Monthly Archives: February 2020

Blessing the Bomb?

Posted on February 26, 2020 | 2 comments
Blessing a Su-34 and its weapons in Volgodonsk

Blessing a Su-34 and its weapons in Volgodonsk

The debate over the propriety of Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) priests blessing Russian bombs and weapons of mass destruction (OMP) is heating up.

According to Interfaks, first deputy chief of the synod’s public relations and media department Aleksandr Shchipkov has expressed disagreement with a possible ban on the consecration of certain types of armaments.

Early this month Meduza reported the ROC’s Inter-Council Presence (an advisory body that helps draft church policy) suggested ending the practice of consecrating some conventional weapons and OMP. Its proposal will considered until at least June 1. The Presence argued that consecrating armaments doesn’t reflect the church’s traditions and should be “abolished from pastoral practice.”

The debate on blessing bombs apparently began last summer.

Interfaks reported that the proposed ban would stop the consecration of weapons which can kill “untold numbers of people” as well as “indiscriminate weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”

Priest consecrates mobile ICBM launchers

Priest consecrates mobile ICBM launchers

Shchipkov, however, said:

The essential motive of the document’s text really separates the soldier from his weapon, asserting, figuratively speaking, that it’s possible to bless the armor, but not the sword. But the Church can’t bless the man and his mission halfway . . . . Including the topic of banning the blessing of this or that type of weapon on the political agenda is an indirect blow to the people’s trust in the army and to the country’s sovereignty.

Responding to the biblical call to “turn the other cheek” against violence, Shchipkov said, “We have a right to turn our own cheek, but we are obligated to protect the cheek of those close to us.”

He claimed a ban on consecrating arms will be viewed as a sign of weakness by Russia’s enemies. (Seriously? Does he think blessing them makes the country stronger?)

Addressing nuclear weapons specifically, Shchipkov concluded:

It’s not necessary for us to repent an inclination toward the unjustified use of nuclear forces. It remains for us to say only that our policy of reasonable defense sufficiency lies in the mainstream of Christian principles.

We recall that military duty is highly valued in Orthodoxy. A weapon is sanctified by serving just and noble aims just as is any involuntary use of force. The subject of discussion should be the purposes of bearing and employing arms not blessing them. It’s important precisely who and how a weapon is used and with what intentions, but not specifically what he uses. Arms themselves don’t kill, but the people using them do, therefore it’s absurd to evaluate a weapon by the degree of its “morality.”

Wouldn’t want to spin into debating just war theory, etc. Suffice it to say it’s interesting that the Russians are discussing it. The argument’s been going on in the West since the dawn of the nuclear age.

Nevertheless, the image of Russian Orthodox priests sprinkling holy water on ICBM launchers isn’t a particularly good look for them, the Russian military, or the Kremlin. At least to Western eyes. But the average Ivan probably doesn’t worry about it too much.

Because of the ROC’s traditional subservience to the state, look for the church to go as Vladimir Putin indicates. That means more tanks will get sprinkled. 

2 Comments

Posted in Civil-Military Relations, RVSN, Strategic Deterrence

Tagged , , , , , ,

Defenders’ Day Promotions

Posted on February 22, 2020 | 2 comments

On February 20, RF President Vladimir Putin signed out his ukaz with military promotions in advance of Defenders’ Day (February 24).

For the MOD, Putin’s list includes nine two-star promotions (seven general-lieutenants and two vice-admirals). As well as 15 one-stars (ten general-majors and five rear-admirals).

By contrast, the Natsgvardiya got one new general-colonel, two general-lieutenants, and three general-majors.

Rustam Muradov

General-Lieutenant Rustam Muradov

The rising star of the MOD group is probably newly-minted General-Lieutenant Rustam Muradov.

Muradov’s a combined arms officer and Deputy Commander of the Southern MD. He commanded two different motorized rifle brigades. He was first deputy commander, chief of staff of the 41st Combined Arms Army. He served with Russian forces in eastern Ukraine and was a military adviser in Syria. In that capacity, he received Hero of the Russian Federation from Putin. Muradov commanded the 2nd CAA for a year.

Three new general-lieutenants are army commanders — Sergey Kisel in the 1st Tank Army, Andrey Kolotovkin in the 2nd CAA, and Oleg Tsekov in the 5th CAA. New two-star Vladimir Kravchenko commands the 11th Air and Air Defense Army.

