Monthly Archives: August 2011

Unlikely Sacrifice

Writing in Moskovskiy komsomolets, Mikhail Rostovskiy examines the possibility that the government might be shaken up, or ministers turned into political human sacrifices in the runup to the December 4 Duma election.

We’ve been on this topic before when Aleksey Makarkin tiptoed around it, examining only the possibility that Defense Minister Serdyukov or Health and Social Development Minister Tatyana Golikova might be sacrificed to appease angry Russian voters.

About Serdyukov’s chances, Rostovskiy writes:

“Victim No. 4.  They say that Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov is not liked very much by his subordinates.  On the other hand, they value him very much up above.  Here they believe that Serdyukov is achieving what his predecessor Sergey Ivanov couldn’t manage.  They say, for example, that under the current minister the real battle to introduce elementary administrative and financial order in the army began.  Therefore I would rate Anatoliy Serdyukov’s chances of surviving a ritual ministerial sacrifice as high.”

Is Serdyukov better than Ivanov?  Vote here.

Just to round it out, here’s Rostovskiy’s full list, from most to least likely to be sacrificed:

  1. Minister of Education and Science Andrey Fursenko
  2. Minister of Health and Social Development Tatyana Golikova
  3. Minister of Transportation Igor Levitin
  4. Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov
  5. Minister of Sports Vitaliy Mutko
  6. Minister of Internal Affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev
  7. Minister of Finance Aleksey Kudrin

What issues have brought Serdyukov political heat?

Most recently, the prime minister and government — Deputy PM, VPK Chairman, and Serdyukov predecessor Sergey Ivanov in particular — really want to tag the current defense minister with the GOZ-2011 mess.

The dustup between Serdyukov and the commander of the VDV training center at Seltsy last fall became a political faux pas for Anatoliy Eduardovich.

Last summer’s fires around military bases, and seemingly perpetual ammo dump explosions were and are weak points for the defense minister.

The bottom line is Serdyukov was always and remains part of Team Putin.  He’ll see his fifth anniversary on the job early next year.  What happens to him after the presidential election depends (obviously) on the outcome of the election.  But he will probably find himself with a bigger, better, possibly somewhat less troublesome portfolio.

More Cadre Changes

President Medvedev’s Armed Forces personnel decree from August 26 retitled the colonels who train conscript soldiers in various specializations, made Colonel Konashenkov chief of the Defense Ministry’s press-service, dismissed General-Major Khokh and relieved Colonel Chumakov (both blamed in the 102nd Arsenal explosion and fire), and dismissed General-Lieutenant Skokov who was allegedly one of several dissatisfied senior officers sent into retirement this summer.  The latter seems a particular loss — Skokov had first-hand experience with army experiments in peacekeeping and contract service from his time in the Volga-Ural MD.

Appoint:

  • Colonel Eduard Stanislavovich Zavarzin, Chief, 467th District Training Center for the Training of Junior Specialists, Western MD, relieved as  Chief, 467th District Training Center for Training Junior Specialists (Tank Troops), Moscow MD.
  • Colonel Igor Yevgenyevich Konashenkov, Chief, Press-Service and Information Directorate, RF Ministry of Defense.
  • Colonel Vladimir Nikolayevich Lugovoy, Chief, 392nd District Training Center for Training of Junior Specialists, Eastern MD, relieved as  Chief, 392nd District Training Center for Training Junior Specialists (Motorized Rifle Troops), Far East MD.
  • Colonel Mikhail Yakovlevich Nosulev, Chief, 473rd District Training Center for the Training of Junior Specialists, Central MD, relieved as Chief, 473rd District Training Center for Training Junior Specialists (Motorized Rifle Troops), Volga-Ural MD.

Relieve:

  • Colonel Oleg Valeryevich Karpov, Chief, Rear Support Directorate, Central MD.
  • Colonel Leonid Vladimirovich Chumakov, Chief, Material-Technical Support Planning and Coordination Directorate, Central MD.
  • Colonel Andrey Ivanovich Yankovskiy, Commander, 23rd Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd Guards Army.

