Monthly Archives: May 2011

More Appointments, Dismissals

Vedomosti’s been following the rather turgid decrees from Defense Minister Serdyukov, and apparently managed to notice that he’s ordered 30 percent of Armed Forces officers to change duty stations before 1 December (the beginning of the 2012 training year).

Rotating officers every three years is a policy Serdyukov’s pushed since at least late 2009, if not earlier.  And it’s quite a shift in thinking for a military establishment in which officers often served their entire careers in the same district or garrison, or even unit. 

It’s a good and overdue shakeup, but one that brings costs and headaches that the Defense Ministry always wanted to avoid.  For example, in the not-distant past, officers would try to avoid remote assignments, of course, or ones where their wives would find it difficult to work or their children to get a good education.  Or they might not want to go somewhere that couldn’t provide equivalent service housing, or might be a terminal assignment in an undesirable location.

All this is just by way of saying that the cadre moves we’ve followed in President Medvedev’s decrees on Armed Forces personnel changes seem to confirm a pretty unprecedented rate of reassignments and rotations, at least for O-6s and above.  And they’ve confirmed more of an effort to move senior officers up in rank, or out at age 50, 55, or 60.

In any event, an overlooked decree from 30 March.


  • Colonel Nikolay Nikolayevich Galchishak, Commander, 5th Independent Tank Brigade, 36th Army.
  • Colonel Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Gurov, Commander, 6th Independent Tank Brigade, 20th Army.
  • Lieutenant Colonel Vladislav Nikolayevich Yershov, Commander, 21st Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd Army.
  • Colonel Sergey Nikolayevich Kombarov, Commander, 7th Independent Tank Brigade.
  • Colonel Eduard Vladimirovich Filatov, Commander, 9th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, 20th Army.


  • General-Major Aleksandr Sergeyevich Nikitin, Chief, Operational Directorate, Far East MD.

Relieve and dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major Yuriy Eduardovich Kuznetsov, Commander, 6950th Aviation Base (1st Rank).

Dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major of Justice Grigoriy Petrovich Kuleshov.

Aerospace Defense Troops’s Sergey Ishchenko published an interesting piece on VKO late last Friday.  He wrote that Space Troops Commander, General-Lieutenant Oleg Ostapenko recently reported to the Federation Council on the creation of VKO, making it clear that Ostapenko’s branch, as reported earlier and elsewhere, will be the basis of Russia’s unified VKO due to stand up by 1 December.

Ishchenko makes these additional points:

  • The long-range missile for the S-400 is still in testing.
  • He doubts the S-500 will be delivered in 2015.
  • His interviewee believes the new Aerospace Defense Troops will get all or some of Russia’s SAM force from the VVS.
  • The interviewee thinks the S-500 is on schedule.

Ishchenko says the debate over the lead for VKO didn’t necessarily center on what’s best to protect Russia’s security, but rather on who would receive new resources and general officer billets.

The Air Forces argued they were best suited to lead it, but the Space Troops apparently argued persuasively that they were better prepared to handle Russia’s future transatmospheric threats.

Now, a quick editorial aside from Ishchenko’s narrative . . . this decision is probably a good thing for the Air Forces, which already have their hands full and don’t need more missions.  They stand to lose only some part of the surface-to-air missile business (which hasn’t always been a core mission for them anyway).  And the VVS will benefit by concentrating on their most important tasks.

But back to Ishchenko . . . he provides a fine review of the USSR’s space weapons and space defense efforts, which, arguably, met or exceeded those of the United States.  He notes President Yeltsin’s 1993 decree on creating VKO, for which no one moved so much as a finger, at least partially because of the country’s economic and budgetary predicament at that time. 

Then Ishchenko gets more interesting.  He details the danger posed to Russia by U.S. “noncontact” wars in Iraq (sic), Yugoslavia, and Libya.  These, however, are really wars of the past rather than the future, he says.  Ishchenko moves on to the threat of Prompt Global Strike.

He talks about a hypersonic bomber cruising at Mach 5-7 speeds and altitudes up to 30,000 meters, beyond the reach of Russia’s current SAMs.  Of course, IOC isn’t before 2025, but Moscow needs to start thinking today about how to counter it.  Meanwhile, the state-of-the-art Russian SAM, the S-400, is barely fielded and its extended range missile is still being tested.  Its successor, the S-500, is supposed to be ready in 2015, but Ishchenko is skeptical.

