In yesterday’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Sergey Konovalov followed up the story of the retiring generals — Andrey Tretyak, Sergey Skokov, and Oleg Ivanov.
Konovalov held to the main line of his earlier report. He maintains the retirement of these Defense Ministry central apparatus officers has been “frozen.” Without addressing the various explanations and denials in the media, he asks why three promising generals would want out early. Finally, he repeats his earlier contention that the resignations could be a sign of “military opposition” to Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reforms.
Konovalov cites a highly-placed Defense Ministry source saying:
“Soon representatives of the Presidential Administration’s cadre organs will talk with the generals who requested discharge to find out the real reasons why young, promising leaders are retiring from the army.”
A law enforcement source tells NG that the Main Military Prosecutor has long questioned the Defense Ministry’s cadre policy:
“Competent officers are dismissed, meanwhile every kind of lawbreaker who’s had a run-in with military justice gets moved up to higher duties.”
One general told NG that General-Lieutenant Sergey Surovikin — slated to head Russia’s new military police force — got one year of probation for trying to sell a pistol while attending the Frunze Military Academy. The paper then lists some other, less prominent, cases of officers with shady or criminal backgrounds who’ve advanced through the ranks to higher posts.
NG’s sources claim the Defense Ministry’s cadre policy will soon undergo an analysis and evaluation by the PA’s cadre department.
The Defense Ministry’s PR blitz (as well as independent reporting) in the wake of the resignations blunted Konovalov’s assertion that the generals were quitting over disagreements with military reforms. This article answered his question from earlier — his sources say the PA will investigate recent Defense Ministry personnel moves. But one wonders how much time and attention President Medvedev’s people can devote to this with an agenda already full of political and domestic policy issues.
According to his revised Mil.ru bio, Deputy Defense Minister Mikhail Mokretsov will supervise the Armed Forces’ finances after all.
Last week Komsomolskaya pravda quoted Defense Minister Serdyukov saying General-Lieutenant Sergey Surovikin, Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Central MD, will head Russia’s new military police force this year.
Kommersantgave details on Surovikin’s background. As a captain in August 1991, he was acting commander of the Taman division motorized rifle battalion responsible for the death of three Yeltsin supporters. He was arrested and investigated for seven months before charges against him were lifted.
As noted on these pages, he commanded the 34th MRD when one his colonels blew his brains out in front of the entire staff after an upbraiding from the commander. And Surovikin had a very short tenure as Chief of the GOU.
He seems an odd choice to be responsible for the army’s new enforcers of law and order. To be in charge of those charged with preventing dedovshchina and other barracks violence.
Also last week, Vedomosti reported that Serdyukov has forwarded the name of Aleksandr Sukhorukov, Director of Rosoboronzakaz, to take over Vladimir Popovkin’s old armaments portfolio. A little harder to believe, two other Vedomosti sources say Navy CINC, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy might take the armaments job.
Returning to the three generals’ resignations . . . the Defense Ministry press-service came out quickly denying any “scandalous” general officer discharges.
The press-service said General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak, General-Lieutenant Sergey Skokov, and General-Major Oleg Ivanov requested discharges for health reasons at different times. But it also indicated the Central Attestation Commission (TsAK, or ЦАК) is reassigning generals to duties in the military districts under Defense Minister Serdyukov’s policy of rotating officers through different posts, and away from Moscow in particular.
A Defense Ministry source told ITAR-TASS the generals’ discharges are not part of any mass dismissal of officers from the Defense Ministry’s central apparatus.
The press was skeptical about three young and vigorous generals suddenly seeking a medical discharge, and it focused on their intent to avoid undesirable reassignments. Newsru.com and Moskovskiy komsomolets reported in this vein.
A Defense Ministry source told news agencies one in three requests for early retirement involves officers who are being reassigned from Moscow to a military district post. The source claimed these cases are usually incorrectly characterized as opposition to military reforms. Tretyak himself told Interfaks his resignation is not connected with Armed Forces reforms or disagreements with the leadership.
Then Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov talked to Rossiyskaya gazeta, giving a version of events varying from the press-service’s initial report of discharges for health reasons.
Pankov told the paper Skokov and Ivanov were offered several good options including troop command duties or General Staff Academy positions, but chose retirement. In Tretyak’s case, health was the issue, according to Pankov. And Pankov called any thought of them leaving over dissatisfaction with army reform “farfetched,” or dissatisfaction with General Staff Chief Makarov “utter stupidity.”
What did military commentators say?