Relieve and dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major Viktor Ivanovich Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Military Academy of Aerospace Defense named for Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov for Training and Scientific Work.
  • General-Lieutenant Viktor Georgiyevich Bychkov, Chief, Air Forces Military Training-Scientific Center “Air Forces Academy named for Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy and Yu. A. Gagarin.”
  • General-Major Vasiliy Andreyevich Dorogavtsev, Chief, Troop Training Directorate, Western MD.
  • General-Lieutenant Sergey Ivanovich Skokov, Chief, Main Staff, First Deputy CINC, Ground Troops.
  • General-Major Sergey Viktorovich Khokh, Chief, Technical Support Directorate, Central MD.

Dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Proshkin.
  • Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Gennadyevich Pushkarev.

Latest on GOZ Woes (Part II)

To review this week . . . Prime Minister Putin’s current deadline for completing GOZ contracts is August 31, but it’s unlikely to be met, even by loyal Deputy PM and OSK Board Chairman Igor Sechin.  Deputy Finance Minister Siluanov said Defense Ministry contracts are being made on credits and government-backed financing rather than cash.  Putin said the price tag for GOZ-2011 is 750 billion rubles, but 30 percent of projected procurement still isn’t covered by contracts as the final third of the year begins.

How did the government, Defense Ministry, and OPK arrive at an August 31 deadline that’s unlikely to be met?

The latest round of this year’s GOZ woes started in early July when MIT General Designer Yuriy Solomonov told Kommersant that GOZ-2011 was already broken, and Russia’s strategic missile inventory is not being renewed as necessary.  He said there’s no contract for the RS-24 / Yars ICBM, and the late arrival of money makes it impossible to salvage 2011.

President Dmitriy Medvedev responded by calling Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov on the carpet.  According to RIA Novosti, he told him:

“Sort out the situation.  If there’s information that the state defense order is broken, it’s true, organizational conclusions are needed in connection with those who are responsible for this, regardless of position or rank.”

“If the situation is otherwise, we need to look into those who are sowing panic.  You know how according to law in wartime they dealt with panickers — they shot them.  I’m allowing you to dismiss them, do you hear me?”

RIA Novosti reported Serdyukov’s opinion on the “wild growth” in the price of military products, especially from MIT and Sevmash.  He said MIT is asking 3.9 billion and 5.6 billion rubles respectively for Topol-M and Yars ICBMs.  Serdyukov put GOZ-2011 at 581 billion rubles [different from Putin’s figure!], and added that only 108 billion, or 18.5 percent, was not yet under contract.  He said everything would be done in 10 days.

At virtually the same time, Deputy PM and VPK Chairman, Sergey Ivanov told ITAR-TASS 230 billion rubles were not yet contracted out.  OSK piled on Serdyukov, claiming contracts for 40 percent of the Navy’s share of the GOZ weren’t finalized.

In late July, it looked like Northern Wharf (which reportedly produces 75 percent of Russia’s surface ships, and is not part of OSK) might be made into an example for other “GOZ breakers.”  While prosecutors talked vaguely about the misuse of GOZ money, the shipbuilder’s representatives apparently mounted a vigorous defense, asserting that the enterprise has been right on time, even though it’s underfinanced by the Defense Ministry.

Main Military Prosecutor Sergey Fridinskiy said prosecutors uncovered 1,500 GOZ-related legal violations during the preceding 18 months.  He indicated there were 30 criminal convictions, and state losses amounted to millions of rubles in these cases.  The most egregious example  was the theft of over 260 million rubles given to OSK’s Zvezdochka shipyard to repair Kirov-class CGN Petr Velikiy.  Fridinskiy indicated the enterprise director and his close associates apparently had 40 million of the money in their own names.  Recall Fridinskiy earlier said 20 percent of defense procurement funding is stolen.

According to Rossiyskaya gazeta, Defense Minister Serdyukov claimed he was on the verge of signing contracts with MIT for Topol-M and Yars production.  Once again, he said all contracting would be finished in two weeks.

