Tag Archives: Anatoliy Serdyukov

Serdyukov’s Two Presidents

One can’t avoid Wikileaks forever . . . you’ve already read about “alpha dog” Putin, and Medvedev who plays Robin to Putin’s Batman.  But not many media outlets picked up on Defense Minister Serdyukov’s story, but Argumenty nedeli did.

In early 2009, the Azeri Defense Minister reportedly shared details of his meeting with Serdyukov with the U.S. Ambassador in Baku.  Sufficiently lubricated after sharing two bottles of vodka, Serdyukov allegedly asked his Azeri counterpart:

“Do you follow the orders of your President?”

Then Serdyukov volunteered:

“Well, I follow the orders of two Presidents.”

This is really no more than anecdotal confirmation of what’s been known all along — Serdyukov was put in place by Putin, and he’s part of Team Putin.  While appropriately deferential and respectful of President Medvedev, Serdyukov is very unlikely to get in a situation where he might have to cross his mentors from Team Putin.  Medvedev himself is part of the Team writ large, but he’s from a different, and less influential branch.  So, the ruling tandem has a senior and junior member and everyone knows it.

Not exactly a revelation, but Serdyukov’s admission makes for a funny story, and no small embarrassment for him now in dealing with Dmitriy Anatolyevich.

Military-Theft Forces

Prosecutors Rate the Most Corrupt Service Branches

40-50 Percent of State Defense Order Simply Stolen in Recent Years . . . no wonder large-scale procurement hasn’t happened.  Serdyukov supporter Korotchenko tries to paint opponents of military reforms as people trying to protect their corrupt schemes.  This surely goes on, but there also have to be people opposing them for reasons other than greed.  Finally, it’s at least conceivable that, if Serdyukov doesn’t make progress against corruption, it could cost him his job (if he stays that long, he is approaching the four-year mark).  Thus endeth the precis for this post . . .

This week Profil investigates military corruption.  The magazine notes the number and scale of Defense Ministry corruption cases is growing by leaps and bounds, reaching losses of 2.2 billion rubles for the first ten months of 2010.  It concludes, despite a significant cut in the officer corps and Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s battle against “thieves in broad stripes [generals],” the number of corruption crimes is not only not declining, but has substantially increased.  Profil obtained an analytical report compiled by the Main Military Prosecutor (GVP) showing who has stolen how much this year.

The GVP presented its report to a closed session of the Duma Defense Committee.  It says its analysis shows “efforts to counteract corruption in the troops are insufficiently effective.”

Profil’s first graphic . . .

Growth of Corruption Crimes in the Army (First 10 Months of 2010)

Troops/Military District/Fleet                     2009       2010       Growth (%)

North Caucasus MD                                             184          311                 69

Moscow MD                                                              94           152                61.7

Air-Assault Troops (VDV)                                 34            119                250

Siberian MD                                                             76            117                 54

Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN)                  59              93                 57.6       

Northern Fleet                                                      50              59                 18

Space Troops                                                        27              44                 63

Caspian Flotilla                                                      5                  7                 40

Black Sea Fleet                                                      2                  6                 200

Profil suggests the recent wave of military retirements signed off by President Dmitriy Medvedev could have been sparked by corruption charges.  While possible, there’s no evidence to support this thesis. 

A Profil source in the Defense Ministry says, not surprisingly, officials responsible for the State Defense Order (GOZ or ГОЗ), capital construction, and the disposition of military property (first and foremost real estate) inflict the greatest losses on the budget.  The article quotes Igor Korotchenko:

“In the course of recent years, 40-50% of resources allocated for the State Defense Order were simply stolen.  This happened, for example, when money was directed at the fulfillment of some concrete work, but there were no real results.  Write-offs appeared in the end or a weapons system was developed that simply didn’t meet its technical requirements.”

Profil suggests that many officers are rushing to get one last bite of military money before Serdyukov’s reforms completely derail their schemes.  It cites Ruslan Pukhov offering two different explanations for rising military corruption:

“Feeling an impending dismissal, officials are probably trying to take the maximum from their positions.  However, it can’t be ruled out that the prosecutor has really reinforced his work in different areas.  Corruption is an acute issue for the prosecutor.”

