Category Archives: Force Modernization

Rosoboronpostavka Understaffed, Ineffective?

This author has written several times that Rosoboronpostavka – the Federal Agency for Supplies of Armaments, Military, Special Equipment and Material Resources – is supposed to be key to making the GOZ and GPV work.  It’s supposed to take responsibility for negotiating, contracting and taking deliveries out of the hands of military men, so they aren’t tempted by bribes and kickbacks from manufacturers, and can concentrate on the specific requirements for weapons and equipment that needs to be made and bought.

In mid-2010, erstwhile Putin ally Viktor Cherkesov (who once warned of infighting and corruption among high-ranking security service veterans) was unceremoniously booted from Rosoboronpostavka.  President Dmitriy Medvedev criticized the agency (and Cherkesov) for not accomplishing much, and he moved it under the Defense Ministry, declaring that it would become a reinvigorated part of the effort to rearm the Armed Forces during the next decade.

Nadezhda Sinikova

With great fanfare, Defense Minister Serdyukov’s confidant, Nadezhda Sinikova took over at Rosoboronpostavka.  This all fit pretty well with Serdyukov’s general intent – to establish strict control over the Defense Ministry’s “financial flows,” and to civilianize Defense Ministry functions that aren’t clearly military in nature.

It’s seemed that Sinikova’s Rosoboronpostavka has remained stillborn, much like it was prior to mid-2010.  At least, nothing was heard from or about it until a 3 March article in Rosbalt.ru.  Now we have to be wary — Cherkesov’s wife, Natalya Chaplina is Rosbalt’s General Director.  Be that as it may, the article seems pretty solid.

According to Rosbalt.ru, Rosstat published data on salaries in the federal executive organs, and experts were surprised the highest average paychecks — 135,000 rubles per month or more than 1.6 million rubles per year — are in Rosoboronpostavka, an organization not even really functioning.  The average 12-month federal salary is 728,000 rubles, about 60,000 per month.
 
Rosoboronpostavka is working only in a technical sense.  The different power ministries and departments haven’t hurried to hand over authority to conclude contracts for them, and they’ve tried to sabotage the agency’s work, according to Igor Korotchenko. 

Rosoboronpostavka’s supposed to have 1,100 professional employees, 980 in the Moscow headquarters.  A source close to Rosoboronpostavka claims that, prior to mid-2010, not more than 10 people worked for the agency, and it didn’t have its own office.  They worked in a room in Rosoboroneksport on Moscow’s Ozerkovskiy Embankment. 

The Rosstat data says Rosoboronpostavka has the lowest staffing level of any executive structure, only 15.5 percent or 152 people against an authorized level of 980.
 
Before the mid-2010 changes, Rosoboronpostavka salaries had been 50-70,000 per month; the director got 70,000 and he reported to Prime Minister Putin.  Now, with its status downgraded and reporting to the Defense Minister, the agency’s pay has increased several times.
 
Experts think the pay’s kept high because the country’s leadership wants to deter corruption in the state defense order (GOZ), but deputy editor-in-chief  the journal “Armaments and Economics,” Professor Sergey Vikulov says this high pay comes “from the naive belief of our leaders that high pay will deter bureaucrats from bribery.” 

One notes Vikulov’s journal is the professional publication of the 46th TsNII, not exactly an objective voice since it used to form the GOZ (and probably collect the bribes) pretty autonomously before Rosoboronpostavka was established.
 
Korotchenko believes even bureaucrats who earn millions will be tempted to “saw off” part of the billion-ruble contracts they oversee.  He goes on to say  corruption in the Defense Ministry directorates occupied with the GOZ and the OPK already caused the failure of the two previous state programs of armaments (GPVs).
 
Rosbalt.ru also claims the Audit Chamber has said GOZ-2009 was only 50 percent completed.  Then it cites NG‘s (Mukhin’s) 70 percent fulfillment figure for GOZ-2010.

