President Medvedev’s Armed Forces personnel decree from August 26 retitled the colonels who train conscript soldiers in various specializations, made Colonel Konashenkov chief of the Defense Ministry’s press-service, dismissed General-Major Khokh and relieved Colonel Chumakov (both blamed in the 102nd Arsenal explosion and fire), and dismissed General-Lieutenant Skokov who was allegedly one of several dissatisfied senior officers sent into retirement this summer. The latter seems a particular loss — Skokov had first-hand experience with army experiments in peacekeeping and contract service from his time in the Volga-Ural MD.
Appoint:
Colonel Eduard Stanislavovich Zavarzin, Chief, 467th District Training Center for the Training of Junior Specialists, Western MD, relieved as Chief, 467th District Training Center for Training Junior Specialists (Tank Troops), Moscow MD.
Colonel Igor Yevgenyevich Konashenkov, Chief, Press-Service and Information Directorate, RF Ministry of Defense.
Colonel Vladimir Nikolayevich Lugovoy, Chief, 392nd District Training Center for Training of Junior Specialists, Eastern MD, relieved as Chief, 392nd District Training Center for Training Junior Specialists (Motorized Rifle Troops), Far East MD.
Colonel Mikhail Yakovlevich Nosulev, Chief, 473rd District Training Center for the Training of Junior Specialists, Central MD, relieved as Chief, 473rd District Training Center for Training Junior Specialists (Motorized Rifle Troops), Volga-Ural MD.
Relieve:
Colonel Oleg Valeryevich Karpov, Chief, Rear Support Directorate, Central MD.
Colonel Leonid Vladimirovich Chumakov, Chief, Material-Technical Support Planning and Coordination Directorate, Central MD.
General-Major Viktor Ivanovich Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense named for Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov for Training and Scientific Work.
General-Lieutenant Viktor Georgiyevich Bychkov, Chief, Air Forces Military Training-Scientific Center “Air Forces Academy named for Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy and Yu. A. Gagarin.”
General-Major Vasiliy Andreyevich Dorogavtsev, Chief, Troop Training Directorate, Western MD.
General-Lieutenant Sergey Ivanovich Skokov, Chief, Main Staff, First Deputy CINC, Ground Troops.
General-Major Sergey Viktorovich Khokh, Chief, Technical Support Directorate, Central MD.
Returning to the latest on Igor Sulim . . . in a late July Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye article, Oleg Vladykin summarized the GVP’s various recent press releases about rising crime in the Armed Forces. He provided insight into how senior officers view Sulim and premium pay extortion at Lipetsk.
A colonel, a deputy formation commander speaking anonymously told Vladykin:
“Almost the entire service of many senior officers came to twenty years in which they constantly humiliated, deprived the army whenever possible, and generally kept it in a miserable state. But at the same time they used it regularly. Senior officers carried all this gloom on their shoulders. And here now, as if in gratitude, they promise to raise their pay three times! Colonels will receive the same as junior managers in some public company, whose peaceful labor the army successfully defended in spite of everything. Many have only a year or two left to serve, then dismissal in connection with reaching the age limit. And what then? And then also an increased, but still laughable pension. It will be two times less than a lieutenant’s pay. Therefore, senior comrades confidently tell younger officers: ‘Boys, you still have everything ahead of you. Somehow, you’ll manage to make a more or less decent living. We here won’t…’ You know the majority understand this. And those like Senior Lieutenant Sulim from the Lipetsk Center are the exceptions. I’m not judging them, no, but I’m sure that after 1 January the prosecutors won’t easily locate those who’ll agree to talk about their contributions to their senior colleagues.”
Vladykin says he can’t agree with this argument, but it’s impossible not to note some logic in it. He concludes:
“The psychology of men in shoulderboards has changed very powerfully in the course of recent Armed Forces transformations.”
In his Moskovskiy komsomolets blog Friday, Sulim highlighted an article posted on Lipetsk’s Gorod48.ru. The article reviewed the shady, semi-criminal past of Hero of the Russian Federation, General-Major Aleksandr Kharchevskiy.