Pukhov thinks that, although the percentage increase in corruption looks really bad for the VDV, “corruption in the armed forces is spread equally and the growth in corruption crimes in separate branches or districts is connected only with where they are being investigated.”

A very good point, Mr. Pukhov.  Yes, the results of this little anticorruption experiment are very much influenced by where and how it is being conducted.  One should also pay much more attention to the absolute numbers of corruption cases than the percentage changes, and nothing has been said about the relative size of the various parts of the armed forces . . . no per capita figures are provided.  Are 44 crimes in the relatively small Space Troops more significant than 152 in the larger Moscow MD?

Korotchenko, a fairly strong Serdyukov proponent, says the Defense Minister and his tax service colleagues are beginning to break existing corrupt ties, institute financial transparency, and deprive the generals of the right to conclude any contracts.  Dividing the Ministry into military and civilian halves will keep military men out of financial expenditures, and this “process of shifting generals out of the feeding trough” will continue until 2012.  The generals will provide requirements, and civilians will allocate the financing.

A second graphic with some absolute figures on losses due to corruption . . .

Growth of Corruption Crimes in the Army (First 10 Months of 2010)

Troops                                                                  Loss Amount                      Annual Growth

                                                                           (millions of rubles)                        (times)

Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN)                      59.8                                            15          

Air-Assault Troops (VDV)                                   57.5                                            12.2

Space Troops                                                            47.6                                              2.2

Korotchenko claims:

“The campaign against Serdyukov is mainly heated up by those people who’ve been deprived of the feeding trough.  So, the director of a large defense enterprise has for many years sawed off rubles by the billion every year in the transfer of money that comes to fulfill the Gosoboronzakaz.  When Serdyukov deprived this director of such a trough, he began to finance any actions directed at discrediting and, possibly, even removing the Defense Minister.”

So, Korotchenko asserts most conflicts over army reform are banal conflicts of interest for those who can’t steal like they used to.  But didn’t the GVP just say they’re doing a better job of stealing than ever before?

Korotchenko continues:

“Of course, Serdyukov is not an angel, and many of his actions on the military reform plane call forth questions, but it’s another thing that before he arrived, corruption in the Defense Ministry had achieved such a level that he was forced to cut to the bone.  Many scandals proceed only because their financial-economic interests were affected:  the meetings of the airborne guys is just one in this series.”

Then Profil turns to Vitaliy Shlykov, who says:

“Broad publicity for corruption scandals in the Defense Ministry cannot but affect the minister.”

But he believes the Kremlin knows no one can fight corruption like Serdyukov, therefore the GVP report isn’t a real blow to him.

Profil concludes, so far, Serdyukov hasn’t squandered the trust placed in him, but the struggle against corruption only strengthens him as long as it’s a success.  If corruption keeps growing, it’s possible the Defense Minister himself could wind up on the “shot list.”

Mending Fences with the Church?

Serdyukov and the Patriarch

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov met Patriarch Kirill yesterday, and only Rossiyskaya gazeta alluded to the possibility it might be a fence-mending effort following the Seltsy incident several weeks ago.  Serdyukov had met Kirill previously, but the timing of this meeting sure looks like an effort to repair  army-church ties.

Patriarchia.ru, Krasnaya zvezda, and Komsomolskaya pravda reprinted portions of the Patriarch’s comments:

“The Armed Forces are now undergoing a very important phase of reform, and we are attentively following what is happening.” 

“The army in Russia was always a powerful patriotic force influencing the mood of society, and the well-being of people.  The army was always an elite of our society, including intellectual and cultural.  Therefore I am deeply convinced the Armed Forces reform, which assumes an entire series of very important organizational decisions, scientific-technical and simply technical, must include both spiritual and cultural dimensions.”

Defense Minister Serdyukov told the Patriarch: 

“It’s always pleasant for me when there’s a chance to meet with you, to discuss these or other issues connected with reform.”

“This reorganization now being conducted is a deliberate, calculated process and, as the initial results already show, quite effective.”

According to RG and KP, Serdyukov told Kirill about plans to open a center for regimental priest training on the base of one of the military academies, most likely in Moscow.  Alluding to the Seltsy problem, Serdyukov also noted the Defense Ministry now has a working group on the issue of constructing Orthodox Churches in military units.  And Serdyukov repeated yesterday he never gave anyone an order to take down the church on the VDV’s Seltsy training grounds.