Although one expert hopes higher pay at the agency is tied to greater productivity in processing contracts, a Rosbalt.ru source says as before only a small number of contracts are being completed.  The expert is just about ready to give up searching for a logical explanation for the lack of elementary order in Russia’s management structures. 

But Korotchenko thinks it might be early to judge Rosoboronpostavka, since it’s still establishing itself.  Perhaps at the end of this year or the beginning of next, it will take over all power ministry arms and equipment procurement contracting, he says.

PAK FA Engine Update

Saturday ITAR-TASS printed an interesting update on the PAK FA engine story.  It doesn’t really clarify anything (actually quite the opposite), but it’s part of the story. 

Recall last spring the engine designers were saying developing a “second phase” engine for PAK-FA could take another 5-6 years, while Sukhoy was saying it might be 10-12 years.  In what follows below, the engines aren’t specifically identified as “second phase,” but they are called “seriously distinct from the 117S.”

General Designer of the A. M. Lyulka Scientific-Technical Center (a Moscow subsidiary of NPO Saturn) Yevgeniy Marchukov claims the construction of an engine for the fifth generation fighter is going successfully, and it will go into serial production. 

The second experimental T-50 reportedly took off with this engine on 3 March.

Marchukov said:

“The engines in the experimental prototypes of the future Russian fifth generation fighter are seriously distinct from the 117S engines intended for Su-35 aircraft, both in their parameters and in their fundamentally new automated control system.  The T-50 aircraft with NPO Saturn engines fully corresponds to the tactical-technical requirements for the aircraft.  And with these engines produced serially, the PAK FA will be supplied for the needs of the Russian Air Forces.”

For his part, Saturn managing director Ilya Fedorov noted that the enterprise “supported the takeoff of the aircraft in the necessary time,” just as it was ready for flight.

ITAR-TASS goes on to add that special stand tests and service life tests on the engine continue at the Lytkarinskiy Machinebuilding Plant (another Saturn subsidiary).  Ground development is being conducted on the T-50-KNS model with aircraft systems from OKB Sukhoy at the Gromov Flight Test Institute.  Flight tests are also ongoing.  T-50-1 has more than 40 flights, the T-50-2 two flights, and the Su-27 flying laboratory has 32 flights.

Ground Troops and the GOZ

Buk-M2 (SA-17 / Grizzly)

Discussions of service wish-lists for State Armaments Program (GPV) 2011-2020 have tended to overlook the Ground Troops.  It seems they don’t enjoy the same priority as other services.

But in late February and early March, there was a flurry of press detailing what the land forces intend to procure, at least in the short term. 

Arms-expo.ru, Lenta.ru, and other media outlets put out brief items on Ground Troops’ acquisition.  They indicated the Ground Troops will emphasize air defense, command and control, fire support, and BTRs and support vehicles.

But the best run-down of all came from Ground Troops CINC General-Colonel Aleksandr Postnikov himself in Krasnaya zvezda.

Postnikov told the Defense Ministry daily that the main feature of GOZ-2011 is the transition from the repair and modernization of existing systems to the purchase of new, modern ones to reequip Ground Troops formations and units completely.

First and foremost, according to the CINC, the Ground Troops will buy modern digital communications equipment and tactical-level automated command and control systems (ASU), like Polyana-D4M1 for air defense brigades.  He said Ground Troops’ Air Defense will also receive modernized S-300V4 systems, Buk-M2 and Buk-M3, short-range Tor-M2U(M) SAMs, and manportable Igla-S and Verba SAMs.

Postnikov says they will continue equipping missile and artillery brigades with the Iskander-M, new MLRS, self-propelled Khosta and Nona-SVK guns, Khrisantema-S antitank missiles and Sprut-SD antitank guns.

The Ground Troops CINC says he foresees purchases of a new modification of the BTR-82A, BREM-K armored recovery vehicles built on a BTR-80 base and BREM-L on a BMP-3 base, Iveco, Tigr, and Volk armored vehicles, and new KamAZ trucks from the Mustang series.

