deputy General Staff Chief, General-Colonel Gerasimov, late of the Moscow MD, might be the main training supervisor.

A little background on Bogdanovskiy as long as it’s here. 

He was born in 1957.  He’s a graduate of the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School, the Frunze Military Academy, and the General Staff Academy.

He’s served as commander of a reconnaissance platoon, a company, chief of staff, then commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the Southern Group of Forces [i.e. Hungary], chief of staff of a fortified region, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, chief of staff of a motorized division, chief of a district junior specialist training center, chief of staff and commander of the 35th Army, Deputy Commander of the Far East MD, Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy CINC of the Ground Troops, and Commander, Leningrad MD.

State of the ‘New Profile’ in One District

General-Lieutenant Bogdanovskiy

Leningrad Military District (LenVO) Commander, General-Lieutenant Nikolay Bogdanovskiy held a news conference today and, along with talking about the upcoming Victory Day parade on St. Petersburg’s Palace Square, he talked about his district’s ‘new profile.’

Firstly, following General Staff Chief Makarov, Bogdanovskiy said contractees will be reduced and conscripts increased.

Specifically, he stated:

“. . . the number of contractees will be signficantly reduced, many of those who showed themselves incapable of serving will need to be dismissed.”

The LenVO needs 25,000 draftees from this spring’s consription campaign beginning on 1 April. But he said this won’t create problems because, last fall, 100,000 young men came through the LenVO’s voyenkomaty and 25,000 were deemed fit to serve.

The LenVO Commander said, in the process of ongoing personnel cuts, 1,600 officers and 1,200 warrants have been ‘placed at the disposition’ of their commanding officers, but only 346 and 284 respectively have been discharged from the service.

These are surprisingly small numbers.

So, in the LenVO at least, only 22 percent of the officers destined for dismissal could actually be dismissed with the benefits and apartments owed them.  The other 78 percent remain in limbo, without duty posts and living on their rank pay [perhaps one-fourth of their former total monthly pay].  And 24 percent of warrants could be sent home with benefits and housing while the other 76 percent wait for these things.

Bogdanovskiy has also asked St. Petersburg’s governor to resolve a situation with owners of garages located on land the Defense Ministry claims near the village of Yukki, where the LenVO now wants to build apartments for servicemen.  But that one will be hard; the Defense Ministry’s old nemesis Rosimushchestvo says the property doesn’t belong to the military.  The builder and construction equipment have already been out to the site with the intention of knocking down the garages.  Boganovskiy says the plan is to put 50 apartment houses on this territory.

The LenVO Commander also acknowledged problems with military housing built in the district:

“I’ve more than once tried to sort out the quality problem in the housing in Pushkin.”

He indicated the problems started small, but failure to fix them in a timely manner means ten times the amount of money must be spent to repair them now.  But he promised to do so by the end of spring.

On the force structure front, he says the LenVO’s reforms were largely completed in 2009.  Ten brigades and other units were formed or reformed in the process [the district has 3 combined arms brigades–the 25th, 138th, and 200th].

Regarding problems with the command and violence in the 138th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade at Kamenka, Bogdanovskiy said:

“. . . we haven’t managed to complete fully tasks connected with discipline–in particular, in the 138th Kamenka Brigade the commander, chief of staff, and assistants for armaments and socialization work were dismissed because of events there.  Now the situation is normalizing, we are trying not to repeat past mistakes.”

Interesting insights into what the Serdyukov’s reforms have meant for one, albeit small and not particularly significant, district.  But, if such a large percentage of officers are being left ‘at the disposal’ of their commanders, can one believe Serdyukov’s assertion that 65,000 officers were put out of the armed forces last year?  Does this include a small number of dismissed and a much larger number of those left ‘at the disposal’ of commanders?  On an issue closely tied to officer cuts, can one believe that the Defense Ministry really obtained 45,000 apartments last year if so many soon-to-be-ex-officers are ‘at the disposal’ awaiting them?

It would seem that, if Serdyukov has failed, or been unable, to move as speedily on officer reductions as he wanted, the door might be left open for someone to reverse this policy, especially if a large number of potentially angry officers remains for a long time in the limbo of being neither in, nor out of, the army.