Tag Archives: Anatoliy Serdyukov

Medvedev in Solnechnogorsk

Posted on October 30, 2010 | 2 comments

President Medvedev (photo: Izvestiya / Yekaterina Shtukina)

Thursday President Dmitriy Medvedev made his most recent foray among the troops, and expressed what sounds something like a defense of his somewhat embattled Defense Minister, and his military reforms.

At Solnechnogorsk’s Center for Retraining and Improving Rifleman Qualifications, the President decorated some officers.  According to Kremlin.ru, he said:

“Our army is changing now.  And despite the fact that all changes are difficult, they are necessary. Because we understand:  if we can’t make our armed forces modern and effective, more combat capable, better armed, if officers receive pay that doesn’t motivate them to work properly, then we won’t have a proper defense.  Therefore, everything now being done is directed at creating modern and effective armed forces.  There are both problems and good decisions here, I am following them personally as Supreme CINC and I intend to continue to do so.”

He also congratulated General-Colonel Arkadiy Bakhin and Admiral Konstantin Sidenko after appointing them to be permanent commanders of the new Western and Eastern MDs respectively.

At the center, Medvedev inspected the school where Russia’s snipers are trained, and inspected the weapons they use.  The school has practically every type of infantry weapon, including NATO ones.

Izvestiya and Kommersant reported that officers there still venerate the Kalashnikov’s reliability and simplicity, but lament its ergonomics and low single shot density.  A new Kalashnikov will begin testing next year, and Izvestiya imagines the officers told the President what requirements for the new weapon will be, since today’s Russian Army can afford to buy the best.  Kommersant and RIA Novosti both noted that Kalashnikov lags behind Western manufacturers, so this all sounded a little like a rerun of recent domestic production vs. foreign procurement debates.

Medvedev visited the nearby military town of Timonovo, and viewed newly built apartment blocks for Space Troops officers.  Officers already in their apartments told Medvedev they are happy with the quality of the construction.  The President also met several dozen residents, families, and military retirees.  Some of the latter who served at Baykonur but received permanent apartments in Moscow Oblast complained of losing their higher pension ‘coefficient’ when they returned to Russia, and Medvedev promised to look into this.

He talked with representatives of the management company contracted to maintain these buildings for the Defense Ministry.  They said residents complain mostly about poor drinking water, and Governor Boris Gromov said this was because of old pipes that he promised to replace.  Medvedev gave Timonovo a positive evaluation, calling it: 

“A good town, normal level of support.”

This was Medvedev’s first trip to see the troops in a while, and he seems like he generally doesn’t go too often or too far to observe them.  He watched the naval portion of Vostok-2010 in July, and visited Alabino in May.

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Posted in Military Housing, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Two More Perspectives on Serdyukov Flap

Posted on October 25, 2010 | Leave a comment

Defense Minister Serdyukov (photo: RIA Novosti)

A couple more interesting ones today . . . .

Calls for Serdyukov to resign seen as an effort to stop the ‘revolution from above’ . . . journalist Mikhail Leontyev told United Russia’s website:

“Serdyukov is a very severe man.  He’s conducting a very severe reform.  The very logic and mission of reform is merciless in relation to many people.  Serdyukov himself and others understand this, but this is not a reason not to renovate the army.  Reform is being conducted from аbove and by a man who’s a stranger to the army.  Moreover such a task was set from the beginning so it would be exactly like this.  Because they won’t ever do anything to ‘their own.’  In essence, the system is resisting.  Many would want to stop military reform at the current stage but this is stupidity.  Therefore a rumor beneficial to a large number of people is launched that they’re removing Serdyukov.”