NBC defense (RKhBZ) troops will get the heavy flamethrower system TOS-1A, RPO PDM-A thermobaric missiles with increased range and power, and VKR airborne radiological reconnaissance systems.  Engineering units will get the newest water purification system on a KamAZ chassis (SKO-10/5).

In the longer term, Postnikov sees rearmament as one of his main tasks, and he repeated President Medvedev’s statement that the Ground Troops should have 30 percent modern equipment by 2015, and 70 percent by 2020.  He laid special stress on getting YeSU TZ into the troops.  Postnikov’s Glavkomat has a Concept for the Development of the Ground Troops Armament System to 2025 emphasizing standardization, multi-functionality, modular construction, and electronic compatibility across several general areas:  armor and military vehicles, tube artillery and MLRS, SSMs, antitank systems, air defense, reconnaissance-information support, UAVs, communications, automated command and control, and soldier and close combat systems.

Second PAK FA Prototype Flies

Novyye izvestiya has 1TV’s video coverage and story on the flight.

Pilot.strizhi.info posted these photos, along with links to the high resolution originals from Sukhoy.org.

Second PAK FA Takes Off

Landing

PAK FA Chutes Deployed

Nikolskiy on GOZ-2010 Failures

On Tuesday, Vedomosti’s Aleksey Nikolskiy wrote about breakdowns in last year’s State Defense Order (GOZ).  He notes that concern about failures started with Roskosmos, but it isn’t limited to that part of the defense sector.

Nikolskiy recounts Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov’s session with the Roskosmos collegium.  The space industry only produced five of 11 satellites specified in GOZ-2010, and 6 civilian launches were postponed.  The three GLONASS satellites lost to a “childish mistake” [in filling the rocket’s tanks] cost 2.5 billion rubles.  But we’ll return to Russia’s space woes another day. 

A Defense Ministry source tells Nikolskiy GOZ failures are constant. 

Bulava SLBM delays kept Yuriy Dolgorukiy from entering service [remember the new SSBN itself had to return to Sevmash for work while it awaits the next Bulava test].  Introduction of the new Severodvinsk SSN has been put off until much later because of construction defects.  A United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) source tells Nikolskiy the Defense Ministry has stopped financing completion of a proyekt 677 diesel-electric sub, and work on two others laid down at Admiralty Wharves is in question.

Nikolskiy says the Air Forces’ assimilation of Yak-130 trainers is delayed by last March’s crash.  And there’s a serious delay in the testing of the Su-35 fighter, according to a Defense Ministry officer [Sukhoy was reportedly testing two Su-35s last August].  One enterprise manager claims reforms in the Defense Ministry purchasing system are holding back contracting for aircraft deliveries this year. 

CAST’s Konstantin Makiyenko says government and Defense Ministry criticism of industry for its GOZ failures could be followed by personnel changes.  In Roskosmos’ case, the situation is almost “overripe.”  But Makiyenko defends other Russian arms producers by noting that delivery delays are common even for U.S. and European manufacturers.

The Defense Sector’s Systemic Failure

In today’s Nezavisimaya gazeta, Vladimir Mukhin concludes the OPK’s “systemic failure” has left the military without new weapons.  His article also says a lot about the base upon which the Kremlin intends to build a modernized economy.  But perhaps the OPK is in worse shape than other sectors . . .

Defense Minister Serdyukov apparently sent President Medvedev a report explaining why some very important armaments and military equipment were not delivered in 2010.

According to Boris Nakonechnyy, Deputy Chief of the Directorate of State Defense Order Formation in the Defense Ministry’s Armaments Department, Serdyukov proposes that the Supreme CINC use “measures of administrative effect against enterprise directors who have violated the timeframe for fulfilling the Gosoboronzakaz.”  He doesn’t say if this means fines, arrest, etc.  Specifically, Nakonechnyy said, in 2010, a proyekt 20380 corvette, two proyekt 955 submarines, one proyekt 885 submarine, 3 of 9 planned Yak-130 trainers, and 73 of 151 expected BMP-3s  were not delivered.