In IA RegnumandGazeta.ru, Anatoliy Tsyganok said the generals’ resignations show things aren’t quite right in the Defense Ministry, but also called reports of problems with Makarov a falsehood. He said the incident shows it’s not just military retirees who bring attention to poorly thought out reforms. At the same time, he doesn’t get the focus on Makarov when he just implements Serdyukov’s plans.
Also in Gazeta.ru, Aleksandr Khramchikhin asks where this ‘opposition’ to reform has been:
“But where were they earlier? Reform’s already been going on for three years.”
Svpressa.ru wrote that no Decembrists remain in the army. It quoted Konstantin Sivkov:
“The thing is in the Defense Ministry and Genshtab generally there are no longer any people capable of standing up for their opinion, if it diverges from the leadership’s viewpoint. They still existed several years ago. Recall General Rodionov, Ivashov. They slowly disposed of them. The only ones remaining are those who loyally hang on the words of the minister and Genshtab chief. A negative selection has occurred. And what remains . . . Only those that agree with everything.”
“The Genshtab chief proposed to all three figures that they leave Moscow, smell the powder a little, become greater practitioners. My sources don’t deny that all of the generals’ troyka requesting retirement had relations with Makarov that weren’t very simple. But all issues were decided behind closed doors, without cursing and throwing down reports [retirement requests] on the table.”
Network connection problems have made for a jumbled start to a new month . . . a couple decrees from President Medvedev today.
Current Defense Ministry Apparatus Chief, Deputy Defense Minister Mikhail Mokretsov is relieved of this duty and becomes simply Deputy Defense Minister.
This is a promotion since the Apparatus Chief has typically been kind of a quasi-deputy minister post. Sometimes the Defense Minister’s head gatekeeper and paper-pusher has just been regarded as being in “the status of a deputy minister.”
Mokretsov’s portfolio, however, isn’t clear. Vladimir Popovkin’s armaments job, Vera Chistova’s finance duties, and Grigoriy Naginskiy’s construction post are all available. And each could use an economist like Mokretsov.
Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye’s Oleg Vladykin participated in a press-tour of the Southern MD (OSK South), and last Friday he published his take on what he saw.
Deputy District Commander, General-Lieutenant Igor Turchenyuk set the scene, telling assembled journalists about establishing the YuVO last year:
“A substantial — more than two times — growth in the combat potential of the grouping of troops and forces deployed on YuVO territory is the result of the transformations which have been carried out.”
Turchenyuk said the YuVO conducted more than 200 command-staff and tactical exercises, including jointly with air and naval forces, during the winter training period. This was reportedly seven times greater than comparable training in the old North Caucasus MD.
Turchenyuk claims the intensity of everyday combat training has increased noticeably, doubling fuel and ammunition expenditure. Outsourcing food and laundry services and arms and equipment maintenance made this possible. By eliminating extraneous duties, a more intense 40-hour week has added more than 300 hours of training time to the year.
Turchenyuk’s main point:
“As a result, we got the chance to prepare a real professional serviceman-specialist even under the conditions of a one-year training cycle.”
And Vladykin’s:
“Of course, it’s hard to argue with figures. Therefore, I really wanted to confirm with my own eyes how conscript servicemen are being turned into real professionals.”
Vladykin and the others were taken first to the 34th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade (Mountain), built from scratch on President Putin’s order. The 34th was established as an elite, model formation as good as any “show” unit elsewhere in the Armed Forces.
But, says Vladykin, not everything turned out as imagined, especially with the formation’s manning.
The brigade found 5,000 contractees to train as professional mountain infantry, but today, with the cut in contractees, more than half the brigade’s manpower are conscripts. After seeing some training, Vladykin concludes:
“I won’t say that all soldiers looked like high-class mountain infantry. But since I know most participants in the exercises have served a little over half a year, I’m ready to acknowledge: they’re not badly trained.”
Next up was the 22nd Independent Brigade of Special Designation (Spetsnaz). Its professionalism needs to be even higher, but this brigade is currently 60 percent draftee. Vladykin wonders out loud whether they will be able to carry out the brigade’s missions, and whether it’s possible to grow a real soldier from a conscript.
Lastly, in the 19th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, practically all soldiers and junior commanders (NCOs) are conscripts. Here, says Vladykin, they learned the difference between draftees and contractees in battles in two Chechen campaigns and in South Ossetia.
Its officers reserve judgement about the efficacy of outsourcing rear service functions. Conscript drivers learn vehicle maintenance from contracted civilian mechanics who won’t be with them in combat.
The brigade’s chief of staff describes how a reinforced company tactical group meets the formation’s permanent (one-hour) readiness requirement in the volatile North Caucasus. Another officer says duty officers have returned to the barracks to keep order at night. The officers here don’t fully trust their conscript soldiers and sergeants.
