Monthly Archives: December 2010

Early Bidding on VKO

Posted on December 13, 2010 | Leave a comment

2011 should be interesting on the Aerospace Defense (VKO or ВКО) front. 

The President’s poslaniye has been turned into orders, including Medvedev’s directive to unify missile defense (PRO), air defense (PVO), missile attack warning (PRN), and space monitoring systems under the command and control of a single strategic command before next December.

This issue will likely take more than a year to come to any kind of resolution.  Moreover, it’s likely to be a bruising bureaucratic battle royale over control and organization that does nothing to improve Russia’s military capabilities, certainly in the near-term and possibly longer. 

Both Deynekin and Svpressa.ru below make the point that there are real live officers who’ll get jerked around (again) by major moves in aerospace-related branches.  Konovalov wonders whether the Kremlin won’t spend too much effort against the wrong threat.

According to RIA Novosti, a Defense Ministry source says the issue of establishing this command by taking PVO from the Air Forces (VVS) and giving it to the Space Troops (KV) is being worked.  And he doesn’t rule out that “significant organizational and structural changes” could occur in the KV.  But, of course, the final decision on this strategic command lies with the Supreme CINC.

RIA Novosti interviewed former VVS CINC, Army General Petr Deynekin, who said:

“. . . the new structure [VKO] shouldn’t be subordinate to some new command.  It should go under the Air Forces, since they are the most modern service of the armed forces.”

He also warned the Defense Ministry against a reorganization which creates more tension in the officer corps.

Olga Bozhyeva in Moskovskiy komsomolets reviews the past history of transformations involving PVO and Missile-Space Defense (RKO), and concludes the VVS and KV will both end up subordinate to a new command under the General Staff.

Interviewed for Novyy region, Leonid Ivashov sees nothing new in Medvedev’s order on a unitary VKO command.  But it will be an uphill task.  He says Russia currently has practically no missile defense system.  The PVO system’s been reduced to point defense, and it doesn’t cover much of Russia’s territory.  More than anything, he sees it as a defense-industrial issue – can the OPK provide the military with new air and space defense systems?

Svpressa.ru concludes there’s no doubt aerospace attack is Russia’s biggest threat, but over the last two decades armed forces reformers have just played their favorite game of putting services and branches together and taking them apart again, and:

“No one considers the money and material resources expended, or even the fates of thousands of officers who’ve fallen under the chariot wheel of organizational-personnel measures.”

Svpressa.ru describes how RKO and the Military-Space Forces (VKS) went to the RVSN under Defense Minister Sergeyev in 1997, then PVO went to the VVS, and they had to create the KV as a home for elements the RVSN no longer wanted in 2001.  The article concludes that this kept VKO divided in half.  Now VVS and KV generals are already hotly debating how Medvedev’s new order on VKO will be implemented.

Svpressa.ru asked Aleksandr Konovalov what he thinks.  Konovalov says VKO is being created against the U.S., when Russia faces more immediate threats from countries without any space capabilities.

In terms of how a unitary strategic command of VKO might be established, Konovalov concludes:

“It’s still impossible to judge this.  I think Serdyukov doesn’t know the answer to this question yet.  Another thing worries me more.  Here we’ve created four operational-strategic [sic] commands – ‘East,’ ‘Center,’ ‘South,’ and ‘West’ – in the Armed Forces in the event of war.  And in peacetime on these borders four military districts remain.  I can’t understand how they will interact.  And it’s all right if I don’t understand.  It’s worse if the Defense Ministry itself is also ignorant.  Judging by everything, it’s impossible to rule this out.  And there are much more real enemies than the U.S. against these newly-minted operational-strategic [sic] commands and districts.  That’s something to think about.  But VKO . . .  If there’s extra money, VKO could also be created.  It could be useful some time.”

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Posted in Air Forces, Command and Control, Force Structure, RVSN, Space Troops

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No Carrier in GPV

Posted on December 11, 2010 | 4 comments

Despite the Navy CINC’s optimism last winter, Defense Minister Serdyukov stated flatly late yesterday Russia has no plans to build carriers in the near future. 

MOSCOW, 10 Dec — RIA Novosti.  The RF Defense Ministry has no plans for aircraft carrier construction in the near future, the chief of the military department Anatoliy Serdyukov stated Friday.

“No, there are no plans,” said Serdyukov, answering such a question from journalists. 

Earlier an RF Defense Ministry representative told RIA Novosti that Russia would begin construction of a class of aircraft carriers consisting of four units before 2020.  According to him, these ships are needed for the full-fledged functioning of the Navy, and the Defense Ministry will not abandon the idea and intention of building them.

Some desires die hard, but that seems like a categorical no.

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Posted in Naval Modernization

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More Military Personnel Decrees

Posted on December 10, 2010 | 1 comment

Kremlin.ru published four more decrees from President Medvedev on military personnel changes today. 

  • General-Lieutenant Studenikin’s removal is surprising.  He’s had some good jobs, and he’s not necessarily too old to serve in another post. 
  • Dismissed General-Colonel Tkachev commanded Baluyevskiy’s experimental Eastern Regional Command, the latest forerunner of today’s four OSKs.
  • There’s a change as chief of staff in the federal chemical weapons storage directorate.
  • That bastard child of the armed forces may be reorganizing – it sounds as if there may be a new Main Directorate of Railroad Troops, presumably it would be part of Bulgakov’s MTO empire.
  • More staff officers from the MDs relieved and dismissed.  Former 58th Army commander Sobolev is dismissed.
  • There’s even a change in one you don’t hear about every day (or even every decade) – the Special Service of Strategic Communications of the RF President.
  • Finally, the changes in the new MDs are getting squared away – commanders and first deputy commanders in the new Southern, Eastern, and Central MDs roll over from their old positions.  Salyukov moves to the General Staff. 

Here are the details. 

Appointed:

  • Colonel Igor Nikolayevich Dylevskiy, Chief, 5th Directorate, Main Operations Directorate, General Staff.
  • Colonel Vladimir Leonidovich Suvorov, Professor, Military Art Faculty (Military Strategy), Military Academy of the General Staff, relieving him of duty as First Deputy Chief, 5th Directorate, Main Personnel Directorate, Defense Ministry.

Relieved of duties: 

  • General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Igorevich Studenikin, Deputy CINC, Ground Troops.
  • Colonel Andrey Gennadyevich Kharitonov, Chief of Staff for Armaments, First Deputy Chief of Armaments, Volga-Ural MD.

Relieved of duties and dismissed from military service:

  • General-Major Vladimir Pavlovich Yedryshev, Chief of Missile Troops and Artillery, Volga-Ural MD.
  • General-Major Nikolay Pavlovich Shebanov, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Chief, Federal Directorate for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons, Ministry of Industry and Trade.

Dismissed from military service:

  • General-Major Yuriy Mikhaylovich Rovchak.

* * *

Appointed:

  • Colonel Sergey Viktorovich Bindel, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief, Federal Directorate for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons, Ministry of Industry and Trade.

Relieved and dismissed:

  • Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Nikolayevich Menyayelo, Deputy Chief, Main Directorate of Communications.

 Dismissed:

  • General-Lieutenant Andrey Ivanovich Grigoryev.
  • General-Major of Justice Viktor Anatolyevich Salatov.
  • General-Colonel Nikolay Fedorovich Tkachev.

* * *

Appointed:

  • Colonel Dmitriy Yuryevich Boyarskiy, Deputy Director, Department of Planning and Coordination of Material-Technical Support, Defense Ministry, and Chief, Operational-Planning Directorate.
  • General-Major Oleg Ivanovich Kosenkov, Chief, Main Directorate of Railroad Troops, relieved of duty as Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Railroad Troops.

Relieved and dismissed:

  • General-Major Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Bulanov, Special Service of Strategic Communications of the RF President.
  • General-Major Vladimir Nikolayevich Glinin, Chief, Combat Training Directorate, North Caucasus MD.

Dismissed:

  • General-Lieutenant Viktor Ivanovich Sobolev.

* * *

Appointed:

  • General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Viktorovich Galkin, Commander, Southern MD, relieved of duties as Commander, North Caucasus MD.
  • General-Major Nikolay Nikolayevich Pereslegin, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Southern MD, relieved of duties as Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, North Caucasus MD.
  • General-Colonel Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, relieved of duties as Commander, Far East MD.
  • General-Lieutenant Anatoliy Alekseyevich Sidorov, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Eastern MD, relieved of duties as Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Far East MD.
  • General-Lieutenant Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Central MD, relieved of duties as Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Volga-Ural MD.
  • General-Lieutenant Vladimir Valentinovich Chirkin, Commander, Central MD, relieved of duties as Commander, Siberian MD.

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Posted in Military Leadership, Officer Corps

Solomonov and Bulava

Posted on December 9, 2010 | Leave a comment

Bulava designer Yuriy Solomonov seems to have come out from underground now that the Bulava SLBM has some successes under its belt.

Yesterday the Russian media carried excerpts from a soon-to-be-published interview with Igor Korotchenko’s Natsionalnaya oborona. 

Solomonov already has a book about his adventures in missile design to his credit.  The only thing that’s changed is the Bulava program seems to be righting itself.

Solomonov said, not surprisingly, that the Bulava’s warheads are ready, and he expects the missile to stay in the inventory until 2050.

He expects Votkinsk to ramp up for Bulava production.  He noted that, for a facility that produced 100 missiles a year in Soviet times, “Now there isn’t any kind of problem from the point of view of organizing the technological process and organizing people for this task.”

Solomonov said Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy will begin (like Dmitriy Donskoy did) with a surface test launch.  But he doesn’t rule out that this could be changed to a submerged launch.  The tentative date is 17 December. 

He forecasts 4 tests in 2011, the start of serial Bulava production, and possibly the missile’s acceptance into the Navy arsenal, if it achieves a “high reliability coefficient.”

In the interview, Solomonov apparently will talk about how Bulava could be adapted into a ground-launched missile.  This brings back the whole issue of “inter-service unification,” which led to some of the excitement with Bulava.

Svpressa.ru and Anatoliy Tsyganok have a good time lambasting Solomonov for this (again) if you want to take a look.

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Posted in Defense Industry, Naval Modernization, Strategic Forces Modernization

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Suicidal Lieutenants

Posted on December 9, 2010 | Leave a comment

President Toasts the Kuropatkins (photo: Aleksandr Astafyev)

The Pacific Fleet command and investigators say the shooting of a 22-year-old lieutenant assigned to a 35-year-old LST in Fokino was a suicide attempt, and not the result of ‘nonregulation relations’ or dedovshchina.  The incident occurred 1 December.  Lieutenant Maksim Kuropatkin was found with a gunshot wound to the head, and he remains in a coma.  Investigators say he shot himself with his service sidearm in the presence of two witnesses.  No criminal case has been initiated.  Their preliminary conclusion is that Kuropatkin suffered a nervous breakdown caused by difficulty adapting to life in the service.

Moskovskiy komsomolets point out the Kuropatkin case is a little special because President Dmitriy Medvedev was the surprise guest of honor at the lieutenant’s wedding in early July.  Medvedev was touring the Far East, and arrived at Birobidzhan’s wedding palace in time to witness three marriages including Kuropatkin’s.  Medvedev wished the lieutenant and his bride a “long happy family life.”  He ordered the governor of the Jewish AO to find apartments for all three couples.  About a month ago, the Kuropatkins got their apartment.

Kuropatkin’s family doesn’t believe his shooting was a suicide attempt.  They say he was always goal-oriented, and aimed for a military career from age 14 (presumably he attended a Nakhimov Naval School).  He graduated from the Pacific Naval Institute late this spring, married, and had been in his first assignment only a couple months.

They also say Kuropatkin recently mentioned the name of a senior officer who often picked on him, and was constantly nagging him to draw up some kind of documents, and when Kuropatkin refused, he said, “Well, that’s it, it’s the end for you.” 

A 24-year-old lieutenant named Ivan Yegorov died in what was also called a suicide aboard Slava-class CG Varyag in mid-November.  MK sums up saying:

“According to the opinion of knowledgeable people, dedovshchina in the officer environment ranges up to physical violence and shootings.”

RIA Novosti also reported a Baltic Fleet suicide this week.  A 23-year-old lieutenant from the Pionerskiy garrison reportedly shot himself in the chest with a Makarov pistol.  He apparently left a note.  The chair of the Kaliningrad Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers said she was completely surprised by this incident, adding that there have never been “any signals” of problems from the unit where this lieutenant served.

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Posted in Law, Order, and Discipline, Navy, Officer Corps

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The Air Forces and the GPV

Posted on December 8, 2010 | 1 comment

General-Lieutenant Sadofyev

Last week, General-Lieutenant Igor Sadofyev – Chief of Aviation, Deputy CINC of the Air Forces (VVS) for Aviation – spoke to the press about his service’s ambitious plans for procurement under State Armaments Program (GPV), 2011-2020.

General-Lieutenant Sadofyev told RIA Novosti the VVS will receive 1,500 new, and 400 modernized aircraft by 2020.  The Chief of Aviation said the State Defense Order (GOZ or ГОЗ) for 2011 includes acquisition of Su-27SM, Su-30M2, Su-34, Su-35S, and Yak-130 aircraft for the VVS, as well as Ka-52, Mi-28N, Mi-8AMTSh (MTV-5-1), Ka-226, Ansat-U helicopters for Army Aviation.  But he provided no specific procurement numbers for next year.

Su-34 (photo: RIA Novosti / Igor Rumyantsev)

For Long-Range Aviation (LRA or ДА), he said the VVS will modernize existing Tu-160, Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and Il-78M aircraft.  The goal is to update 80 percent of this inventory in what he calls the medium-term future – defined by him as 2020.  What he has in mind here is service life extension and the replacement of some electronics and other systems.

For Military-Transport Aviation (VTA or ВТА), Sadofyev says the VVS will modernize its existing aircraft, and purchase more than 50 percent new ones.  He doesn’t break it down by particular types of transports.

For Frontal Aviation, some existing aircraft will be modernized, and over that medium-term future (2020) more than half the order-of-battle will be replaced with new aircraft, and 14 percent of the inventory will be ‘perspektivnyy’ (перспективный) aircraft.  One supposes that means PAK FA.  If that 14 percent is 70 PAK FAs, that would put Frontal Aviation at about 500 aircraft total.

Army Aviation, according to Sadofyev, will get 70 percent new aircraft by 2020, and 100 percent sometime afterward.  He said the VVS will begin getting the Ка-52 / Alligator next year.  And he made a point of noting that Army Aviation will remain within the VVS, despite rumors it might return to the Ground Troops.

He said serial deliveries of the Yak-130 trainer will begin next year to replace 1970s-vintage L-39 jets.  Flight instructors and technical personnel will learn the Yak-130 at Lipetsk before using it to train young pilots at Krasnodar.

Sadofyev also told RIA Novosti the number of VVS day-night, all-weather aircraft will increase 4.5 times, and this will lower aircraft losses by a factor of 10-12.  According to him, the share of precision weapons in the VVS will increase 18 times, taking it to 70 percent of the inventory by 2020.  So less than 4 percent of current air-delivered munitions qualify as precision weapons.  UAVs will be increased 6 times, taking them to 30 percent of the aircraft inventory.  So they are about 5 percent at present.  Sadofyev adds that money will go to providing a common reconnaissance-information environment for the VVS.

Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Vladimir Drik also talked about VVS procurement last week.  He said the VVS got new and modernized aircraft this year, including Su-27SM and Su-25SM, and Mi-24PM and Ansat-U helicopters.  But he had to admit only the Ansat-U is new, and he didn’t provide numbers.

There was a major garble over the Su-27SM.  RIA Novosti quoted Drik as saying the VVS “received four squadrons of modernized Su-27SM” this year.  In fact, the transfer of the final 4 of 48 Su-27SM happened in late November 2009.

Drik said Russia’s air defenses will be 100 percent new by 2020, with the VVS operating the S-400, S-500, and Pantsir-S.  Once again, no one seems to want to talk about what’s going on with SAM production.

Igor Korotchenko’s take on VVS procurement from October looks pretty on-target in light of this latest press.  He said the priorities were precision weapons, automated C2, aircraft, and air defense systems.  And, at that time, he put the acquisition numbers at 500 new aircraft, 1,000 helicopters, and 200 air defense systems.

All in all, an extremely ambitious plan.  Fulfilling it will demand complete and timely funding, and even then it will be a challenge for Russia’s aviation industry.  Also, Sergey Ivanov says the GPV has gone to the government today, so maybe we’ll learn how VVS requirements fare.  VVS will be a priority, but we’ll have to see how high.

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Posted in Air Forces, Command and Control, Force Modernization

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A Really Cheap Post

Posted on December 7, 2010 | 9 comments

Tomorrow will be this blog’s 365th day of existence.  One hopes it’s been a good source of understanding, or at least information.

309 posts in 365 days is a pretty good average, but one wishes there had been no “no post” days at all.  There’s been a conscious effort to avoid lots of cheap posts.  This author thinks there’s something significant to write about every day, and there’s a backlog of great topics too.  Some with great information that haven’t been written — more on YeSU TZ system testing, developments in the UAV production debate, and GLONASS.  You’re owed an update on German and Italian armor for Russian combat vehicles.

A post on the Air Forces and the GPV is almost ready.  This blog started last year with a post on the trouble brigade at Kamenka, and you deserve an update.  The recent reported suicides of two lieutenants in the Pacific Fleet is another interesting one.  How about the launching of an anti-Serdyukov movement among former officers from the Main Directorate of Combat Training.  One hasn’t managed to return to the military housing story, or to the anti-reform monograph by Grinyayev and Fomin.  How about this one — the ECHR has ruled Moscow must pay millions of Euros in compensation for civilian casualties in several 1999 and 2000 operations, some headed by Vladimir Shamanov.  There’s a great story from the FSKN and the General Prosecutor about illegal drug use among young Russians, including in the military.

You get the picture.

Input or feedback of any kind would be welcome and helpful.  The statistics say you’re out there, quietly reading.

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Posted in Uncategorized

Cablegate on the Mistral Sale

Posted on December 6, 2010 | Leave a comment

In case you missed it in Wikileaks, the U.S. Defense Secretary discussed many important topics with his French counterpart in early 2010, and France’s plan to sell the Mistral to Russia among them, though it may have been one of the less urgent issues.

What you read is the dialogue of allies respectfully sharing differing views of the situation and its significance.  It’s interesting for Defense Secretary Robert Gates to say it’s not Russia’s capability the U.S. worries about, but about sending the wrong signal to new allies on Moscow’s doorstep.  His French counterpart argues for Mistral as a tangible sign of the benefits of Russian partnership with the Western allies.  He concedes the ship is intended for power projection, but argues this single ship [well, two plus the plans for two more] won’t change Russia’s capabilities much given the poor condition of its naval production infrastructure.

————–Russia/Mistral                                                                                                                           ————–

18. (S/NF) SecDef expressed U.S. concerns about the Mistral sale to Russia.  He told Morin that because of Sarkozy’s involvement in brokering a ceasefire in Georgia, which Russia was not fully honoring, the sale would send the wrong message to Russia and to our Allies in Central and East Europe.

 19. (S/NF) Morin told SecDef pointedly that he had pushed hard for the sale.  He conceded that it was indeed a warship for power projection.  But Morin asked rhetorically how we can tell Russia we desire partnership but then not trust them.  Morin told SecDef that he understood the U.S. position on considering Central and East European Allies’ concerns about the perceived threat from Russia.  Morin argued, however, that this single ship would not make any difference with respect to Russian capabilities, as Russia’s naval production ability was severely degraded.

 20. (S/NF) SecDef replied that U.S. concerns were not about military capacity but about messaging.  Some allies, because of their past experiences, are still very concerned with Russia and are not sure how much to trust the West.  SecDef observed that Russian democracy has disappeared and the government was an oligarchy run by the security services.  President Medvedev has a more pragmatic vision for Russia than PM Putin, but there has been little real change.

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Posted in Arms Sales, Defense Industry, Naval Modernization

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Serdyukov’s Two Presidents

Posted on December 6, 2010 | 1 comment

One can’t avoid Wikileaks forever . . . you’ve already read about “alpha dog” Putin, and Medvedev who plays Robin to Putin’s Batman.  But not many media outlets picked up on Defense Minister Serdyukov’s story, but Argumenty nedeli did.

In early 2009, the Azeri Defense Minister reportedly shared details of his meeting with Serdyukov with the U.S. Ambassador in Baku.  Sufficiently lubricated after sharing two bottles of vodka, Serdyukov allegedly asked his Azeri counterpart:

“Do you follow the orders of your President?”

Then Serdyukov volunteered:

“Well, I follow the orders of two Presidents.”

This is really no more than anecdotal confirmation of what’s been known all along — Serdyukov was put in place by Putin, and he’s part of Team Putin.  While appropriately deferential and respectful of President Medvedev, Serdyukov is very unlikely to get in a situation where he might have to cross his mentors from Team Putin.  Medvedev himself is part of the Team writ large, but he’s from a different, and less influential branch.  So, the ruling tandem has a senior and junior member and everyone knows it.

Not exactly a revelation, but Serdyukov’s admission makes for a funny story, and no small embarrassment for him now in dealing with Dmitriy Anatolyevich.

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Posted in Military Leadership, Serdyukov's Reforms

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Scapegoat Biront Wins in Court, for Now

Posted on December 5, 2010 | Leave a comment

Lieutenant Colonel Biront (photo: http://www.odnoklassniki.ru)

Last Tuesday, the Lyubertsy Garrison Military Court held President Medvedev’s dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Biront to be illegal.  Recall Biront was the President’s and the Defense Ministry’s scapegoat when the 2512th Central Aviation-Technical Base of Naval Aviation burned in this summer’s infernos near Moscow.

A criminal case for negligence was also raised against Biront, but, according to Moskovskiy komsomolets, they punished him by dismissing him “in connection with nonfulfillment of contract.”  Biront fought back, and an inquiry revealed that, as of 1 February, the base’s firefighting unit had been disbanded, a 50-meter fire break hadn’t been established, and firefighting supplies were absent.  Biront had informed his leadership, but was ignored.  Biront’s lawyer also argued that his client had an impeccable 26-year service record, and had only been in charge of the Kolomna base for 3 months and 25 days.

The lawyer said Biront was left with 70 sailors to dig a fire safety zone around an 8-kilometer perimeter.  And Biront’s predecessor was fined for trying to dig this zone on his own.  The lawyer says the Defense Ministry plans to appeal the overturning of Biront’s dismissal.

In its coverage, Kommersant said Biront’s lawyer pointed out that every due process was violated in his client’s case: 

“First an investigation is performed regarding the disciplinary violation which served as the basis for dismissal, then the serviceman should be familiarized with its results and guaranteed the right to present his objections.  None of this was done.”

The lawyer continues, “The president gave the order to sort it all out and dismiss the guilty, but they didn’t sort it out and found a scapegoat among the unit’s officers.”

In Kommersant’s version, Biront and 30 sailors fought the fires armed with nothing but axes. 

One officer told the paper a chain reaction following Biront’s victory was likely, as others dismissed make similar appeals based on the lack of due process.

So, one can conclude that Medvedev’s ‘tough guy’ on-the-spot firing in the 4 August special Sovbez session was really nothing more than feelgood PR at best, or stupid at worst.  But, if they want to get Biront, they will, especially for being impudent enough to fight the system, and not being a quiet, cooperative victim. 

Biront is one of those allegedly superfluous officers denigrated by the victors in Serdyukov’s ‘new profile’ reforms for being a ‘housekeeper,’ uninterested or unprepared to conduct combat training.

The news about the Biront case has received very little media attention.

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Posted in Military Leadership, Navy, Officer Corps, Rear Services, Serdyukov's Reforms

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