Army Outsourcing

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov conducted another extramural collegium Wednesday, this time in Khabarovsk.  Serdyukov and company congratulated themselves for completing the ‘large-scale work’ of forming the Eastern Military District (VVO or ВВО), and the other three new districts, ahead of schedule.  This reshuffling was done in less than a year, so it probably really doesn’t count as ‘large-scale work.’

General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov reported the VVO has operated since 1 October.  For his part, Serdyukov noted:

“The Eastern Military District is the largest in combat composition, area, and length of ground and maritime borders.”

The VVO sports the Pacific Fleet, an air and air defense army, and four combined arms armies, leading the Defense Minister to conclude:

“Unifying all forces and means under a single commander allowed for a substantial increase in the combat possibilities and potential of the district.”

Possibly, yes, but it remains to be realized and proven . . . since the very same forces have just been aggregated in a new way.  Is this new whole more than the sum of its parts, or not?

Attendees discussed unified logistics as well as unified combat forces.  Reports said along with unified commands a unified system of material-technical support (MTO) is being established in the military districts.  As previously reported, it is supposed to unite arms supply and logistics in one function and organization.

At any rate, the collegium had new or semi-new business as well . . .

Serdyukov, Makarov, and other attendees also discussed Defense Ministry outsourcing.

Before the meeting, Makarov told wire services the issue of delimiting spheres of activity between the military department and outside organizations that will provide support functions for servicemen and military towns, including heating, electricity, and food service, would be discussed.  According to Rossiyskaya gazeta, Makarov said:

“We need to clearly determine the bounds within which structures should work to support the everyday life of military bodies.”

Speaking like an old-hand, Makarov said the outsourcing system will take care of noncore tasks like feeding the troops and providing utilities to military towns.  The Defense Ministry’s board of directors discussed transferring responsibilities and corresponding property to these contractors.  Are they going to operate or own these assets?

RG reminded readers 340,000 troops are supposed to be fed by civilian firms by year’s end.  They include students in cadet corps, Suvorov schools, military VUZy, and patients in Defense Ministry hospitals.  The paper said outsourced food service would be coming soon to permanent readiness units.  And laundry services, part of military transportation, and equipment supply, including aviation, POL, and support for all deployed Navy ships, will be outsourced.

Finally, Army General Makarov said the collegium discussed in detail the issue of replacing or scrapping worn out equipment.  According to RIA Novosti, Makarov indicated there’ll be a major inventory and weeding out of what’s usable and what isn’t:

“In the course of 2011, everything that’s inoperable, particularly, in the aviation and ship inventory, we will manage to restore and put back on the line.  That which has outlived its time according to its parameters should be withdrawn from service.  This is quite a solid sum which could be redirected to acquiring new types of equipment and armaments.”

Not sure how much they make on this scrap sale.  Not so long ago the Defense Ministry said it was cutting repairs (as well as RDT&E) to focus more money on buying new systems.

Officer Discontent on Poklonnaya Gora

Reviewing the press on Sunday’s VDV meeting on Poklonnaya Gora, one could say there’s an inclination to dismiss it as the howling of old cranks who don’t constitute an organized challenge to anything or anyone.  But behind that initial take, some media saw palpable discontent among officers, both retired and active duty.  Nezavisimaya gazeta suggested there might be more below the surface of this rather feeble demonstration – either more powerful interests or much larger numbers of affected individuals.  Ekspert concluded, at a minimum, the whole episode might lead Defense Minister Serdyukov to take the opinions of officers more seriously.      

The VDV demonstration goes back to the 30 September Seltsy incident, and the Russian Airborne Union’s (SDR) call for Serdyukov resign for insulting Hero of Russia, Colonel Krasov as well as for destroying the army.  Kommersant put the number of participants at about 1,500.  Retired General-Colonel Vyacheslav Achalov and other organizers threaten to resume protesting on 17 November if President Medvedev doesn’t fire Serdyukov.  They also want General Staff Chief Nikolay Makarov, Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov, and Main Personnel Directorate Chief Viktor Goremykin to resign. 

The conspiracy-minded protesters maintain that Vladimir Shamanov’s crash was no accident; they think someone tried to kill him since he’s the only man standing in the way of the VDV’s ruin.