In mid-August, OSK enterprises Sevmash, Admiralty Wharves, and Zvezdochka said they would soon be forced to cease work unless the Defense Ministry signed contracts with them.  Putin, Sechin, and Serdyukov met and launched a special interdepartmental commission to set prices for the Navy’s remaining 40 billion rubles in GOZ contracts.  And, according to Kommersant, everyone was once again reassured that all contracts would be completed in two weeks.

And it’s not just all ICBMs, ships, and submarines . . . Kommersant wrote that the Defense Ministry eschewed contracts for 24 or more MiG-29K and more than 60 Yak-130 trainers at MAKS-2011.

So what does the mid-year GOZ picture look like? 

The president and prime minister have fumed and set a series of deadlines, not met thus far.  And the defense minister and deputy prime ministers have assured them they would meet each deadline in turn. 

More interesting, and somewhat unnoticed, is the fact that the prime minister and defense minister (among others) seem to be consistently working from different sets of numbers on the size of the GOZ, and how much has been placed under contract.  The GOZ hasn’t captured this kind of leadership attention at any time in the past 20 years.

Producers are being honest when they say late state contracts mean they can’t do anything (or at least what the Defense Ministry wants them to) in what remains of the year.

Picking up the pieces of GOZ-2011, and trying to put GOZ-2012 on a better footing will occupy the rest of this year.

Lost in everything is what will the Russian military get eventually by way of new hardware, and when will they get it?  And how good will it be?

Bulava Success

Bulava Launch (photo: RIA Novosti / Avrora)

Cheap post with a pretty picture thanks to RIA Novosti.  This was a maximum range test, from the White Sea to a target area in the Pacific Ocean.  It was the 16th test overall, and the second this year.  It makes nine announced successes out of 16.  And that’s four in a row.

If, as it appears, the designers and manufacturers have finally slicked the Bulava’s earlier problems, now Moscow will have to crank up the Bulava SLBM and Borey-class SSBN production lines.

That is a different kind of problem, a problem of the GOZ and the OPK.

Latest on GOZ Woes (Part I)

So much has swirled around the state defense order (Gosoboronzakaz or GOZ) this year that it makes one avoid the topic.  But here’s a shot at making amends for neglecting it. 

Perhaps this information will just precede the next wave of GOZ news, likely to break before the end of August.  The current deadline for putting out GOZ contracts is August 31 (who knows when the weapons and other military equipment being bought will actually be delivered?).

You may recall Prime Minister Vladimir Putin set August 31 as the most recent “last deadline” for placing all GOZ-2011 contracts back in late July.  At that time, Putin pretty much put all blame on the Defense Ministry.  Defense Minister Serdyukov said he would complete the contracting, and report to the President and Prime Minister by the deadline.  The report is supposed to be a joint one reflecting the positions of all players involved in the GOZ.

This very day, BFM.ru reports that Deputy PM Igor Sechin says he’ll be two more weeks negotiating OSK shipbuilding contracts with the Defense Ministry.  He claims three of 13 remaining contracts are being signed today.  Prices for the remaining ten will apparently be specified and agreed over the next 14 days.

According to ITAR-TASS, a VPK source indicated the Defense Ministry still needs to contract with Sevmash for delivery of one Proyekt 885 (Yasen-class) and two Proyekt 955 (Borey-class) submarines this year.  The source said work continues despite the lack of a signed contract.

ARMS-TASS, however, provided the best insight into the current state of play on the GOZ.  The news agency cited Deputy Finance Minister Anton Siluanov on a Putin-led government conference on the GOZ early this week.  Siluanov concluded the Defense Ministry will soon sign its contracts and send out advance payments.  Additionally, he criticized the delays for “breaking budgetary discipline,” and added that defense contracts are being signed on credit schemes and state guarantee mechanisms [i.e. not cash].

ARMS-TASS also quoted Putin at length:

“Naturally, the priority in buying equipment, armaments is, of course, domestic equipment, but it should still be modern, wanted, promising and acceptable to the customer, to the Defense Ministry, but taking account of prices for the state.”

