It appears the best way to get the latest promotion list out is now Google Docs. This conclusion follows a number of frustrating gyrations.
These promotions came in President Putin’s decree signed out 12 December 2013 and published in Krasnaya zvezda.
Posted in Command and Control, Military Leadership
Tagged Cadres, Decree, Personnel, Promotions, Ukaz, Vladimir Putin
For Russia Day on 12 June, President Vladimir Putin promoted a number of armed forces and other “power” ministry officers to higher ranks.
Click on this link to see those promoted in Putin’s decree along with as many positions as could be identified for them. The link goes to an Excel file, click “View full-size workbook” and you’ll see the spreadsheet on Microsoft’s Skydrive site.
Promotions from February remain in the file as well.
On February 20, President Putin, as is customary, issued a pre-Defender’s Day promotion list. The link takes you to a page with an Excel file. Click on the icon for “View full-size workbook” and you’ll access the entire spreadsheet on the Microsoft Skydrive site.
Putin promoted forty officers. Most of their duty posts are identified on the spreadsheet.
You can see the original promotion list at Pravo.gov.ru or Krasnaya zvezda.
So, Do You Have a Girlfriend? (photo: Izvestiya / Gleb Shchelkunov)
A strange and ironic title. “Do Ask, Do Tell” might be appropriate too.
By chance, two recent articles focused on the Main Directorate for Personnel Work (GURLS or ГУРЛС).
Information at Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye’s disposal indicates Defense Minister Shoygu will reorganize GURLS into a Cadre Policy Department (DKP or ДКП), like what he had at MChS. The change would encompass everyone working with personnel issues, military education, and psychological evaluation and treatment.
Author Vladimir Mukhin concludes the Defense Ministry’s personnel structures haven’t been effective during the entire post-Soviet period. But former Defense Minister Serdyukov, in particular, had little use for personnel work. He dismissed the last chief of GURLS, and left the post vacant. The chief before was convicted for bribery and sent to jail for seven years.
Serdyukov cut personnel work officers by a factor of three, sold off cultural-educational institutions in large garrisons, and was prepared to privatize major facilities reportedly worth “several billion dollars” — the Central Academic Theater of the Russian Army, the Cultural Center and Museum of the Armed Forces.
The article in Izvestiya is much more interesting.
Its headline says Russian officers are obligated to determine the sexual orientation of their soldiers (among other things).
This comes from “methodological recommendations” codified by GURLS at the end of last year. They cover the spectrum of psychological work with young soldiers, from counteracting “barracks rackets” to national [ethnic] and religious issues.
As they put it, “disorderly sexual relations” qualify as a sign of nervous-psychological instability on par with alcohol addiction, running away from home, suicidal tendencies, and stealing.
Officer-educators (officer-indoctrinators) should get to know a soldier, ask about his sexual experience, if he has a girlfriend, and whether her fidelity is important to him.
A physical inspection of the soldier to look for tattoos is recommended:
“The reasons for having tattoos could attest to a low cultural and educational level. If the influence of external motivations is established, for example persuasion, coercion, then this will attest to the compliance of the young man, his inclination to submit to another’s will.”
“. . . knowledge of tattoo symbols will help the officer best organize work with a specific individual. Special attention should go to tattoos on areas of the face, the genitals, the buttocks. They can attest not only to specific personal attitudes, but also to possible sexual deviations.”
A military psychologist from GURLS tells the paper the army remains a bastion of traditional views on sexuality:
“In closed military collectives, sexual minorities introduce unnecessary tension, negatively influence the moral atmosphere. Soldiers begin thinking not about their service, but about extraneous things.”
An assistant battalion commander for personnel work says he can’t talk with every young soldier; this is up to company and platoon commanders. But the perplexed officer asked rhetorically:
“Will they inspect genitals for tattoos? And how do you ask about the first sexual experience? ‘When did you try a woman for the first time, greenhorn? Answer straight, don’t weasel.'”
He claimed he had one gay contractee who came to the army looking for more partners.
Other officers told Izvestiya they aren’t in a hurry to follow GURLS’ guidance.
Before Serdyukov introduced the “new profile” reforms, companies had deputy commanders for indoctrination work, and battalions still had a staff psychologist. Now there’s only the deputy battalion commander for personnel work, and companies have four officers — the company commander and three platoon commanders.