General-Lieutenant Maksim Penkov heads the Mozhayskiy Military-Space Academy. and General-Lieutenant Yuriy Bobrov is a directorate chief in the MOD’s Main Personnel Directorate.

New Vice-Admiral Denis Berezovskiy is the turncoat Ukrainian admiral and one-time commander of Ukrainian naval forces who threw in his lot with Moscow after the seizure of Crimea. He’s deputy commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Vice-Admiral Vladimir Dmitriyev commands the Pacific Fleet’s Submarine Forces.

The one-stars don’t ring any bells except new Rear-Admiral Aleksey Yuryevich Sysuyev. He commands the Pacific Fleet’s 25th Submarine Division (three SSBNs — an ancient Delta III and two Borey SSBNs Aleksandr Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh). Previously, he was first deputy commander, chief of staff of the 31st Division in Northern Fleet, also SSBNs. So he’s a riser.

His father is likely retired Admiral Yuriy Sysuyev who was a submariner, one-time 5th Eskadra commander, and naval educator.

2 Comments

Posted in Military Leadership

Tagged , ,

Tanks in GPV-2027

Posted on February 20, 2020 | 3 comments

According to a February 13 report from Vedomosti’s Ivan Safronov, Russia’s Ground Troops could receive 900 T-14 and T-90M tanks before the current State Armaments Program (GPV) ends in 2027. The article is paywalled, but Bmpd recapped its contents.

Nine hundred — 500 T-14 and 400 T-90M — seems quite an optimistic forecast.

T-90

According to Safronov’s story, a source close to the Russian MOD said there were three contracts between 2017 and 2019 to deliver more than 160 T-90M (Proryv-3) tanks. The first two called for 60 tanks in 2018-2019, of which 10 would be newly built, 50 would be older T-90 tanks modernized to T-90M, and 100 would be T-90A tanks from the inventory improved to T-90M.

However, an industry source said the deliveries slipped because its fire control and target tracking system needed to be finished, and the turret with its dynamic defense — the tank’s main feature — had to be tested.

These issues are supposedly resolved, and the tank is in series production. The MOD should get not less than 15 T-90M tanks in 2020.

A source close to the MOD leadership indicated that President Vladimir Putin wants to renew Russia’s tank inventory over the next five years. Currently, only 50 percent of the Ground Troops’ armored vehicles are “modern” — the lowest indicator of any branch or service of the RF Armed Forces.

Upgrading Russia’s armor will involve both new production and modernization. There may be a contract in 2020 to improve another 100 T-90s to T-90M. Deputy Defense Minister and arms chief Aleksey Krivoruchko has indicated there are 400 T-90s in the Ground Troops that could be upgraded.

State testing of the newest T-14 tank on the Armata chassis is set to begin in 2020. A Vedomosti interlocutor says there could be a state order for 500 T-14s by 2027.

Recall after debuting in 2015, the T-14 was supposed to enter state testing in 2017 but that didn’t happen.

Ground Troops are hoping for 900 T-14 and T-90M tanks to arrive by 2027, but they won’t supplant some 2,000 T-72B3 tanks as the foundation of Russia’s tank inventory, according to military commentator Viktor Murakhovskiy. He adds that the T-72B3 can’t really be considered a “modern” tank without serious modernization.

For those keeping score, the T-72B3 is a 2010 upgrade of the T-72B not really improved since the mid-1980s. The T-72B3M is a 2016 modification adding Relikt reactive armor, a more powerful engine, etc. The T-90 and T-90A are early 1990s upgrades on the T-72B. The T-90M is a 2018 update with the same gun as the T-14, Afganit active protection, Relikt reactive armor, etc.

T-72B3M

Not addressed in the Vedomosti report is what (if anything) the Russian Army plans regarding the future of upgraded T-80BVM tanks. It received an unspecified number in 2017-2019. The Ground Troops often prefer its gas turbine engine over diesel for extreme cold in the Arctic and Eastern MD.