Then Sulim asks (rhetorically) how Kharchevskiy can be silent, and how could he not know about the criminal activities of his deputy, of his cousin, or of his subordinates who extorted money from their subordinates. He sums it up:
“It’s shameful and disgusting that in the space of twenty years they’ve turned an elite flying unit into an elite business for stuffing pockets, hiding all this under a mask of love for the Motherland and swearing on officer’s honor.”
Perhaps there’s some kind of behind-the-scenes three-way struggle between the Defense Ministry, Air Forces, and military prosecutors over premium pay extortion. Or maybe it’s a negotiation to agree on how, and how far, to pursue the Lipetsk case and ones like it.
But the Defense Ministry seems paralyzed. The unit checks ordered by Serdyukov rather improbably failed to turn up similar crimes in services or branches besides the Air Forces. As the colonel quoted above says, the Defense Ministry may believe the scandal will die down after the new, higher military pay system goes into effect.
The cracks in the Air Forces’ stonewall on the Sulim case are only tiny fissures. Those immediately involved in extorting money and pressuring officers at Lipetsk are finally in trouble with the law, but no one above that immediate level. As an institution, the VVS appears unworried for now.
The prosecutors apparently can’t even name the officers they “hold accountable” in the VVS Glavkomat. This isn’t to belittle Sergey Fridinskiy, his organization, and their efforts. He and his prosecutors sometimes seem to be the only people looking honestly at the state of the Russian military. There are clearly only so many battles they can fight.
And preoccupied as they are with their own positions, skirmishes, and the fast-approaching election season, Russia’s political and government leaders aren’t likely to devote more time or attention to untangling what’s happened at Lipetsk.
An update on the Igor Sulim case . . . on Tuesday, Moskovskiy komsomolets’Olga Bozhyeva reported there may finally be some pressure on the alleged extortionists. Colonel Kovalskiy and one Captain Artemyev decided (in fine Russian tradition) to go the hospital to avoid arrest, but a former 4th squadron chief of staff and Kovalskiy relative, Mikhail Zakurdayev was arrested on July 30.
Bozhyeva wrote about related crimes at Lipetsk including forgery and extortion from civilian workers receiving premiums to the tune of 10 million rubles.
She reported that, despite the Defense Ministry’s promise to check all units, systemic extortion of premium pay was only found in Lipetsk, Sevastopol, Syzran, and Michurinsk.
The case at the Syzran generated some media attention starting on July 29. The press reported the chief of the helicopter pilot training center, Colonel Nikolay Yartsev, and a former training regiment commander have allegedly been “taxing” pilots five percent of their premium pay, taking a total of four million rubles from 43 officers last year. The Saratov garrison commander has opened a criminal case against them.
According to Bozhyeva, military prosecutors say the command in Lipetsk is still creating obstacles instead of establishing order in the ranks. It transferred a primary witness and Sulim ally — Major Anton Smirnov — to Chelyabinsk. Another officer whose wife complained in a letter to the president was removed from flight duty for “poor morale.”
Bozhyeva ends with an excerpt from Sulim’s blog where he says officers are quizzed several times a day on the most obscure military topics. Failing the tests justifies not paying their premium pay.
According to RIA Novosti, on Wednesday, Sergey Fridinskiy announced that unnamed VVS Glavkomat officers have been held to account for violating the rights of Lipetsk pilots facing extortion from their own commanders.
The Main Military Prosecutor apparently responded to queries from Duma deputies interceding on behalf of Senior Lieutenant Sulim. Fridinskiy indicated his prosecutors checked on Sulim’s complaint that his rights were violated during the initial [Air Forces] investigation.
The head prosecutor claimed, as a result of these checks, several criminal cases were launched, and steps were taken to prevent further violations. The GVP also announced that:
“The officials, including those in the VVS Glavkomat, who committed them have been brought to account on the GVP’s demand.”
The GVP found that, in the investigation, no active steps were taken, and conditions were created for continued illegal activity by dishonest officers. They obstructed the investigation, and pressured officers prepared to cooperate with investigators.
According to RIA Novosti, Sulim’s main antagonists, Colonels Kovalskiy and Sidorenko, were removed from duty, but continued to have regular, unfettered access to the base. But the pilots and navigators who gave evidence were removed from flight duty and given menial duties. Several times the command’s given Sulim tasks without informing him to provide the basis for reprimands for not fulfilling assigned duties.