The end of Ishchenko’s article is a brief interview with the chief editor of the journal Vozdushno-kosmicheskaya oborona, Mikhail Khodarenok.  Khodarenok’s a retired colonel, professional air defender, graduate of the General Staff Academy, and former staffer of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU).  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, he was an outstanding military journalist for Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, but by 2003 or 2004, he left for VKO and Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, both wholly owned by air defense system designer Almaz-Antey.

Ishchenko asks what Khodarenok knows about the process of creating the Aerospace Defense Troops.  The latter hems about not having access to secret directives and documents before concluding:

“But I can say that much has already been determined.  In particular, it’s decided that Space Troops will be the basis of VKO.  Although there were other proposals.  The Air Forces, in particular, proposed taking their service as the basis.”

Asked about this tug-of-war for VKO within the Defense Ministry, he says:

“And this is a beloved Russian pasttime.  In our Armed Forces, they are constantly getting rid of something or resubordinating.  What happened, for example, with army aviation.  In my memory, five times it was given to the Air Forces, then returned to the Ground Troops.  Usually then five years of complete confusion.  Billions lost.  And it all begins again.”

Asked what will be in VKO:

“The basis is the Space Troops.  Evidently, the surface-to-air missile troops (ZRV) will be transferred to them from the VVS.  Fully or partially.  This isn’t determined yet.”

Finally, asked whether Almaz-Antey General Director Igor Ashurbeyli was replaced because of problems with the S-400’s long-range missile or issues in the S-500’s development, Khodarenok says:

“Ashurbeyli’s resignation was not connected with engineering problems in any way.  Neither with difficulties on the S-500, nor on the S-400.”

“I have my suppositions on this score.  But I don’t want to share them.  I repeat:  the most important thing is that the S-500’s development is on schedule.  And this system really will very much help the country’s aerospace defense.”

Navy Main Staff Moving 1 June

Navy Main Staff in Moscow

A Defense Ministry representative told RIA Novosti Friday that the main complex of the Navy’s Main Command has to be emptied before 1 June in connection with its move to St. Petersburg.  This means the Navy Main Staff building on Bolshoy Kozlovskiy.  The representative said 200 admirals and other officers have to head for the northern capital by the end of the month.
The source couldn’t say who will occupy the Main Staff’s old digs.  But other Navy Glavkomat buildings in Moscow aren’t being emptied yet.  These include the Navy Armaments Staff on Bolshoy Zlatoustinskiy, the Naval Aviation Staff in Skakovaya Alley, and the Rear Services Staff on Spartakovskaya Square.
RIA Novosti notes the back-and-forth, on-again / off-again nature of talk about moving the Navy’s headquarters to Piter.  Admiralty’s had a sign for several years saying it’s the home of the Navy Main Staff and Navy CINC.

The wire service failed to mention that Defense Minister Serdyukov has been solid all along, saying the transfer would happen eventually and gradually, even if his deputies or senior uniformed officers sometimes wavered on the issue.

Fateful Season for Bulava Begins

A Defense Ministry source tells RIA Novosti that Bulava SLBM testing will resume between 15 and 17 June.  The test launch will come from modified Proyekt 941U SSBN Dmitriy Donskoy, though the source claims Borey-class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy is ready to fire the missile.

Recall that Proyekt 955 Dolgorukiy was back at Sevmash for work this winter.

The source says the first launch from Dolgorukiy will come after two successful firings from Donskoy.

Bulava now has 7 reported successes in 14 tries.  There will be 4-5 tests in 2011.

If they are successful (and at least a couple come from Dolgorukiy), the SLBM and its intended submarine will be accepted into the Navy inventory.  And serial production of Bulava will ramp up. 

If they aren’t, the naval strategic modernization effort will find itself back where it was prior to two successful launches last October.

But the Russians seem pretty confident this time around.

Sweeping Clean at Spetsstroy

The broom has swept clean at Spetsstroy.

This morning’s ukaz from President Medvedev dismissed:

  • General-Major Vasiliy Petrovich Bogomolov.
  • General-Lieutenant Nikolay Vasilyevich Gulakov.
  • General-Lieutenant Vladimir Vladimirovich Mirzoyev.
  • General-Major Yuriy Fedorovich Onilov.
  • General-Major Aleksandr Vasilyevich Khodos.

RIA Novosti indicated Khodos had been ex-Spetsstroy Chief Abroskin’s Chief Engineer.  Bogomolov was his Deputy for Construction of Special Designation Facilities.  And Mirzoyev was Deputy for Capital Construction and Industry.  Specific duties for Onilov and Gulakov weren’t cited. 