It’s difficult to assess even what happened with tanks in GPV 2011-2020. Putin and the MOD called for 2,300 tanks in 2012 even though Ground Troops procurement wasn’t a priority in that GPV. The naive assumption they’d be new ones soon gave way to realization that all tanks received were ones modernized as described above. Complicating matters further, Russian MOD descriptions of what they actually received typically lump all armor — tanks and armored vehicles — together making it virtually impossible to tell how many upgraded tanks of which type (re-)entered Russia’s forces.

3 Comments

Posted in Defense Industry, Force Modernization, Ground Troops

Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

More on the Damage Estimate

Posted on February 18, 2020 | 4 comments

Additional thoughts regarding the damage to Admiral Kuznetsov . . . .

The gulf between OSK chief Rakhmanov’s 300 million rubles and 95 billion rubles from Kommersant’s Northern Fleet staff officer source is as wide as it gets. How do we parse what we’ve heard? Whom do we believe?

Admiral Kuznetsov on fire

Interesting that Rakhmanov had something of an estimate, but, at the same time, said, “We simply weren’t allowed on-board for a long time.” He also rejected the possibility of critical damage right after the fire. Can he really know the extent of damage if experts haven’t been on-board?

The same may go for Kommersant’s source. Have he and other naval officers been on-board? Maybe 95 billion was misheard? Doesn’t seem likely though in the case of a quality paper like Kommersant.

We’re in a “he said, she said.”

So let’s try to understand 300 million and 95 billion rubles.

  • A TASS feature in July indicated that a Krylov center design for a 44,000-ton catamaran-hull carrier, the design alone, would cost 3-4 billion rubles.
  • In December, an OPK source told RIAN development and construction of an unspecified new carrier would likely cost Moscow 300-400 billion rubles ($4.7-6.3 billion).
  • Even the “medium repair and limited modernization” of Admiral Kuznetsov, as envisaged in 2018, is likely to cost at least 55 billion rubles ($860 million), per Bmpd.
  • To get your bearings, first-in-class USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) cost $12.8 billion to build with $4.7 billion in R&D costs.

Bottom line: we have to wait and see how much this fire costs the Russian Navy, if we ever find out. We have to watch for Russia’s financial calculus vis-à-vis continuing the repair and modernization of Kuznetsov. But here’s a guess. The fire damage from December 12 will be closer to Kommersant’s number than Rakhmanov’s.

4 Comments

Posted in Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Navy

Tagged , , ,

Kuznetsov Damage Estimate

Posted on February 16, 2020 | 2 comments

We’re still waiting to learn (and may never know) how much the December 12 fire aboard the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov will cost the Russian Navy.

According to Interfaks, OSK chief Aleksey Rakhmanov said the bill will exceed 300 million rubles ($4.7 million).

Fire on Admiral Kuznetsov

Rakhmanov told Russian journalists:

. . . there’s no final figure. The commission continues to work. Given that the work of firefighters and law enforcement organs has been gathered up, I think we still require some time to reconcile it. We simply weren’t allowed on-board for a long time.

. . . I don’t want to scare or delight anyone, but there’s definitely no 90 billion [$1.4 billion] there. But I think we won’t get away for 300 million.

Recall the fire took a day to extinguish and two Russian naval personnel — an enlisted contractee and an officer — died, and 14 others were injured.

In the immediate aftermath, Rakhmanov claimed Kuznetsov didn’t sustain critical damage. He rejected a December 19 Kommersant story indicating that the bill for fire repairs could reach 95 billion rubles. The business daily said the estimate came from a Northern Fleet staff officer.

The OSK chief said equipment in the engine room where the blaze occurred was already dismantled. Welding sparks started the fire and it apparently spread to electrical cables.

Completed in the early 1990s, the ill-fated sole Russian carrier is being renovated under an April 2018 contract. The ship was damaged in late October 2018 while floating out of the PD-50 dry dock at Roslyakovo. Kuznetsov was initially set to be finished in 2021, but the date has slipped to 2022.

The carrier reportedly will receive a navalized version of the Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) gun-missile air defense system, new boilers, pumps, flight control and communications systems, as well as repairs to its turbines.

2 Comments

Posted in Cheap Posts, Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Navy

Tagged , , , ,

OPK Write-Off

Posted on February 8, 2020 | 2 comments

President Vladimir Putin has apparently agreed to a major write-off of Russian defense industry debt. It’s a significant story not receiving much attention.