“An unprecedented amount of monetary resources — 750 billion rubles — has been allocated for the purchase and modernization of equipment and armaments, for RDT&E on defense subjects.”

“In modern Russia such money has never been allocated so that in a year there’s 750 billion rubles — this is not some kind of percentage, this is half again as much as in 2010.”

“The government is counting on all this enormous money being effectively used to improve the quality of the work of defense industry and state customers.”

“Meanwhile, according to data which I have, more than 30 percent of the total volume of the GOZ still doesn’t have contracts.”

There’s quite a lot in those statements.  Probably as much substantive as Putin’s said publicly about GOZ problems.

Tomorrow we’ll do Part II on the latest woes.  Then maybe we’ll look at 2011 — the year of the GOZ.  And possibly even a look at the GOZ since 2000 or so.

Bulava Test on Saturday

Yesterday RIA Novosti’s source in the state testing commission said Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy will test fire a Bulava on August 27.  The launch was originally scheduled for last Saturday when a malfunction occurred on the submarine.  The news agency’s Defense Ministry source stressed that, although not impossible, conducting the test on August 20 was deemed “inexpedient.”  The defect in the power supply to one of Dolgorukiy’s systems has been fully corrected, and the submarine is ready for sea.  The state commission source said this launch — the 16th overall, and the second in 2011 — will be a maximum range test.

Their Man in Pyongyang

Admiral Sidenko

Eastern MD Commander, Admiral Konstantin Sidenko suddenly became the Kremlin’s man in Pyongyang yesterday.  His visit to North Korea was kept tightly wrapped until his departure.

Sidenko will visit the DPRK from August 22-26, while North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is in Russia’s Far East to meet President Medvedev.

Moscow’s once close military relationship with the DPRK declined to practically zero over the past 20 years, hence the surprise of yesterday’s news.  Meanwhile, Russia cultivated military-to-military ties with the rest of northeast Asia — China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea — leaving its old ally in the cold.  Until yesterday.

The Defense Ministry’s press release says Admiral Sidenko will meet command representatives from the Korean People’s Army, and consult on questions of renewing and further developing military and naval cooperation, possibly conducting Russian-Korean humanitarian exercises, and mutual ship visits between the RF and DPRK navies.

Additionally, according to the press release, the sides will discuss the future of cooperation between their Ground Troops, the possibility of conducting joint exercises and training for naval SAR, and also the issue of providing assistance to civilians during natural disasters.

The Russian media has written little thus far on what it means to have a military delegation visit the North Korean capital.  However, AP asked Aleksandr Golts for comments, and this is how the wire service summarized them:

“Military expert Alexander Golts said North Korea’s goal in inviting the Russian military could be to assuage fears of instability as Russia is considering building a natural gas pipeline through North Korea.  The pipeline is expected to be one of the main topics of Kim and Medvedev’s talks.”

“Golts said it was highly unlikely Russia would renew arms sales to North Korea, which would not be in its interests as a participant in the six-party talks.  He also noted the low level of the Russian delegation, which is led by the commander of Russia’s eastern military district.”

One might suppose it’s equally possible the North Koreans wanted the Russian military to visit Pyongyang as part of its quid pro quo for considering a gas pipeline over its territory to South Korea.

Arms sales seem unlikely, but probably because Moscow’s no longer in the game of providing free military aid. 

Admiral Sidenko is a lower level visitor, but it’s traditional for Moscow to send proximate regional commanders on such visits.  MD commanders can be precursors to General Staff Chiefs and Defense Ministers, and higher-profile military relations generally.

It’s almost impossible to know when the DPRK is involved, but this first interaction in nearly ten years automatically means something’s afoot.  The participants themselves probably don’t know where a bit of diplomatic, economic, and military activity will lead.

Failure to Launch

SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy (photo: RIA Novosti / Sergey Guneyev)

Not the same as a failed launch, of course . . .

Interfaks reports proyekt 955 Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy cancelled a Bulava test launch on Saturday.  According to Sevmash, the power supply to one of Dolgorukiy’s systems malfunctioned.  The submarine returned to the factory to investigate.  The Interfaks source said the state commission supervising Bulava testing indicated the launch would be put off until late this week.

The source emphasized there aren’t issues with the Bulava, which was fully ready for launch.  Interfaks recalled the 15th launch scheduled for last December was delayed until June because Dolgorukiy wasn’t ready, although the official reason was White Sea icing.  The June launch from the submerged Dolgorukiy was successful.

In Moskovskiy komsomolets, Olga Bozhyeva’s source says the problem was a sensor in a system needed to prepare the missile for launch.  They postponed until later Saturday, but, when they couldn’t fix it, the SSBN returned to port Sunday morning.  The source says the state commission will probably delay the next launch attempt until September.

RIA Novosti provided a more official spin on the cancelled test.  It emphasized there was no unsuccessful launch.  The news agency’s state commission source stressed that, when submarines go to sea for system testing, the commission makes its decisions based on many factors and conditions.  And the source stated the Bulava flight test program will be completed in the established time frame.

T-50 Flight Aborts at MAKS Today

The T-50 or PAK FA aborted its demonstration flight at Zhukovskiy today when its right engine malfunctioned as it started down the runway.  The pilot stopped the flight, deploying his brake chutes.  The aircraft was traveling about 100 kmph when the malfunction occurred.  The cause is being investigated.

Here’s RIA Novosti and other video of what occurred.

 

Kommersant reports its sources say the problem was a malfunction in the power plant’s automatic controls which allowed an uncontrolled supply of fuel to the engine.  The incident could have had more serious consequences if the aircraft had actually taken off.

Passion for the S-300PS

Friday’s Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye editorial assures readers the end of S-300PS production — combined with a lack of contracts for the S-400 — won’t bring the apocalypse or, at least, a threat to Russia’s administrative and industrial heartland.

Like others, NVO is wrestling with the meaning of former Almaz-Antey General Director Igor Ashurbeyli’s most recent words.

Despite the sturm und drang over the S-300’s demise elsewhere in the media, NVO takes the rational tack.  There’s nothing new in Ashurbeyli’s statements.  Everything’s normal, it says.  Almaz-Antey could have upgraded the S-300P Favorit forever, but proposed S-500 development instead.  It’s natural and sensible to draw S-300 production down to a close.

And, after all, the S-400 is entering service, and the Vityaz and S-500 are in development.  The medium-range Vityaz will replace the S-300PS.  Morfey’s in development for short-range protection of the most important targets.  And Ashurbeyli says “it’s proposed” that the S-500 will be complete in 2015.

Here, NVO’s editors shift to a less optimistic, perhaps a more realistic tack:

“It’s true, we all know that in our country it’s always a great distance from plans to their fulfillment.  In that great distance, sometimes not just ruts and potholes arise, but even chasms.  Here not everything with full-blooded use of the S-400 system is clear and obvious.  According to the reports of both Ashurbeyli and the VVS CINC General Zelin, there are big problems with the long-range missile, and also at Moscow factory “Avangard,” where this serial production goes on, according to media accounts, there are no orders for it.  It could be because it’s not in shape.  And the “400,” on which great hopes rest today, as a transitional system from the S-300PS to Vityaz and the S-500, doesn’t justify these expectations?  It isn’t excluded that it’s for exactly this reason that the Defense Ministry no longer wants to order it?  Why spend money and buy something that doesn’t meet the tactical-technical requirements which the customers laid down for the system?  Here the generals wouldn’t lack common sense.”

But, says NVO, they could go forward with the S-400’s short- and medium-range missiles, couldn’t they?  Delays in the S-400 contract threaten to cause failures in establishing the country’s defenses.

With a two-year production cycle, and no contracts in 2011, it’s naive to expect the appearance of new systems in 2013, according to NVO’s editors.  What’s more, there’s no absolute certainty that Vityaz and Morfey will succeed in this time frame, or that some kind of real basis for developing the S-500 will be laid.

NVO concludes:

“And so here passions for the “300” are understandable.  But it’s only desired that they shouldn’t take on an alarmist character.  It isn’t necessary to frighten anyone.”