The Duma deputies who went to Fridinskiy think the Lipetsk command’s dragging out the case and using “administrative resources” to pressure those who spoke out. The deputies believe the Tambov garrison military prosecutor isn’t interested in closing the case, and to them, this means higher-ranking officials will have to be made accountable.
This morning’s Rossiyskaya gazetarepeated a lot of what’s known about the retiring generals’ troyka. More interesting, however, are other statements and language it used to describe what’s going on in the Defense Ministry.
The article is subtitled, “Cadre Purge Begun in the Defense Ministry.” An odd choice of words for something that’s been going on for some time, and is supposed to be routine and unsensational.
About Friday’s latest Armed Forces cadre ukaz, RG reports:
“In the Defense Ministry, they don’t conceal the fact that these aren’t the last cadre decisions which will affect highly-placed military leaders, particularly from the military department’s central apparatus.”
The paper repeats the rumor about possible uniformed opponents of Serdyukov’s (or Makarov’s) military reforms being shown the door as well as the contrary points and official denials. Again, no sensation; all this was hashed over a week ago.
RG ends this way:
“Meanwhile, in the Defense Ministry they don’t exclude new dismissals. The thing is right now in the Russian Army certification [аттестация] of all command personnel is going on, and, according to its decision, they will propose that a number of military leaders, who’ve served in Moscow more than five years, serve in more distant military districts.”
“As a source in the military department told RG’s correspondent, the majority of dismissal reports appear at once when they suggest a man change his duty in the capital for an equivalent one somewhere in Russia’s sticks.”
Yes, we know generals often prefer to retire in Moscow, get valuable permanent apartments in the capital, and enable their well-connected wives to keep lucrative employment rather than spend a few extra years serving in a possibly terminal post in Khabarovsk, etc.
What we’re getting at here (again) is either (a) there really is something to Moskovskiy komsomolets’ report about drastically cutting uniformed officers in the central apparatus, or (b) RG was being lazy and reran a worn-out story using some loosely chosen verbiage.
Returning to the three generals’ resignations . . . the Defense Ministry press-service came out quickly denying any “scandalous” general officer discharges.
The press-service said General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak, General-Lieutenant Sergey Skokov, and General-Major Oleg Ivanov requested discharges for health reasons at different times. But it also indicated the Central Attestation Commission (TsAK, or ЦАК) is reassigning generals to duties in the military districts under Defense Minister Serdyukov’s policy of rotating officers through different posts, and away from Moscow in particular.
A Defense Ministry source told ITAR-TASS the generals’ discharges are not part of any mass dismissal of officers from the Defense Ministry’s central apparatus.
The press was skeptical about three young and vigorous generals suddenly seeking a medical discharge, and it focused on their intent to avoid undesirable reassignments. Newsru.com and Moskovskiy komsomolets reported in this vein.
A Defense Ministry source told news agencies one in three requests for early retirement involves officers who are being reassigned from Moscow to a military district post. The source claimed these cases are usually incorrectly characterized as opposition to military reforms. Tretyak himself told Interfaks his resignation is not connected with Armed Forces reforms or disagreements with the leadership.
Then Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov talked to Rossiyskaya gazeta, giving a version of events varying from the press-service’s initial report of discharges for health reasons.
Pankov told the paper Skokov and Ivanov were offered several good options including troop command duties or General Staff Academy positions, but chose retirement. In Tretyak’s case, health was the issue, according to Pankov. And Pankov called any thought of them leaving over dissatisfaction with army reform “farfetched,” or dissatisfaction with General Staff Chief Makarov “utter stupidity.”
What did military commentators say?
In IA RegnumandGazeta.ru, Anatoliy Tsyganok said the generals’ resignations show things aren’t quite right in the Defense Ministry, but also called reports of problems with Makarov a falsehood. He said the incident shows it’s not just military retirees who bring attention to poorly thought out reforms. At the same time, he doesn’t get the focus on Makarov when he just implements Serdyukov’s plans.
Also in Gazeta.ru, Aleksandr Khramchikhin asks where this ‘opposition’ to reform has been:
“But where were they earlier? Reform’s already been going on for three years.”
Svpressa.ru wrote that no Decembrists remain in the army. It quoted Konstantin Sivkov:
“The thing is in the Defense Ministry and Genshtab generally there are no longer any people capable of standing up for their opinion, if it diverges from the leadership’s viewpoint. They still existed several years ago. Recall General Rodionov, Ivashov. They slowly disposed of them. The only ones remaining are those who loyally hang on the words of the minister and Genshtab chief. A negative selection has occurred. And what remains . . . Only those that agree with everything.”
“The Genshtab chief proposed to all three figures that they leave Moscow, smell the powder a little, become greater practitioners. My sources don’t deny that all of the generals’ troyka requesting retirement had relations with Makarov that weren’t very simple. But all issues were decided behind closed doors, without cursing and throwing down reports [retirement requests] on the table.”
The story of Igor Sulim and the premium pay scandal is like the 19th century one about Russian society’s generation gap. With liberals and nihilists reversed.
In Sulim’s story, the fathers are old senior and mid-grade officers who span Soviet and Russian worlds. They have no problem taking whatever’s not nailed down. The sons are post-Soviet junior officers, reared on the Internet, familiar with Western-style justice and rule-of-law, and ready to demand an end to corruption (that costs them money).
Perhaps your author reads too much into this. Or just maybe there’s some truth in this description. Let’s review some new details first.
The investigation into Senior Lieutenant Sulim’s accusations is a very slow roll. Rolling the victims. Here’s an update on the action (or inaction?).
Sulim posted his first video on May 31. Gorod48.ru wrote about it.
Sulim explained why he felt he had to complain to Defense Minister Serdyukov and go public about corruption in his unit despite the military’s “corporate ethic” against it. He said he exhausted other avenues and had no other resource at his disposal. He didn’t intend to be a one-man campaign against corruption but he’s getting support, and hearing similar stories, from others. And he thanks his fellow officers supporting him despite the difficulties and pressure they face.
He concludes speaking out is his civic duty. Russians should unite around one idea and struggle together so Russia doesn’t lose its greatness and remains a great power. And so the next generation doesn’t hate the current one for being silent and patient, believing nothing will ever change. It’s not revolution or spilled blood he wants, but the path of civilized development.
On June 2, Moskovskiye novosti wrote that Sulim predicted a disciplinary reprimand and deprivation of his premium pay would come his way for going over his superior officers (and, in fact, both came pretty quickly). The “army Navalnyy” and other officers are being pressured in every way by the authorities, and the entire Lipetsk center’s been deprived of premium pay to turn other officers against Sulim. He was removed from flight status. Public Chamber member Anatoliy Kucherena reported over half of 150 personnel he met said they were aware of the corrupt pay scheme at the base.
“Here is the misfortune — the essentially socialist army was not ready for these market relations. Indoctrinated on the principle that everyone in the line is equal before the commander and in battle, before life and death, everyone to an equal degree responsible for his country and its security, officers became accustomed to distinguishing one from another only by stars on the shoulderboards and by position, where the difference in pay between lieutenant and colonel, a general even, was minimal: a couple — four thousand rubles. And here suddenly it became colossal — several times. And, of course, when not everyone started receiving such premiums for the very same service-work, but just those chosen by still incomprehensible principles, a Bolshevist idea immediately arose — take it and divide it up.”
“But it was impossible not to understand to what the revolutionary introduction of market relations and big money for different categories of servicemen could lead. But has pay become a schism in combat units? There’s no unambiguous answer.”
“What’s the result? To what is the Senior Lieutenant Sulim phenomenon leading? Most likely just to changes in the various fates of various officers and various military units. But over some kind of time everything will remain as before. If Orders No. 400, 400A and 155 aren’t be suspended and changed. If from 1 January next year, the difference in pay and premiums for the very same service-work aren’t so monstrously striking. It’s not worth destroying the monolithic army line with the almighty ruble. This could bring serious consequences in a real battle.”
Sulim gave Ogonek an interview. Sulim said his father was not happy about him going public, but Sulim stressed it was his own personal decision. General-Major Sulim’s being pressed to keep his son’s mouth shut.
Ogonek asked Sulim if he isn’t afraid of sharing MVD Major Dymovskiy’s fate:
“His colleagues, as I understand it, didn’t support Dymovskiy. There are more and more of us now. If I had been alone, perhaps, I would have repeated his fate. But my colleagues are supporting me so, everyone is ready to go only forward.”
By mid-June, Sulim’s antagonists — Colonels Kovalskiy and Sidorenko — were both relieved of duty, but his supporters — Majors Kubarev and Smirnov — had been hauled before an Air Forces attestation commission in Moscow, called cowards for not refusing to pay kickbacks, and all but told they would be transferred from their elite Lipetsk duty, according to Komsomolskaya pravda. The paper points out Kubarev is a Su-34 pilot qualified for aerial refueling, and Smirnov was regiment’s top pilot last year.
In Moskovskiy komsomolets, Olga Bozhyeva wrote that Sulim’s reprimand was for violating the law’s prohibition on “discussing and criticizing the orders of a commander.” The authorities apparently didn’t go after him for revealing some of the stupid things said and written by Deputy VVS CINC General-Major Viktor Bondarev. Instead, they focused on his criticism of the Defense Ministry’s anticorruption orders posted on his blog. For its part, MK posted new audio clips indicating that the even the local FSB is in on getting kickbacks at Lipetsk, and this didn’t happen just in the 3rd Squadron, but all over the center. Bozhyeva asks, if this happens in an elite formation like Lipetsk, what happens in less prestigious units?
Senior Lieutenant Igor Sulim
There is lots on Sulim’s blog. Most recently, he wrote about meeting with VVS Deputy CINC, General-Lieutenant Sadofyev, who asked him why he had to “create a scandal.” Of course, Sulim’s made the point many times that he tried to go through the chain, through channels, and to do it without blood, and quietly. But Sadofyev and the older generation really don’t get it.
The new Russian generation of sons might make even congenitally pessimistic observers of Russia a little hopeful. The authorities could be playing an ultimately futile game of whack a mole with an entire generation of Dymovskiys and Matveyevs and Sulims.
Colonel Pavel Valentinovich Kirsi, Commander, 18th Machine Gun-Artillery Division.
Relieve and dismiss from military service:
Rear-Admiral Yuriy Vladimirovich Baylo, Chief of Rear Services, Deputy Commander for Rear Services, Pacific Fleet.
Appoint:
Colonel Stepan Aleksandrovich Vorontsov, Chief, Rear Support Directorate, Western MD.
General-Major Aleksandr Valentinovich Golovko, Chief, 1st State Testing Cosmodrome, relieved as Chief, 153rd Main Test Center and Space Systems Directorate.
General-Major Oleg Vladimirovich Maydanovich, Chief, 153rd Main Test Center and Space Systems Directorate, relieved as Chief, 1st State Test Cosmodrome.
Dismiss from military service:
General-Major Sergey Petrovich Degtyarev.
General-Major Vladimir Ivanovich Perekrestov.
* * *
Appoint:
General-Major Sergey Vasilyevich Varfolomeyev, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, 4th Air Forces and Air Defense Command, relieved as Deputy Commander, 1st Air Forces and Air Defense Command.
General-Major Igor Mikhaylovich Nerestyuk, Deputy Commander, 1st Air Forces and Air Defense Command, relieved as Commander, 6983rd Guards Aviation Base (1st Rank).
Colonel Aleksandr Vasilyevich Duplinskiy, Commander, 6983rd Guards Aviation Base (1st Rank).
Colonel Vladimir Viktorovich Kvashin, Commander, 62nd Missile Division.
Relieve and dismiss from military service:
Rear-Admiral Aleksey Borisovich Tuzov, Deputy Chief, Navy Training-Scientific Center “Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy.”
Dropping Russia’s military manpower level below one million? Talk about a watershed. This might be spurious information, but coming from Dmitriy Litovkin, the report has to be taken seriously. In fine Russian tradition, it could be a trial balloon to elicit public and elite reactions.
In yesterday’s Izvestiya, Litovkin reported that, over the course of two years, the Russian Army will become smaller by 150,000 men, according to a Defense Ministry source.
The impetus for this is the Finance Ministry’s. Aleksey Kudrin’s been ordered to fight the budget deficit, and he’s got defense and security spending in his sights.
The source says concrete proposals to cut military expenditures were prepared for a special government conference in early June. As a result, the government adopted an “additional reduction” of 150,000 servicemen. This would reportedly save 10 billion rubles in 2010 [sic], and almost 50 billion rubles in 2014. The article says military staffs have already been cut 40 percent as a result of army reform.
Litovkin notes Defense Minister Serdyukov has previously called one million the “optimal” manning figure — ostensibly 150,000 officers, 100,000-120,000 contract sergeants, and conscripts for the balance.
But it wasn’t so long ago that the Defense Ministry declared the need for an increase of 70,000 officers, and raising the number of contract NCOs and soldiers to 480,000. It’s not clear how these new cuts are supposed to jibe with increases proposed earlier this year. The Supreme CINC [together with his tandem partner] will have to decide.
Litovkin enumerates Defense Minister Serdyukov’s competing costly initiatives — higher officer pay, outsourcing nonmilitary tasks, etc. According to this, outsourcing alone has already brought 380,000 [!?] civilians into military support positions and this number is supposed to increase. Litovkin doesn’t close the loop on this, but he seems to imply the high cost of these efforts requires cuts in manpower.
This is all exciting and interesting and occasions a couple thoughts.
One. The new “optimal” number for the Armed Forces must be 850,000. Liberal Russian politicians, military analysts, and observers have long argued for this, or an even more radical cut. But one million has had mystical power. Russian conservatives will vociferously object that the country’s borders are too extensive to be defended by a single man short of one million, as if even one [or for that matter two] million could do it, or as if sheer manpower’s the best way to parry modern military threats.
Two. Though not mentioned by Litovkin, isn’t it possible Moscow’s decided to make a virtue of necessity and recognize that demographic and draft problems have left them well short of a fully-manned force of one million anyway? This could be a small step in the direction of becoming (or at least looking) more like just another European army.
Three. The inevitable downsides. Keeping more officers had been intended to deal with the outplacement cost (apartments) and other negative fallout of cutting the officer corps in half, not to mention simply having more officers around to deal with unruly nonprofessional soldiers in the ranks. And another round of personnel reductions is likely to delay any resumed movement toward a long-term professional enlisted force.
Just the latest fro in the game of Russian defense policy to-and-fro.
A thing rare in recent times was announced today . . . the promotion of a general officer. In this case, Southern MD Commander, General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Galkin picked up his third star.
President Medvedev’s decree on General-Colonel Galkin was dated June 11, according to RIA Novosti.
Large, well-publicized general officer promotion ceremonies used to be the norm, but no longer.
Recall one of Defense Minister Serdyukov’s objectives was turning the “bloated egg” of the officer corps into a pyramid. As part of this, he planned to trim 1,100 generals to 900.
Of course, Serdyukov had to walk back part of his decision on cutting officers this year, but generally it’s clear that lots of O-6s now occupy billets once held by one-stars. Army commanders routinely two-stars in the past now wear only one. And MD commanders who typically wore three, have been wearing only two . . . at least until now.
Galkin joins Western MD Commander, General-Colonel Arkadiy Bakhin at the three-star rank.
Galkin’s promotion shows the team has to be rewarded for doing the heavy lifting of establishing the “new profile.” Three-star rank also extends his statutory retirement to 60.
Central MD Commander, General-Lieutenant Vladimir Chirkin and Eastern MD Commander, Vice-Admiral Konstantin Sidenko are both older than Galkin. They are likely serving on extensions right now, and might be better candidates for retirement than promotion. But another star can’t be ruled out. In Chirkin’s case, the recent arsenal explosions in his AOR won’t help him.
Aleksandr Viktorovich Galkin is especially strongly linked to General Staff Chief, Army General Nikolay Makarov through his service in the former Siberian MD in the 2000s. Bakhin and Chirkin are also “Siberians” with ties to Makarov.
Some details on Galkin: He was born March 22, 1958 in Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz), North-Ossetian ASSR. He graduated the Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command School in 1979, and served in motorized rifle command posts up to chief of staff and deputy commander of a battalion in the GSFG. He was a battalion commander in the Far East MD. In 1990, he completed the Frunze Military Academy, and served as a motorized rifle regiment commander in the Transcaucasus, and chief of staff and deputy commander of a motorized rifle division in the Far East MD. On completing the General Staff Academy in 2003, he served as deputy commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army (Novosibirsk), and chief of staff and first deputy commander of the 36th Combined Arms Army (Borzya). In 2006-2007, he commanded the 41st. In 2008, Galkin became deputy commander, then chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Siberian MD. In early 2010, he became commander of the North Caucasus MD, and the renamed Southern MD early this year.
It’s rare when a single incident like Lipetsk is deemed serious enough to warrant a quick public response. But that’s what’s happening.
Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov has ordered checks for corruption in large formations, formations, and units [i.e. army-level down]. His press-service says they’ll look specifically for premium pay kickback schemes. And servicemen and their families are urged to fill out electronic complaint forms on Mil.ru if they know about extortion rackets. They don’t need to observe the chain of command either.
Newsru.com has a good recap. VVS Deputy CINC, General-Major Bondarev has confirmed the existence of a kickback scheme at Lipetsk. But he also called Sulim and others cowards for not refusing to pay. He also denied putting any pressure on the men.
As Newsru notes, MK has audio of Bondarev indicating otherwise. Talking to Sulim, Bondarev claims he’s just angry he wasn’t promoted, his father illegally got him into the elite Lipetsk unit, and warns him that his fellow servicemen will kill him when they lose their premium pay. The tape also showed that Sulim only wants to resign because of the corruption, not for personal reasons, as Bondarev claims.
In fact, Sulim hopes to continue serving.
Gazeta.ru focused on Bondarev’s comment that it’s possible violations at Lipetsk are administrative rather than criminal [which would make Kovalskiy no more guilty than Smirnov or Sulim]. Bondarev claims Major Kubarev retracted his support for Sulim [Kubarev’s also being reported as Kubyrev].
Gazeta then talked to Sulim, who points out Bondarev only investigated in the 3rd squadron, not in the 1st or 4th squadrons, because the leadership is trying to limit the damage, and to make it look like it’s one squadron’s problem, and not a base-wide scheme.
You can see Bondarev’s own words in his 24 May interview with Ekho moskvy.
The RVSN actually moved out on this scandal before the Defense Ministry:
“Taking into account the recent events in one of the RF Defense Ministry’s units, connected with the illegal collection of money from servicemen, and to preclude the occurrence of similar situations in RVSN units, RVSN Commander, General-Lieutenant Sergey Karakayev has decided to establish permanently functioning commissions in every missile army to prevent similar legal violations.”
The press release said commissions will conduct anonymous surveys of officers and their families, and also look for this during inspections. But there might already be a lot of work to do.
Look at the impassioned comment a retired RVSN lieutenant colonel left on the webpage for Olga Bozhyeva’s interview with Sulim and Smirnov:
“Such kickbacks go on THROUGHOUT Russia’s VS [Armed Forces]!! It would be possible to jail ALL commanders of ALL units in Russia in good conscience!!”
“I live in the military town of an RVSN division. Many of my acquaintances are still serving. Previously they included ONLY SELECTED ‘RELIABLE’ officers in the order for the annual receipt of this mad money (extra MONTHLY pay up to 160-200 thousand rubles!!!) — but not more than 30% of the unit’s officers. EVERYONE knows that they collect ‘tribute’ from this money paid according to MO RF Order № 400: and who gets it, and who doesn’t, and their wives, and the osobisty (FSB), and the prosecutors, and even conscript soldiers [know who gets it]!! And such corruption arranges EVERYTHING — it’s clear that both prosecutors and osobisty get it! And it also arranges the officers who give the most ‘tribute’ — refuse to pay, they find a reason and deprive you of this mad, undeserved money!!!”
“Of course there’s hostility among officers, and their wives because of the payment of this money! You bet! Of two similar officers fulfilling similar duties, one gets SEVERAL TIMES more!! Not 2, 3, 5, 10, or 20 thousand rubles a months more, but several times more!!! Meanwhile, it’s usually not the best, but the ‘reliable’ one who will ‘kickback’ money without a fuss!!”
“THIS UNDERMINES ALL FOUNDATIONS of the Russian Army and its COMBAT READINESS!! ONLY AN ENEMY OF RUSSIA could think up such a thing!!”
Russian Defense Policy 