Serdyukov almost a victim of his own success when it comes to making military officers focus exclusively on military affairs . . . Aleksandr Golts writes in today’s Yezhednevnyy zhurnal:

“The entire business, in my view, consists in the fact that a new revolution is ripening in the armed forces today.  They are removing officers, almost to the very top, from the heavy responsibility of distributing finances.  Unit commanders and district commanders alike henceforth don’t need to answer for the work of a boiler or cafeteria, or for guaranteeing electricity to the district’s troops.  Civilian departments — Oboronservis, Rosoboronpostavka and the like — will be occupied with supporting the troops with all essentials — from ammunition to the most complex armaments.  Military reformers set as their goal to put an end forever to commanders as ‘big business managers.’  In the course of decades, the commander was hardly evaluated by senior chiefs according to how he trained his unit for action on the battlefield.  They evaluated him according to whether he succeeded in building the cafeteria or bathhouse ‘efficiently,’ that is without allocating the necessary resources.  All this submerged commanders in tangles of corrupt relationships.  Besides lumber and bricks, the officer could pay his debts with the help of a natural resource which was at his disposal — a free work force.  If in Soviet times this system was somewhat limited by party control, then in the 1990s, when the state didn’t have any money at all to support its gigantic military machine, military units were practically condemned to self-support.  As a result, now officers have come to be brigade commanders and deputy army commanders who know perfectly how to ‘operate,’ but not to command.  This is not their fault, but their misfortune.  And the Defense Ministry is creating a special system for retraining senior and higher officer personnel [to learn or relearn their strictly military business].”

“But far from all military leaders are inspired by the prospect of perfecting troop command and control, and combat training methods day and night, meanwhile having at their disposal only that money that came to their personal bank card from their salary.  Many long ago became accustomed to side profits which now seem like their base pay.  In the minister’s innovations, they see the main threat to their interests.  And, as we’re seeing, they aren’t standing on ceremony.”

No, they aren’t standing on ceremony.  They’re using the opportunity to come after the guy who dared threaten their profitable arrangements.  Who knows how widespread this kind of corruption is, but it certainly exists and those benefiting don’t want it to end.  Similarly, one can only guess to what extent Serdyukov’s been successful instituting his civilian control over Defense Ministry financial flows.  And no one should assume the civilian hands on these flows will be any cleaner.

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Posted in Crime and Corruption, Military Leadership, Rear Services, Serdyukov's Reforms, VDV

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Political Tinge of the Serdyukov Flap

Posted on October 25, 2010 | 1 comment

In this morning’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Vladimir Mukhin says the Serdyukov flap has taken a political tinge.  NG’s Kremlin sources claim President Dmitriy Medvedev is “very worried about the developing situation.”

Mukhin says there won’t be any public lashing a la Mayor Luzhkov, but Medvedev called Serdyukov last week and categorically directed him “to carry out deliberate, well-considered work to create a positive image of the military reform which the country’s leadership is organizing and conducting.”

He concludes it’s clear Defense Minister Serdyukov has already reacted to the call from the Kremlin and begun “to work on the mistakes.” 

On Friday, Serdyukov unexpectedly met with the Defense Ministry’s ‘heavenly group,’ the superannuated retired generals and marshals in its General Inspectors’ Service (SGI or СГИ).  Mukhin says until now Serdyukov hasn’t paid them their due or used their experience in his reforms.  But all of a sudden he gathered them to inform them about how well his changes are going, and announced he’s forming a Defense Ministry organ to work with veterans and veterans organizations. 

And, of course, veterans – specifically airborne vets, but not only them – were the group most offended by what transpired between Serdyukov and Colonel Krasov at the Seltsy airborne training center.

Mukhin turns to retired General-Lieutenant Yuriy Netkachev for a comment:

“Elections are coming, and successes in military reform aren’t apparent.  The social situation of servicemen and military pensioners especially is worsening.  In this case, any incident similar to what happened in Seltsy could be a detonator for mass protest acts by a large number of veterans’ social organizations.  The party of power can’t allow such a thing on the eve of elections.  The opposition has already been using the dissatisfaction of the airborne veterans.  And therefore we will very soon be witness to a mass PR campaign on behalf of the head of the military department and his steps to form a new profile for the army and fleet.”

He didn’t, but Mukhin could have quoted former Soviet General Staff Chief, now SGI member, Army General Mikhail Moiseyev who supported Serdyukov and obediently told ITAR-TASS there’s no other way except to reform the Russian Army:

“We no longer need 192 divisions, it’s better to have a smaller quantity of permanent readiness brigades which will define the army’s combat readiness.”

That, of course, is a real no-brainer, and surely there must be aspects of Serdyukov’s reforms Moiseyev doesn’t agree with.  We’d like to hear about them.

Moiseyev also thinks Serdyukov is going to establish an assistant to the commander of each MD and fleet commander for work with veterans.