Other Russian media noted they followed others forced out before Abroskin was retired.  Some accounts claimed they were connected to construction of “Putin’s palace” on the Black Sea.

In any event, ex-Deputy Defense Minister, now Spetsstroy Chief Grigoriy Naginskiy has wasted no time in getting a clean slate.  And it’s pretty rare that the wheels of the cadre machinery turn rapidly.  The whole operation must have been in the works for some time.

More Appointments, Dismissals

President Medvedev’s 3 March decree on Defense Ministry personnel.


  • Colonel Sergey Faatovich Akhmetshin, Deputy Chief, Main Staff, Air Forces, relieved as Chief, Central Command Post of the Deputy Chief for Combat Command and Control, Main Staff, Air Forces.
  • Rear-Admiral Aleksey Yevgenyevich Belkin, Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet for Material-Technical Support, relieved as Chief, Rear Services, Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet for Rear Services.
  • Colonel Andrey Nikolayevich Yeliseyev, Chief, Rear Support Directorate, Southern MD.
  • Colonel Igor Anatolyevich Kolesnikov, Chief, 644th Facility “S,” Regional Nuclear Support Center.
  • Colonel Aleksandr Nikolayevich Lyapkin, Chief, Development Planning Directorate, Air Forces, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff, Air Forces, relieved as Chief, Organizational-Planning Directorate, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff, Air Forces.
  • Captain First Rank Oleg Mikhaylovich Molchanov, Deputy Commander of Baltic Fleet for Personnel Work, relieved as Deputy Commander of Baltic Fleet for Socialization Work.
  • General-Major Petr Valentinovich Panteleyev, Chief, Faculty of National Security and State Defense, Military Academy of the General Staff, RF Armed Forces.
  • Colonel Nikolay Sergeyevich Sheludyakov, Chief 957th Facility “S,” Regional Nuclear Support Center.
  • General-Major Aleksey Dmitriyevich Konnov, Chief, Branch, Military Academy of the RVSN (Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast), relieved as Deputy Chief, Petr Velikiy Military Academy of the RVSN.
  • Colonel Anatoliy Vladimirovich Lbov, Deputy Commander of Baltic Fleet for Material-Technical Support, relieved as Chief of Rear Services, Deputy Commander of Baltic Fleet for Rear Services.
  • Captain First Rank Yuriy Vladimirovich Tripolskiy, Chief, Directorate of Material-Technical Support Planning and Coordination, Northern Fleet.
  • Colonel Andrey Sergeyevich Trifonov, Commander, 27th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade.


  • Colonel Aleksandr Lvovich Golubev, Chief, Operational Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff, Leningrad MD.
  • Colonel Viktor Petrovich Kosyanov, Chief, Rear Services, Deputy Commander of the 36th Army for Rear Services.
  • General-Major Sergey Ivanovich Levin, Chief of Staff of Rear Services, First Deputy Chief of Staff of Rear Services, Siberian MD.
  • General-Major Igor Vadimovich Sulim, Chief, Frontal and Army Aviation Directorate.
  • Colonel Sergey Viktorovich Zherikhov, Chief of Rear Services, Deputy Commander of 5th Army for Rear Services.
  • Rear-Admiral Farit Khaziyevich Zinnatullin, Chief of Armaments and Arms Servicing, Deputy Commander of Pacific Fleet for Armaments and Arms Servicing.
  • Colonel Oleg Anatolyevich Lakshin, Chief of Rear Services, Deputy Commander of 35th Army for Rear Services.

Relieve and dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major Mikhail Mikhaylovich Levshunov, Chief of Armaments, Deputy Commander of VDV for Armaments.
  • General-Major Pavel Georgiyevich Smelov, Chief, Missile Troops and Artillery, Siberian MD.

Dismiss from military service:

  • General-Major Ivan Vitalyevich Borodinchik.
  • General-Major Boris Georgiyevich Zaytsev.

The Sound of Managed Democracy?

The classic dilemma of civil-military relations . . . is jet noise the sound of freedom — or in this case, of managed democracy?

Or is jet noise a dangerous nuisance?

Last Sunday, ran an article on complaints about a major expansion of Baltimor Air Base on the outskirts of Voronezh.  Baltimor also goes by the name Voronezh-B.  This is just the most recent article on local concerns about Baltimor.  Novaya gazeta published on the situation in the middle of last year.