The Defense Ministry didn’t officially comment on yesterday’s protest, but Kommersant garnered an unofficial reaction.  An unnamed Defense Ministry representative said:

“Criticism should be constructive.  When memorial days like 7 November are used for political purposes, it’s unseemly.  Moreover, criticizing the minister for the reform is premature, since it’s not complete yet.”

So the Defense Ministry didn’t think the protest was helpful, but they also think 7 November is still a holiday.  The last is the best though.  Exactly when, where, and how are opponents supposed to raise their objections?  When everything’s over and done with?  Another insight into current regime thinking about the proper interaction of politics and policymaking . . . none.

Nezavisimaya gazeta was most interested that it wasn’t just the usual non-systemic outcasts at the VDV rally, but Just Russia (Справедливая Россия) flags showed that some of the official opposition was there too.  Federation Council Speaker and Just Russia leader Sergey Mironov was once a VDV senior sergeant himself.  NG sees SR trying to play an army card to its advantage while remaining part of the official opposition.

The paper says Mironov could be using the military, and showing support for officers against Serdyukov (and Medvedev by extension) for his own purposes.  And he’s politicizing the army – something not done in recent years and generally considered unacceptable.  NG indicates some think there’s more to all this than just a reaction to Serdyukov’s alleged rudeness to the VDV:

“There is, incidentally, an opinion that the [Seltsy] incident was only a pretext, and the interests of some military circles and retired officers connected to them, who feed off the army and are dissatisfied with the current military reform, are behind the protest.”

Novyye Izvestiya describes Poklonnaya Gora as quite the retrograde affair replete with Soviet flags, and the usual representatives of the radical opposition.

One participant bragged to its reporter after passing through one of many metal detectors:

“We don’t need weapons, we could take the Kremlin with a stool leg.”

But Novyye had more serious points too, like one ex-VDV who complained of Serdyukov’s cuts in military medicine, and his commercialization of military hospitals.  He asked:

“What military doctors will be on the battlefield?  There aren’t any remaining.  But there’s no one to fight, in a year’s army service what can you learn?  Only to sweep the parade ground.”

The paper concludes VDV veterans believe only military men can solve the army’s problems, the army needs to be mobile and highly capable, and it shouldn’t be shameful to serve in it.  At least everyone seems to agree on the last two.

Writing for Ekspert, Stanislav Kuvaldin describes Seltsy and Poklonnaya Gora as a breakdown in communications between the Defense Minister and the officer corps.  One SDR leader told Kuvaldin:

“Serving officers are silent, but they think the same things.  We grew them and indoctrinated them.”

He went on to say that even if they are silent about Serdyukov and reforms in exchange for today’s higher officer pay, it doesn’t mean they’ve been suppressed.

A key element of Serdyukov’s reform is basically tripling officer pay, and this higher pay is already a serious factor in calculations about serving, but it hasn’t happened yet (except for those getting special premium pay).  Nevertheless, potentially higher pay won’t automatically mean Serdyukov will be more popular, and it doesn’t mean the VDV will get over Serdyukov’s insult to one of its officers and a Hero of Russia, according to Kuvaldin.

Kuvaldin reports the Defense Ministry may compromise on some of the VDV’s more specific complaints, i.e. not moving the VDV Headquarters to Ryazan and preserving the VDV Museum, but not reversing the VDV Higher Military Command School’s subordination to the Combined Arms Academy.

In the end, Kuvaldin writes, this dissatisfaction is only creating tense moments for Serdyukov, not a serious threat:

“In the end, if after two years of reforms, vulgar insults to the head of one military school have become the cause for veterans to come out, it’s possible only to talk about an unpleasant emotional backdrop for the minister, but not about a hypothetical organized resistance.”

However, possibly, the situation will force the minister to deal with officers’ opinions more attentively and respectfully.

But this author wouldn’t bet on it.

In a not particularly surprising postscript, the GAI stopped SDR leader Pavel Popovskikh — former colonel, VDV Reconnaissance Chief, and defendant in the murder of journalist Dmitriy Kholodov — for driving drunk after the demonstration.  The story was widely reported, but an alternative version hasn’t gotten as much play.  Segodnya.ru reported that Popovskikh’s friends and others say he stopped drinking long ago.  The website also says Vladislav Shurygin wrote in his blog that traffic cops were ordered to stop Popovskikh and check him for alcohol, but they sheepishly released him with an apology when they found he was sober.