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Larger Significance of the Serdyukov Flap

Posted on October 23, 2010 | Leave a comment

Pavel Felgengauer

You’ll find bits of the following by Pavel Felgengauer in various English language articles, but not his full argument as laid out here.

Writing in Novaya gazeta this week, military commentator Pavel Felgengauer concludes that Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov remains in place, but the army’s problems are growing.  He says:

“Today a dangerous situation of general decay in discipline and order is taking shape which could lead to a loss of control over the armed forces.”

The slow disintegration of the Soviet Armed Forces required Serdyukov to take immediate, radical, and often not well thought out reforms, according to Felgengauer.  Mass officer and warrant officer dismissals have put 70 thousand outside the TO&E “at the command’s disposition,” essentially just waiting for dismissal.  Only 10,000 are junior officers whom the Defense Ministry owes little by way of benefits.

A bit of explanation that Felgengauer doesn’t give you.  We haven’t had any independent observer put this number so high.  These 70,000 are waiting for housing because, by law, surplus officers can’t be discharged until they get permanent apartments.  But they aren’t living on much while they wait.  Because they don’t have duty posts, they get only rank pay, not various monthly supplements that officers in active positions get.  Rank pay might be only 30 percent of what they received when they were in the TO&E.

But back to Felgengauer.  He turns next to NCOs.  He says experts say, with a million-man army and 150,000 officers, the Russian Armed Forces need 200,000 or 300,000 sergeants.  But in Serdyukov’s ‘new profile’ TO&E, there are billets for only 90,000 contractee-specialists and NCOs together.

And these are the guys who’re supposed to help the shrunken officer corps keep order in the ranks.

Felgengauer then recites the Main Military Prosecutor’s announcement that barracks violence is up 50 percent in 2010.  He says incidents of open ‘hooliganism,’ criminal violence, and inter-ethnic conflict are all rising.  And only a declining number of officers is there to hold all this together – with the help of an inadequate NCO corps.  This is why, says Felgengauer, the Soviet officer corps relied on dedovshchina as a lever to keep order among the troops.  He may be suggesting Russian officers are doing the same thing now.

He concludes many are dissatisfied with this state of affairs, and they all focus blame on Serdyukov, somewhat unfairly, according to Felgengauer.  Criticism is focused on the man who actually tried to fix Russia’s decaying defense department, and not his predecessors who drove it to ruin.

Of course, one could ask Felgengauer isn’t this the fate of all reformers?  Maybe those being reformed were happy with the decaying and ineffective bureaucracy and forces that were comfortable, and perhaps profitable, for them.

Felgengauer returns to the issue of attempts to train NCOs.  Instead of officers, military schools are supposed to prepare sergeants instead.  But only the erstwhile Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School is actually doing it, and, ironically, this is where the storm over Serdyukov arose.

Felgengauer concludes that Putin and Medvedev agreed with Serdyukov’s reforms, and so they aren’t ready to dismiss him now.  But the problems and tensions surrounding the Defense Ministry are growing.

In a kind of postscript, Felgengauer sees the decision for military police as something of a ridiculous answer to disorder in the army.  First, they will be selected from the ranks of the most disgruntled – the dismissed officers.  The concept behind using some ‘dissatisfied-dismissed’ to keep order among other dissatisfied is just a little inscrutable.  And, in the best case, it’ll take over a year to change all the laws and regulations to allow military police to operate.  Will Serdyukov and his reforms remain intact by then?

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Posted in Command and Control, Law, Order, and Discipline, Officer Corps, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Shamanov Sides with Serdyukov

Posted on October 21, 2010 | Leave a comment

General-Lieutenant Shamanov

VDV Commander Vladimir Shamanov knows which side his bread’s buttered on.  Talking to the press yesterday, Shamanov supported the boss in the storm over his alleged obscenity and грубость at the VDV’s Seltsy training center.

In short, Tverskaya, 13 reported the airborne chief doesn’t believe the story about Defense Minister Serdyukov.  He denies the boss ordered Colonel Krasov dismissed as head of the airborne commissioning school.

According to Shamanov, Serdyukov expressed doubts about constructing the Church of the Prophet Elijah opposite the airborne training school, since cadets aren’t there for long.  The Defense Minister suggested [politely one is sure] that they move the church to a populated area adjacent to the training center where the congregation can take care of it [but aren’t the VDV cadets and officers the congregation?].  Shamanov concludes:

“All the rest is cock and bull.”

Apparently answering the Union of Russian Airborne Troops’ appeal to the President and Patriarch, Shamanov told ITAR-TASS and RIA Novosti he’s satisfied with the course of army reforms, and doesn’t see any reason to worry about the fate of his service branch:

“The plans that will be presented to the Supreme CINC for approval indicate that the VDV’s composition will remain as before.  Also two more district-level airborne formations [соединение] should come into service raising the troops’ potential overall.”

As if to assure people the VDV won’t march on the Kremlin, Shamanov added that the situation in his branch is “normal,” and his troops are occupied with combat training as usual.

Tverskaya, 13 reported Shamanov saying for the umpteenth time that his branch will remain independent [i.e. not be subordinated to the Ground Troops] under Serdyukov’s ‘new profile’ reforms.  He added that the VDV will get the BMD-4M according to the ‘concept’ of GPV 2020.

We should recall that Serdyukov may have helped Shamanov on some occasions, and certainly did in one instance.  The Defense Minister at least acquiesced in Shamanov’s return to lead the VDV in May 2009.  And last September, he helped Shamanov out of his own scandal when he tried to order a detachment from the VDV’s 45th Independent Reconnaissance Regiment to detain an investigator looking into his son-in-law, a well-known criminal figure.  Shamanov only got a reprimand for this incident.  He could easily have been dismissed.  Serdyukov likely retained him because the airborne general is a useful ally.

In today’s Tverskaya, 13, Deputy Defense Minister Naginskiy offered an impassioned defense of Serdyukov.  Naginskiy was on the Seltsy inspection with the Defense Minister.

Naginskiy said they saw facilities unfinished since 2008.  But he doesn’t exactly deny the press reports:

“Nothing terrible happened there.  I think if people standing 120 meters behind us heard something, filled it in, and put it on the Internet, they are dishonest.  I can say there was no boorishness or cursing, but there were raised voices, when on the territory of a unit entrusted to you someone is selling things and someone is building for 180 million rubles, undoubtedly, this calls forth natural indignation and, as it should, a conversation in raised voices.”

Naginskiy goes on, questioning why they need a church at Seltsy when troops go there to train and then return to Ryazan, but:

“I’m in absolute solidarity with the Defense Minister — what I saw there brought indignation.  There were no orders to move the church.”

This morning Nezavisimaya gazeta’s Viktor Litovkin reported some comments from Colonel Krasov himself: 

“In particular, Serdyukov expressed dissatisfaction over the incomplete repair of the cafeteria and engineering networks.  The conversation was very emotional both from Krasov’s side [speaking of himself in the third person] and from Serdyukov’s side.  However, this was a businesslike dialog.  The Ryazan school has already eliminated deficiencies revealed during the military minister’s visit.”

That certainly sounds like some type of unpleasantness transpired.  Litovkin says it’s strange neither Shamanov nor Krasov remembered [or mentioned] any obscenities.  But nevertheless he concludes:

“If this is ‘cock and bull’ as General Shamanov says, or simply ‘businesslike dialog,’ as Colonel Krasov asserts, then it’s no longer worth worrying about the battle against dedovshchina and nonregulation relations in the armed forces.”

It isn’t worth it because the abuse of subordinates apparently begins from the Defense Ministry’s very top, and won’t ever be rooted out.

Litovkin finishes saying the VDV have nothing to gain from fighting with Serdyukov, and are just trying to silence the whole incident.  There will be other defense ministers, but the VDV will always exist.

Izvestiya’s Dmitriy Litovkin says his Defense Ministry sources say there were no demands to raze the church.  He claims Serdyukov may have wanted to move it outside the base’s gates to ease access for its parishioners.  He finds the whole situation odd since there are 200 churches on Russian military property, and next year the army will begin training military chaplains.

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Posted in Force Structure, Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms, VDV

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Kremlin Source Denies Serdyukov Resignation

Posted on October 21, 2010 | Leave a comment

According to Moscow News , an unnamed Kremlin source denies Prime Minister Putin asked for Defense Minister Serdyukov’s resignation in the wake of the storm over his harsh words for the chief of the VDV’s Ryazan Higher Command School on 30 September.

The report of Putin asking for Serdyukov to resign originally appeared in Argumeny nedeli.  And it’s being echoed elsewhere.

Titillating, yes, but virtually certainly just a rumor.  Even if Putin’s the power behind President Medvedev’s ceremonial throne, the former president probably wouldn’t try to fire a run-of-the-mill minister, much less Serdyukov, without thoroughly coordinating with Medvedev first. 

The Defense Ministry, like the other power ministries, is part of Putin’s cabinet, but it also reports directly to the President, unlike ordinary ministries. 

Of course, we remember Putin’s the one who put Serdyukov in charge of the Arbat MD in the first place.  It’s at least conceivable he could suggest to Serdyukov that maybe it’s time for him to go.

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VDV Ain’t No Choir Boys

Posted on October 20, 2010 | Leave a comment

Poking Fun at Serdyukov and VDV (photo: Tden.ru / Leonid Shakhov)

The picture’s worth 1,000 words.  VDV figuring out how to get at Defense Minister Serdyukov:

“Army cursing, it’s his weakest point.”

“Damn if it isn’t.  It’s insulting somehow being abused in civilian.”

Could the VDV really be so offended by a little cussing?  Not likely since they’re pros themselves.  Why are they acting like they haven’t heard and said it all.

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Serdyukov Reportedly Offends VDV

Posted on October 20, 2010 | 1 comment

It took a couple of weeks for the story to leak out, but it did, largely thanks to Russian bloggers. 

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov reportedly insulted Colonel Andrey Krasov, chief of the VDV’s Ryazan Higher Command School (now officially a filial of the Combined Arms Academy).  Monday’s Kommersant summed it up well.  Serdyukov flew to Ryazan on 30 September and visited the school’s Seltsy training center.  Getting off his helicopter, he reportedly launched into an obscene and humiliating public tirade against Krasov (who also happens to be a Hero of the Russian Federation) over the small wooden Church of the Prophet Elijah located on the grounds.

Serdyukov ordered the church dismantled, and Colonel Krasov dismissed.  The latter tried to explain that the church was built with money from sponsors, and that it will be used for training chaplains starting next year.  But, according to a retired VDV general’s account, Serdyukov wouldn’t have any of it, saying or telling his minions:

“Don’t give money to this VDV center.  We generally need to cut this school back.  Remove this impudent colonel.”

So Serdyukov comes off badly, and Colonel Krasov sounds as mild as a choir boy.  Who knows if we’ll ever know exactly how it happened.

In any case, the VDV was apparently already seething about the bureaucratic downgrading of its alma mater, and the Union of Russian Airborne Troops has asked President Medvedev and Patriarch Kirill to intercede on behalf of Colonel Krasov.  The Union’s chairman, former VDV Commander and failed putschist, Vladimir Achalov wrote the appeal:

“Anatoliy Serdyukov insulted Colonel Andrey Krasov with unprintable language, degrading his professional and personal worth in front of his subordinates.  The religious senses of the airborne were also insulted for building the church with their own resources.  And this is the fourth military church Anatoliy Serdyukov has ordered dismantled.”

“The insult to Hero of Russia Andrey Krasov is an insult to all defenders of our Motherland.  We reserve the right to act in defense of the honor and dignity of servicemen.”

There’s been no official reaction to all this from the Defense Ministry, but it’s become quite a storm.  Most major print and Internet media have covered it.

Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov met with Airborne Union representatives on Monday to smooth the whole thing over, according to Kommersant.

A Ryazan church official gave the paper the church’s view that the military has no relationship to the Church of the Prophet Elijah, and said Patriarch Kirill has already met with Medvedev on this, and decided the church won’t come down.

This situation is reminiscent of Serdyukov’s first foray as Defense Minister inspecting the St. Petersburg Nakhimov School in March 2007.  Appalled by its condition, he sacked its chief —  respected former submariner Aleksandr Bukin — on the spot, and was criticized later for mistreating a decorated admiral whose duty post  suffered from a chronic lack of resources.  But Serdyukov seemed to learn from the PR, both good and bad, and we haven’t seen anything similar in public since.

At Seltsy, maybe Serdyukov just lost his self-control.  Maybe there’s sub-text or details here we don’t know.  The whole thing could be overblown to make Serdyukov look bad.  But who’d benefit from that?  The VDV?  The Defense Minister’s really handled that branch of service with kid gloves in the process of his reforms.  Maybe, at its root, it’s a traditional civil-military dust-up — maybe this civilian Defense Minister and uniformed military men don’t understand or respect each other very much.

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Fridinskiy vs. Serdyukov on Dedovshchina

Posted on October 9, 2010 | Leave a comment

Barracks violence in Russia has risen by at least 50 percent thus far in 2010; this isn’t exactly news since the Main Military Prosecutor announced the same thing back in July.  But his comments on the situation provide an interesting contrast with what Defense Minister Serdyukov said in his interview this week.

ITAR-TASS reported on Main Military Prosecutor (GVP or ГВП) Sergey Fridinskiy’s statement that increasing the number of conscripts in Russia’s armed forces has led, as he predicted, to a rise in ‘nonregulation relations.’  And some 3,000 servicemen have suffered from hazing and other violence in the barracks.

Fridinskiy said:

“If we’re talking about nonregulation manifestations, then, of course, they worry everyone – both society and military prosecutors – since they infringe on the life and health of servicemen, and therefore we view them in the most severe way.  Amid a reduction in general criminality, the quantity of cases of barracks violence rose by almost a third over nine months of this year.”

Among the 3,000 victims, Fridinskiy reported:

“Nine men died, and another 96 suffered serious harm to their health.”

“Our joint efforts – both with commands and with civil society institutions – really allowed us not only to stop negative processes in the army environment, but even to prevent many serious consequences.  The curve of nonregulation manifestations certainly went lower.  However, since last year, the situation began to change again.  Since the fall [of 2009], we felt that the sharp increase in conscript soldiers could lead to a deterioration in legal order among the troops.  And we talked about this.  And so it happened.”

“There’s no need to fear.  And I will say that, on the whole, the crime level among the troops is declining.  Based on the results of the first eight months, the number of registered crimes fell almost 10 percent.  There are a lot of military units where there are practically no legal violations.”

Fridinskiy called the doubling of the draftee contingent one of the reasons for the growth in ‘nonregulation manifestations.’  He said more than 1,400 soldiers and sergeants were convicted of assault and battery through August.  Then Fridinskiy added a second reason – great negligence in the work of officers.

GVP data shows approximately one-third of the victims of violence are draftees in their first 2-3 months of service, and the offenders, on the other hand, have served 8-9 months.  So, Fridinskiy concludes, the informal division of conscripts into ‘seniors’ and ‘juniors’ in the barracks hasn’t gone away.

Fridinskiy noted that instead of ‘youthful boldness,’ barracks violence is now more often motivated by baser motives.  The number of ‘nonregulation manifestations’ connected with theft and extortion has grown more than 50 percent.  And he said:

“They steal mobile phones and money most often – just exactly like it happens on city streets.”

So, let’s go back to Defense Minister Serdyukov’s analysis of barracks violence.  Asked whether one-year conscription is having any effect on dedovshchina, he said: 

“There are more nonregulation instances in absolute terms.  But this doesn’t scare me, because there are more conscripts.  The situation has to level out with time.  And the statistics will begin to fall perfectly precisely.  Particularly when you account for our methods:  we are very demanding with commanders on this, even up to dismissal in cases with deadly consequences.  Human rights advocates have already begun to criticize me for dismissing many of them for nothing.” 

So Serdyukov and Fridinskiy agree there are more, and they surely know if there are more in relative terms as well.  Say incidents per 1,000 soldiers.  But they aren’t saying. 

And the argument that there’s more violence because there are more conscripts doesn’t necessarily hold water either.  Before the shift to 1-year conscription, about 130,000 guys were inducted every six months in 4 cycles over 2 years, for a total of roughly 520,000 conscripts at any given time.  The only thing that’s changed is that they’re taken in two large tranches now . . . if it’s 260,000 guys, that’s still 520,000 soldiers at any moment.

In late 2009, Serdyukov called hazing and other violence a major unresolved problem, and clearly the situation will be even worse by late 2010.  Don’t forget that dedovshchina and other violence remains the number one reason why Russian men don’t want to serve, and it’s significant it’s rising at the very moment the army’s trying to put ever-expanding numbers of guys [280,000 this fall] in uniform.  It certainly doesn’t make the job easier. 

Serdyukov’s answer above really sounds like soft-peddling an intractable problem.  He thinks this will magically “level out” by itself.  And he’s counting on commanders to rectify it, the very people Fridinskiy says are to blame.

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Posted in Conscription, Hazing, Law, Order, and Discipline, Manpower

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More on Serdyukov as Possible Moscow Mayor

Posted on October 4, 2010 | Leave a comment

Defense Minister Serdyukov (photo: Vadim Savitskiy)

Russkiy Newsweek has taken a look at Anatoliy Serdyukov as a candidate for mayor.  And gotten an interview from him.  He doesn’t give many. 

The magazine does it two ways . . . they give their spin on the interview, then the actual text of the interview.  Fair enough. 

Their spin is labeled КОНТЕКСТ (Context).  Their bold sub-heading says Serdyukov might be the only guy who meets the criteria for Moscow mayor.  They repeat today’s Nezavisimaya gazeta on Serdyukov meeting with Putin last week, then with General Staff Chief Makarov.  The latter reportedly gathered highly placed military men and told them ‘cadre changes are possible,’ which people take as confirmation ‘they’ will move Serdyukov to the mayor’s office. 

In Serdyukov’s favor, he’s from Piter, he’s twice shown his effectiveness in tough places (Tax Service, Defense Ministry).   And shocked at how they stole stuff in the Defense Ministry on his arrival, he’s been successful in the struggle against corruption [well, maybe more successful than predecessors who were completely unsuccessful!].  And Russkiy Newsweek concludes he’s shown he’s capable of moving a large structure like the army from a dead stop, and this makes him a fully possible candidate for mayor [since the same thing is required in the Russian capital].  And finally, Putin and Medvedev trust him. 

Now, the interview . . . 

Asked about the GPV budget, Serdyukov says Russia didn’t allocate money for rearmament for a long time, and now expenditures are being increased to what is really necessary for effective development of the armed forces.  He lists the following priorities — nuclear deterrence, Space Troops, PVO, aviation, and communications.  He says proposals for the GOZ 2011-2013 are now being prepared based on the ten-year GPV. 

On cooperation with the U.S. in missile defense, Serdyukov says the possible joint use of a radar in Kaliningrad remains just a proposal. 

Did the Georgian war spur military reform?  He says: 

“The conflict really accelerated this process.  It confirmed the need for reorganizations.  We are trying not to use the word ‘reform.’  We’re establishing a new profile for the army.  We’ve done a great deal.  We researched the experience of foreign armies — Israel, America, Germany, France, Italy — for the creation of our own model, taking account of geopolitics and economic possibilities.  But it all began with basic things.  We evaluated the correlation of officers and soldiers.  It turned out to be 50:50.  That is a soldier for every officer.  When we began to analyze it, this was for officers, it became clear — senior personnel, not lower than lieutenant colonel.  And among them the overwhelming majority not only didn’t have combat experience, but even experience commanding sub-units and units.  Were this many necessary?  We concluded this was an inflated correlation.  In European armies, the share of officers is from nine to 16%.  It’s true their armies are built differently.  We have space, rocket troops, and strategic nuclear forces.  Here the share of officer personnel is much higher.  And this is essential.  The calculations we made showed that the number of officers should be within the limits of 15% of all armed forces personnel.  Approximately the same correlation as in the world’s leading armies.” 

Serdyukov says he made: 

“The conclusion that it’s essential to make the transformations quickly and decisively.  The conflict showed that the army acutely needed a modern command and control system for its troops and equipment.  That it needed to change its entire system of training officers, soldiers, and sergeants.” 

The interviewer asked Serdyukov about the new military districts / OSKs. 