By year’s end, Baltimor is supposed to be Russia’s largest air base, with 200 aircraft, according to Svpressa.  A second, 3,500-meter runway is being built there to accommodate all aircraft types.  Takeoffs and landings at Baltimor occur just a few hundred meters away from apartment blocks.  Residents expect the jet noise to double along with the number of aircraft.  Here’s a video of local aircraft operations.  And another

Svpressa notes the air base was used little after 1990, except for spikes during the Chechen wars.  And from about 4 years ago, it was all but abandoned, overgrown, and broken down.  At the same time,  apartment construction grew outward toward the base.

The resumption and expansion of activity at Baltimor put nearby residents into action.  They believe, with 200 aircraft, flights will be virtually constant.  And a former serviceman told Svpressa he expects the base to have 200 flight days (and nights) a year, with as many as 10 aircraft up simultaneously.

Not surprisingly, residents worry about crashes, about fuel and munitions storage depots, about airport-level noise and vibration, and its effect on young children and infants.  Svpressa reprints their long petition to Voronezh officials asking who and how the air base’s expansion was approved:

“How was such a document signed?  Who was responsible for preparing it?  Why is the population’s opinion supplanted by the conclusions of some ‘experts’ and the silent consent of the oblast administration?”

The website also publishes Air Forces CINC Aleksandr Zelin’s answer.  He asserts they illegally built too close to the airfield, and emphasizes the state’s interest in expanding an existing air base rather than building a new one for “several billion rubles.”

The case of Baltimor Air Base is interesting in its own right, but it’s significant on two other levels.

On the first, the Baltimor situation is evolving in the context of debate over the Air Forces’ force structure and base structure.

Defense Minister Serdyukov’s major reforms pointed immediately at concentrating the Air Forces at fewer bases.  The exact number, however, has shifted constantly downward from 55 at first.  Recall at the 1 April Security Council session on the aviation sector, Medvedev told ministers and officials:

“Now the airfield network of military aviation does not correspond to the basing requirements of aviation groupings.  At the Defense Ministry collegium which took place recently [18 March], I gave orders to establish several large air bases.  Taking into account the deployment of troops, they will be situated on the main strategic axes.”

At the collegium, Serdyukov in fact announced, instead of 33 air bases, there will be eight army aviation bases subordinate to the four military districts / OSKs, and the number of aircraft at each will increase 2.5 or 3 times.  Of course, saying that and getting to that point are two different things entirely. printed a nice summary of the VVS ground infrastructure issue.  It concluded fewer bases would make things cheaper, but also easier for a potential enemy.  It said a similar effort to resubordinate air and air defense forces to MD commanders in the early 1980s failed.  Rossiyskaya gazeta said experts think the number of air bases should be different for different MDs, as should the mix of aircraft.

It seems, for economic reasons, these large air bases will be picked from the list of existing ones, they won’t necessarily take advantage of vast swaths of unpopulated territory, and they’re likely to irritate the civilian population.

Abandoning old bases and airfields leads to another, longstanding but growing problem of late — the archipelago of unneeded garrisons and military towns.  The Defense Ministry would like to shuffle them off to someone else’s responsibility, and resettling retired military, dependents, and civilian workers elsewhere has been problematic.  BRAC-like processes are especially painful in Russia. 

On the second level, Baltimor could become politically and socially significant.  It’s rare in Russia these days for a military problem to have that kind of potential.  

If politicians ignore or downplay what the locals feel is their basic right to health and environmental protection for the sake of an intangible state interest, there’s a chance Baltimor could become a more serious regional, or even national, issue.  Especially if similar circumstances arise in other cities.

This may seem a stretch, but remember ordinary Russians tend to be galvanized by the local impact of things like auto import tariffs, immigration, building roads through forests, etc.  And concern about the impact of air bases would come on top of other civil-military issues.

In Chelyabinsk, and several other places, the locals are protesting explosive ammunition destruction that is rocking parts of their cities.  Prosecutors already found that the military lied about the size and power of demolition activities not far from Chelyabinsk.  Chelyabinsk residents are also angry about overflights of the city from nearby military airfields.

What Kind of Army?

Not again . . . but yes, Wednesday Trud asked what kind of army does Russia need in the future? 

It’s almost 20 years since the army ceased to be Soviet, and the paper asked five relatively independent experts the same question that’s been asked since 1991 –what is to be done about Russia’s Armed Forces?

Yes, it’s repetitive . . . it’s rare we hear something new, the problem is not ideas and initiatives, it’s implementing them.

At the same time, these commentaries are short and pithy.  They cover a lot of ground, and might be handy.

Korotchenko supports the Defense Ministry’s swerve back toward contractees, since there aren’t enough conscripts.  And he doubts conscripts are up to the task of handling modern weapons.  But he points to the need to end dedovshchina and other barracks violence to attract professional enlisted. 

Sharavin believes the big mobilization army is still needed, and conscription will continue alongside contract service for some time.  He wants more benefits for conscripts who’ve served, and he wants the sons of the bureaucratic elite to serve. 

Belozerov agrees recruiting 425,000 professional soldiers won’t be easy or fast.

Litovkin is harsher; he says there’s no reform, just back and forth on contract service.  He lampoons the current small-scale effort to train professional NCOs.  He ridicules thoughts of a serious mobilization reserve because of the lack of reserve training.

Makiyenko thinks a contract army is cost prohibitive, and the army numbers only about 800,000.  He likes the fighting spirit of soldiers from the Caucasus, opposes segregating them, but hopes Muslim clergymen in the ranks can restrain them. 

Igor Korotchenko:

“Of the million servicemen, ideally we should have 220 thousand officers, 425 thousand contractees and 355 thousand conscripts.   It’s true, not now, but in 10 years.  On the one hand, this is due to the physical impossibility of calling up more — there is simply no one to put under arms according to demographic indicators.  In the last call-up, the army took in 70 thousand fewer conscripts than in the preceding campaigns.  On the other hand, it’s simply scary to entrust those weapons systems, which should be purchased in the coming decade according to the state armaments program (and this is 20 trillion rubles by 2020), to people who were just driven out of the  sticks and into the army for a year.  Whether the Armed Forces want it or not, they are doomed to a certain intellectualization.  However, this is impossible if existing nonregulation relations between servicemen are preserved.  It seems that the Armed Forces leadership has started to understand this.  A program for the humanization of  service which also aims to remove the problem of dodging service (about 200 thousand men) has appeared.  Now in the Ryazan VDV School the first graduating class of professional sergeants is finishing the three-year course of study.  The eradication of nonregulation relations is connected directly with them.”

Aleksandr Sharavin:

“What kind of army to have is determined primarily by the country’s geographic situation.  If there is a potential threat to its territory from neighboring countries, we need a conscript army, through which a large mass of young men pass and allows for having a great mobilization reserve as a result.  If there is no threat, we can limit ourselves to professionals.  Russia has such threats — look closely at the map!”

“Is the transition to a professional army possible in Russia?  I suggest it’s possible, but not necessary. According to the Supreme CINC, we will transition to a new profile of the Armed Forces in 10-15 years.  For this or an even more extended period, conscription will remain.  Possibly in a much easier form — they will serve, not a year, or will call-up not 200 and some thousand, as now, but only 170 thousand men.  In the future, it would do to reduce even this number.  Moreover, reducing it will allow a certain selection and thereby improve the quality of the young men conscripted into the army.”

“In my view, a serving citizen [conscript] can’t receive the current 500 rubles [per month].  Hard military work should be well-paid, otherwise it is objectively devalued.  The rate — not lower than the country’s minimum wage!  We also need to think about other stimuli:  free higher education for those who’ve served, some kind of favorable mortgage credit, and, most importantly, we should only accept those young men who’ve fulfilled their duty to the Homeland into state service.  No references to health conditions can be taken into account.  If there’s strength to be a bureaucrat — get well and find the strength to serve in yourself!  If we need to amend the Constitution for this, we’ll amend it.  Our neighbors in Kazakhstan went this way and got a double benefit:  improved quality of the army contingent and bureaucrats who are not so divorced from the people, as in Russia.”

Vasiliy Belozerov:

“If the political decision is made, it’s possible even now, undoubtedly, to establish a fully volunteer army in Russia.  But do we need this?  I suggest it will be correct and justified if the share of professional sergeants and contractees in the army will be raised gradually.  Since it’s unclear from where a quantity of 425 thousand professionals can be gotten all at once.  They won’t fall from the sky.  We have to remind ourselves that the contingent of both current conscripts and potential professionals is one and the same:  young men 18-28.  This means we have to  create such conditions that it’s not the lumpen who go into the army, but normal men.  And worthy people need worthy conditions.  And there’s one more figure:  based on world experience it’s possible to say that in a professional army in the year for various reasons (health, age, contract termination, etc.) 5 percent of personnel are dismissed.  This means that in a 425,000-man professional corps in a year we have to recruit an additional 20 thousand men.  They also need to be gotten from somewhere.”