Poklonnaya Gora Coverage

Furniture Man Minister Is Russia's Shame

A Livejournal blogger’s provided photos and comments on today’s meeting of airborne and other veterans on Poklonnaya Gora.  Organized by former VDV Commander Achalov, the protest is dedicated to denouncing Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and his reforms.  The blogger puts the number of demonstrators at less than 4,000.

According to Lenta.ru, current and former VDV generals have appealed to airborne veterans not to get into it with the Defense Ministry.  They included current chief of staff, Nikolay Ignatov, former Commander Georgiy Shpak, and former First Deputy Defense Minister Aleksandr Kolmakov.  An address from VDV Commander General-Lieutentant Vladimir Shamanov, who remains in the hospital following last weekend’s car accident, was also read.

Shamanov asserted that an ‘unprecedented propaganda campaign’ has been unleashed against Serdyukov in the last month to force his dismissal.  He added that some of ‘our respected and honored comrades’ have been drawn into this ‘politicized game.’

He said everyone from platoon commander to Defense Minister makes mistakes:

“However, this doesn’t mean that we need to demand their immediate resignation for every miscalculation.”

Sounding like the ultimate devotee of civilian control of the army, Shamanov said Serdyukov is making long overdue changes at the Supreme CINC’s direction.  He denied the VDV has lost any combat capability due to Serdyukov’s reforms and again promised it’ll remain an independent branch, receive new weapons and equipment, and get two more formations.  

He told airborne men ‘not to believe loud, but misleading announcements about how the VDV’s combat capability will supposedly decline.’  He said corrupt people of all stripes and so-called oppositionists are against the army’s renewal.

Shamanov called on delegates to this ‘conference’ of the Russian Airborne Union not to allow themselves to be dragged into an unnecessary confrontation with the Defense Ministry.

Not One of My Generals Looks Down on Me

Serdyukov with Der Spiegel (photo: Yevgeniy Kondakov)

Let’s look at Defense Minister Serdyukov’s two most recent media interactions, starting with his interview Sunday on Rossiya TV’s ‘News of the Week’ program.  If anyone finds the video for this, please send it in.  As it is, we have just the wire service snippets.  Better than nothing.  Much of this you will have heard before, but there will be things of interest, so don’t stop reading.

On the army’s winter preparations, Serdyukov said the Defense Ministry has studied the ‘serious emergencies’ [so there were more than just Steppe] in military garrisons last winter, and taken necessary measures to prepare the army for this winter.  He says the army is 98-99 percent ready, so he concludes this winter will go very quietly. 

This is, of course, quite a contrast with what Minregion and Basargin have reported, as well as with Severomorsk’s predicament.  There hasn’t been any press release announcing that the Severomorsk garrison’s utilities debt has been cleared, or that the heat’s been turned on yet.  The Navy had been preparing to move several hundred people from buildings belonging to eight different units without heat.

On allowing parents and public representatives to accompany conscripts to their service locations, Serdyukov had this comment:

“It seems to me this removes a certain tension from both parents and public organizations.  And this worried us enough, therefore we, including commanders, became more seriously inclined to it.”

Serdyukov issued yet another denial of any intent to change the current one-year draft term:

“Once again I want to say we don’t intend to increase the term (of service).  The term is 12 months, and so it will remain.”

He called a professional army a goal “we still can’t allow ourselves.”

He commented, yet again, on Russia’s plans for foreign arms purchases:

“Unfortunately, in recent years, in a number of (cases) and types of equipment we have fallen behind a little.  This, certainly, concerns both armored equipment and communications and UAVs somewhat.  We, naturally, won’t go over to mass purchases of foreign armaments and military equipment, we will only buy that which interests us, in limited quantities, to understand and evaluate those tactical-technical characteristics which they possess, on the one hand, and on the other – to try to formulate for our industry what we want to see from ourselves very soon.”

Serdyukov mentioned again Russia’s desire for two large amphibious carriers from abroad, and confirmed that two more would be built in Russian shipyards using the full technical documentation transferred along with the first two units.