Vladykin doesn’t provide a larger bottom line. It seems to be that the YuVO may be turning draftees into soldiers, but not true professionals. For all the figures about the district’s higher training tempo, Vladykin doesn’t seem too impressed.
Tomorrow’s Nezavisimaya gazeta reports Defense Ministry sources claim several young, promising generals have tendered their resignations because of problems with General Staff Chief, Army General Nikolay Makarov. NG says they include Deputy General Staff Chief and Main Operations Directorate Chief, General-Lieutenant Andrey Tretyak, First Deputy Ground Troops CINC and Main Staff Chief, General-Lieutenant Sergey Skokov, and Genshtab Electronic Warfare Directorate Chief, General-Major Oleg Ivanov, and others.
The paper describes these guys as the Russian Army’s future leaders. So why do they want to quit? The reasons, unfortunately, haven’t been advertised (yet).
NG points out that, if Tretyak leaves, the GOU (the cerebral cortex of the “brain of the army”) will have its third chief in four years. Skokov has been a key man working on automated C2 (YeSU TZ or ЕСУ ТЗ). A “highly-placed” anonymous officer says it’s because of their disagreement with army reform steps taken by Makarov. And explicitly not because of any problem with Defense Minister Serdyukov, whom they regard as an effective manager.
They feel the Armed Forces, during Makarov’s tenure, have been in a provisional, experimental state, living on projects and according to unconfirmed directives (basic instructions and combat regs). And after three years of “development,” the Genshtab Chief still can’t determine their final shape. There are no confirmed decisions on service or branch TO&E structures, or their basing areas. NG’s anonymous contact says the condition of the troops, and their “fantastic” combat training about which Makarov likes to talk, is “a fiction, which could be the topic of a separate conversation.”
The source implies time, money, and other resources have been wasted trying to develop automated C2 for old-fashioned, World War II-type operations. And this is why Skokov requested his discharge.
NG’s sources believe this “scandal” will have political consequences. The paper wonders whether President Medvedev will choose to get involved. A source claims Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov is supposed to meet with the generals who want to quit, and discuss their problems with Makarov “from the point of view of the state’s interests.”
Tolya’s remarks to the press today made quite a few headlines, and left a few useful benchmarks for the future. Defense Minister Serdyukov addressed procurement and manpower issues. Here are his quotes from RIA Novosti and ITAR-TASS.
Tanks for Nothin’
“We met the designers who proposed their preliminary work to us. 60 percent of what was proposed is old work. Therefore, we still declined these proposals.”
“Now it’s more expedient to modernize our country’s tank inventory than to buy new ones, for example the T-90.”
Cold Water on Carriers
“We have no plans to build aircraft carriers.”
“Only after this [a preliminary design of what this ship might look like], the Genshtab together with the Navy will make a decision on the need for such a ship.”
SSBNs Aren’t Automobiles
“‘Bulava’ flew, this is good news. We understand precisely that it’s possible to launch serial production of the missile on this variant.”
“We got the result, now it’s possible to load SSBN ‘Yuriy Dolgorukiy’ with ‘Bulava.'”
“We’d like to do this [test Bulava from Aleksandr Nevskiy], but we understand that to plan this precisely is impossible. A nuclear submarine isn’t an automobile.”
Bullish on Arms Deliveries
“Deliveries of strategic missiles ‘Topol-M,’ ‘Yars,’ ‘Avangard’ will increase three times, ‘Bulava’ and ‘Sineva’ missiles for strategic submarines one and a half times, aircraft four times, helicopters almost five times, air defense systems almost two and a half times [in 2011-2015 compared with 2006-2010].”
Not Going Below a Million Men
“There are no such plans, there are no questions of cutting manpower. We’re striving for the entire army under the million number, and it isn’t planned to cut this figure.”
“On account of this [increasing contractees from 2014], we’ll manage without fail to get through the demographic hole which is anticipated in 2014.”
Two Arctic Brigades
“The Genshtab is now developing plans to establish two of these formations. In the plans, deployment places, armaments, manning, and the infrastructure of these brigades need to be specified.”
“It’s possible this will be Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, or another place.”
Twenty years after the Warsaw Pact, VTsIOM asked Russians what they think, looking back, about the former Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe.
The poll was done 18-19 June with 1,600 respondents in 138 populated areas of 46 RF subjects, and a margin of error not exceeding 3.4%.
First and foremost, two-thirds (66%) of those surveyed didn’t know or remember why the Warsaw Pact existed.