Mukhin calls this an obvious failure, and estimates at least 30 percent of the 2010 GOZ wasn’t realized.  He contrasts this with President Medvedev’s Poslaniye, in which he said he was sure defense expenditures in the 2011-2013 budgets would allow the Armed Forces to buy the new armaments they need.

Speaking to defense enterprise directors in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Nakonechnyy said the cause of failure in the Gosoboronzakaz is poorly organized work by enterprises and designers:

“Signing contracts . . .  an enterprise director assumes quite serious obligations.  And, signing such a state contract, he is correspondingly bound to meet these obligations.”

But, he says, in a number of OPK enterprises, this isn’t happening.

Mukhin turns to the directors’ side of the story.

Military plant directors in the Urals unanimously announced that “contracts are concluded in such a way that we will always be in extremis.”  They say they’ve made proposals about contracts, but none of them are considered.  They also point to the Defense Ministry’s significant indebtedness to enterprises for completed work.  This supposedly amounts to 228 million rubles in the Urals.  Most of all, managers worry about uncertainty in this year’s GOZ, and about the Defense Ministry’s intention to pay 2009 prices this year.

The head of the Sverdlovsk producers’ group says:

“To this point, there are no agreements, no money.  All this pushes us toward emergency work in the future.  The pricing policy is driving us into a corner.”

Another general director complains of low profitability in the OPK.  Only 6-7 percent, according to him.  The Defense Ministry is allowing growth in materials costs of not more than 1 percent this year, and this will erode profitability further.

Military analyst Vladimir Dvorkin says a third of defense enterprises are really bankrupt.  Investment in R&D is ten times lower than in developed countries.  Investment in basic capital and personnel training is five times lower.  He continues:

“Fixed capital assets at OPK enterprises are two-three times, and labor productivity five-ten times lower than in developed countries.  More than 70% of technologies supporting production demands are worn-out or obsolete.  More than half the machine tool inventory is 100% worn-out.  The average age of OPK workers is more than 50, in defense NII [scientific-research institutes] it approaches 60.”

Dvorkin thinks the Armed Forces can’t be brought to the level of the world’s leading armies without extraordinary efforts.  Priorities need to be set for the armaments development system in order to concentrate efforts on a limited list of systems.

Mukhin thinks it might be too late since Medvedev’s already signed GPV 2011-2020.  But whether its priorities will be met is another thing.  So far in post-Soviet history, not one GPV has been fulfilled, Russia’s defense industry continues to decline, and global restructuring in military production still hasn’t been noticed in Russia.

Corruption and the GPV

This morning’s press included various accounts of statements from Igor Korotchenko or in the name of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council, on which Korotchenko serves, about mitigating the impact of corruption on the State Program of Armaments (GPV), 2011-2020.

RIA Novosti quoted Korotchenko to the effect that the rearmament program will only be successful with strict financial accounting and effective measures against corruption in the State Defense Order (GOZ or гособоронзаказ).

He said Defense Minister Serdyukov is taking steps to ensure that resources are used as intended, including the establishment of a Military Products Price Formation Department and the resubordination of the Federal Arms, Military, Special Equipment and Material Resources Supply Agency (Rosoboronpostavka) to the Defense Ministry.  But the latter step was done over six months ago, and not much has been heard about it since.

Novyye izvestiya and Novyy region quoted the Public Council’s statement:

“But for the army to receive all this [equipment in the GPV], money is simply not enough – it’s necessary to make things so that Defense Ministry generals, who to this point were occupied simultaneously with orders and purchases of weapons, don’t get access to money, are occupied only with formulating lists of everything needed for the conduct of modern war, but the function of monitoring prices and purchases should be transferred to other departments.  Otherwise, government resources allocated to the GPV will get ‘sawed off,’ placing this program in jeopardy.”