The Defense Minister described a three-stage military reform to 2020:

“In the first part there are TO&E measures, and we have essentially already completed them.  We’ve gone to 1 million (servicemen) in size, of them 150 thousand will be officers, on the order of 100-120 thousand will be professional noncommissioned personnel, and the rest will be conscript soldiers.”

“The second task is, naturally, social issues which we need to take care of for our officers.  And armaments are the third task.  Armaments is a quite lengthy process.  We’ve broken it into two parts:  to 2015 is the first phase and out to 2020 will be the second.  We need to get to these parameters:  by 2015 modern equipment in the army must be not less than 30 percent and by 2025 on the order of 70 percent.  We believe that 2020 will be the completion of the transition to a new profile of the armed forces.”

It looks like Serdyukov is giving more wiggle room on rearmament.  Most reports to date have quoted Defense Ministry representatives saying 70-100 percent new arms by 2020.  Well, perhaps ITAR-TASS heard it wrong.  For this writer’s money, even 30 percent in 2015 looks like a longshot.

Also, not really much to say about those military social issues – and this presumably would be the main focus now since task one’s pretty much done and task three’s a long-term deal.

Even the pretty much completed task one is interesting.  Many press and media outlets seized on this one to finally understand, more precisely, the composition of the armed forces.  So Serdyukov says they’re down to 150,000 officers already.  And with a thinner layer of sergeants, that leaves between 730,000 and 750,000 conscripts at any given time.  But drafting 270,000 semiannually would leave Moscow short by roughly 200,000 conscripts.  Better round up those evaders.  And with all the varying comments, it’s very hard to say if Russia’s at one million men (150,000 officers) yet or not.

But moving on . . . on 27 October Der Spiegel copped an interview with Serdyukov.  It focused on relations and cooperation with NATO, Europe, and the U.S., and Russia’s view of missile defense, but there was stuff on Serdyukov’s reforms.  The Defense Minister told Spiegel flatly:

“As far as weapons go, in recent years, no modern weapons have been bought for the Russian Army.  Our armaments are largely outdated.”

Quite a stark admission he might not make to a Russian magazine.  Perhaps he’s willing to be a little more painfully blunt with a Western publication.

On buying abroad, Serdyukov told Spiegel that Russia can produce everything it needs, but some things are simpler, cheaper, and quicker to get from foreign producers.  He confessed that Russian industry has fallen behind the last 20 years.

Serdyukov goes on to discuss the million-man army, the imbalance in officers and grunts, eliminating corruption, Rosoboronpostavka, and cutting administrative layers. 

Then he’s asked why military men might oppose his changes:

“It’s obvious.  Who wants to lose his job?  Over the coming three years, we will cut the size of the officer corps to one hundred fifty thousand men.  At the same time, we will make service in the army more attractive, in particular, by raising pay.  The attractiveness of army service has now reached the very lowest level.”

Again, are they at 150,000 officers or not?  No one’s clear on this.  And one would think, with all Serdyukov’s efforts, serving might already be a little more attractive.

Asked if he’s worried about a military putsch, Serdyukov said:

“This doesn’t worry me.  We aren’t taking any impetuous measures.”

Of course, impetuous depends on whether you’re on the giving or receiving end of policy.

His interviewers asked if it’s easier for a civilian to conduct reforms in the military.  Serdyukov said:

“I can’t do everything myself.  We are working in a team – the Chief of the General Staff and my deputies.  It’s possible some things are simpler for me to do because I’m not connected to certain traditions and understandings which exist in the army.  I see problems from the outside, and because of this it’s easier for me to ask why we can’t do things differently.”

And finally they asked him if a general can take a civilian seriously, and he replied:

“I can assure you not one of my generals looks down on me.”

Shades of Seltsy perhaps . . . it seems it would have sufficed to say something bland like ‘we have our own spheres and mutual respect’ or we’ve created a two-branch Defense Ministry with civilians occupied with this and military men with that.  But instead Serdyukov comes off sounding like it’s a choice between dominating and being dominated.

Vox Populi

How did readers react to the Vedomosti editorial supporting Defense Minister Serdyukov and his reforms?  Basically, two ways — perhaps about 30 percent expressed qualified agreement, and 70 percent believed it was paid PR written, if not by Serdyukov himself, then by one of his minions.