Viktor Litovkin:

“As is well-known, the army should know only two states:  either fighting, or preparing for war.  For us, it is either reforming or preparing to reform.  Meanwhile, there’s still no clear presentation of ​​what kind of army we want and what government resources we are prepared to give for this army.”

“In Russia, there is no coherent policy on establishing new Armed Forces.  The fact is the Chief of the Genshtab says we made a monstrous mistake and the Federal Targeted Program for Forming Professional Units failed, therefore we’ll get rid of contractees.  A half year goes by, the very same Genshtab Chief comes to the podium with the words that the country, it turns out, again needs 425 thousand professionals.  Make the basic calculations:  for this number of soldiers we need to have 65 thousand professional junior commanders [NCOs].  And now in Ryazan we have 250 men studying to be sergeants, they’ll graduate next year.  Meanwhile, there’s no data that they’ve selected the next course.  Has anyone thought about this?  And one more thing.  When we say that we need the call-up to create a trained reserve, this is self-deception.  The reserves are so unprepared!  Suppose we trained a soldiers for a year to drive a tank.  What next?  Once or twice a week after work this mechanic-driver has to work on the trainer at the voyenkomat, and every six months — drive a real tank on the range.  Otherwise, in case of war, we get not a trained reserve, but several million 40-year-old guys with beer guts who’ve forgotten which end the machine gun fires from.”

Konstantin Makiyenko:

“In my opinion, the transition to a professional army in Russia is desirable, but absolutely impossible.  A contract army is actually substantially more expensive than a conscript one.  Another thing, our announced one-million-man [army], in my view, likely doesn’t number 800 thousand men.  We have to talk about yet another problem — the coexistence of conscripts from the Caucasus and other regions in the army. Everyone remembers the wild incident, when these guys laid out the word ‘Kavkaz’ using conscripts of other nationalities.  But, on the other hand, conscripts from Dagestan, Chechnya or Kabardino-Balkaria, as a rule, stand-out for the best physical preparation and desire to learn about weapons.  Once the idea was floated to have Caucasians serve in some units, and Russians in others.  At the last session of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council, it was announced that this won’t be.  It was decided to refrain from creating monoethnic military formations of the ‘wild division’ type from the Tsarist Army.  Contradictions between conscripts called up from the Caucasus and other regions of the country will be removed by introducing the institution of military clergy of the Islamic persuasion.”

More Appointments, Etc.

Medvedev’s 29 March decree.


  • Rear-Admiral Vasiliy Fedorovich Lyashok, Chief, Development Planning Directorate, Deputy Chief, Main Staff, Navy, relieved as Chief, Organizational-Planning Directorate, Deputy Chief, Main Staff, Navy.
  • Colonel of Medical Service Aleksey Eduardovich Nikitin, Chief, 2nd Directorate, Deputy Chief, Main Military-Medical Directorate, Defense Ministry.
  • General-Lieutenant Igor Nikolayevich Turchenyuk, Deputy Commander, Southern MD, relieved as Commander, 35th Army.
  • General-Major Sergey Vitalyevich Solomatin, Commander, 35th Army, relieved as Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, 36th Army.
  • General-Major Valeriy Yevgenyevich Sharagov, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, 36th Army, relieved as Deputy Commander, 2nd Army.


  • Rear-Admiral Viktor Nikolayevich Afanasyev, Chief of Armaments and Arms Servicing, Deputy Commander for Armaments and Arms Servicing, Black Sea Fleet.
  • General-Major Vladimir Grigoryevich Belyayev, Commander, 6991st Aviation Base (1st Rank).
  • Rear-Admiral Anatoliy Nikolayevich Minakov, Deputy Commander, Indoctrination Work, Northern Fleet.
  • Rear-Admiral Yuriy Stanislavovich Rebenok, Chief, Higher Special Officers’ Classes, Navy.

Relieved and Dismissed

President Medvedev’s 8 April Defense Ministry personnel decree.


  • Colonel Vitaliy Leonidovich Razgonov, Commander, 200th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, Western MD.
  • Captain First Rank Aleksandr Viktorovich Shemetov, Chief Navigator, Navy.

Relieve and dismiss from service:

  • General-Lieutenant Vadim Yuryevich Volkovitskiy, Chief of the Main Staff, First Deputy CINC, Air Forces.

Dismiss from service:

  • General-Major of Medical Service Sergey Anatolyevich Belyakin.
  • Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Anatolyevich Popov.
  • General-Lieutenant Yuriy Nikolayevich Tuchkov.