Those are, of course, the jobs of the new Price Formation Department and Rosoboronpostavka.  Serdyukov’s tax service veterans are supposed to free the payments system from graft, and use their experience to uncover complex theft schemes.  Military prosecutors are also expected to be more active here.  Main Military Prosecutor (GVP) Sergey Fridinskiy told Novyy region about prosecutors’ work in uncovering the theft of 6.5 billion rubles’ worth of military budget.  He claimed his prosecutors have stopped 240,000 violations, suspended 12,000 illegal actions, held 40,000 people to account, and returned 4 billion rubles to the treasury.  But it’s not clear what time period he’s talking about.

RIA Novosti recounted Korotchenko’s comments about preventing corruption in military RDT&E:

“Special control needs to be provided on scientific-research work and justification of expenditures on it, but also on the development of new types of armaments, since it’s precisely here that opportunities for different types of financial machinations and abuse exist.”

Of course, reminds RIA Novosti, RDT&E only amounts to 10 percent of the GPV.  Bigger chances for theft exist in procurement, which is supposed to be 78-80 percent of the rearmament plan.

According to Novyye izvestiya, on the procurement side, Korotchenko says, in past years, a minimum of 45-50 percent of money for arms simply ended up in someone’s pocket.  For this reason:

“For the very same money, Russia buys 14 tanks a year, and India 100.  This led the country’s leadership to the kind of thinking reflected in the Defense Minister’s authority to reorganize the entire purchasing scheme.  This time [the new GPV] 19 trillion rubles are at stake.  Can you imagine with what interest the ‘market players’ are waiting for them?  But the state machinery is running: many OPK directors are already being removed, in the case of the director of one of the system-forming design bureaus, suspected of stealing money from a state order through offshore shell companies, an investigation is being conducted, and other criminal cases in orders-purchases from previous years are also possible.”

The nongovernmental National Anticorruption Committee says the average kickback in civilian contracting is 30 percent, but, in defense, it’s 60 to 70 percent.  Because arms prices are secret [and hard to determine anyway], no one knows how much this is.  But common sense says this makes everything cost nearly twice what it should.

Popovkin Details the GPV

Yesterday First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin gave RIA Novosti more details on Russia’s procurement plans under the State Program of Armaments (GPV), 2011-2020.  He said 78-80 percent of the 19-trillion-ruble Armed Forces portion of the GPV will go to procurement.   

Popovkin said Russia plans to develop a new liquid-fueled heavy ICBM to carry up to ten warheads, and having a service life of up to 35 years.  Former RVSN Commander General-Lieutenant Andrey Shvaychenko talked about a new liquid heavy as far back as late 2009, and the issue’s been debated in the Russian military press since. 

Popovkin said the Defense Ministry plans to accept the Bulava SLBM and the first two Borey-class SSBNs this year.  There will be 4-5 Bulava launches this year.  Recall to date only 7 of 14 Bulava tests have been successful.  Addressing the missile’s past failures, Popovkin said there were many deviations from the design documentation during production.  He also said Russia plans to build eight SSBNs to carry Bulava by 2020.  He was unclear if this includes the first two Borey-class boats.

Popovkin said work on a new strategic bomber is ongoing, and he claimed a technical design will be complete in 2015.  He said this work isn’t being rushed.

Popovkin told RIA Novosti  the Air Forces will receive more than 600 new aircraft and 1,000 new helicopters by 2020.  In 2011, Su-27SM, Su-30M2, Su-35S, Yak-130, and Su-34 aircraft are to be procured.  More than 100 helicopters, including Mi-26 transports and Mi-28N and Ka-52 combat helicopters will be acquired this year, according to Popovkin. 

Popovkin said a contract for the first ten experimental PAK FA (T-50) aircraft will be signed in 2013, with serial production of 60 aircraft beginning in 2016.

The GPV includes the purchase of ten S-500 air defense systems.  Popovkin said this system will begin testing in 2015, initially with missiles from the S-400.  Fifty-six S-400 units will also be purchased by 2020.  This sounds like seven 8-launcher battalions.   

Popovkin said the GPV will buy 100 ships – including 20 submarines, 35 corvettes, and 15 frigates – for the Navy.  He didn’t specify types for the other 30 ships, and it’s unclear if new SSBNs are included in these numbers.  Popovkin reconfirmed Russia’s plan to buy two and build two Mistral amphibious ships.  Recall also the Black Sea Fleet alone is supposed to get 18 new ships including proyekt 636 diesel-electric submarines, proyekt 11356 and 22350 frigates, and proyekt 11711 LSTs.

Popovkin also mentioned plans to buy a limited number of French FELIN soldier systems, with the intent of Russia producing its own version by 2020.  He looks for it to equal the advertised capabilities of U.S. and German equivalents.

Mi-28N Crash

Mi-28N Night Hunter

Russia’s Mi-28N Night Hunter helicopters are grounded pending completion of the investigation into Tuesday’s crash in which the pilot died and his co-pilot was hurt.  The Mi-28N belonged to the Budennovsk-based 487th Helicopter Regiment in the Southern MD.

Unnamed sources tell RIA Novosti investigators attribute the crash to engine failure caused by metal shavings in the engines or gear box.  But one experienced test pilot told Vzglyad.ru that shavings usually don’t cause a sudden loss of control or engine failure.

Over the last year, problems with the Mi-28N’s gear box, flight controls, and tactical performance have been reported in the media. 

In January, Izvestiya’s Dmitriy Litovkin visited the flight training center in Torzhok to look at the Mi-28N.  He discussed the June 2009 crash of an Mi-28N at the Gorokhovets training range with the center’s chief, Colonel Andrey Popov.  Litovkin said people believe that crash occurred when powder gases from a rocket firing got in the helicopter’s engines.  Here’s a video.  Popov acknowledged the Mi-28N’s growing pains, and said the manufacturer is constantly modifying the aircraft.

This certainly sounds like production problems to these nonexpert ears.  There’s still a struggle between those who back the Mi-28N and others who favor the Ka-52 as Russia’s primary attack helicopter.  With stronger state support, the Night Hunter has been winning the battle, but this accident might hurt its case.  Meanwhile, a second Mi-28N squadron is supposed to be established at Budennovsk this year.

A Second Regimental Set of S-400s

Russian news outlets reported yesterday that two new S-400 SAM battalions (a “regimental set”) will soon go on duty in the 210th Air Defense Missile Regiment at Dmitrov north of Moscow. They will join the first two battalions fielded at Elektrostal east of Moscow in 2007 and 2008.

In early 2010, Air Forces CINC, General-Colonel Aleksandr Zelin talked about getting up to 5-6 battalions last year, but this didn’t happen. Zelin has also said 18 S-400 battalions will be in service by 2015.

The factory handover of the two new battalions began Wednesday at Kapustin Yar. The acceptance process included various test firings yesterday with OSK VKO Commander, General-Lieutenant Valeriy Ivanov and Air Defense Missile Troops Commander, General-Major Sergey Popov in attendance.

Lenta.ua quoted Ivanov saying 3-4 S-400 regiments will defend Moscow by 2020, with most going on duty in 2016-2020. He told Interfaks:

“If earlier we accepted it (the S-400 SAM) in separate units of equipment by battalion, by launcher, then today for the first time everything is being received fully – as a regiment.”

One supposes these regiments will only have two S-400 launch battalions then.

Lots has swirled around the inability to get S-400s in the field.

General Director Igor Ashurbeyli was dismissed from Almaz-Antey early this month. There’s been the talk of the government financing two new plants to speed the process of building the S-400.

Last May, Viktor Litovkin was reporting that the VVS would receive six S-400 battalions in 2011. He also said the Defense Ministry would not order more after that.

Ashurbeyli said last April the Defense Ministry was not signing contracts for S-400 production in 2012.