Asked which time period was most secure, calm, and stable internationally, 55% said the 1960s-1980s, 4% said the 1990s, the Yeltsin era, and only 28% said the present day. Four years ago, the numbers were 47%, 5%, and 34% respectively.
According to VTsIOM, those groups most likely to think the Soviet era most secure are Communists, pensioners, the poorly-educated, and non-Internet users. Those most likely to see today as more stable are United Russia members, young people, the well-educated, and Internet users.
Eighty-nine percent of respondents look back on the Pact as a defensive, peaceloving, and stabilizing force. Only 6% say it was militaristic, or held Eastern European countries in an unfree condition.
Eighty percent think Russia lost more than it won when the Pact dissolved twenty years ago. Ten years ago, 78 percent thought Russia lost more.
Finally, those surveyed were asked if Russia needs, or doesn’t need, to create an international military-political bloc like the Warsaw Pact or NATO. Overall, 51% of respondents said it’s needed, 23% said it’s not, and 26% found it difficult to answer. This question was broken out some along the political spectrum without many significant variations.
VTsIOM missed the chance to ask if respondents know Russia already has an international military-political alliance. Their answers to a question about the Collective Security Treaty Organization would be fascinating, to be sure.
The answers to the questions that were asked are a little surprising and disturbing. Some of them can be attributed simply to feckless nostalgia or the persistence of Cold War propaganda. Some are due to a tendency to equate (or confuse) domestic or internal well-being with the country’s external security situation. Finally, some may come from genuinely perceived threats and insecurities Russians feel today.
The story of Igor Sulim and the premium pay scandal is like the 19th century one about Russian society’s generation gap. With liberals and nihilists reversed.
In Sulim’s story, the fathers are old senior and mid-grade officers who span Soviet and Russian worlds. They have no problem taking whatever’s not nailed down. The sons are post-Soviet junior officers, reared on the Internet, familiar with Western-style justice and rule-of-law, and ready to demand an end to corruption (that costs them money).
Perhaps your author reads too much into this. Or just maybe there’s some truth in this description. Let’s review some new details first.
The investigation into Senior Lieutenant Sulim’s accusations is a very slow roll. Rolling the victims. Here’s an update on the action (or inaction?).
Sulim posted his first video on May 31. Gorod48.ru wrote about it.
Sulim explained why he felt he had to complain to Defense Minister Serdyukov and go public about corruption in his unit despite the military’s “corporate ethic” against it. He said he exhausted other avenues and had no other resource at his disposal. He didn’t intend to be a one-man campaign against corruption but he’s getting support, and hearing similar stories, from others. And he thanks his fellow officers supporting him despite the difficulties and pressure they face.
He concludes speaking out is his civic duty. Russians should unite around one idea and struggle together so Russia doesn’t lose its greatness and remains a great power. And so the next generation doesn’t hate the current one for being silent and patient, believing nothing will ever change. It’s not revolution or spilled blood he wants, but the path of civilized development.
On June 2, Moskovskiye novosti wrote that Sulim predicted a disciplinary reprimand and deprivation of his premium pay would come his way for going over his superior officers (and, in fact, both came pretty quickly). The “army Navalnyy” and other officers are being pressured in every way by the authorities, and the entire Lipetsk center’s been deprived of premium pay to turn other officers against Sulim. He was removed from flight status. Public Chamber member Anatoliy Kucherena reported over half of 150 personnel he met said they were aware of the corrupt pay scheme at the base.
“Here is the misfortune — the essentially socialist army was not ready for these market relations. Indoctrinated on the principle that everyone in the line is equal before the commander and in battle, before life and death, everyone to an equal degree responsible for his country and its security, officers became accustomed to distinguishing one from another only by stars on the shoulderboards and by position, where the difference in pay between lieutenant and colonel, a general even, was minimal: a couple — four thousand rubles. And here suddenly it became colossal — several times. And, of course, when not everyone started receiving such premiums for the very same service-work, but just those chosen by still incomprehensible principles, a Bolshevist idea immediately arose — take it and divide it up.”
“But it was impossible not to understand to what the revolutionary introduction of market relations and big money for different categories of servicemen could lead. But has pay become a schism in combat units? There’s no unambiguous answer.”
“What’s the result? To what is the Senior Lieutenant Sulim phenomenon leading? Most likely just to changes in the various fates of various officers and various military units. But over some kind of time everything will remain as before. If Orders No. 400, 400A and 155 aren’t be suspended and changed. If from 1 January next year, the difference in pay and premiums for the very same service-work aren’t so monstrously striking. It’s not worth destroying the monolithic army line with the almighty ruble. This could bring serious consequences in a real battle.”
Sulim gave Ogonek an interview. Sulim said his father was not happy about him going public, but Sulim stressed it was his own personal decision. General-Major Sulim’s being pressed to keep his son’s mouth shut.
Ogonek asked Sulim if he isn’t afraid of sharing MVD Major Dymovskiy’s fate:
“His colleagues, as I understand it, didn’t support Dymovskiy. There are more and more of us now. If I had been alone, perhaps, I would have repeated his fate. But my colleagues are supporting me so, everyone is ready to go only forward.”
By mid-June, Sulim’s antagonists — Colonels Kovalskiy and Sidorenko — were both relieved of duty, but his supporters — Majors Kubarev and Smirnov — had been hauled before an Air Forces attestation commission in Moscow, called cowards for not refusing to pay kickbacks, and all but told they would be transferred from their elite Lipetsk duty, according to Komsomolskaya pravda. The paper points out Kubarev is a Su-34 pilot qualified for aerial refueling, and Smirnov was regiment’s top pilot last year.
In Moskovskiy komsomolets, Olga Bozhyeva wrote that Sulim’s reprimand was for violating the law’s prohibition on “discussing and criticizing the orders of a commander.” The authorities apparently didn’t go after him for revealing some of the stupid things said and written by Deputy VVS CINC General-Major Viktor Bondarev. Instead, they focused on his criticism of the Defense Ministry’s anticorruption orders posted on his blog. For its part, MK posted new audio clips indicating that the even the local FSB is in on getting kickbacks at Lipetsk, and this didn’t happen just in the 3rd Squadron, but all over the center. Bozhyeva asks, if this happens in an elite formation like Lipetsk, what happens in less prestigious units?
Senior Lieutenant Igor Sulim
There is lots on Sulim’s blog. Most recently, he wrote about meeting with VVS Deputy CINC, General-Lieutenant Sadofyev, who asked him why he had to “create a scandal.” Of course, Sulim’s made the point many times that he tried to go through the chain, through channels, and to do it without blood, and quietly. But Sadofyev and the older generation really don’t get it.
The new Russian generation of sons might make even congenitally pessimistic observers of Russia a little hopeful. The authorities could be playing an ultimately futile game of whack a mole with an entire generation of Dymovskiys and Matveyevs and Sulims.
Komsomolskaya pravda’s Viktor Sokirko had an interesting article today about life in a disbat — a disciplinary battalion. It features a rather idyllic video showing some of the inmate-soldiers’ daily activities.
Sokirko says only two disbats remain, and he was invited inside one to see a “prison in shoulderboards.” The 28th Independent Disciplinary Battalion looks like other units with barracks, parade grounds, etc. But it also has barbed wire, guard dogs, and a security company.
The acting commander says he has 162 men under guard, although he could accommodate 800.
Most are inside for “nonregulation relations” or dedovshchina. There’s also theft, extortion, AWOL, and less often, desertion.
One Russian conscript from Abkhazia is serving 6 months for refusing to scrub the barrack floor. He adopted the “law of the mountains,” and refused to do “women’s work.” Another, a sergeant, got two years for rupturing the spleen of a soldier who cursed him for sending him to clean the latrine.
The acting commander says his charges aren’t beaten or thrown into pits, but simply forced to march in formation and live strictly according to regulations (including learning every line). And there’s cleaning the barracks.
If they don’t toe the line, there’s the guardhouse, and no one wants to go there, so even the proud and independent Caucasians follow orders. More than half the inmates — 96 — are North Caucasians. The article claims only 2 percent of the Russian Army is drafted there, but half the men in the disbat are Caucasians.
The commander says there’s no special treatment in the disbat:
“Here everyone scrubs the toilets, and eats lard. The friendship of peoples in miniature.”
Inmates don’t get a permanent record from time in the disbat, and the command claims only 5 percent of its former inmates become criminals subsequently.
Interestingly, Rossiyskaya gazeta wrote about the disbat in 2009. It said there were still 5 disbats with about 1,200 inmates in all. It noted, while they don’t get a record, their disbat time doesn’t count, and they still have to complete their conscription term. RG said 40 percent were serving time for AWOL, about the same for dedovshchina, and the rest for other crimes.
Sergey Ivanov had proposed the guardhouse as a replacement for the disbat. Disciplinary cases would go to the guardhouse, and any soldier committing a crime not covered in the regs would be handled in civil court and prisons. But Anatoliy Serdyukov didn’t support the plan to build and rebuild guardhouses. Of course, he also claimed the disbat provided a better chance to get a guy back on track.
Russian Defense Policy 