None of this is scientific, of course.  It’s just an attempt to make sense of 84 posted comments on the article.  Vedomosti is a mainstream, semi-liberal paper (certainly neither far left nor far right) with an educated readership.  Take it for granted that those disagreeing with the editorial were more likely to comment.

With that said . . . let’s look at opponents of the piece.

The thrust of their comments, if it’s even possible to summarize them, boils down to this: 

  • The editorial is part of a ‘special operation’ to rehabilitate Serdyukov and reforms after the Seltsy dust-up (was it really that serious or damaging?), and to head off Achalov’s 10,000-man meeting (which Achalov now says will be more like 5,000).
  • The editorial fails to recognize how demoralized the army is by reforms and a reformer like Serdyukov.  One reader even suggested that, after buying arms abroad, Russia might once again hire foreign officers too.
  • The editorial’s opponents say it’s Serdyukov who’s destroyed the army, and one argued you can only reform the army if you were commissioned a lieutenant and fought in a ‘hot spot.’
  • Finally, less polemical types argued Vedomosti didn’t address the state of the Russian Army’s combat capability under Serdyukov.  One said cutting is not reform, and the division-to-brigade transformation was really no more than a recognition of the true state of affairs in most formations.  Another suggested going to Siberia or the Far East and sounding the combat alarm in a motorized rifle brigade to observe directly how combat readiness has collapsed (of course, maybe that’s why this year’s training is to focus on small units).

The comments of those who agree with the editorial actually mesh up kind of nicely (at least for purposes of contrast) with those above:

  • The army was destroyed in the 1990s by its own bloated cadre officer corps that turned into a band of uniformed profiteers (but were they any different from other Russians at that time?).  This generals’ mafia was capable neither of defending the country nor returning conscript sons home safely to their mothers.  One reader said the near-disaster in South Ossetia only confirmed the correctness of Serdyukov’s direction.
  • These readers said the right civilian makes a good Defense Minister.  One compared Serdyukov (once again) to Robert McNamara.
  • Another reader said he supports Serdyukov, but he still can’t tell if Russia’s combat readiness or the effectiveness of its defense expenditures is higher under him or not.
  • A final reader wants to give Serdyukov a chance and more time to see if he can improve the country’s defense capability.  He says he was a conscript in 2000-02 and only fired his weapon three times during that period.

Serdyukov’s Carte Blanche

In an editorial Monday, Vedomosti supported the carte blanche President Dmitriy Medvedev has apparently given Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and his military reforms.  The paper likes the reforms enough that it wants the President to think about the possible effectiveness of the ‘army method’ in reforming the MVD.  Here’s what Vedomosti had to say:

“Renaming the Army”

“Dmitriy Medvedev’s and Anatoliy Serdykov’s joint trip to a model Moscow suburban military unit went beyond the protocol of the visit.  The President’s speech in awarding outstanding military men became a new signal to officers, the army, and society:  ‘Despite the fact that all changes are difficult, they are necessary…  Everything that is now being done is directed at establishing modern and effective armed forces.  Here there are both problems and good decisions, I am following this personally as Supreme CINC.’  The Kremlin demonstrated that, despite the recent media scandal, it trusts the civilian Defense Minister, won’t bow to the generals’ and veterans’ opposition, and intends to continue its planned military reform.”

“The new carte blanche for Serdyukov for further transformation is important for many reasons.  The current minister is not the first civilian director of the military department.  However, he specifically replaced a campaign of reforming with systematic transformations.  In his inheritance from Sergey Ivanov, Serdyukov received a much truncated army of the Soviet type, not answering modern requirements.  Dedovshchina, obsolete armaments (modern equipment is not much more than 10% of the general inventory) and command and control, and manning were its main problems.  Add to this corruption among the generals which prevented equipping the army with new types of armaments and communications.  The victorious August war of 2008 showed that the victors couldn’t suppress the enemy’s aviation and artillery and were inferior to the vanquished in modern communications and reconnaissance means.”