Posted in Manpower
Tagged Cadres, Conscripts, Contractees, ГУРЛС, Gays, GURLS, Homosexuals, Main Directorate for Personnel Work, MChS, Personnel, Sergey Shoygu, Sexual Orientation, Tattoos
President Medvedev’s decree yesterday dismissed Russia’s senior military representative to NATO, Army General Aleksey Maslov, who was once Ground Troops CINC. Fifty-eight-year-old Maslov leaves a little early for a four-star general. No word on whether he requested to retire. At any rate, other generals might be shuffled about to fill the NATO milrep spot, or it might be gapped for a time.
But on to the decree.
Appoint:
Relieve:
Relieve and dismiss from military service:
Dismiss from military service:
Posted in Air Forces, Military Leadership
Tagged Aleksey Maslov, Cadres, Decree, NATO, Personnel, Ukaz
In yesterday’s decree, President Medvedev retired General-Lieutenant Sadofyev, Deputy CINC of the Air Forces and Aviation Chief. As you’ve read, he was sometimes the service’s spokesman, especially on modernization issues. Sadofyev turned 55 (normal age limit for two-stars) in January. At one time, he looked like a candidate to replace Air Forces CINC, General-Colonel Zelin, who continues to serve.
Medvedev made General-Major Vladimir Gradusov Deputy CINC of the Air Forces. He wasn’t given the Aviation Chief title to replace Sadofyev directly. But he has the background for it.
General-Major Gradusov
As the decree said, Gradusov comes from the 185th Combat Training and Combat Employment Center in Ashuluk. Krasnaya zvezda recently profiled him.
He’s 53 (maybe 52). Native of Moscow Oblast. Trained at the Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots. Served as pilot-instructor at Kharkov. Commanded the training squadron at the Krasnodar Higher Aviation School, training foreign students on the L-39 and MiG-21.
He’s commanded fighter regiments, and served in the former Kiev, North Caucasus, Transbaykal, and Siberian MDs. In 2003, he left the post of aviation chief of the Siberian MD’s air and air defense army for the training center job in Ashuluk.
He’s mastered the L-29, L-39, MiG-21 (all mods), MiG-29, MiG-31, and An-26. Apparently not a Sukhoy guy. KZ notes without elaboration that Gradusov has been in combat.
But on with the decree . . .
Appoint:
Relieve and dismiss from military service:
Posted in Air Forces, Military Leadership
Tagged Cadres, Decree, Igor Sadofyev, Personnel, Ukaz, Vladimir Gradusov
Izvestiya’s Denis Telmanov reported yesterday that 64-year-old General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Shlyakhturov is set to retire from his post as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
Shlyakhturov went to the hospital at the end of last month [probably for his military discharge exam], and hasn’t returned to his office.
Genshtab sources tell Izvestiya that Shlyakhturov did his job – making “severe” cuts in the GRU, dismissing 1,000 officers, cutting from eight Spetsnaz brigades to five and resubordinating them to MD commanders, and making other cadre changes that can’t be discussed publicly.
In short, according to the paper’s source, Shlyakhturov implemented the reorganization his predecessor Valentin Korabelnikov reportedly wouldn’t two years ago.
One military official called Shlyakhturov a taciturn executive, who never once argued with Defense Minister Serdyukov and fulfilled all his orders.
The GRU Chief was also allegedly given his third star to up his pension as a reward at the end of August.
Ex-GRU Colonel Vitaliy Shlykov told Izvestiya the GRU needs a fresh face for its leadership:
“If the military leadership wants serious reforms in the GRU, it has to attract a person from outside. But I still don’t see real contenders for this duty. They’ve already searched several years for a worthy candidate.”
Typically, at this point, the press usually raises the possibility that the GRU might be headed by someone from the SVR, or even subsumed in the civilian foreign intelligence agency. But Serdyukov was willing to appoint a caretaker from inside to replace Korabelnikov in 2009. And the GRU falls on the uniformed side of the Defense Ministry where Serdyukov hasn’t replaced generals with his cronies from the tax service.
But let’s return to Izvestiya . . .
An unnamed GRU veteran told the paper the situation in the agency is close to critical:
“The collapse of military intelligence, which has long since been the eyes and ears of the military command, is occurring. The Spetsnaz brigades were cut, new equipment isn’t arriving, experienced specialists are being dismissed, only the young who clearly don’t know how to do anything remain. Therefore, the new head of the directorate will have a lot of work.”
Surprisingly, the wire services got General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov to react to the Shlyakhturov retirement story. He did little to damp it down. He said:
“I still can’t say anything about this. Shlyakhturov is our chief of the intel directorate and remains so.”
“We’re all old, and I can’t foretell anything.”
“There are still no decisions. The president makes the decision.”
It may be, in fact, that President Medvedev hasn’t signed the papers yet. He’s just a little busy after all.
Fact is, Shlyakhturov’s been beyond statutory retirement age for a two-star general (60) for some time. This isn’t just a routine retirement on reaching the service age limit. There are a few possibilities: (a) Shlyakhturov has asked to be dismissed; (b) Shlyakhturov has to be dismissed for health reasons; or (c) the leadership is dismissing Shlyakhturov because it’s got a replacement.
Unlike (c), (a) and (b) imply that (as the well-connected Shlykov intimated above) the leadership may not have a good candidate ready. But another short-timer can always be found.
This is the last of the backlogged Armed Forces personnel decrees. It’s from March 2. All presidential decrees on cadre changes are now reflected on these pages. This one made General-Lieutenant Yevnevich an assistant to Defense Minister Serdyukov, and dismissed one General-Lieutenant Chaynikov, deputy chief of the 12th GUMO.
Appoint:
* * *
Relieve:
* * *
Relieve and dismiss from service:
* * *
Dismiss from service:
This morning’s Rossiyskaya gazeta repeated a lot of what’s known about the retiring generals’ troyka. More interesting, however, are other statements and language it used to describe what’s going on in the Defense Ministry.
The article is subtitled, “Cadre Purge Begun in the Defense Ministry.” An odd choice of words for something that’s been going on for some time, and is supposed to be routine and unsensational.
About Friday’s latest Armed Forces cadre ukaz, RG reports:
“In the Defense Ministry, they don’t conceal the fact that these aren’t the last cadre decisions which will affect highly-placed military leaders, particularly from the military department’s central apparatus.”
The paper repeats the rumor about possible uniformed opponents of Serdyukov’s (or Makarov’s) military reforms being shown the door as well as the contrary points and official denials. Again, no sensation; all this was hashed over a week ago.
RG ends this way:
“Meanwhile, in the Defense Ministry they don’t exclude new dismissals. The thing is right now in the Russian Army certification [аттестация] of all command personnel is going on, and, according to its decision, they will propose that a number of military leaders, who’ve served in Moscow more than five years, serve in more distant military districts.”
“As a source in the military department told RG’s correspondent, the majority of dismissal reports appear at once when they suggest a man change his duty in the capital for an equivalent one somewhere in Russia’s sticks.”
Yes, we know generals often prefer to retire in Moscow, get valuable permanent apartments in the capital, and enable their well-connected wives to keep lucrative employment rather than spend a few extra years serving in a possibly terminal post in Khabarovsk, etc.
What we’re getting at here (again) is either (a) there really is something to Moskovskiy komsomolets’ report about drastically cutting uniformed officers in the central apparatus, or (b) RG was being lazy and reran a worn-out story using some loosely chosen verbiage.
Posted in Military Leadership, Officer Corps, Serdyukov's Reforms
Tagged Cadres, Central Apparatus, Personnel, Rotation
In yesterday’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Sergey Konovalov followed up the story of the retiring generals — Andrey Tretyak, Sergey Skokov, and Oleg Ivanov.
Konovalov held to the main line of his earlier report. He maintains the retirement of these Defense Ministry central apparatus officers has been “frozen.” Without addressing the various explanations and denials in the media, he asks why three promising generals would want out early. Finally, he repeats his earlier contention that the resignations could be a sign of “military opposition” to Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reforms.
Konovalov cites a highly-placed Defense Ministry source saying:
“Soon representatives of the Presidential Administration’s cadre organs will talk with the generals who requested discharge to find out the real reasons why young, promising leaders are retiring from the army.”
A law enforcement source tells NG that the Main Military Prosecutor has long questioned the Defense Ministry’s cadre policy:
“Competent officers are dismissed, meanwhile every kind of lawbreaker who’s had a run-in with military justice gets moved up to higher duties.”
One general told NG that General-Lieutenant Sergey Surovikin — slated to head Russia’s new military police force — got one year of probation for trying to sell a pistol while attending the Frunze Military Academy. The paper then lists some other, less prominent, cases of officers with shady or criminal backgrounds who’ve advanced through the ranks to higher posts.
NG’s sources claim the Defense Ministry’s cadre policy will soon undergo an analysis and evaluation by the PA’s cadre department.
The Defense Ministry’s PR blitz (as well as independent reporting) in the wake of the resignations blunted Konovalov’s assertion that the generals were quitting over disagreements with military reforms. This article answered his question from earlier — his sources say the PA will investigate recent Defense Ministry personnel moves. But one wonders how much time and attention President Medvedev’s people can devote to this with an agenda already full of political and domestic policy issues.
Russian Defense Policy 