“The character of wars has changed in recent decades.  The zone of military actions is now not some piece of territory, but the entire country.  This has changed the demands on troop groupings.  They have to be flexible, maneuverable, and highly mobile.  And the former six military districts didn’t fully guarantee the reliable defense of our borders.  The military-administrative divisions of the country no longer answered existing military threats.  Troops essential for repulsing aggression had to be scattered in several military districts.  Besides we didn’t have command and control organs on strategic axes that were capable of uniting the effort of ground, aviation, and naval forces.  And finally, the territorial borders of the military districts didn’t correspond to the borders of zones of responsibility for air defense.  These problems are being eliminated with the establishment of the updated military districts.  Now all troops on their territory will be subordinate to one commander.  And he will bear personal responsibility for security in the region.” 

Asked if he’s an opponent of the domestic arms industry, Serdyukov said: 

“In this case, we’re in the role of consumers.  Consumers of those arms that the OPK supplies.  There are requirements which form the basis of parameters — technical characteristics for their production which are presented to us.  The thing is our opponents also have requirements for defense production.  And we need to correlate these figures.  Our defense sector often can’t support the required characteristics.  We are talking about this with domestic corporations.  You can’t do it yourself — go to them.  The issue of the ‘Mistral’ arose for this reason.  The Russian OPK couldn’t support the essential parameters for us.  Therefore we’re talking about readiness to buy foreign ships.  Our enterprises want to put out old models.  We don’t want to buy them.  But this isn’t really a conflict — it’s a working situation.” 

Asked about his largely civilian team of financial specialists, their focus on results, and what kind of results they seek, he said: 

“A combat capable, modern, like one of my colleagues put it, a ‘smart’ army.  An army is a sufficiently serious consuming part for the country.  The money could go to more humane purposes, if it’s possible to say so.  Therefore, it needs to justify expenditures on itself by their effectiveness.  We have tried to make the management structure two-tier.  To divide its activity into military and that connected with support of the military.  There is still the task of building a financial oversight system.” 

This one was the most shocking to many folks.  Asked simply if they steal in the Defense Ministry, Serdyukov said: 

“When I came to the Defense Ministry, to put it bluntly, I was discouraged by the extent of theft.  This sensation still hasn’t passed.  Financial licentiousness, the impunity of people whom no one had ever checked out.” 

“This system was so ingrained that it was already a way of thinking.  We are developing an effective oversight system.  I’m not saying that today the problem has been fully uprooted.  But there are very palpable results.” 

Asked why Russia is moving away from contract service when the budget for arms has tripled, the Defense Minister said: 

“Don’t believe that armaments are cheaper than a good contractee.  If you calculate it, these are colossal expenditures.  The past program didn’t work precisely because it was done in a formalistic way.  The military was told you have to do it.  They saluted.  But it was perfectly clear that a contractee wouldn’t go into the army for seven thousand, if he could earn not less than 15 as a civilian.” 

“We actually could forego rearmament and let the money go to the improvement of contract service.  But then we’d have old equipment and weapons that don’t meet modern requirements.” 

He continues: 

“We aren’t giving up on contract service, but only shrinking the number of such servicemen.  To 90-100 thousand.  We’ll see further.  If we save money in other areas — of course we’ll return to this idea.  But an already well-prepared one.” 

Asked whether one-year conscription’s having any effect on dedovshchina, Serdyukov said: 

“There are more nonregulation instances in absolute terms.  But this doesn’t scare me, because there are more conscripts.  The situation has to level out with time.  And the statistics will begin to fall perfectly precisely.  Particularly when you account for our methods:  we are very demanding with commanders on this, even up to dismissal in cases with deadly consequences.  Human rights advocates have already begun to criticize me for dismissing many of them for nothing.” 

Asked if he has carte blanche from the country’s leadership, he says: 

“There is trust.  I’m trying to talk over, get support for any serious things.  Before beginning the transformations there were three meetings with Putin, then with Medvedev.  There were many meetings and sessions.  All of 2008 we gathered [Duma?] deputies in various formats and tried to explain the logic from military, economic, and financial viewpoints.  This is serious work.  Large-scale.  But there was no longer another way.  Otherwise was a road to nowhere.  More and more money would be spent, but the results would be worse and worse.” 

So the interviewer concludes they needed someone from the financial sector: 

“Honestly, I never expected such a decision.  When they dismissed me from the army after my service, I thought I wouldn’t end up there any longer.  Obviously, they decided that they really needed a financial specialist for these tasks.”

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