“Serdyukov’s attempts to establish control over expenditures on purchases for the army met severe resistance from rear services officers and generals.  Not long ago he acknowledged to journalists:  ‘When I came to the Defense Ministry, speaking plainly, I was surrounded by large amounts of thievery.  Financial licentiousness, the impunity of people whom no one had checked out (…) was so deeply ingrained that it had already become a way of thinking.’  The minister confirms that the transparency of the defense order is a ways off.  The unnecessary secrecy of the military budget is interfering with this.  Meanwhile, progress in the struggle against traders in shoulderboards is obvious.  In 2006, corruption cases were started against seven generals, in 2007, when Serdyukov became minister, — against 16, in 2008 — against 20, in the first half of this year — against eight more.”

“Besides this, the Defense Ministry put up for sale unneeded property and facilities which were being illegally rented out to enrich a few people, and didn’t allow for building apartment blocks for officers needing housing on these grounds.”

“On the whole, it’s possible also to consider organizational transformations a success:  the transition to a more modern system of command and control and the reduction in the excess number of generals and higher officers.  In 2008, of 249 generals and admirals who underwent certification [аттестация], 50 were dismissed, and 130 sent to new places of service.  One can’t avoid mistakes in cutting and dismissing officers, but those deprived of a sinecure cried loudest of all about the collapse of the army and treason.”

“The struggle with barracks hooliganism goes on with varying success.  According to the Main Military Prosecutor’s data, in 2006, more than 5,800 people suffered beatings from fellow servicemen, in 2009 — 3,000.  And for the first five months of 2010, 1,167 soldiers suffered from dedovshchina — 1.5 times more than the analogous period of 2009, of them, four died.  The cause is not only in the growth — because of the cut in the service term — the number of new conscripts went from 123,000 in the fall of 2006 to the current 270,600.  Generals, having botched the program costing 84 billion rubles to transfer to contract, now are forced to call up those with criminal records.  Military police will remain a paper tiger for ‘dedy’ and ethnic clans.  We note that Serdyukov hasn’t forsaken a professional army, but put off its creation until the time when the Defense Ministry will be able to select and not collect contractees through deception and duress.”

“Nevertheless, it’s notable that over 3 and 1/2 years, the reform, being conducted by independent managers without legal changes and loud renamings, has really moved forward.  It’s possible it’s worth the President considering the effectiveness of the army method in reforming the MVD.”

Shamanov Update

Shamanov's BMW 525 (photo: Lifenews.ru)

If we needed reminding, the extent of media coverage of Shamanov’s narrow escape from Saturday’s horrific head-on collision proves again that this two-star general is a national figure.

So what happened?  Shamanov’s warrant officer driver was killed; some press is saying he turned the car to take the blow himself and protect the boss.

Shamanov was in serious, but stable condition, and was moved from Tula to Moscow’s Burdenko Main Military Clinical Hospital.  Also injured were the acting commander of the VDV’s 106th Division, Colonel Aleksey Naumets, and Shamanov’s assistant Colonel Oleg Chernous.  Naumets’ condition is serious, but Chernous has improved a little. 

Putin Visits Shamanov (photo: RIA Novosti)

Prime Minister Putin and Defense Minister Serdyukov visited his bedside.  Izvestiya reported Putin said Shamanov was in a good mood despite what happened to him.  Serdyukov said:

“Vladimir Shamanov is real airborne, and airborne, as is well-known, are spiritually strong and physically powerful people.  Therefore I’m sure that he’ll get right and return to the line.”

Shamanov was in satisfactory condition this morning, and he went into surgery at 1200 MSK.  The focus of today’s operation was the general’s left leg.  Reports say Shamanov suffered a concussion and unspecified fractures to his arms and legs.

One has to wonder if Shamanov can rebound from this.  He might, but he might not be the same.  It would be surprising if he’s able to resume his regimen of jumping with the troops, etc.  He’s 53 and faces retirement on age grounds in a couple years unless he adds another star.  If he emerges from this accident with any kind of disability, he could be put out for that reason.  Of course, it all comes down to whether the powers-that-be want him in or out.

And this story wouldn’t be complete without possible conspiracy.  More than a couple commentators wonder if someone isn’t out to eliminate Shamanov . . . could be his son-in-law Glyba’s enemies . . . could be airborne veterans who might object to his slavish support for Serdyukov.  The Defense Ministry denies that anyone was out to get the VDV Commander.  It might just be an accident.