Putin with VTB chief Kostin in August 2019

Putin with VTB chief Kostin in August 2019

The decision came in a secret presidential ukaz at the end of 2019. VTB chief Andrey Kostin broke the news in a late January interview with Rossiya 24 television at the World Economic Forum in Davos. The most coherent rendering of what Kostin said came from Interfaks-AVN:

Everything’s decided. At the end of last year the President met with all interested parties, the President’s ukaz was received, it’s true it’s secret, therefore I wouldn’t begin to comment on it. [But then he does, at least generally.]

But on the whole the problem’s solved, there is active participation of the [federal] budget and preferential restructuring on the part of leading banks is also provided, but it is so feasible, it is reasonable, it really takes into account, of course, that risk the banks took, therefore on the whole we’re satisfied with this decision. I think the government is too. So the program is being effected. I believe we won’t return to this issue again.

According to Interfaks-AVN in late December, Deputy PM and arms tsar Yuriy Borisov said measures to improve the financial state of key OPK enterprises were worked out and there would be a clearing of loans amounting to 700 billion rubles [$11 billion]. The main troubles, he indicated, were at OAK, OSK, ODK, and Roskosmos.

In early December, Borisov proposed writing off 400-450 billion of the debt and restructuring the remaining 300-350 billion for 15 years with a five-year initial payment holiday and a preferential two percent interest rate, according to a report in Rbc.ru.

Borisov and Russian bankers other than Kostin haven’t commented.

Borisov’s proposal may be the plan contained in Putin’s ukaz, but we don’t know since it’s secret. And it’s most likely secret to keep normally docile Russian citizens from learning that the government is bailing out weapons makers, not them. Russian household debt has increased steadily in recent years with little or no economic growth.

In July, Borisov said Russian defense industry’s large debt load was forcing it to “live hand to mouth, servicing financial institutions that don’t produce anything,” Interfaks-AVN reported. He indicated then that 90 percent of the debt belonged to OAK, OSK, Uralvagonzavod, Almaz-Antey, and Precision Systems (Высокоточные комплексы).

He called for writing off all or part of the debt at that time. But the biggest OPK creditors Sberbank and VTB opposed it.

Yuriy Borisov

Yuriy Borisov

In September, Putin directed then PM Dmitriy Medvedev to investigate problems with the profitability of defense enterprises. This came after the Military-Industrial Commission session in Izhevsk at which Putin blamed “unused capacity during a reduction in order volumes and the requirement to finance development work, the costs of which aren’t included in planning documents.” The president didn’t say anything about contract prices being too low or funding lost to waste or corruption. 

Novaya gazeta reported in July that 700 billion rubles represents non-performing defense industry loans. Total OPK indebtedness, however, is 2.3 trillion rubles ($36 billion). A write-off of 700 billion rubles (or part of this amount) would be a significant hit to the working capital of major Russian banks (and OPK creditors).

Borisov said corporations and enterprises were making only interest payments on the most troubled loans, according to Novgaz. Experts told the paper that more than half of the OPK’s profits are going to debt service leaving most producers with net profits of only 3-4 percent or even losses. Defense enterprises say they are frequently paying 22-23 percent on loans accumulated over many years. Meanwhile, the Russian banking sector is earning record profits.

Based on the recent history of OPK debts, Novgaz concluded the most likely scenario is partial write-off, partial restructuring, and recapitalization of affected banks by the Finance Ministry. Promsvyazbank (PSB) — bankrupt and nationalized in early 2018 — is also being turned into a specialized bank for handling state defense orders and problem loans to the OPK. PSB might insulate healthy parts of the Russian banking sector from bad OPK debt, and possibly from U.S. economic sanctions.

Defense producers say price formation — agreement with the MOD on contract prices — remains a substantial problem, according to the Novgaz report. Its source said:

Everyone is right — both the customer can’t pay a lot, and the contractor can’t operate at a loss. But there’s no arbiter for a compromise, and the customer is always stronger.

This OPK debt write-off is pretty much like earlier ones. It may take care of the most immediate and acute symptoms but it won’t cure the causes of the ailment, including price formation, theft, and cumbersome rules about handling GOZ funds.

2 Comments

Posted in Defense Industry, Force Modernization, Military Budget

Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , ,